Medel v. Carder, et al

Filing 7

ORDER that Pltf shall have 30 days in which to amend his #1 Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If Pltf fails to so amend his Complaint, the matter will be dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Pltf a blank prisoner 1983 form. ( Amended Complaint due by 12/18/2021.) Signed by Chief Judge Martin Reidinger on 11/18/2021. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(ejb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:21-cv-00324-MR
EDWIN MEDEL,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
BEEN CARDER, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
________________________________ )

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, [Doc. 1], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)
and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2, 6].
I.

BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Edwin Medel (“Plaintiff”) is a North Carolina state

inmate currently incarcerated at Marion Correctional Institution (“Marion”) in
Marion, North Carolina. He filed this action on October 28, 2021, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the following Defendants: (1) Been Carder,
identified as the Superintendent of Marion; (2) FNU Bullis, identified as the
“ASSP Superintendent of Operations” at Marion; (3) David Cothron,
identified as the “ASSP Superintendent of Program” at Marion; (4) Grge [sic]
Swink, identified as Program Supervisor of the Rehabilitation Diversion Unit

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(RDU)1

at Marion; (5) FNU Suttle, identified as the Assistant Program

Supervisor of the RDU at Marion; (6) the North Carolina Department of Public
Safety (NCDPS); and (7) Todd Ishee, identified as the NCDPS Director of
Prisons. [Doc. 1 at 2-4]. Plaintiff purports to sue all Defendants in their
individual and official capacities. [See id.]. Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to
be solely based on his placement in the RDU program when he arrived at
Marion on September 22, 2020. [See id. at 9]. Plaintiff does not allege what
constitutional or federal statutory right(s) he believes were violated. [See id.
at 3]. Plaintiff also fails to allege that he suffered any injury as a result of his
placement in the RDU program. [See id. at 8]. Plaintiff seeks declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief. [Id.].
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the
grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, under § 1915A

The RDU program at Marion “was created as part of North Carolina Department of Public
Safety’s (NCDPS) recent policy reforms regarding restrictive housing in the North
Carolina prisons.” Covington v. Lassiter, No. 1:16-cv-00387, 2017 WL 3840280, at *5
(W.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2017). “[T]he RDU program was designed to help people transition
from Control to regular population through the provision of targeted behavioral
programming and increasing privileges, congregate activity, and out-of-cell time.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
1

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the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune to such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972).

However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III.

DISCUSSION
“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States
and must show that the deprivation of that right was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff does not allege which constitutional right(s) he contends his
placement in the RDU program violated. The Court, therefore, addresses

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those claims fairly raised by Plaintiff’s Complaint. Giving Plaintiff the benefit
of a very generous inference, these include potential claims under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
A.

Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of
punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement.
Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).

Williams v.

Extreme deprivations are

required, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth
Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). The
plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials
knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). A plaintiff must also allege “a serious
or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged
conditions.”

Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.3d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff’s sole allegation that he was placed in Marion’s RDU program does
not satisfy the very high standards for cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. See De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th
Cir. 2003); Lattimore v. Doe, No. 1:13CV692, 2014 WL 197807, at **1-3
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 14, 2014). Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to state a claim
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under the Eighth Amendment.
B.

Fourteenth Amendment

To prevail on a procedural due process claim, an inmate must first
demonstrate that he was deprived of “life, liberty, or property” by
governmental action. Bevrati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997).
Although prisoners are afforded some due process rights while incarcerated,
those liberty interests are limited to “the freedom from restraint which, while
not exceeding the sentence in such and unexpected manner as to give rise
to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless
imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a prisoner has no
constitutional right under the due process clause to be incarcerated in a
particular facility or to be held in a specific security classification, barring
some showing by the prisoner that her confinement posed an atypical and
significant hardship in relationship to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,
245 (1983); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 468 (1976). Moreover, changes “in a prisoner’s location,
variations of daily routine, changes in conditions of confinement (including
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administrative segregation), and the denial of privileges [are] matters which
every prisoner can anticipate [and which] are contemplated by his original
sentence to prison.” Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991);
Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The federal constitution
itself vests no liberty interest in inmates in retaining or receiving any
particular security or custody status ‘[a]s long as the [challenged] conditions
or degree of confinement ... is within the sentence imposed ... and is not
otherwise violative of the Constitution.’”) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.
460, 468 (1983)). Here, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable due process
claim in relation to his placement in the RDU program.
The Court will, however, allow Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his
complaint to state a claim for relief, if the facts support such an amendment.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s

Complaint fails initial review. The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days to
amend his Complaint, if he so chooses, to properly state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Any amended complaint will be subject to all timeliness
and procedural requirements and will supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal
amendment will not be permitted. Should Plaintiff fail to timely amend his
Complaint in accordance with this Order, the Court will dismiss this action
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without prejudice.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30)
days in which to amend his Complaint in accordance with the terms of this
Order.

If Plaintiff fails to so amend his Complaint, the matter will be

dismissed without prejudice.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner §
1983 form.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: November 18, 2021

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