Hall et al v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW et al
Filing
57
ORDER adopting 53 Memorandum and Recommendations; denying 46 Motion; denying 49 Motion to Dismiss; Plaintiff's claims against Daimler are Dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr on 12/5/11. (com)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:10-cv-418-RJC-DSC
CHARLES R. HALL, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW;
and UAW LOCAL UNION 5285,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Daimler Trucks North America
LLC’s (“Daimler”) Motion for Entry of Dismissal, (Doc. No. 46), Defendants International
Union, UAW, and UAW Local Union 5285's (collectively, “the Union”) Motion to Dismiss,
(Doc. No. 49), the Magistrate Judge’s July 29, 2011 Memorandum and Recommendation (“July
29 M&R”), recommending that the Court deny the Union’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 53),
and the Union’s Objections to the M&R, (Doc. No. 54).
I.
BACKGROUND
The Union does not object to the facts set forth in the April 6, 2011 Memorandum and
Recommendation (“April 6 M&R”), (Doc. No. 36), and adopted in the July 29 M&R, (Doc. No.
53). See (Doc. Nos. 50 at 1; 55 at 1). Therefore, the Court adopts those facts here. In short, this
matter arises out of the implementation and enforcement of an arbitration award issued on
January 21, 2010 pursuant to grievance procedures established in the 2006-10 collective
bargaining agreement between Daimler and the Union (collectively, “Defendants”). Due to
Daimler’s shift of certain truck production from its Mt. Holly facility to its Santiago, Mexico
facility, Defendant UAW instituted a class action grievance on behalf of all the adversely
affected employees. On January 21, 2010, the Arbitrator ruled in favor of Defendant UAW and
ordered that Daimler “make whole” certain bargaining unit employees affected by the contract
violations. The Arbitrator expressly directed the question of “employee losses” to Daimler and
the Union for further “consideration and determination” and retained jurisdiction “to determine
any disputes over the interpretation or application of this award, including the extent of
employee losses.” Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on September 24, 2010, claiming
that Defendants failed to implement the initial arbitration award. (Doc. No. 11).
On April 25, 2011, Plaintiffs moved to file a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. No.
37). The Magistrate Judge granted this motion on May 31, 2011. (Doc. No. 44). Plaintiffs filed
their Second Amended Complaint on June 6, 2011. (Doc. No. 45). In allowing the amendment,
the Magistrate Judge stated:
The essence of Plaintiffs’ proposed Second Amended Complaint is that [the
Union] settled the employee losses dispute with [Daimler] by agreeing to terms
which would have never been reached had they fairly represented their
membership and engaged in arms length negotiations. The proposed Second
Amended Complaint asserts that [the Union] breached its duty of fair
representation by using the Arbitration Award negotiations as a bargaining chip in
negotiations for the new 2010-2014 CBA.
To show that a union breached its duty of fair representation, an employee must
demonstrate that the union recklessly disregarded the employees’ rights, was
grossly deficient in its representation, or otherwise acted arbitrarily,
discriminatory or in bad faith in handling the employees’ grievances. Thompson
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 276 F.3d 651, 657 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2002). The Court
finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Union advanced its own interests and
agenda to the detriment of the affected employees by using the Arbitration Award
negotiations as a bargaining chip in negotiations for the new 2010-2014 CBA are
sufficient at this stage of the proceedings to support a claim that [the Union]
breached its duty of fair representation.
2
(Doc. No. 44 at 2-3).
In recommending that this Court deny the Union’s motion to dismiss, the Magistrate
Judge pointed further to Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Union: (1) failed to grieve excessive
overtime; (2) misinformed employees; (3) agreed to a very limited definition of “make whole”
compensation; (4) agreed to inadequate health insurance payments; (5) agreed to an improper
setoff against other wages earned; and (6) agreed to an inadequate compensation formula for
calculating the work required to produce a truck. (Doc. No. 53 at 3).
The Union objects to the Magistrate Judge’s failure to: (1) apply a deferential standard of
review to the actions of the Union, and (2) “properly scrutinize the ‘facts’ that are set forth in the
Second Amended Complaint.” (Doc. No. 54).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court may assign dispositive pretrial matters pending before the court to a
magistrate judge for “proposed findings of fact and recommendations.” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B). The Federal Magistrate Act provides that “a district court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specific proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made.” Id. at § 636(b)(1); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir.
1983). However, “when objections to strictly legal issues are raised and no factual issues are
challenged, de novo review of the record may be dispensed with.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d
44, 47 (4th Cir.1982). Similarly, de novo review is not required by the statute “when a party
makes general or conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the
magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Id. “[I]n the absence of a timely
filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy
itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
3
recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.
2005) (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 72 advisory committee’s note).
In its review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the court should accept as true all well-pleaded
allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan
Labs, Inc. v. Matakari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be
supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at
563. A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will survive if it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
The Union’s Motion to Dismiss
After a de novo review of the Union’s motion, the Court agrees with the Magistrate
Judge, ADOPTS the July 29 M&R, (Doc. No. 53), and DENIES the Union’s motion to dismiss,
(Doc. No. 49).
In addition to the grounds cited by the Magistrate Judge, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’
fourteen specific factual allegations are sufficient to state a claim for their single count of a
breach of the duty of fair representation by the Union. See (Doc. No. 45 at 26-29). The
deference that the Union stresses courts must give union actions is built into the cause of action
already. Plaintiffs must plead, and eventually prove, that the Union’s actions were not just
4
negligent, but instead grossly deficient or in reckless disregard for the rights of the employees it
represents. Thompson v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 276 F.3d 651, 656 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiffs are not required to meet any heightened pleading standard and the Court must still
“accept as true all well-pleaded allegations.” Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Matakari, 7 F.3d at 1134.
The Union’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 49), is DENIED.
B.
Daimler’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint omitted any allegations against Daimler. (Doc.
No. 45). Daimler moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s action “with prejudice as to Daimler” on this
ground. (Doc. No. 46). Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice as to
Daimler. (Doc. No. 48). Daimler has not filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) entitles Plaintiff to dismiss his case against
Daimler without prejudice. Daimler’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s case with prejudice, (Doc.
No. 46), is DENIED. Plaintiff’s claims against Daimler are DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.
The Magistrate Judge’s July 29 M&R, (Doc. No. 53), is ADOPTED;
2.
The Union’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 49), is DENIED;
3.
Daimler’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s case with prejudice, (Doc. No. 46), is
DENIED; and
4.
Plaintiff’s claims against Daimler are DISMISSED without prejudice.
5
Signed: December 5, 2011
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?