Hinton v. Henderson et al
Filing
101
ORDER denying as moot 84 Motion to Compel; denying as moot 86 Motion to Compel; denying as moot 91 Motion for Hearing; granting 96 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr on 8/19/2013. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(eef)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:10-cv-505-RJC
CHARLES EVERETTE HINTON,
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)
Plaintiff,
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)
vs.
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)
MICHAEL W. HENDERSON, et al.,
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Defendants.
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_________________________________________ )
ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment by
Defendants Teresa Broadway and Andrew Rudgers.1 (Doc. No. 96). Also before the Court are
two Motions to Compel filed by Plaintiff, as well as a Motion for Hearing on the Motions to
Compel. (Doc. Nos. 84; 86; 91).
I.
BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Charles Everette Hinton is an inmate in the custody of the North Carolina
Department of Public Safety currently housed at Maury Correctional Institution in Maury, North
Carolina.2 (Doc. No. 97-1: Defs. Ex. A). Plaintiff is serving two, 10 to 13 year consecutive
sentences after being convicted on April 25, 2012, of being a habitual felon, and on charges of
breaking and entering, larceny, and sexual offense against a child. (Id.).
1
In accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff was advised of
the necessity of filing a response to the summary judgment motion and of the manner in which
evidence could be submitted to the Court. (Doc. No. 99). On July 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed his
Response. (Doc. No. 100).
2
Plaintiff is a frequent and abusive filer in this Court. He has inundated this Court with meritless
actions and motions. He has already accumulated three strikes against him under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g). See Order, Doc. No. 9, Case No. 3:12cv367 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (noting that Plaintiff has
filed 19 civil lawsuits in this Court).
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On October 12, 2010, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants Mecklenburg County
Deputy Sheriff Michael W. Henderson, former Mecklenburg County District Attorney Peter S.
Gilchrist III, and probation officers Teresa Broadway and John Doe. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff
alleged that Defendants, individually or collectively, violated his unspecified constitutional rights
under theories of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment by causing charges to be brought
against him (alleged against Henderson) or pursued against him (alleged against Gilchrist), or by
causing probation violations to be alleged against him resulting in his arrest (alleged against
Broadway and Doe).3 (Id.). On December 3, 2010, Plaintiff amended his Complaint to name
Defendant Andrew Rudgers in place of Defendant John Doe. (Doc. No. 12). On November 16,
2010, Defendant Gilchrist moved for dismissal of the Complaint against him on grounds of
absolute immunity as a state prosecutor, which the Court granted. (Doc. Nos. 7; 43). On February
7, 2011, Defendant Henderson moved for summary judgment, which the Court also granted. (Doc.
Nos. 32; 54).
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was on probation and supervised first by Defendant
Broadway and later by Defendant Rudgers. See (Doc. Nos. 1-2 at ¶¶ 10; 11: Affidavit of Charles
Everette Hinton). According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was arrested on December 31, 2008, as a
result of a criminal complaint brought against him by former defendant Henderson and prosecuted
by former defendant Gilchrist. See (Doc. No. 1-1 at 2: Complaint; Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 3; 8).
3
As Defendants note, Plaintiff does not specify in his Complaint whether he is suing Defendants
in their individual capacities, their official capacities, or both, and he seeks only money damages
against them. (Doc. No. 1 at 5). Plaintiff states in his Response that he sued Defendants in both
capacities. (Doc. No. 100 at 4). A suit against a state official or employee in his official capacity
based on § 1983 constitutes a suit against the State, which is protected from liability for money
damages under the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 70-71 (1989). Thus, Plaintiff could not recover money damages from Defendants in their
official capacities even if his action could survive the summary judgment motion.
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Plaintiff was eventually released from custody on April 21, 2010. (Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 11). He
alleges that Defendants Broadway and Rudgers, as probation officers, “filed false probation
violation reports that were eventually dismissed.” (Doc. No. 1 at 2). Regarding Defendant
Rudgers, Plaintiff more specifically alleges:
Defendant [Rudgers] obtained an arrest warrant for Plaintiff on April 26, 2010,
alleging that Plaintiff had violated his probation when in fact the probation had
expired prior to Plaintiff’s release [on] April 21, 2010, and that no such probation
violation report was made prior to the expiration of the probation period which said
report would have had to have been filed with the clerk’s office prior to the
expiration of the probation. Plaintiff was eventually arrested and held in custody
establishing again another false imprisonment. The resident judge dismissed the
alleged violation explaining that the probation officer had no jurisdiction over
Plaintiff since no such report was filed prior to the expiration of the probation.
(Doc. No. 1-2 at ¶ 11).
Defendant Broadway was Plaintiff’s probation officer until July 2009. According to his
own allegations, Plaintiff was incarcerated for the last six months of Broadway’s supervision of
him, on charges she did not cause to be brought. See (Doc. Nos. 1-1 at ¶¶ 2-4; 1-2 at ¶¶ 1-9).
Having been incarcerated on charges he admits Broadway did not bring, Plaintiff remained
incarcerated until long after Broadway had ceased to supervise his case in July 2009. Thus, neither
the initiation of his incarceration nor the length of it can be attributed to any action of Broadway’s.
Defendant Rudgers took over supervision of Plaintiff’s case in July 2009. Rudgers states in
his Declaration that he did cause probation violations to be brought against Plaintiff in April 2010
that resulted in Plaintiff’s arrest in June of that same year. (Doc. No. 97-2 at ¶¶ 12-13: Affidavit of
Andrew J. Rudgers). Rudgers asserts, however, that he initiated probation violation procedures in
reliance on his professional belief, reinforced by information received from the computerized
probation tracking system, that Plaintiff’s probation had been tolled during the period of his
incarceration on new Mecklenburg County charges from March 23, 2009, to April 16, 2010, thus
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extending Plaintiff’s probation until February 2012. (Id. at ¶ 8). The Superior Court judge
eventually ruled that Plaintiff’s probation was not tolled during his period of incarceration and,
thus, his probation had expired by the time Rudgers brought charges against him in late April
2010. (Doc. Nos. 1-2 at ¶ 11; 97-2 at ¶ 14). As soon as the judge so ruled, Rudgers immediately
obtained an order terminating Plaintiff’s probation and filed the order with the clerk of court.
(Doc. No. 97-2 at ¶ 15).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or
the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought. The
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the
motion.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The rule goes on to provide procedures for responding to a motion for
summary judgment:
c) Procedures.
(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.
(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A party may
object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a
form that would be admissible in evidence.
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(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may
consider other materials in the record.
(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose
a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify
on the matters stated.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of production to
show that there are no genuine issues of fact for trial. Once the moving party has met that burden,
the non-moving party has the burden of persuasion to establish that there is a genuine issue for
trial.
When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with “specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
“genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (citations omitted;
emphasis in the original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56).
III.
DISCUSSION
First, as to Defendant Broadway, Plaintiff alleges that Broadway “caused [him] to be
detained and held on numerous secured bonds resulting in false imprisonment by falsely accusing
[him] of [] probation violations,” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 2), but he does not specify when she allegedly
did so, what probation violations she allegedly instituted, or how she caused him to be detained
and held. Furthermore, for the incarceration relevant to this case—from December 31, 2008, to
April 21, 2010--Plaintiff explicitly attributes his arrest and detention to the actions of Henderson
and Gilchrist, not Broadway. Moreover, and again by his own admission, Plaintiff’s incarceration
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extended long past the date in July 2009 when Broadway ceased to supervise him. Thus,
Broadway cannot be found liable either for his initial detention or his continued incarceration
thereafter. In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint is insufficient to state a claim against Broadway, as he
provides no facts as to any false charges allegedly brought by Broadway. Moreover, in his brief in
response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiff does not even attempt to refute
Defendant Broadway’s argument in support of summary judgment. In fact, he does not mention
Broadway at all in his response brief. Because Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of any
cognizable claim against Defendant Broadway, she is entitled to summary judgment.
Next, as to Defendant Rudgers, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). In determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, the court applies a
two-pronged test. First, the court must decide whether the facts plaintiff alleged make out a
violation of a constitutional right. Second, the court must decide if the right at issue was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established right, the
official is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)). If a government officer objectively reasonably believed that his actions were lawful at the
time of the challenged act, then the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Anderson, 483 U.S. at
638. Reasonable mistakes are not actionable, because if they were, “difficult questions of
discretion would always be resolved in favor of inaction, and effective law enforcement would be
lost.” Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1991).
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Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s allegations against Rudgers arise out of Rudgers’
performance of his official duties. Rudgers states in his Declaration that he believed that his
actions were lawful at the time he undertook them. That is, he believed that the relevant
probationary period was tolled by Plaintiff’s incarceration, and this belief was supported by the
Department of Public Safety’s computer system, which automatically extended Plaintiff’s
probationary period when Rudgers updated it to reflect Plaintiff’s release from incarceration.
(Doc. No. 97-2 at ¶¶ 5-8). Rudgers’ actions were consistent with his duties as a probation officer
faced with an apparent probation violation and, at most, Plaintiff has shown that Rudgers simply
made a mistake in charging Plaintiff with a probation violation. Moreover, Plaintiff’s conclusory
contention that Rudgers was acting out of bad faith is not enough to withstand summary judgment.
In sum, Rudgers is entitled to qualified immunity, and the Court will therefore grant his summary
judgment motion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 96), is GRANTED;
2.
Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel, (Doc. Nos. 84; 86), and his Motion for Hearing,
(Doc. No. 91), are DENIED as moot.
3.
As all Defendants have now been dismissed from this action, the Clerk is instructed
to terminate this case.
Signed: August 19, 2013
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