Leardini v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education et al

Filing 72

ORDER denying 63 Motion for New Trial; denying 63 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Signed by Senior Judge Graham Mullen on 5/18/2012. (blf)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:09-CV-264

JEFFREY T. LEARDINI,

)
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG
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BOARD OF EDUCATION and
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KAY CUNNINGHAM, in her individual )
and official capacities,
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Defendants.
)
____________________________________)

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial and
Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [D.I. 63, 64], Plaintiff’s Response [D.I. 68],
and Defendants’ Reply [D.I. 71]. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants’ Motion is
DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
The trial in this matter resulted in a verdict against Defendants on both claims: the § 1983
due process violation against both Defendants and negligence by Defendant Cunningham.
Defendants now move for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for several reasons. First, Defendants claim that the Court committed a substantial
and prejudicial error by instructing the jurors that they could consider Plaintiff’s criminal
prosecution and acquittal in awarding damages. Second, Defendants claim that the Court
committed substantial error in refusing to instruct the jury on contributory negligence. Third,
Defendants claim that the Court committed substantial error in refusing to instruct the jury on
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Defendants’ affirmative defense, that Plaintiff would have been dismissed if he had been given a
hearing, to the § 1983 claim. Finally, Defendants claim that the Court committed plain error in
the jury verdict form because Question 1 omitted the elements or misrepresentation or coercion
and the element of intent, and Question 5, according to Defendants, assumed that Defendant
Cunningham was negligent without asking the jury to find the elements of negligence.
Additionally, Defendants make a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) on the issue of municipal liability and on all
grounds stated in the Rule 50(a) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law previously filed [D.I.
56].
The Court will first address Defendants’ Rule 59 arguments and then proceed to address
Defendants’ Rule 50(b) arguments.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW - NEW TRIAL (RULE 59)
Pursuant to Rule 59, the Court may grant a new jury trial “for any reason which a new
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in a federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(a)(1)(A). A new trial is necessary where “(1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the
evidence, or (2) is based upon evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of
justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would permit the direction of a
verdict.” Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2000). A new trial can be needed
when the trial judge created a substantial error in giving the jury instructions or when the
instructions, taken as a whole, either were misleading to the jury or incorrectly stated the law.
See Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891-92 (4th Cir. 1980). In
considering the motion, the Court should not substitute its own judgment of facts and witness
credibility, particularly where the subject matter of the trial is easily comprehended by a lay jury.
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Connor v. Shrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 201 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Abasiekong
v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055, 1059 (4th Cir. 1984).1 The decision to grant or deny a motion
for a new trial “rests with the sound discretion of the district court[.]” Bristol Steel & Iron Works
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1994).
III. ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANTS’ RULE 59 MOTION
1. The Jury Instructions Were Proper As a Whole
Defendants first ask for a new trial on the ground that the jury was instructed that it could
not consider Plaintiff’s criminal charges and acquittal in deciding liability, but that it could
consider them in awarding damages. Defendants challenge the following instruction:
You’ve heard the testimony at this trial that Mr. Leardini was charged with and
eventually acquitted of the violation of some criminal statutes. I instruct you that the fact
that Mr. Leardini was found not guilty of criminal conduct has no bearing on this case on
the issue of liability and may have some bearing as to the issue of damages.
(Tr. 2/24/2012 p. 83). The standard for challenging this instruction is as follows: “Instructions
will be considered adequate if construed as a whole, and in light of the whole record, [they]
adequately [informed] the jury of the controlling legal principles without misleading or
confusing the jury to the prejudice of the existing party.” King v. McMillan, 594 F.3d 301, 311
(4th Cir. 2010) (citing Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2003)).
The Court ruled in pre-trial motions that evidence of Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution
would not be admitted at trial. Plaintiff moved the Court to reconsider and the Court granted

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Defendants contend that the Court may weigh the evidence and credibility. See Bryant v. Aiken
Regional Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2003). However, the Court should grant a
new trial only if “1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, 2) is based on
evidence which is false, or 3) will result in a miscarriage of justice. Id (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
59). The three scenarios described Bryant are not present here, and thus the Court finds it
unnecessary to weigh evidence and judge witness credibility in the manner suggested by
Defendants.
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Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration after a juror, during jury selection, disclosed that he read a
news account of Plaintiff’s criminal trial indicating that Plaintiff was acquitted.
Subsequently, the Court agreed to Defendants’ request to instruct the jury that the
evidence it heard at trial regarding Plaintiff’s criminal charges and acquittal was irrelevant to
determining whether Plaintiff’s resignation was involuntary. The Court further agreed to
Plaintiff’s request for an instruction that the evidence of the criminal charges and acquittal “may
have some bearing” in determining Plaintiff’s damages.
It is clear to the Court that the verdict was not based on anger towards the Defendants
regarding Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution. Rather, the verdict recognized the damages that
flowed from the denial of Plaintiff’s due process rights and the humiliation that Plaintiff
endured. Plaintiff’s expert addressed an economic loss of approximately $521,000.00 and the
jury returned a verdict of approximately the same amount for Plaintiff’s non-economic damages.
Taken as a whole, the Court’s instruction was proper and the jury’s verdict was a measured
assessment of the impact that the due process deprivation had on the Plaintiff.
2. The Court Properly Declined to Instruct the Jury Regarding Contributory
Negligence
Defendants properly note that in North Carolina, contributory negligence is ordinarily a
question for the jury rather than an issue decided as a matter of law. See Champs Convenience
Stores v. United Chemical Co., 329 N.C. 446, 406 S.E.2d 856 (N.C. 1991). However,
Defendants rely specifically on two cases that declined to apply contributory negligence to assert
that the Court erred in not giving the instruction. See Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E. 65
(N.C. 1968); Hummer v. Pulley, Watson, King & Lisher, P.A., 140 N.C. App. 270, 536 S.E.2d
349 (N.C. App. 2000). Under this Court’s reading of Miller, Plaintiff was not required to
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anticipate that Defendant Cunningham would give him misleading information when she
confronted him about the allegations of inappropriate touching. Hummer only explains the
difference between contributory negligence and the doctrine of avoidable consequences. These
cases do not persuade the Court that a contributory negligence instruction would be proper in the
instant matter. At trial Defendants failed to present evidence sufficient to support a contributory
negligence instruction.
3. The Court Properly Declined to Instruct the Jury Regarding the § 1983
Affirmative Defense
Defendants argue that the Court erred in not allowing the jury to consider the affirmative
defense that Plaintiff would have been terminated even if he received his hearing. At trial,
CMS’s Director of Employee Relations and 30(b)(6) witness regarding personnel policies, Janet
Hamilton, conceded that she had “no idea” whether Plaintiff would have been terminated
following a hearing. Additionally, the CMS Policy on Standards of Conduct state that “[a]ny
form of unwelcome or inappropriate physical contact with a student... is grounds for discipline,
up to and including immediate termination.” In no way did Defendants present evidence, by
way of testimony or document, that met the evidentiary burden necessary to require this Court to
give an instruction on the § 1983 affirmative defense.2

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The standard is set forth in the case, Montgomery v. City of Ardmore, 365 F.3d 926, 937 (10th
Cir. 2004), Defendants cite on this issue: “[I]f the employer can establish that the employee
would have been terminated even if a proper hearing had been given, the terminated employee
cannot receive damages stemming from the termination in an action for a procedural due process
violation.” Id.; see McClure v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 228 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“The [defendant] must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have reached
the same termination decision in any event. Unless the defendant carries that burden, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for the injury caused by the defendant’s adverse action.”);
Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1209 (10th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff entitled to compensatory
damages for adverse action when defendant failed to establish adverse action would have
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4. The Verdict Form was Proper
Defendants request a new trial on the basis that Questions 1 and 5 because Question 1
omitted the elements of misrepresentation or coercion and the element of intent, and because
Question 5 assumed that Defendant Cunningham was negligent without asking the jury to find
the elements of negligence. The verdict form was proper because the Court instructed the jury
on the elements of misrepresentation or coercion and the element of intent, and because the
Court instructed the jury on the elements of negligence. Defendants cite no authority to support
their argument regarding missing elements in a verdict form. Furthermore, Defendants own
proposed verdict form [D.I. 50] omitted the “elements” of which Defendants complain.
5. The Jury Instructions on the Issue of Municipal Liability for the § 1983 Claim
Were Proper
Defendants request a new trial on municipal liability based on the jury instructions. The
Court does not find Defendants argument persuasive.
The Supreme Court held that the issue of who is the policymaker is a question of state
law. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986); City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989). The
“trial judge must identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final
policymaking authority for the local governmental actor.” Jett, 491 U.S. at 737. The Court must
“ask whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a
particular area, or on a particular issue” and that “inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state
law.” McMillan v. Monroe County, Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785-86 (1997).

occurred even if due process had been provided).
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Here, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-325(o) and Board Policy GCQC, the Board was not
the policymaker. Rather, the superintendent was the policymaker and he could delegate his
authority under Board policy and practice. This Court declared there was no dispute that CMS
delegated authority to the Superintendent and then to Kay Auger. (Tr. 2/24/2012 pp. 11-13). To
the limited extent that a factual inquiry was needed about the customary practice of the school
district, the jury was properly instructed to determine if CMS delegated the policymaking
function regarding resignations.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW - JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW (RULE 50)
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where “there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on the issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
“[W]hen a jury has returned its verdict, a court may grant judgment as a matter of law only if,
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing every
legitimate inference in that party’s favor, the court determines that the only conclusion a
reasonable jury could have reached is one in favor of the moving party.” Sloane v. Equifax Info.
Servs., 510 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir.
2002)).
Pursuant to Rule 50, a party who moved for judgment as a matter of law at trial may,
within twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment, renew the request for judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). In ruling on a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, a
court has several options and may: (1) allow judgment on the verdict; (2) order a new trial; or (3)
direct entry of judgment as a matter of law on the claims. Fed R. Civ. P. 50(b)(1)-(3). A “Rule
50(b) motion should be granted if a district court determines, without weighing the evidence or
considering the credibility of the witnesses, that substantial evidence does not support the jury’s
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findings.” Konkel v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing White v.
Cnty. of Newberry, 985 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1993)). A district court may grant judgment as a
matter of law “if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for
the [non-moving] party...” Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055, 1059 (4th Cir. 1984)). A renewed motion
for judgment as a matter of law is properly granted “if the nonmoving party failed to make a
showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he had the burden of proof.”
Wheatley v. Wicomico Cnty., Md., 390 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Singer v. Dungan,
45 F.3d 823, 827 (4th Cir. 1995)).
V. ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANTS’ RULE 50 MOTION
1. Defendants Request for Judgment as a Matter of Law on Municipal Liability is
Denied
Defendants claim that the Plaintiff failed, at trial, to connect his § 1983 violation to
Defendant Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. Defendants assert that the Board did not
delegate its policymaking authority as to resignations, that it did not delegate authority to
negotiate the terms of resignations or authority to allow someone to rescind, and that there was
no evidence of customary practices that amounted to delegation of the Board’s policymaking
authority.
Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-325(o)3 moved policymaking
authority over resignations away from the school board and to the superintendent. Under Policy

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The only case to interpret this statute held that any action by a local board on a resignation was
a “gratuitous and meaningless formality.” See Warren v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 80
N.C. App. 656 at 659, 343 S.E.2d 225 at 227 (N.C. App. 1986).
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GCQC, the Board delegated to the Superintendent and his designees any policymaking authority
it might claim under § 115C-325(o). Additionally, evidence presented at trial showed that, as a
matter of customary practice, resignation matters were delegated to the Assistant Superintendent
for Human Resource and not reviewed by anyone above her. Accordingly, there was evidence to
support the jury’s finding on the issue of municipal liability and this Court will not disturb the
jury’s verdict.
2. Defendants’ Renewed Original Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [D.I. 56]
is Denied
On February 23, 2012, this Court denied certain portions of Defendants initial Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law. Defendants present no compelling argument as to why this Court
should overturn its past ruling and therefore, Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law is denied.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ Motion for a New Trial and Renewed
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: May 18, 2012

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