Hall v. Pruitt et al

Filing 11

ORDER that 9 Amended Complaint, survives initial review on Pltf's claim of excessive force/failure to intervene against Defts Pruitt, Brigth, and Kalinowski; remaining claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 915(e)(2)(B)(ii); and Clerk directed to commence procedure for waiver of service as set forth in LR 4.3 for Defts Pruitt, Brigth, and Kalinowski who are current or former employees of NC DPS. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 5/28/2018. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(ejb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:18-cv-44-FDW
ADAM WADE HALL,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
FNU PRUITT, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,
(Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. See (Doc. No. 6).
I.

BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff has filed a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with regards to an
incident that allegedly occurred at the Marion Correctional Institution where he is still
incarcerated. The Complaint was dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and Plaintiff
was given the opportunity to file an Amended Complaint, which is presently before the Court on
initial review. See (Doc. No. 8).
Plaintiff names as Defendants Sergeant Pruitt, Officer Kalinowski, and Officer Brigth.
Construing the Amended Complaint liberally and accepting the allegations as true, Plaintiff was
in a cell in the North Wing of Marion C.I. at 14:05 hours on January 4, 2018, when Officer
Kalinowski cuffed him, then pushed and hit him with closed fists. Officer Brigth jumped in to help
Kalinowski. Sergeant Pruitt tried to spray Plaintiff but another officer stopped her. Plaintiff also
alleges that “[t]hey jump on me cause we was in my cell no crame for me by gay and then Sgt.
spray me and said you a gay ass Muslim.” (Doc. No. 9 at 4). In addition, his prayer rug was taken
1

by Officers Brigth and Sergeant Pruitt.
Plaintiff’s leg was cut, he was sprayed which still hurts, and he has “small redness” to his
head and neck, for which he was given ibuprofen. (Doc. No. 9 at 5).
Plaintiff seeks the return of his prayer rug, transfer from the institution or “fixs it where no
inmate be in cell with officer,” and $3,000. (Doc. No. 9 at 5).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the
Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “(i) frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In its frivolity
review, a court must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory
or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim “unless ‘after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as
true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor, it
appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him
to relief.’” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)).
A pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); see also Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Liberal construction of the
pleadings is particularly appropriate where … there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights
issues.”). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore
a clear failure to allege facts in his complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under
2

federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). A pro se complaint must
still contain sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007);
see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (the Twombly plausibility standard applies to all federal
civil complaints including those filed under § 1983). This “plausibility standard requires a plaintiff
to demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Francis v.
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). He must
articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate he has stated a claim entitling him to relief.
Id.
III.
(1)

DISCUSSION

Excessive Force
“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment,” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 31 (1993). In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” the Eighth Amendment places
restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against
prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met.
First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious,” Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 298 (1991); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5, and must result in the denial of “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The second
requirement is that a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson, 501
U.S. at 297, 302-03; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5, 8. “[T]he use of excessive physical force against a
prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not suffer
3

serious injury.” Hudson, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992); see Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 34 (2010). The
“core judicial inquiry,” is not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather
“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. “When prison officials maliciously and
sadistically use force to cause harm,” the Court recognized, “contemporary standards of decency
always are violated ... whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth
Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting
less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 13–14.
The Fourth Circuit addresses a failure to intervene claim as a theory of “bystander liability”
wherein there is “an omission to act...coupled with a duty to act.” Randall v. Prince George’s Cnty.,
302 F.3d 188, 202 (4th Cir. 2002). A “bystander officer” could be liable for his or her nonfeasance
if he or she: “(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional rights; (2)
has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.” Id. at 204. However,
if no excessive force is applied by the fellow officer, the officer witnessing the conduct “cannot be
held liable under bystander liability for a failure to intervene.” Howie v. Prince George’s Cnty.,
2009 WL 2426018 at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 5, 2009); see also Jarvis v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, 2012
WL 527597 (D. Md. Feb. 16, 2012).
Plaintiff alleges that Officers Kalinowski and Brigth hit him for no reason while he was
handcuffed and that Sergeant Pruitt attempted to, or actually, sprayed him. He has stated a facially
sufficient claim against Defendants Kalinowski, Brigth, and Pruitt for the use of excessive force
and/or failure to intervene. This claim will therefore be permitted to proceed.

4

(2)

Housing and Transfer
Plaintiff does not have a federally protected liberty interest in any particular housing or

classification unless it exceeds the scope of his original sentence and imposes an atypical and
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472 (1995). “[C]hanges in a prisoner’s location, variations of daily routine, changes in
conditions of confinement (including administrative segregation) and the denial of privileges …
are necessarily functions of prison management that must be left to the broad discretion of prison
administrators to enable them to manage prisons safely and efficiently.” Gaston v. Taylor, 946
F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
Plaintiff requests transfer away from Marion C.I. and a private cell. Plaintiff has no interest
in his transfer to another facility or in his placement in a cell without staff access, and therefore,
has failed to state a claim for which relief is available.
(3)

Property
Where a state employee’s random, unauthorized act deprives an individual of property,

either negligently or intentionally, the individual is relegated to his state post-deprivation process,
so long as the State provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). However, post-deprivation remedies do not satisfy the due
process requirement where the deprivation complained of is effected pursuant to an established
state procedure rather than a random, unauthorized action. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422 (1982).
Under North Carolina law, an action for conversion will lie against a public official who
wrongfully deprives an owner of his property by an unauthorized act. Gallimore v. Sink, 27
5

N.C.App. 65, 67, 218 S.E.2d 181, 182 (1975). North Carolina’s post-deprivation remedies are
adequate. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291; see Wilkins v. Whitaker, 714 F.2d 4, 6 (4th Cir. 1983) (due
process satisfied where North Carolina tort law provides an adequate avenue for relief for state
prisoner).
Plaintiff appears to allege that the loss of his prayer rug resulted from a random,
unauthorized action rather than an established state procedure. Adequate post-deprivation
remedies exist for Plaintiff’s alleged property loss, so there is no legal theory which would support
this claim. See, e.g., Smith v. Ledford, 2006 WL 1431666 at *2 (W.D.N.C. May 22, 2006), aff’d,
203 Fed. Appx. 484 (4th Cir. 2006) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim that jail administrator confiscated
his personal property upon his departure from the jail and refused to return it, because plaintiff had
an adequate post-deprivation remedy for conversion). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a
cognizable claim for relief with regards to the alleged loss of his property.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Amended Complaint is sufficient to proceed against
Defendants Pruitt, Brigth, and Kalinowski on Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force and failure to
intervene, but his remaining allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1. The Amended Complaint, (Doc. No. 9), survives initial review on Plaintiff’s claim of
excessive force/ failure to intervene against Defendants Pruitt, Brigth, and Kalinowski.
2. The remaining claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
3. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Clerk is directed to commence the
procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Rule 4.3 for Defendants Pruitt,
Brigth, and Kalinowski who are current or former employees of NC DPS.
6

Signed: May 28, 2018

7