Stewart v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, PLLC et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER granting 26 Motion to Compel Arbitration; denying as moot 5 Motion Requesting Judicial Notice, 7 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 22 Motion to Dismiss and 24 Motion to Dismis s; this action, including class claims set forth in Complaint, is STAYED pending arbitration of Plaintiff's nonclass claims; Clerk directed to administratively close case pending arbitration. Signed by District Judge Martin Reidinger on 6/1/12. (nll)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BRYSON CITY DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 2:11cv26
ROBERT STEWART, an individual,
and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LEGAL HELPERS DEBT
RESOLUTION, LLC, a Nevada
limited liability company; MACEY,
ALEMAN, HYSLIP & SEARNS, an
Illinois general partnership; CDS
CLIENTS SERVICES, INC., a
California corporation; JEFFREY
HYSLIP, an individual; and LINDA
CAROL, an individual,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Compel
Arbitration.
[Doc. 26].
Also pending before the Court are the following
motions: Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Judicial Notice [Doc. 5]; Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 7]; Defendants Legal Helpers
Debt Resolution, LLC and Macey, Aleman, Hyslip & Searns and CDS Client
Services, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 22]; and Defendants Jeffrey Hyslip
and Linda Carol’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 24].
I.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, a resident of North Carolina, initiated this action in the
Macon County General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, against the
Defendants Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC (“LHDR”)1; the law firm
Macey Aleman, Hyslip & Searns (“Law Firm”); attorney Jeffrey Hyslip
(“Hyslip”); attorney Linda Carol (“Carol”); and CDS Client Services, Inc.
(“CDS”).
[Doc. 1-1].
In his Complaint, the Plaintiff asserts claims for
declaratory relief, rescission, and damages arising from unfair and deceptive
trade practices in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, et seq., legal
malpractice, negligence, and consumer fraud.2 The Plaintiff further seeks to
1
LHDR is identified in the caption of the Complaint as Legal Helpers Debt
Resolution, PLLC. [Doc. 1-1 at 1]. In the body of the Complaint, the Plaintiff identifies
LHDR as “Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, a/k/a Legal Helpers Debt Resolution,
PLLC” and alleges that it is a Nevada limited liability company. [Id. at 2] (emphasis
added). The Defendants assert that the correct designation is “LLC” and not “PLLC.”
[Doc. 26 at 1 n.1].
2
Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action against the
Defendants: a claim for declaratory relief to the effect that the services provided by CDS
and LHDR constituted illegal debt adjusting and the unauthorized practice of law, and
therefore, the parties’ contract is void ab initio (Count I); a claim for rescission of an
illegal and unconscionable contract against LHDR (Count II); claims for unfair and
deceptive trade practices against LHDR (Count III), the Law Firm (Count IV), and CDS
(Count V); claims for unjust enrichment against CDS (Count VI) and LHDR, the Law
Firm, and Hyslip (Count VII); a claim for legal malpractice against Hyslip, the Law Firm,
and LHDR (Count VIII); a claim for negligence against Carol (Count IX); and a claim for
2
represent a class of North Carolina residents, who from June 9, 2007 to the
present, entered into contracts for legal services with LHDR and who paid
“advance fees” for such services. [Id. at ¶¶14-19]. The Defendants removed
the action to this Court on July 11, 2011. [Doc. 1].
The Complaint alleges that on June 1, 2010, the Plaintiff received a
direct mail solicitation from LHDR, offering debt negotiation services. [Id. at
¶¶ 20, 24]. The Plaintiff called the toll free number on the solicitation and
spoke to a financial advisor. [Id. at ¶ 25]. After discussing his financial
situation with the advisor, the Plaintiff entered into an Attorney Retainer
Agreement (“ARA” or “Agreement”) with LHDR. [Id. at ¶ 28]. The ARA
authorizes LHDR to negotiate and modify the Plaintiff’s unsecured debt in
exchange for certain fees. [ARA, Doc. 1-1 at 27-30]. Included among these
fees is an obligation to pay 15% of the total scheduled debt to a separate
entity, CDS. [Id. at ¶ 31]. It is alleged that LHDR uses CDS to handle
negotiations for debt adjusting under the ARA. [Id. at ¶ 33].
The Complaint alleges that LHDR represented to the Plaintiff that it was
a law firm authorized to provide legal services in North Carolina. [Id. at ¶ 38].
It is alleged that as of May 4, 2011, however, the only attorney employed by
consumer fraud against LHDR, the Law Firm, and Hyslip (Count X).
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LHDR who was properly licensed to provide legal services in North Carolina
was Defendant Carol. None of the services provided to the Plaintiff through
LHDR, however, were actively performed by Carol.
[Id. at ¶¶ 40-42].
Defendant Hyslip, an LHDR attorney not licensed to practice in North
Carolina, purported to represent the Plaintiff on behalf of LHDR. [Id. at ¶ 43].
The Complaint alleges that to date, the Plaintiff has paid the total sum
of $8,658.36 under the ARA but has received no offers to settle his debts. [Id.
at ¶ 52]. It is alleged that LHDR has advised the Plaintiff that it will do nothing
to settle his debts until he has paid all payments due under the ARA, a total
of $25,975.20, which is an amount equal to 60% of his original total
outstanding debt. [Id. at ¶ 53].
The Defendants contend that the ARA requires the Plaintiff to submit to
arbitration of his claims. [Doc. 26]. With respect to arbitration, section XVIII
of the ARA provides as follows:
XVIII. Arbitration: In the event of any claim or
dispute between Client and LHDR related to the
Agreement or related to any performance of any
services related to this Agreement, such claim or
dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration upon
the request of either party upon the service of that
request. The parties shall initially agree on a single
arbitrator to resolve the dispute. The matter may be
arbitrated either by the Judicial Arbitration Mediation
Service or American Arbitration Association, as
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mutually agreed upon by the parties or selected by
the party filing the claim. The arbitration shall be
conducted in either the county in which Client resides,
or the closest metropolitan county. Any decision of
the arbitrator shall be final and may be entered into
any judgment in any court of competent jurisdiction.
The conduct of the arbitration shall be subject to the
then current rules of the arbitration service. The costs
of arbitration, excluding legal fees, will be split equally
or be born[e] by the losing party, as determined by the
arbitrator. The parties shall bear their own legal fees.
[ARA, Doc. 1-1 at 30].
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parties do not dispute that the contract at issue is governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. (“FAA”). The FAA provides that
any written provision to resolve by arbitration a controversy arising pursuant
to a contract involving commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 of the FAA reflects “both a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a
matter of contract.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct.
1740, 1745, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011) (internal quotation marks and internal
citations omitted). “In line with these principles, courts must place arbitration
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agreements on equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according
to their terms.” Id. ( internal citations omitted).
The FAA constitutes a “body of federal substantive law of arbitrability,
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.” Int'l
Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GmbH, 206 F.3d 411, 417
n.4 (4th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). In light of the liberal federal policy in
favor of arbitration, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay,
or a like defense to arbitrability.” Patten Grading & Paving, Inc. v. Skanska
USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 2004) (citation and emphasis
omitted).
In determining whether the dispute at issue is one which should be
resolved though arbitration, this Court “engage[s] in a limited review to ensure
that the dispute is arbitrable -- i.e., that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists
between the parties and that the specific dispute falls within the substantive
scope of that agreement.” Murray v. United Food and Commercial Workers
Int’l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
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III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Arbitration of Claims against Non-Signatories
The Plaintiff first contends that the language of the arbitration provision
limits its applicability solely to LHDR as the signatory to the ARA. As such,
the Plaintiff argues, he cannot be compelled to arbitrate his claims against any
non-signatories to the agreement.
“Generally, arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit.” Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 416-17 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “It is well-established, however, that a nonsignatory to an
arbitration clause may, in certain situations, compel a signatory to the clause
to arbitrate the signatory’s claims against the nonsignatory despite the fact
that the signatory and nonsignatory lack an agreement to arbitrate.” Am.
Bankers Ins. Group, Inc. v. Long, 453 F.3d 623, 627 (4th Cir. 2006).
At the outset, the Court notes that the Plaintiff’s contention that the Law
Firm is a distinct entity from LHDR and thus not a party to the ARA [Doc. 31
at 5] is baseless. The ARA expressly provides as follows:
I. Parties and Purposes: This Agreement for legal
services is entered into on the date shown below
between Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, also
known as the law firm of Macey, Aleman, Hyslip &
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Searns (hereinafter referred to as LHDR) and
ROBERT STEWART (hereinafter referred to as
Client) relating to advice, counseling, analysis and
negotiation services in regard to Client’s unsecured
debt and related financial circumstances ....
[ARA, Doc. 1-1 at 27] (emphasis added). The plain language of the ARA
makes clear that the reference to “LHDR” within the ARA expressly includes
both LHDR and the Law Firm. As a named party to the ARA, the Law Firm
therefore may enforce the arbitration provision against the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff further contends that as non-signatories of the ARA,
attorneys Hyslip and Carol are not entitled to seek arbitration of the Plaintiff’s
claims against them. [Doc. 46 at 4-7]. Non-signatories to an arbitration
agreement, however, may enforce an arbitration agreement executed by other
parties “under ordinary state-law principles of agency or contract.” Long v.
Silver, 248 F.3d 309, 320 (4th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds, Hertz
Corp. v. Friend, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 1190-92, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010). “Under
the theory of agency, an agent can assume the protection of the contract
which the principal has signed.”
Collie v. Wehr Dissolution Corp., 345
F.Supp.2d 555, 562 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Davidson v. Becker, 256 F.Supp.2d
377, 383-84 (D. Md. 2003). Here, the Plaintiff has alleged that attorneys
Hyslip and Carol were acting in their capacities as members of LHDR. [Doc.
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1-1 at ¶¶ 9, 10, 40, 43]. Thus, while attorneys Hyslip and Carol did not sign
the ARA, their status as agents of LHDR enables them to rely on the ARA to
compel the Plaintiff to arbitration. See Collie, 354 F.Supp.2d at 562.
Although a non-signatory to the agreement, CDS is also entitled to
enforce the arbitration agreement between the Plaintiff and LHDR.
The
Fourth Circuit has recognized that a nonsignatory to an arbitration clause may
compel a signatory to arbitrate “when the signatory is equitably estopped from
arguing that a nonsignatory is not a party to the arbitration clause.” Am.
Bankers Ins. Group, Inc., 453 F.3d at 627. “Equitable estoppel precludes a
party from asserting rights he otherwise would have had against another when
his own conduct renders assertion of those rights contrary to equity.” Int’l
Paper, 206 F.3d at 417-18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In
the arbitration context, the doctrine recognizes that a party may be estopped
from asserting that the lack of [another's] signature on a written contract
precludes enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause when [the party] has
consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be
enforced to benefit him.” Id. at 418.
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Applying these principles, the Fourth Circuit applies the following test to
determine when equitable estoppel should apply against a signatory to an
arbitration agreement:
[E]quitable estoppel applies when the signatory to a
written agreement containing an arbitration clause
must rely on the terms of the written agreement in
asserting its claims against the nonsignatory. When
each of a signatory's claims against a nonsignatory
makes reference to or presumes the existence of the
written agreement, the signatory's claims arise out of
and relate directly to the written agreement, and
arbitration is appropriate.
Brantley v. Republic Mortg. Ins. Co., 424 F.3d 392, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). “Because this legal
test examines the nature of the signatory's underlying allegations against the
nonsignatory, courts should examine the underlying complaint to determine
whether estoppel should apply.” Am. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc., 453 F.3d at
627.
In the present case, the Plaintiff alleges that LHDR relies upon and uses
CDS to handle negotiations for debt adjusting under the ARA [Doc. 1-1 at ¶
33], and that the ARA obligates the Plaintiff to pay 15% of the total scheduled
debt to be settled to CDS [Id. at ¶ 31]. In Count I of the Complaint, the Plaintiff
seeks a declaration that the services provided by CDS and LHDR pursuant
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to the ARA constitutes illegal debt adjusting. [Id. at ¶ 56]. The Complaint
further asserts that the activities of LHDR and CDS constitute unfair and
deceptive trade practices (Counts III, IV, and V), and that the proceeds
received from CDS under the ARA were the result of illegal debt adjusting and
thus constitute unjust enrichment (Count VI). The Plaintiff’s claims against
CDS arise out of and relate directly to this Agreement. The Plaintiff cannot
assert such claims against CDS and yet deny CDS the right to demand
arbitration in accordance with the parties’ contract. See Am. Bankers, 453
F.3d at 627.
Additionally, “equitable estoppel is warranted when the signatory to the
contract containing the arbitration clause raises allegations of substantially
interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one
or more of the signatories to the contract.” Brantley, 424 F.3d at 396 (internal
quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). Here, the Plaintiff has
alleged that CDS engaged in concerted misconduct with LHDR, a signatory
to the ARA. [See ARA, Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 30, 31, 33, 56]. As such, equitable
estoppel precludes the Plaintiff from arguing that CDS as a non-signatory is
not entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement.
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CDS is further entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement due to its
status as a third party beneficiary of the ARA. See Brantley, 424 F.3d at 39697. The ARA obligates the Plaintiff to pay CDS a percentage of the total
scheduled debt. [ARA, Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 31]. This contractual provision clearly
demonstrates the signatories’ intent to provide a benefit to CDS under the
Agreement. See Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 329
N.C. 646, 652, 407 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1991) (noting that “intent to benefit is the
determining factor” in establishing a third party’s status as intended
beneficiary of contract).
For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that the Defendants, both
signatories and non-signatories alike, are entitled to enforce the arbitration
agreement set forth in the ARA.
B.
LHDR’s Capacity
Next, the Plaintiff argues that as a foreign limited liability company that
failed to obtain a certificate of authority from the State of North Carolina,
LHDR lacked the capacity or authority to enter into a contract for professional
legal services, and therefore, the parties’ arbitration agreement is invalid.
[Doc. 31 at 6-8].
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“The law is well settled in this circuit that, if a party seeks to avoid
arbitration and/or a stay of federal court proceedings pending the outcome of
arbitration by challenging the validity or enforceability of an arbitration
provision on any grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract, the grounds must relate specifically to the arbitration clause and not
just to the contract as a whole.” Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290
F.3d 631, 636 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Thus, “unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the
contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.”
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46, 126 S.Ct.
1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006).
Here, the Plaintiff’s challenge to the
“capacity” and “authority” of LHDR as an unregistered foreign limited liability
company to enter into an agreement with a resident of North Carolina does
not relate to the arbitration clause specifically. Rather, the Plaintiff’s challenge
calls into question the validity of the ARA as a whole. See Snowden, 290 F.3d
at 638 (concluding that plaintiff’s assertion that defendant was not state
licensed as money lender was challenge to validity of contract as a whole and
did not relate to validity of arbitration agreement specifically). Because the
validity of the entire agreement is an issue that is reserved for the arbitrator,
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it cannot serve as a basis to deny the motion to compel arbitration in this
case. See id.
C.
Unconscionability
The Plaintiff next contends that the arbitration provision of the ARA is
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. [Doc. 46 at 7-11].
The question of unconscionability is one of state law. See, e.g., Perry
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987).
Here, it is alleged that the ARA was entered into in North Carolina. [Doc. 1-1
at ¶ 12].
Accordingly, the Court will apply the substantive law of North
Carolina to determine whether the contract was unconscionable.
Unconscionability is an affirmative defense, and the party asserting it
has the burden of proof. Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C.
93, 102, 655 S.E.2d 362, 370 (2008). “A court will find a contract to be
unconscionable only when the inequality of the bargain is so manifest as to
shock the judgment of a person of common sense, and where the terms are
so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them on the one hand,
and no honest and fair person would accept them on the other.” Id. at 102-03,
655 S.E.2d at 369 (citation omitted).
A party asserting the defense of
unconscionability must prove that the contract is both procedurally and
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substantively unconscionable. Id. at 102, 655 S.E.2d at 370. “[P]rocedural
unconscionability involves ‘bargaining naughtiness’ in the form of unfair
surprise, lack of meaningful choice, and an inequality of bargaining power.”
Id. at 102-03, 655 S.E.2d at 370 (citation omitted).
“Substantive
unconscionability, on the other hand, refers to harsh, one-sided, and
oppressive contract terms.” Id.
In the present case, the Plaintiff’s sole argument regarding procedural
unconscionability is that “[t]he chasm of legal understanding and negotiating
skills between LHDR . . . and the Plaintiff is overwhelming.” [Doc. 46 at 7].
As the North Carolina Court of Appeals has noted, however:
[B]argaining inequality alone generally cannot
establish procedural unconscionability. Otherwise,
procedural unconscionability would exist in most
contracts between corporations and consumers.
There would nearly always be some degree of
‘inequality of bargaining power.
Westmoreland v. High Point Healthcare, Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, 721 S.E.2d
712, 717 (2012). Such statement is all the more true with respect to contracts
between consumers and lawyers. Therefore, the fact that LHDR may have
had legal knowledge and negotiating skills superior to that of the Plaintiff,
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without more, does not render the parties’ arbitration agreement procedurally
unconscionable.3
The Plaintiff next argues that the provisions in the arbitration agreement
requiring the parties to pay their own legal fees and to share the costs of
arbitration renders the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable.
The Plaintiff’s argument that arbitration would subject him to prohibitively high
fees, however, is simply speculative.
First, the ARA calls for arbitration
through either the Judicial Arbitration Mediation Service (JAMS) or the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), two well-known arbitration forums,
both of which are consumer friendly and affordable.
Under JAMS, the
consumer’s fees for arbitration is only $250.4 Under the AAA, individual
consumers with claims under $10,000 are responsible for one-half of the
arbitrator fees up to a maximum of $125; for claims not exceeding $75,000,
the maximum fee for which an individual consumer is responsible is $375.5
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An arbitration clause in an engagement letter proposed by an attorney is not
unconscionable and does not rise to the level of being unethical. RPC 107.
4
See JAMS Consumer Arbitration Policy: Minimum Standards of Procedural
Fairness (eff. July 15, 2009), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/consumer-arbitration
(last visited May 29, 2012). A true and accurate copy of this document is filed in the
record as Doc. 51-1.
5
See AAA Consumer Arbitration Costs, Administrative Fee Waiver, and Pro
Bono Arbitrators, available at http://www.adr.org (last visited May 29, 2012). A true and
accurate copy of this document as it appears on the AAA’s website is filed in the record
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Further, while each party is required to bear their own attorney’s fees, the
Plaintiff has not shown that the costs of retaining counsel for the purposes of
arbitration would be any more cost prohibitive than retaining counsel for the
purposes of maintaining this action in federal court. As such, the Plaintiff has
failed to established that the legal fees provision has in any way “deterred
[him] from attempting to vindicate his rights by means of a full and fair
arbitration proceeding.” Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238
F.3d 549, 558 (4th Cir. 2001).
Further, it should be noted that the arbitration provision does not
preclude the Plaintiff from selecting the arbitrator.
Indeed, the provision
permits the arbitrator to be selected from one of two national arbitration
entities either by mutual agreement of the parties or by the filing party, thereby
ensuring the neutrality of the arbitrator appointed. Additionally, the arbitration
agreement provides for arbitration in a convenient forum -- i.e., the Plaintiff’s
county of residence or the closest metropolitan county. As such, it cannot be
argued that the forum provision is fundamentally unfair or disproportionately
one-sided, or that it would cost the Plaintiff money for travel and lodging.
as Doc. 51-2
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For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate that the arbitration agreement is procedurally and
substantively unconscionable.
D.
Arbitration of Class Claims
The parties are in agreement that arbitration of the class claims set forth
in the Plaintiff’s Complaint would not be appropriate. [See Doc. 31 at 8; Doc.
32 at 11-12]. Accordingly, these class claims will be stayed pending the
resolution of the Plaintiff’s non-class claims that proceed to arbitration. See
Cannon v. GunnAllen Financial, Inc., No. 3:06-0804, 2007 WL 189601, at *8
(M.D. Tenn. Jan. 22, 2007) (staying class claims pending resolution of
plaintiff’s non-class claims in arbitration).
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Compel
Arbitration [Doc. 26] is GRANTED and arbitration of the Plaintiff’s individual
claims against the Defendants is hereby COMPELLED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Judicial
Notice [Doc. 5]; Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 7];
Defendants Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC and Macey, Aleman, Hyslip
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& Searns and CDS Client Services, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 22]; and
Defendants Jeffrey Hyslip and Linda Carol’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 24] are
DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action, including the class claims
set forth in the Complaint, is STAYED pending the arbitration of Plaintiff’s nonclass claims.
The Clerk of Court is directed to administratively close this case pending
arbitration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: June 1, 2012
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