Stevens v. Montreat College, et al.
Filing
75
ORDER denying 66 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 67 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Chief Judge Martin Reidinger on 1/27/2025. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(hms)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:23-cv-00284-MR-WCM
RYAN CRAIG STEVENS,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
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)
MONTREAT COLLEGE, DR. PAUL
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J. MAURER, DR. DANIEL BENNETT, )
DR. DOROTHEA SHUMAN, and
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DR. RYAN ZWART,
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Defendants.
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________________________________ )
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the pro se Plaintiff’s “Motion for
Leave to File an Amended Complaint” [Doc. 66] and “Motion for Reversal of
the Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss” [Doc. 67].
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The lengthy procedural history of this case is detailed in prior orders of
this Court and will not be repeated in full here. [See Docs. 21, 32]. The
Plaintiff Ryan Craig Stevens originally filed suit in Buncombe County
Superior Court on October 25, 2022, alleging several federal civil rights
claims related to his time as a student at, and his eventual expulsion from,
Montreat College. [Doc. 1]. The Plaintiff named as Defendants Montreat
College, as well as Dr. Paul J. Maurer, Dr. Daniel Bennett, Dr. Dorothea
Shuman, and Dr. Ryan Zwart (collectively, “the Individual Defendants”). On
October 6, 2023, prior to service on the Individual Defendants, Montreat
College removed the action to this Court. [Id.]. The Plaintiff thereafter filed
his Second Amended Complaint on December 29, 2023, asserting claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his First Amendment rights to free
exercise of religion and free speech and for violation of his due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment; Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2 to 2000c-9; Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681; the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 6101 et seq.; the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1964
(“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; and 25 C.F.R. § 11.404.1 [Doc. 14].
The Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint. [Docs. 18, 24]. On November 4, 2024, the Court entered an
Order granting the Defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissing this action
with prejudice. [Doc. 63]. A Clerk’s Judgment was entered that same day.
[Doc. 64]. On December 11, 2024, the Plaintiff filed the present motions,
seeking leave to file another amended complaint as well as a “reversal” of
1 The Plaintiff also attempted to file a Third Amended Complaint and a Fourth Amended
Complaint. [Docs. 17, 45]. Both of these pleadings were stricken. [See Docs. 21, 63].
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the Order granting the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. [Docs. 66, 67]. The
Defendants have responded to the Plaintiffs’ motions [Docs. 68, 69], and the
Plaintiff has filed replies [Docs. 73, 74].
These matters are ripe for
disposition.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Motion for Reversal
The Court construes the Plaintiff’s “Motion for Reversal” as either a
motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) or a motion for relief
from judgment under Rule 60(b).
A motion to alter or amend the judgment must be filed within 28 days
after the judgment is entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). As noted supra, a
judgment was entered in this action on November 4, 2024. [Doc. 64]. The
Plaintiff did not file his “Motion for Reversal” until December 11, 2024, 37
days later. As such, his motion is untimely under Rule 59(e).
Even if the motion had been timely filed, the Court finds no merit to his
motion. The Court may grant a motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only in the following circumstances:
“(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account
for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or
to prevent manifest injustice.” Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir.
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2002) (quoting Collison v. Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 34 F.3d 233, 236 (4th
Cir. 1994)). The Plaintiff has failed to establish that any of these
circumstances are present here.
To the extent that the Plaintiff’s motion could be construed as one
seeking relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, it is also without merit. Rule 60(b) allows the Court “[o]n
motion and just terms [to] relieve a party or [his] legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding” for any of the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that
has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). In addition to meeting one of the subsections of Rule
60(b), a litigant seeking to set aside a judgment also must establish that his
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motion was timely filed, that he has a meritorious claim, and that there would
be no unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party by having the judgment set
aside. See Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp.,
843 F.2d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1998).
The Plaintiff has failed to establish any of these elements here. The
Plaintiff filed his motion 37 days after the entry of judgment, and he offers no
plausible justification for this delay. Further, the Plaintiff still fails to present
plausible allegations to support any meritorious claim. Finally, the Plaintiff
has failed to show that the Defendants would not suffer any unfair prejudice
by having the judgment set aside.
For all these reasons, the Plaintiff’s “Motion for Reversal” is denied.
B.
Motion to Amend Complaint
“[A] district court may not grant a post-judgment motion to amend the
complaint unless the court first vacates its judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e) or 60(b).” Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 470-71
(4th Cir. 2011) (citing Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006) (en
banc)).
“To determine whether vacatur is warranted, however, the court
need not concern itself with either of those rules’ legal standards. The court
need only ask whether the amendment should be granted, just as it would
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on a prejudgment motion to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).”
Katyle, 637 F.3d at 471.
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent
part, that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within
21 days of serving it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, “a party may
amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the
court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Absent a finding of prejudice, bad
faith, or futility, leave of the Court should be “freely given when justice so
requires.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Laber, 438 F.3d at
426; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Here, it is unclear what amendments the Plaintiff proposes to make to
his Second Amended Complaint, as he failed to submit a brief in support of
his motion or a proposed amended complaint. Assuming, however, that the
Plaintiff intended to assert additional claims of age discrimination as
referenced in his motion, the Court finds that any such amendment is a bad
faith attempt to avoid dismissal of his action. The “new evidence” that the
Plaintiff claims to have recently discovered are documents
and
communications that the Plaintiff received from Montreat College in 2019,
over five years prior to his proposed amendment. The Plaintiff has been
litigating this action for over two years, having filed his original action in state
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court in October 2022. He already has moved to amend his claims in this
action on multiple occasions. When the Court denied those motions to
amend, the Plaintiff filed unauthorized purported amended complaints
anyway. [See Docs. 17, 45]. When the Court struck those complaints from
the record, the Plaintiff filed new lawsuits with those same claims in order to
circumvent the Court’s rulings. [See Case No. 1-24-cv-00225-MR-WCM,
Doc. 1-1; Case No. 1-24-cv-00235-MR-WCM, Doc. 6].
This pattern of
repeatedly filing duplicative and frivolous “amended” complaints also has
severely prejudiced the Defendants, who have had to spend a great deal of
time and incur significant expense in defending against the Plaintiff’s
baseless claims and his duplicative and vexatious motions.
This is one of at least three actions that the Plaintiff has filed related to
his time at Montreat College, all of which address the same underlying
events and raise similar claims. The other two actions are addressed by the
Court in separate Orders entered contemporaneously herewith. Because
the Plaintiff has shown himself to be an abusive and prolific filer, the Court
hereby issues the following warning to the Plaintiff. Litigants do not have an
absolute and unconditional right of access to the courts in order to prosecute
frivolous, successive, abusive or vexatious actions. See Demos v. Keating,
33 F. App’x 918, 920 (10th Cir. 2002); Tinker v. Hanks, 255 F.3d 444, 445 (7th
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Cir. 2002); In re Vincent, 105 F.3d 943, 945 (4th Cir. 1997). District courts
have inherent power to control the judicial process and to redress conduct
which abuses that process. Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583,
590 (4th Cir. 2001).
The Plaintiff is hereby informed that future frivolous filings will result in
the imposition of a pre-filing review system. Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am.,
Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2004); Vestal v. Clinton, 106 F.3d 553, 555
(4th Cir. 1997). If such a system is placed in effect, pleadings presented to
the Court which are not made in good faith and which do not contain
substance, will be summarily dismissed as frivolous. See Foley v. Fix, 106
F.3d 556, 558 (4th Cir. 1997). Thereafter, if such writings persist, the prefiling system may be modified to include an injunction from filings. In re
Martin–Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262 (2d Cir. 1984).
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s “Motion for Leave to
File an Amended Complaint” [Doc. 66] and “Motion for Reversal of the Order
Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss” [Doc. 67] are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: January 27, 2025
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