Adkins v. Martin et al

Filing 18

ORDER: The 17 Amended Complaint survives initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Clerk is directed to commence the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Rule 4.3 for Defendant Martin who is a current or former employee of NC DPS. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 5/28/2018. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.) (maf)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:17-cv-343-FDW
DARRYL BOYD ADKINS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
FNU MARTIN, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,
(Doc. No. 17). Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. See (Doc. No. 12).
I.

BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Darryl Body Adkins has filed a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 with regards to an incident that allegedly occurred at the Marion Correctional Institution
where he is still incarcerated. The Complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and he was given the opportunity to file an Amended Complaint,
which is presently before the Court on initial review. See (Doc. No. 16).
Plaintiff names as the sole Defendant Officer Martin in her individual capacity.1 Construing
the Amended Complaint liberally and accepting the allegations as true, Defendant Martin came to
escort Plaintiff from the recreation cell back to his own cell on October 6, 2017. Plaintiff told
Defendant Martin that he had been asking her for the television remote control ever since she put

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Plaintiff refers to other individuals in the body of the Amended Complaint, but clearly identifies Martin as
the sole Defendant against whom he is proceeding. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (“In the complaint the title of the
action shall include the names of all of the parties); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2005) (“to make
someone a party the plaintiff must specify him in the caption and arrange for service of process”).

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him in the recreation cell. She responded that she had been busy and forgot. Defendant Martin
cuffed Plaintiff’s hands in front of his body, removed him from the cell, and began escorting him
while gripping his arm tightly. Plaintiff told Defendant Martin she was grabbing him too tightly
and to loosen her grip. She did not say anything and gripped his arm tighter. Plaintiff stopped
walking, looked Defendant Martin in the eyes, and said she is grabbing him too hard and to loosen
up. They started arguing. Plaintiff was about to continue walking when Defendant Martin shoved
him by the arm and pushed him against the wall. Defendant Martin said “don’t think ‘cause she a
old white lady cause she can still get in it and beat my ass [meaning she can fight].” (Doc. No. 17
at 5). Plaintiff, who was was still pinned to the wall, started laughing. Defendant Martin pulled
him off the wall, walked him to his cell, and called on her walkie talkie for the control booth to
open Plaintiff’s cell door. Defendant Martin was still gripping Plaintiff’s arm tightly and Plaintiff
was still laughing at her.
When the cell door opened, Plaintiff “yanked” his arm from Defendant Martin’s tight
grasp. (Doc. No. 17 at 6). Defendant Martin let go of his arm and Plaintiff walked into his cell.
When he was all the way into his cell towards the bed, still handcuffed, he turned around to see
Defendant Martin standing outside the cell door fumbling with her pepper spray holster. She
pointed the pepper spray can at Plaintiff so he turned his head and closed his eyes. He felt the
chemicals hitting his hair, right jaw, and right ear. He did nothing aggressive towards Martin and
felt his life was in danger from this excessive use of force that was unconstitutional and violated
prison policy. No other officers was present at the time of Defendant Martin’s use of force. (Doc.
No. 17 at 6).
Plaintiff was partially blind and tried to remove the pepper spray from his face yet it spread
to his eyes. Plaintiff rushed towards Martin outside the cell and punched her face. She tumbled
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backwards and fell, then Plaintiff jumped on top of her and punched her a few more times. A Code4 was called on the intercom. Plaintiff got up off Defendant Martin and backed into his cell to
await the first responder officers. Plaintiff told the officers that Defendant Martin pepper sprayed
him for no reason and that he acted in self-defense to prevent further harm because he felt his life
was in danger. Plaintiff felt officers piling on top of him to bring him down to the floor. They
cuffed and shackled him then roughly snatched him off the floor to escort him to lockup in E-unit
for detox in the showers. Defendant Martin denied Plaintiff’s version of events so he asked to look
at the surveillance video footage. Defendant has denied Plaintiff’s version of events so he has
asked for an investigation and review of the video footage.
Petitioner was having a hard time breathing because of asthma and had a “slight” reaction
due to the pepper spray which “almost” caused an asthma attack. (Doc. No. 17 at 8). The spray
caused facial swelling and a nurse checkup that came back with no positive vital or blood pressure
signs.
Plaintiff seeks Defendant Martin’s permanent reassignment to another prison, damages,
costs and fees, and discovery including video camera surveillance footage of the incident.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the
Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In its frivolity
review, a court must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory
or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure
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to state a claim “unless ‘after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as
true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor, it
appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him
to relief.’” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)).
A pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); see also Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Liberal construction of the
pleadings is particularly appropriate where … there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights
issues.”). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore
a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under
federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). A pro se complaint must
still contain sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007);
see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (the Twombly plausibility standard applies to all federal
civil complaints including those filed under § 1983). This “plausibility standard requires a plaintiff
to demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Francis v.
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). He must
articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate he has stated a claim entitling him to relief.
Id.
III.

DISCUSSION

“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is
confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment,” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 31 (1993). In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” the Eighth Amendment places
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restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against
prisoners. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 1 (1992).
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met.
First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious,” Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 298 (1991); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5, and must result in the denial of “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The second
requirement is that a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson, 501
U.S. at 297, 302-03; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5, 8. “[T]he use of excessive physical force against a
prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer
serious injury.” Hudson, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992); see Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 34 (2010). The
“core judicial inquiry,” is not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather
“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. “When prison officials maliciously and
sadistically use force to cause harm,” the Court recognized, “contemporary standards of decency
always are violated ... whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth
Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting
less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 13–14.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Martin pepper sprayed his face while he was handcuffed,
not resisting, and posed no threat to her. These allegations state a facially sufficient claim for the
use of excessive force.
Therefore, the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim will be permitted to proceed
against Defendant Martin.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Amended Complaint is sufficient to proceed against
Defendant Martin.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1. The Amended Complaint, (Doc. No. 17), survives initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915.
2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Clerk is directed to commence the
procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Rule 4.3 for Defendant Martin
who is a current or former employee of NC DPS.

Signed: May 28, 2018

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