Womack et al v. Owens et al

Filing 3

ORDER DISMISSING CASE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Granting 2 MOTION to Proceed in forma pauperis. Signed by District Judge Martin Reidinger on 07/19/17. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.) (emw)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:17-cv-00173-MR-DLH

CARL WOMACK and
RUTH WOMACK,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STEVE OWENS, JOHN CARROLL,
)
and ADENA WIDENER,
)
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Defendants.
)
________________________________ )

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff Carl Womack’s
Application to Proceed without Prepayment of Fees or Costs [Doc. 2].
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs, Carl Womack and his mother, Ruth Womack, bring this

action against Steve Owens, the Rutherford County Clerk of Court; John
Carroll, Director of the Rutherford County Department of Social Services;
and Adena Widener, a social worker with the Rutherford County Department
of Social Services, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other
federal civil rights statutes for injuries resulting from a state court proceeding
in which Ruth Womack was declared incompetent and placed in protective
custody with the Department of Social Services. The Complaint, which

appears to be drafted solely by Carl Womack, asserts eleven separate
causes of action against the Defendants. In Counts 1 and 2, the Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendants “being friends,” purportedly conspired to deny
Ruth Womack’s “right to a trial by jury and to appeal a court ruling” due to
her age. [Doc. 1 at 5]. In Counts 3 and 6, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants conspired to deprive Carl Womack of his civil rights “based on
[his] social class, by making up lies [about him], to keep [him] from seeing
[his] mother.” [Id. at 14]. In Counts 4 and 10, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants “conspired to deny Ruth Womack her right to an adequate
defense by keeping her from getting money from her bank account.” [Id. at
14, 16]. In Count 5, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Carroll “discriminated
against Ruth Womack due to her age [and] made up lies [about] her to get
her ruled incompetent.” [Id.]. In Counts 7 and 8, the Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant Owens intimidated and retaliated against Carl Womack for
making a report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation about the alleged
misconduct of the Defendants during the competency proceeding. [Id. at 1415].

In Count 9, the Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Owens committed

prosecutorial misconduct by admitting false testimony at the competency
hearing and by allowing the admission of evidence that was not provided in

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discovery. [Id. at 15-16]. Finally, in Count 11, the Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendants were negligent in failing to prevent the conspiracy to deprive
Ruth Womack of her civil rights and allowed false testimony to be presented
at her competency hearing. [Id. at 16-17].
As their request for relief, the Plaintiffs seek the dismissal of the state
actions against them1 or, in the alternative, $7,000,000. [Id. at 7].
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. United States

ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2009). “Thus, when
a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action, the action must
be dismissed.” Id. The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that
may be raised at any time. See Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc.,
519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008). “If the court determines at any time that
it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1

It is unclear from the Complaint the nature of the state court proceeding pending against
Carl Womack.
3

III.

DISCUSSION
In this action, the Plaintiffs appear to challenge the outcome of a

competency proceeding in a North Carolina state court. Under the RookerFeldman doctrine, however, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider
the Plaintiffs’ claims.
The United States Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from state-court judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). As a corollary to this rule, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits “a party losing in state court . . . from
seeking what in substance would be an appellate review of the state
judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim
that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v.
De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
bars lower federal courts from considering not only issues raised and
decided in state courts, but also issues that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
the issues that are before the state court.” Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d
274, 279 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486). As the Fourth
Circuit has explained, “if the state-court loser seeks redress in the federal

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district court for the injury caused by the state-court decision, his federal
claim is, by definition, ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state-court decision,
and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of the federal district court.” Davani
v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Supreme Court has cautioned that Rooker-Feldman is a “narrow
doctrine” which “is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine
acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005). Accordingly, pursuant to Exxon, the Court must examine
“whether the state-court loser who files suit in federal district court seeks
redress for an injury caused by the state-court decision itself. If he is not
challenging the state-court decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
apply.” Davani, 434 F.3d at 718 (footnote omitted); Moore v. Idealease of
Wilmington, 465 F.Supp.2d 484, 490 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
In the present case, the Plaintiffs challenge the actions of three state
actors in the course of a proceeding to determine the competency of Plaintiff
Ruth Womack, and they seek as relief the dismissal of that action. Because

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the Plaintiffs do not allege any injury independent of what flows from the
result of this state-court action, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs’
Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. If the Plaintiffs wish to challenge the
validity of the state court’s order, they must do so in the North Carolina state
courts.2
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Application to
Proceed without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit [Doc. 2] is hereby
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. 1] is
DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: July 19, 2017

2

As further grounds for dismissal of this action, the Court notes that it appears from the
allegations of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint that a North Carolina state court has declared
Plaintiff Ruth Womack incompetent. Thus, she is incapable of asserting any claims on
her own behalf. Additionally, as a pro se litigant, Carl Womack cannot represent the
interests of his mother in this action.
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