US Airways, Inc. v. US Airline Pilots Association

Filing 97

ORDER denying 93 Motion to Vacate the Permanent Injunction. Signed by District Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr on 6/13/2014. (tmg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:11-cv-371-RJC-DCK
US AIRWAYS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

US AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCITATION,
and MICHAEL J., CLEARY
Defendants.
____________________________________

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ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Vacate the
Permanent Injunction, (Doc. 93), and the memoranda supporting the respective positions of the
parties, (Docs. 94–96). It is ripe for review.
I.

BACKGROUND
The question in this case is whether to vacate a permanent injunction issued by this Court

two years ago to enjoin violations of the Railway Labor Act (RLA). The injunction was issued
in response to a pattern of unlawful work stoppages perpetrated by Defendants in order to gain
leverage in a collective bargaining dispute with the Plaintiff, US Airways, Inc. Defendants, a
pilots’ union (USAPA) and its officer, were specifically enjoined from coordinating and
conducting slowdown tactics such as delaying flight times by issuing superfluous maintenance
write-ups and prolonging taxi times. (Doc. 72). After the parties agreed to convert the
preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction on January 11, 2012, (Doc. 91), US Airways
merged with American Airlines, (collectively: American). Defendants contend that changed
factual circumstances stemming from the merger justify dissolving the injunction. (Id.).

US Airways and American Airlines memorialized their merger with a Memorandum of
Understanding, (MOU), which implemented industry standard pay and job protections for US
Airways pilots. (Doc. 94). It is the Defendants’ position that the MOU renders the injunction
unnecessary. (Doc. 94). Furthermore, Defendants contend that good faith compliance for two
years weighs heavily in favor of dissolution. (Doc. 94).
Plaintiff disagrees and contends that circumstances have not changed to the extent
necessary to justify dissolving the injunction. Significantly, Plaintiff argues that it is precisely
because the parties are about to enter into collective bargaining negotiations that Defendants seek
to dissolve the injunction. Notwithstanding Defendants’ full compliance, it is the Plaintiff’s
position that the injunction is still needed to prevent unlawful work stoppages that could ensue as
the parties enter into collective bargaining negotiations. (Doc. 95).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
As the party seeking relief from the injunction, Defendants bear the burden of

establishing that changed circumstances warrant relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6); In re Brunley,
938 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). Courts consider several factors in
determining whether to vacate a permanent injunction, including: (1) the circumstances leading
to entry of the injunction and the nature of the conduct sought to be prevented; (2) the length of
time since entry of the injunction; (3) whether the party subject to its terms has complied or
attempted to comply in good faith with the injunction; (4) the likelihood that the conduct or
conditions sought to be prevented will recur absent the injunction; and, (5) whether the objective
of the decree has been achieved and whether continued enforcement would be detrimental to the

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public interest. North Carolina Alliance for Transp. Reform, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 713 F.
Supp. 2d 491, 512 (M.D.N.C. 2010).
III.

DISCUSSION
Defendants offer several reasons why this Court should vacate the permanent injunction,

including: that the injunction is moot because the union is no longer engaged in collective
bargaining with US Airways; that the MOU implemented favorable industry standard terms and
thereby removed any incentive to engage in slowdown tactics; that the injunction is burdensome
because it is not narrowly tailored; and, that it adds an element of confusion as to whether the
new American Airlines is protected by the injunction and whether post-merger pilots are bound
by it. Finally, USAPA contends that its good faith compliance for two years weighs heavily in
favor of dissolution.
By contrast, US Airways contends that this motion, filed on the eve of negotiations for a
joint collective bargaining agreement (JCBA), suggests an intent to resume a campaign of
slowdown tactics; that compliance with the injunction is not burdensome as it merely mandates
that Defendants refrain from behavior which they have no legal right to engage in; and that the
injunction is necessary to the public interest to protect the flying public from delays and
cancellations.
A permanent injunction may be dissolved when it is no longer equitable due to changed
or unforeseen circumstances. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 60(b)(6); Crutchfield v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 175 F. Supp. 2d 835, 843 (E.D.Va. 2001). However, the Defendants have not carried
the initial burden of showing that circumstances stemming from the unforeseen merger warrant
the extraordinary relief of dissolving a permanent injunction. See id.

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Principally, it cannot be said that the concerns that brought about the injunction have
been put to rest due to the merger. Under the terms of the merger, the parties are scheduled to
engage in a new set of collective bargaining negotiations to establish contractual terms
applicable to all pilots employed by (post-merger) American Airlines. (Doc. 95). Therefore, it
does not follow that there is “nothing left to address” as Defendants claim. (Doc. 94).
Moreover, notwithstanding the upcoming JCBA negotiations, Defendants have failed to
offer any substantive reason why the injunction is unduly burdensome and detrimental to the
public interest. Even if all contentious issues had been resolved by the merger, complying with
duties already existing (under the RLA) is not substantially more onerous now than at the time
the injunction was issued. Additionally, the extent to which the merger renders the injunction
unworkable appears to be overstated. Defendants’ arguments would have more traction if the
effect of the injunction was to prohibit a class of pilots from performing activities that another
class was allowed to perform freely. Here, the injunction does nothing more than formally
prohibit activities to a certain class of pilots that are already prohibited to all pilots. This is
another way of saying that the injunction merely requires Defendants to obey the existing laws; it
does not, by its own terms, create any differences in the types of activities allowed by certain
classes of pilots. On balance, Defendants’ good faith compliance, while relevant, is nonetheless
outweighed by the natural possibility that slowdown tactics might resume during any
negotiations.
Finally, Defendant contends the injunction must be vacated because it is inconsistent with
the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA). This argument is unavailing. While the NLGA prevents
courts from issuing injunctions that unfairly curb a union’s collective bargaining power, it does

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not displace the Railway Labor Act, which governs collective bargaining disputes and takes
precedence over the NLGA. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R.R. & Ind. R.R. Co.,
353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957). The Supreme Court has repeatedly found that district courts have the
authority to enjoin RLA violations even if they have an adverse effect on the collective
bargaining posture of a party. Id. at 42. The district court has the “jurisdiction and power to
issue necessary injunctive orders (to enforce compliance with the requirements of the Railway
Labor Act) notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” Id. (quoting
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1952)) (parentheses in original).
This Court conducted an NLGA analysis when it granted the preliminary injunction and
found no conflict between the terms of the injunction and the NLGA as the former merely
enforced compliance with the RLA. (Doc. 72). Additionally, the NLGA establishes standards
for injunctive relief and does not speak to the dissolution of injunctions. 29 U.S.C. § 101.
Accordingly, this injunction remains relevant to prevent RLA violations, and the NLGA does not
set forth any criteria that would require this Court to vacate a valid permanent injunction. For
these reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to vacate the permanent injunction.
IV.

CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate the Permanent Injunction (Doc. No. 93), is DENIED;

2.

The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

Signed: June 13, 2014

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