Troche v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution, Inc.
Filing
86
ORDER denying 78 Motion to Stay or Strike Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff shall have until September 19, 2014 to respond to Defendants motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr on 09/08/2014. (jlk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:11-cv-234-RJC-DSC
MICHAEL TROCHE, individually
and on behalf of all similarly situated
individuals,
Plaintiff,
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vs.
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BIMBO FOODS BAKERIES
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DISTRIBUTION, INC.,
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Defendant.
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____________________________________ )
ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff Michael Troche’s Motion to Stay
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting materials, (Docs. 78-80, 83), and
Defendant’s memorandum in opposition, (Doc. 82). It is ripe for review.
On September 6, 2013, this Court entered a scheduling order stating that: “Discovery in
this case shall be bifurcated. Fourteen (14) days after the Court’s ruling on class certification,
the parties shall submit proposed dates for trial and all other matters relevant to Stage II.” (Doc.
31 at 2). On July 11, 2014, Plaintiff filed its motion for class certification, (Doc. 58), and
Defendant has until September 19, 2014 to respond.
Defendant argues that summary judgment is proper at this juncture as it would promote
efficiency. If granted, summary judgment would moot the need to continue briefing and
additional depositions related to certification; if denied, it would inform the parties of the Court’s
requirements for class certification. Significantly, Defendant contends that summary judgment
at this stage of litigation is proper as neither the federal rules of civil procedure, nor the local
rules of this district restrict the timing of summary judgment orders.
Contending that Defendant has brought this motion in order to stall the class certification
decision, Plaintiff urges this Court to use its discretionary authority to prohibit a motion it
regards as premature. Plaintiff distinguishes the posture of this motion from cases where other
courts have entertained summary judgment motions prior to class certification: such cases
differed from this one by presenting focused and tailored motions that actually created
efficiencies in the litigation.
Whether a court should exercise its discretion to strike (or deny without prejudice) precertification motions for summary judgment turns largely on the factual and procedural posture
of the particular case and the timing of the motion. As cases rarely present identical factual
scenarios, citations to earlier cases, even to those issued by this Court, are of limited usefulness
in guiding the Court.
Here, Defendants have chosen to move for summary judgment prior to class certification.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serve as no obstacle to Defendants motion; Rule 56
provides that a party may move for summary judgment “at any time until 30 days after the close
of all discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b). Additionally, neither the local rules of this district nor
the scheduling order in this case preclude this motion. Therefore, the authority to strike or deny
Plaintiff’s motion would arise from the Court’s discretionary authority to guide the process of
litigation. This determination turns on whether the motion—for factual or timing reasons—is
unfair to Plaintiff, not merely whether it is disagreeable or inconvenient. Here, the Court finds
that the Defendant is within its rights in filing a pre-certification motion for summary judgment.
Ultimately, the decision of whether to file a motion for summary judgment at a stage of litigation
is a strategic one and best determined by the individual defendant. See Cowen v. Bank United,
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70 F.3d 937, 941-42 (7th Cir. 1995) (outlining some of the strategic considerations related to
summary judgment motions prior to class certification).
Therefore, the Court will consider the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, but
will extend the time for Plaintiff to respond to the motion until September 19, 2014 – the same
date that Defendant’s response to class certification is due. In so holding, the Court expects
Defendant to comply with the deadline to respond to the class certification motion and that the
two motions can be addressed by the Court in succession. The Court notes, however, that the
summary judgment motion is not binding on the purported class members but effects only the
claims of the individual Plaintiff.
If the parties desire that the class certification motion be stayed or handled at a later
stage, they must file a brief within fourteen (14) days of this order suggesting an alternate course.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay or Strike Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 78) is denied.
2.
Plaintiff shall have until September 19, 2014 to respond to Defendant’s motion
for Summary Judgment.
3.
If the parties wish to delay the Court’s consideration of class certification, they
must file a motion and supporting brief with the Court within fourteen (14) days
of publication of this order.
Signed: September 8, 2014
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