Armento v. Asheville Buncombe Community Christian Ministry, Inc.

Filing 23

ORDER denying 4 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Martin Reidinger on 09/01/17. (emw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:17-cv-00150-MR-DLH

GREGORY ARMENTO,

)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs.
)
)
ASHEVILLE BUNCOMBE
)
COMMUNITY CHRISTIAN
)
MINISTRY, INC.,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the Plaintiff’s Motion for
Injunctive Relief [Doc. 4].
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 12, 2017, the Plaintiff Gregory Armento initiated this action

against the Defendant Asheville Buncombe Community Christian Ministry,
Inc. (“ABCCM”), asserting claims for various violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act; retaliation and
wrongful termination; “duress, undue influence, and illegal contracts”;
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1983 and 1985 for violations of his rights under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1]. Along with his
Complaint, the Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Injunctive Relief. [Doc.
4]. On August 14, 2017, ABCCM filed its Answer and a Response to the
Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief. [Docs. 18, 19].
Having been fully briefed, this matter is now ripe for disposition.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that (1)

he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
absent injunctive relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4)
the injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

“A preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Id. at 24. Thus, in each
case the Court “must balance the competing claims of injury and must
consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the
requested relief.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542
(1987). Ultimately, a plaintiff’s entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief is a
matter of discretion with the Court. See Metropolitan Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc. v.
American Home Realty Network, Inc., 722 F.3d 591, 595 (4th Cir. 2013).

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IV.

ANALYSIS
The Plaintiff currently resides at the Veterans Restoration Quarters

(“VRQ”), a homeless shelter for veterans owned and operated by ABCCM.
[Doc. 1 at ¶ 7]. As a condition of residing at the VRQ, the Plaintiff is required
to work a number of “service hours” contributing to the operation of the
facility. [Id. at ¶ 17]. In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that he was employed
on a part-time basis by ABCCM to serve as the Front Desk Manager of the
VRQ. [Id. at 18]. The Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to unpaid wages and
overtime compensation as a result of work performed both as “service hours”
and in his capacity as a part-time employee. [Id. at ¶¶ 17, 19].
In his Motion for Injunctive Relief, the Plaintiff asks the Court to order
ABCCM to continue housing him at the VRQ and to bar ABCCM from
expelling him. [Doc. 4 at 1]. For the following reasons, the Plaintiff’s motion
must be denied.
In this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid wages and overtime
compensation under the FLSA, and he asserts claims for retaliation (i.e.,
wrongful termination of employment) and intentional infliction of emotional
distress related to the nonpayment of wages. [See Doc. 1]. Through his
preliminary injunction motion, however, the Plaintiff asks the Court to require

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ABCCM to continuing housing him at the VRQ. The Plaintiff has presented
no evidence showing that his entitlement to reside at the VRQ is in any way
related to the claims he asserts in this lawsuit, which are claims for monetary
damages arising from the Defendants’ alleged failure to pay the Plaintiff
proper wages. A preliminary injunction cannot issue for matters “lying wholly
outside the issues in the suit.” De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325
U.S. 212, 220 (1945). As the Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is not
sufficiently related to the claims asserted in this lawsuit, his motion must be
denied.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Plaintiff’s motion for
a preliminary injunction were sufficiently related to the claims asserted in this
action, the Court would still deny the requested relief. First, the Plaintiff will
not suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is denied. As set forth in
Plaintiff’s Complaint, ABCCM is a provider of supportive housing1 to

“Supportive housing” is defined as housing supportive services provided for homeless
veterans that:
1

(1) Is not shelter care, other emergent housing, or housing
designed to be permanent or long term (more than 24
months), with no requirement to move; and
(2) Is designed to either:
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homeless veterans. [Doc. 1 at ¶ 14]. ABCCM receives grant money from
the U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs through a grant per diem program
to cover the cost of housing homeless veterans. [Affidavit of Tim McElyea
(“McElyea Aff.”), Doc. 19-1 at ¶ 3]. The evidence before the Court shows
that homeless veterans participating in the grant per diem program are
ordinarily entitled to only 24 months of funding. [Id. at ¶ 4]. At the conclusion
of the 24-month period, the veteran is expected to have obtained
employment and to be able to transition to permanent housing. [Id.].
The Affidavit of Tim McElyea, which was submitted by the Defendant
in support of its response to the Plaintiff’s motion, establishes that the Plaintiff
began receiving assistance under the grant per diem program on September
5, 2015. [Id. at ¶ 7]. Thus it is undisputed that the Plaintiff will no longer be
eligible to receive grant per diem funds on September 5, 2017.2 [Id.]. Thus,

(i) Facilitate the movement of homeless veterans to
permanent housing within a period that is not less than 90
days and does not exceed 24 months, subject to § 61.80; or
(ii) Provide specific medical treatment such as detoxification,
respite, or hospice treatments that are used as step-up or
step-down programs within that specific project's continuum.
38 C.F.R. § 61.1. A homeless veteran may remain in supportive housing for a period
longer than 24 months, “if permanent housing for the veteran has not been located or if
the veteran requires additional time to prepare for independent living.” 38 C.F.R. § 61.80.
2

The Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to indicate that he is entitled to any
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requiring ABCCM to continue to house the Plaintiff beyond September 5,
2017, is simply not a benefit to which the Plaintiff is entitled.
Moreover, if ABCCM were required to continue to house the Plaintiff
beyond September 5, 2017, it would cause substantial harm to ABCCM, as
it would be forced to utilize private resources to cover the cost of the
Plaintiff’s living expenses. [Id. at ¶ 10]. ABCCM also would have to deny
benefits to another veteran, and there are at least 34 homeless veterans in
Western North Carolina on the waiting list for the VRQ. [Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10].
Given the likelihood of substantial harm to ABCCM and to the local
community of homeless veterans, the Court finds that the balance of equities
tips in favor of not granting the requested relief and that granting the
requested relief would not serve the public interest.3
For all of these reasons, the Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction is denied.

extension of the 24-month time period. It should be noted, however, that ABCCM intends
to provide the Plaintiff with transitional case management for up to 18 months after
September 5, 2017 and has offered to provide furniture, food, boxes, clothing, bus
passes, and other supportive assistance to the Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶ 8].
3

In light of these findings, the Court need not address whether the Plaintiff is likely to
succeed on the merits of his claims. Therefore, the Court does not express any opinion
regarding the likelihood of the Plaintiff’s success on the merits.
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ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 4] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: September 1, 2017

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