Johnson v. Fields et al

Filing 47

ORDER denying 45 Motion to Dismiss ; denying 45 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 11/01/16. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(emw)

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BRYSON CITY DIVISION
2:14-cv-38-FDW
ROCKY JOHNSON,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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EVA FIELDS, Nurse, et al.,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, (Doc. No. 45), filed by
Defendant Diane Ray, pursuant to Rules 8, 9(g), and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant Ray is
represented by Katherine R. Hilkey-Boyatt of the law firm of Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog, LLP.
I.

BACKGROUND

This case has a detailed procedural history, but the Court will only recite the facts
relevant to Defendant Ray’s pending motion to dismiss. Pro se Plaintiff Rocky Johnson, an
inmate in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons, filed this action, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, on August 25, 2014, alleging among other things that movant Diane Ray and
other named Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs while
he was a pretrial detainee at the Buncombe County Detention Center. (Doc. No. 1). On initial
review, this Court, among other things, dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s claim against
Defendant Ray for deliberate indifference to medical needs with prejudice for failure to state a
claim. (Doc. No. 9). In addressing Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to serious
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medical needs as to Defendant Ray, this Court found as follows:
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of a brief delay in receiving medical care and medication for
his lower back pain do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. By his own
allegations, Plaintiff alleges that, although he was denied the right to see a medical provider in
June 2013, he was eventually seen and that his lower back pain was treated with Gabapentin by
August 2013. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege that the delay in receiving medical care and
medication adversely affected his condition. See Webb v. Hamidullah, 281 Fed. App’x 159 (4th
Cir. 2008) (“An Eighth Amendment violation only occurs . . . if the delay results in some
substantial harm to the patient.”). In sum, . . . Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for an Eighth
Amendment violation against Defendant Ray.
(Doc. No. 9 at 6).
Plaintiff appealed this Court’s dismissal and on June 30, 2015, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, vacated, among other things, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims of deliberate
indifference against Defendant Ray. (Doc. No. 14). Defendant Ray has now filed the pending
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff has not sufficiently stated a claim
for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Defendant Ray. Defendant also
moves for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Ray for punitive damages and
Plaintiff’s state law claim against Defendant for medical malpractice.
II.

DISCUSSION

The Court first finds that Defendant Ray’s motion to dismiss as to the deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs claim is denied, as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
already held, in reversing this Court, that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim against
Defendant Ray for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Specifically, in reversing
this Court, the Fourth Circuit stated:
We review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C §
1915A(b)(1) (2012), “applying the same standards as those for reviewing a
dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” De'lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524
(4th Cir.2013). “The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency
of a complaint; importantly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not resolve contests
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surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). As a result, to survive such a motion, a
complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level” and have “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “In assessing the complaint's plausibility, we
accept as true all the factual allegations contained therein.” De’lonta, 708 F.3d at
524. “[D]eliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of a pretrial detainee
violates the due process clause.” In order to make out a prima facie claim of
deliberate indifference, Johnson must allege “that the defendants actually knew of
and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to [him] or that they actually
knew of and ignored [his] serious need for medical care.” Id. at 575-76. We
conclude that Johnson alleged in his complaint a prima facie case of deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs. Johnson pleaded facts that showed the
Defendants were on notice as to his medical need but delayed treatment for two
months. Johnson's allegations further raised a factual question as to whether he
had a medical need that was “serious.” Thus, dismissal of this claim was
premature. . . . We . . . vacate the district court's dismissal with prejudice of
Johnson's claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against
Defendants Salyers and Diane Ray. As to the remaining claims and Defendants,
we affirm the district court's dismissal without prejudice. We remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion but express no opinion about the merits
of Johnson's claims.
Johnson v. Fields, 616 F. App’x 599, 600-01 (4th Cir. 2015) (emphases added) (some citations
omitted). In its order reversing this Court’s dismissal, the Fourth Circuit clearly held that
Plaintiff stated a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs as to Defendant Ray
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. This Court is
bound by the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claim against her must therefore be denied.1
Next, Defendant Ray contends that Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages should be

Although the Fourth Circuit’s per curiam order does state, rather confusingly, that the court
“expresses no opinion about the merits of [Plaintiff’s] claims,” the appellate court clearly did
rule on the merits of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Ray, finding that
the allegations were sufficient under the standards set forth in Rule 12(b)(6).
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dismissed. Punitive damages may be awarded in Section 1983 actions in appropriate
circumstances, where the punishable conduct involves “’reckless or callous indifference to the
federally protected rights of others,’ as well as for conduct motivated by evil intent.” Cooper v.
Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). “The
callous indifference required for punitive damages is essentially the same as the deliberate
indifference required for a finding of liability” on a § 1983 claim alleging deliberate indifference.
Id. Because Plaintiff has at least sufficiently alleged plausible claims for deliberate indifference
as to Defendant Ray, he has also sufficiently alleged claims for punitive damages. Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages will be denied at this time.
Finally, Defendant Ray contends that, to the extent that Plaintiff purports to bring a state
law claim of medical malpractice against her, Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because
Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss with regarding to Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim is denied
to the extent that this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s supplemental state
law claim for medical malpractice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1)

Defendant Ray’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 45), is DENIED.

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