Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 12

ORDER that the Commissioners decision is REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further review consistent with this Order. Signed by Senior Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr on 1/6/2025. (brl)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-00044-RJC
SHERRIE SMITH,
)
)
)
)
)
) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF
)
REMAND
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Social Security Brief, (Doc.
No. 7), Defendant’s Brief, (Doc. No. 10), and Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, (Doc. No. 11).1
Having fully considered the written arguments, administrative record, and applicable
authority, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court adopts the procedural history as stated in the parties’ briefs.

Plaintiff filed the present action on February 20, 2023. (Doc. No. 1). Relevant to the
present discussion2, Plaintiff assigns error to the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)

1 Following amendments to the Supplemental Rules for Social Security Actions, 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), and to Local Civil Rule 7.2, the parties are no longer required to file
dispositive motions.
2 Because the Court determines that remand is warranted based on material
inconsistencies in the ALJ’s decision, the Court declines to address the remaining
allegations of error.
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determination at step five3, arguing that the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s Residual
Functional Capacity4 (“RFC”), his ultimate RFC finding, and his assessment at step
five are materially inconsistent. (Doc. No. 7 at 4–6).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3), limits this Court’s

review of a final decision of the Commissioner to: (1) whether substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner’s decision, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401
(1971); and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, Hays
v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d
31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The District Court does not review a final decision
of the Commissioner de novo. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986);
King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d
773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972).
As the Social Security Act provides, “[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Fourth Circuit defined “substantial evidence” as being “more than a scintilla”
and “do[ing] more than creat[ing] a suspicion of the existence of a fact to be

3 “Step five requires the Commissioner to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that

a claimant can do other work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy.” Lawrence v. Saul, 941 F.3d 140, 142 (4th Cir. 2019).
4 The Social Security Regulations define “Residual Functional Capacity” as “the most
[a claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The
Commissioner is required to “first assess the nature and extent of [the claimant’s]
physical limitations and then determine [the claimant’s] [R]esidual [F]unctional
[C]apacity for work activity on a regular and continuing basis.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(b).
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established. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1179 (4th Cir.
1986) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); see also Seacrist v.
Weinberger, 538 F.2d 1054, 1056–57 (4th Cir. 1976) (“We note that it is the
responsibility of the [Commissioner] and not the courts to reconcile inconsistencies in
the medical evidence.”).
The Fourth Circuit has long emphasized that it is not for a reviewing court to
weigh the evidence again, nor to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner,
assuming the Commissioner’s final decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d at 1456; see also Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d at 345; and
Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d at 775. Indeed, this is true even if the reviewing court
disagrees with the outcome—so long as there is “substantial evidence” in the record
to support the final decision below. Lester v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir.
1982).
III.

DISCUSSION

Relevant to the discussion here, Plaintiff argues remand is warranted because
the ALJ’s decision contains material inconsistencies between his analysis of
Plaintiff’s RFC, his ultimate assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC, and his assessment at
step five. (Doc. No. 7 at 4–6).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s deficits “preclude
her from performing any detailed or complex tasks,” but the ALJ did not include this
limitation in the RFC assessment. (Doc. No. 7 at 4–6). As a result, the ALJ did not

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proffer this limitation on detailed or complex tasks to the Vocation Expert (“VE”) at
the hearing, during which the VE recommended that Plaintiff could perform
reasoning level 2 jobs. (Id.). Plaintiff argues “this constitutes harmful error because
the jobs the ALJ relied upon to deny [Plaintiff’s] case at Step Five . . . require the
individual to perform detailed work.” (Doc. No. 11 at 1).
The Commissioner agrees that the ALJ mentioned but did not include in the
RFC Plaintiff’s inability to complete detailed and complex tasks, but he argues that
the ALJ’s repeated use of the word “simple” leaves no conflict. (Doc. No. 10 at 5–7).
According to the Commissioner, the RFC limitation to “simple” tasks provides for
Plaintiff’s inability to perform “detailed” tasks, which is consistent with a
determination that Plaintiff can perform reasoning level 2 jobs. (Id. at 5–6). The
Commissioner relies on Thomas and Lawrence in arguing that no conflict exists. (Id.).
In Thomas, the Fourth Circuit held that an ALJ’s failure to address a conflict
between the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and the testimony of the VE
warrants remand. Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 2019). The Fourth
Circuit found a conflict between a limitation to “short, simple instructions” and a
reasoning level of two (which requires carrying out detailed but uninvolved
instructions). Id. Subsequently, in Lawrence, the Fourth Circuit distinguished its
ruling in Thomas, holding that no conflict exists between a reasoning level of two and
the limitation to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks.” Lawrence v. Saul, 941 F.3d 140,
143–44 (4th Cir. 2019). The court explained the difference between the limitation

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“simple, routine, repetitive tasks” (reasoning level two) and the limitation in Thomas
to “short, simple instructions” (reasoning level one).
[T]he key difference is that Thomas was limited to “short” instructions.
“Short” is inconsistent with “detailed” because detail and length are
highly correlated. Generally, the longer the instructions, the more detail
they can include. . . . There is no comparable inconsistency between
[simple, routine, repetitive tasks] and Level 2 [reasoning].
Id. at 143. Further, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that “simple” instructions do
not conflict with “uninvolved” instructions because “both connote instructions that
‘are not complicated or intricate.’” Id. (quoting Moore v. Astrue, 623 .3d 599, 604 (8th
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted)).
Here, the issue is not whether a limitation of “simple” tasks is inconsistent
with reasoning level 2 jobs. Rather, the issue is whether inconsistencies between the
ALJ’s analysis and his ultimate RFC determination warrants remand. The ALJ twice
acknowledged Plaintiff’s inability to participate in “detailed” tasks but failed to
include this limitation in the RFC nor in the hypothetical presented to the VE,
resulting in the VE’s determination that Plaintiff could perform certain reasoning
level 2 jobs, which require “[a]pply[ing] commonsense understanding to carry out
detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions.” DOT, App. C, 1991 WL 688702.
Specifically, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “can understand and follow
simple instructions and directions,” “can perform simple tasks independently,” and
reduced her RFC “to allow for only a range of simple tasks.” (Doc. No. 5-2; Tr. 22, 25).
However, in his analysis, the ALJ acknowledged that his findings “reveal deficits that
would preclude [Plaintiff] from performing any detailed or complex tasks.” (Doc. No.

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5-2; Tr. 25). The ALJ reiterated that “[w]hile [Plaintiff] would clearly have difficulty
performing work that was detailed or complex in nature, . . . there is nothing
suggesting she is unable to perform a range of simple work as described in the above
residual functional capacity.” (Id. at 26). Despite the ALJ’s recognition of Plaintiff’s
inability to perform detailed tasks, the ALJ did not include this limitation in the RFC,
instead limiting Plaintiff to “simple” tasks, which materially affected the VE’s
recommendation. (Id.).
The inconsistency in the ALJ’s decision “frustrate[s] meaningful review” and
warrants remand so that the ALJ can clarify the apparent inconsistency between its
analysis of Plaintiff’s inability to perform detailed tasks, the RFC limitations, and his
determination that Plaintiff can perform jobs that require carrying out detailed
instructions. Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted);
see Wilson v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20CV661, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30906, at *21 (M.D.N.C.
Feb. 22, 2022) (remanding where “it is not clear whether [the inconsistency] was
intentional or why the inconsistency exists between the ALJ’s analysis and the actual
RFC”); Timothy G. v. O’Malley, No. 6:22-cv-03608-TMC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31336, at *9–10 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2024) (“[T]he ALJ’s overall RFC analysis contained
several inconsistencies that were not accounted for in the explanation, and, as such,
the court is unable to meaningfully review the ALJ’s reasoning.”); Shawanda T. v.
O’Malley, No. 23-2663-CDA, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173112, at *12 (D. Md. Sept. 25,
2024) (“Because the inconsistency between the ALJ’s analysis and the RFC
‘frustrate[s] meaningful review’ of the ALJ’s decision, remand is ‘appropriate.’”);

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Mallett v. Berryhill, No. 5:18-CV-241-D, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112782, at *13–14
(E.D.N.C. June 17, 2019), memorandum and recommendation adopted, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 112223 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2019) (remanding where the ALJ “actually
created inconsistencies or ambiguities that preclude meaningful review of her
decision”).
Accordingly, the Court concludes this matter must be remanded for the ALJ to
resolve material inconsistencies in its decision. The ALJ’s assessment is “lacking in
the analysis needed for [the Court] to review meaningfully [his] conclusions.” Mascio
v. Colvin, 780 F.3d at 636–37. By ordering remand pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court does not forecast a decision on the merits of Plaintiff’s
application for disability benefits. See Patterson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 846
F.3d 656, 663 (4th Cir. 2017).
IV.

CONCLUSION

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to
Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)5 for further review consistent with this
Order.
2. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum and Order to counsel
for the parties.

Sentence Four authorizes “a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision . . . with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Sullivan v.
Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 625 (1990). In this case, a new hearing is required.
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Signed: January 6, 2025

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