National Nurses Organizing Committee v. MH Hospital Manager, LLC

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER that the Deft's 9 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and the Pltf's 12 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The Pltf's action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Deft's request for attorneys' fees is DENIED. The Clerk is respectfully directed to enter a judgment consistent with this Order and terminate this civil action. Signed by Chief Judge Martin Reidinger on 3/25/2024. (ejb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 1:23-cv-00321-MR-WCM

NATIONAL NURSES
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE,

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MH HOSPITAL MANAGER, LLC,
)
)
Defendant.
)
_______________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the parties’ cross Motions for
Summary Judgment [Docs. 9, 12].
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 3, 2023, Plaintiff National Nurses Organizing Committee

(“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant MH Hospital Manager, LLC
(“Defendant”) under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) and Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 10. [Id.]. The Plaintiff seeks to vacate an arbitration award on the grounds
that it was not in accordance with the parties’ collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”). [Id.].

On December 4, 2023, MH Hospital Manager, LLC, filed an answer
and a counterclaim against National Nurses Organizing Committee, seeking
to confirm and enforce the arbitration award. [Doc. 4]. On February 7, 2024,
the parties both filed Motions for Summary Judgment. [Docs. 9, 12]. On
February 28, 2024, the parties both filed their Responses in Opposition to
each’s Motion. [Docs. 14, 15]. On March 13, 2024, the parties both filed
their Replies in Support of their Motions. [Docs. 16, 17].
Having been fully briefed, this matter is now ripe for disposition.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of arbitral awards in the collective bargaining context is

“among the narrowest known to the law.” Union Pac. R. Co. v. Sheehan,
439 U.S. 89, 91 (1978). The court is not entitled to decide the merits of the
dispute. Rather, “if an arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the
contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that a court is
convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his
decision.” Major League Baseball Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001)
(per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). Nor is the court permitted to
second-guess factual determinations. “When an arbitrator resolves disputes
regarding the application of a contract, and no dishonesty is alleged, the
arbitrator’s ‘improvident, even silly, factfinding’ does not provide a basis for

2

a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award.”

Id. (quoting United

Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987)).

The

rationale behind this deference to the arbitrator is that it is the arbitrator’s
interpretation of the facts and the agreement that the parties bargained for,
so it is the arbitrator’s ruling that the parties should get, so long as the
arbitrator “did his job.” See Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Int’l Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir. 1996); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
The only circumstance in which the court may vacate an arbitral award
on the merits is “when the arbitrator strays from interpretation of the
agreement and effectively ‘dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice.”’
Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509 (quoting Enterprise Wheel & Car, 363 U.S. at 597
(alterations in original)). In the Fourth Circuit’s words, “we may vacate an
arbitrator’s award only if it ‘violates clearly established public policy, fails to
draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, or reflects merely
the arbitrator’s personal notions of right and wrong.”’ Yuasa, Inc. v. Int’l
Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine & Furniture Workers, 224
F.3d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Champion Int’l Corp. v. United
Paperworkers Int’l Union, 168 F.3d 725, 729 (4th Cir. 1999)).

3

The central consideration in determining whether the award “drew its
essence” from the contract is the text of the agreement. See Mountaineer
Gas, 76 F.3d at 608. Thus, “[w]hen determining whether the arbitrator did
his job, [the] court examines: (1) the arbitrator’s role as defined by the CBA;
(2) whether the award ignored the plain language of the CBA; and (3)
whether the arbitrator's discretion in formulating the award comported with
the essence of the CBA’s proscribed limits.” Id.
III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are not in dispute, except where otherwise noted.
The Plaintiff is a labor union that represents registered nurses

employed at Mission Hospital in Asheville, North Carolina. [Doc. 1: Compl.
at ¶¶ 3-4]. The Defendant operates Mission Hospital and employs registered
nurses that are represented by the Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶ 5]. The parties entered
into a CBA effective July 2, 2021, to July 2, 2024. [Id. at ¶ 9]. Article 40,
Section 2 of the collective bargaining agreement provides that the hospital
will provide the union with one bulletin board in each break room of each
nursing department as the “sole and exclusive” locations for the union to post
notices on hospital property. [Doc. 1-1: CBA at 60].

The CBA further

specifies:
Each notice shall be signed and dated by the Union
Representative or Nurse Representative posting the
4

notice. Copies of Union materials to be posted shall
be delivered to the Human Resources Department
forty-eight (48) weekday hours prior to being posted.
Undisputed material to be posted will be limited to
appropriate Union business and will not contain any
inflammatory material or political material related to
a political party, politician or public election. No
materials will be posted that are critical of any
Hospital Registered Nurse or of any policy relating to
patient care or the delivery of patient care at the
Hospital. If the Hospital does not agree that the
posting is “appropriate” as described above, the
document will not be posted unless and until the
dispute is resolved as provided below.
In the event of a dispute as to the appropriateness of
a posting, the parties shall first meet, in person or by
phone, and discuss the matter in an effort to resolve
the dispute amongst themselves. Second, if the
dispute is not resolved within twenty-four (24) hours,
the parties shall engage the services of a mutually
agreeable arbitrator and shall participate in
expedited arbitration. The arbitrator shall hear and
rule on the dispute within twenty-four (24) hours
(forty-eight (48) hours from the inception of the
dispute) and shall have the authority to fashion an
appropriate remedy including the revocation of the
posting privilege. The arbitration hearing may be
conducted telephonically if necessary. The parties
shall each bear their own costs and fees incurred in
preparing and presenting their case to the arbitrator.
The charges, fees and expenses of the arbitrator
shall be borne and paid for by the losing party.
[Id.].

5

The CBA also contains provisions for when and how union
representatives may access the hospital, and how disputes over such
access are to be resolved. [Id. at 60-63]. Specifically, the CBA states:
The Hospital shall allow duly authorized Union
Representatives to visit the Hospital to ascertain
whether or not this Agreement is being observed and
to assist in adjusting grievances, to post literature in
accordance with Section 2, or to distribute literature
during conference room events in accordance with
Section 4 and within the confines of the conference
room (with the Union expressly agreeing to clean up
all of its property at the conclusion of the event). . . .
If the Hospital believes a Union Representative has
violated the access privileges identified in this Article,
the Hospital may revoke that Union Representative’s
access privileges (but not the Union’s access
privileges) pending resolution of the dispute. If the
Union wishes to challenge this action, they may
advance the issue directly to arbitration under Article
1, Arbitration, which, if the Union requests, will be
conducted within forty-eight (48) hours of the
inception of the dispute.
[Id.].
In December 2022, a dispute arose about certain flyers that the
Plaintiff’s nurse representatives distributed in the hospital. [Doc. 1 at ¶ 15].
The flyers were posted in the Cardiovascular Intensive Care Unit (“CVICU”)
breakroom and concerned a vote of no confidence regarding the CVICU
Nurse Manager; the fliers also included the name, telephone number, and
email address of union representative Brian Walsh (“Walsh”). [Doc. 4: Def.’s
6

Countercl. at ¶¶ 13-14]. The Defendant contended that the Plaintiff’s posting
of the flyers violated the CBA. [Doc. 1 at ¶ 15]. The Defendant accordingly
revoked Walsh’s hospital access privileges for a period of 30 days. [Doc. 4
at ¶ 16].
On January 17, 2023, three days before Walsh’s 30-day access ban
was set to expire, the other designated union representative, Neil Pettit
(“Pettit”), requested access to the hospital for the following day, January 18,
2024. [Id. at ¶ 17]. The Defendant believed that Pettit was also involved in
the same access violations as Walsh,1 and therefore denied him access until
the same 30-day period expired on January 20, 2023. [Id. at ¶¶ 18-19].
The Plaintiff then submitted a grievance requesting expedited
arbitration challenging the revocation of access privileges for both Walsh and
Pettit. [Doc. 1 at ¶ 17]. The parties selected Edward M. Davidson as the
arbitrator, and an arbitration hearing was held on July 28, 2023. [Id. at ¶ 18].
The issue submitted to the arbitrator was: “Did the Employer violate the
Collective Bargaining Agreement Article 40, Section 5 by revoking access to
the Employer’s property for Union Representatives Brian Walsh and Neil
Pettit in December 2022 and January 2023 respectively? If so, what should
be the remedy?” [Id. at ¶ 19].

1

The Plaintiff denies that Pettit was involved in the access violations. [Doc. 1 at ¶ 16].
7

The arbitrator found that Walsh “assisted in the development, cost
coverage and production of the flyers,” and that the Plaintiff union’s nurse
representatives posted flyers in areas not permitted under the CBA. [Doc.
1-2 at 8]. Therefore, the arbitrator found that the Defendant was not in
violation of the CBA in denying hospital access to Walsh. [Id. at 8-9].
However, the arbitrator found that Pettit was not proven to be involved in
posting the flyers, and therefore, denial of access to Pettit was in violation of
the CBA. [Id.].
The parties now both move for summary judgment, with the Plaintiff
seeking to vacate the award and the Defendant seeking to enforce the
award. The Defendant also moves for an award of attorneys’ fees.
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

The Arbitrator’s Award

As discussed above, the Court’s review of an arbitration award is
limited and essentially looks to whether the award drew its essence from the
CBA. See Mountaineer Gas, 76 F.3d at 608. “[A]n award fails to draw its
essence from the agreement if an arbitrator has ‘based his award on his own
personal notions of right and wrong,’” or if it “‘disregards or modifies
unambiguous contract provisions.’” Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441
F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 2006) (first quoting Upshur Coals Corp. v. United

8

Mine Workers, Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir.1991); then quoting Mo.
River Serv., Inc. v. Omaha Tribe of Neb., 267 F.3d 848, 855 (8th Cir. 2001))
(alterations omitted).
“When the parties bargain for an arbitrator’s construction of a contract,
‘the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of
the contract is different from his.’” U.S. Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers
Union, AFL-CIO, 204 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599
(1960)). The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract, but
given that the parties have authorized the arbitrator to give meaning to the
language of the agreement, a court should not reject an award on the ground
that the arbitrator misread the contract. United Paperworkers Int’l Union,
AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
Here, the Plaintiff argues that the arbitrator sustained a revocation of
access without finding any violation of the CBA’s access provisions, and
therefore the arbitrator’s decision did not draw its essence from the CBA and
must be vacated. [Doc. 13 at 16]. The Defendant argues that the arbitrator
properly interpreted and applied the CBA. [Doc. 10 at 10]. The key issue is
whether “access privileges” as used in Article 40, Section 5 of the CBA refers

9

to all of the privileges enumerated in Article 40, or only those listed under
“Access for Union Representatives” in Section 3.
The parties dispute the arbitrator’s interpretation of “access privileges”
in the CBA. The term is not defined in the CBA, but rather, in the relevant
provision, simply refers to “the access privileges identified in this article.” The
arbitrator interpreted this to mean all of the privileges in Article 40, including
the use of bulletin boards by the union, hospital access for union
representatives, and the use of conference rooms by the union. Even if this
Court were to find that the arbitrator misread the CBA, which it does not so
find, the arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA certainly draws its essence
from the CBA and does not ignore the plain meaning of “access privileges”
or any other provision therein.
Indeed, most of the sections in Article 40 involve some kind of “access,”
not just Section 3. [Doc. 1-1 at 60-62]. For example, Section 1 gives union
representatives access to nurse orientation rooms for the purpose of
presenting union information to new employees. [Id. at 59]. Section 2
provides that the hospital will provide the union with a bulletin board in each
break room as the exclusive place that union members can post union
notices. [Id. at 60]. Section 4 dictates under what conditions the hospital will
give the union access to conference or meeting rooms within the hospital.

10

[Id. at 62]. All of these provisions define the various ways that the union may
“access” the hospital. As such, the award does not disregard or modify any
provision of the CBA, and instead reasonably interprets the relevant
provisions.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment and affirm the arbitration award.
B.

Attorneys’ Fees

“Although an award of attorney’s fees is not specifically authorized by
the Labor Management Relations Act, fees may be awarded against a party
who unjustifiably refuses to abide by an arbitrator’s award.” Media Gen.
Operations, Inc. v. Richmond Newspapers Pro. Ass’n, 36 F. App’x 126, 133
(4th Cir. 2002). Where a challenge to an arbitration award “goes to . . .
whether [the] award draws its essence from the contract, the standard for
assessing its justification is whether it has any arguable basis in law. Under
this standard, such a challenge is justified unless it literally has no reasonably
arguable legal support.” Id. at 133-34 (quoting United Food & Commercial
Workers v. Marval Poultry Co., 876 F.2d 346, 351 (4th Cir.1989)) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
In its motion, the Defendant requests attorneys’ fees on the grounds
that the Plaintiff’s challenge has no arguable basis in law. The Plaintiff

11

argues that its position is supported by Fourth Circuit precedent, but that
even if this Court finds against it on the merits, it cannot be said that its
position has no arguable legal support.
A reasonable interpretation of the CBA and the term “access
privileges” could have plausibly led to a different result. See Clinchfield Coal
Co. v. Dist. 28, United Mine Workers of Am. & Loc. Union No. 1452, 720 F.2d
1365, 1369 (4th Cir. 1983). Therefore, under the “relatively lenient” standard
for “any arguable basis in law,” the Plaintiff has shown that its challenge to
the award was justified. United Food & Com. Workers, Loc. 400 v. Marval
Poultry Co., 876 F.2d 346, 351 (4th Cir. 1989). For the foregoing reasons,
the Court declines to award the Defendant attorneys’ fees.

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 9] is GRANTED, and the Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 12] is DENIED. The Plaintiff’s action is hereby
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant’s request for attorneys’
fees is DENIED.

12

The Clerk is respectfully directed to enter a judgment consistent with
this Order and terminate this civil action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: March 25, 2024

13