Wilson v. SunTrust Bank et al
Filing
35
ORDER granting 22 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying as moot 22 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by District Judge Frank D. Whitney on 2/23/12. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(com)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
DOCKET NO.: 3:11-CV-580-FDW
JENNIFER L. WILSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SUNTRUST BANK, INC., SUNTRUST
MORTGAGE, INC.; RESIDENTIAL
FUNDING COMPANY, LLC f/k/a
RESIDENTAL FUNDING
CORPORATION; THE LAW FIRM OF
HUTCHENS, SENTER & BRITTON, P.A.;
AND DOES 1-10,
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ORDER
Defendants.
THIS MATTER comes now before the Court upon Defendants Suntrust Bank, Inc.,
Suntrust Mortgage, Inc., f/k/a Residential Funding Corporation’s Motion To Dismiss (Doc. No.
22). For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) is GRANTED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is DENIED as moot.
I. Background
Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for several claims related to the foreclosure of
her residence including misrepresentation, breach of contract, violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, wrongful foreclosure, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff also seeks to
quiet title.
On January 19, 2007, Plaintiff obtained a loan from Defendant SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.
This loan was evidenced by a promissory note and secured by recording a deed of trust in the
Gaston County Registry. In the Deed of Trust, Plaintiff granted Defendant SunTrust Mortgage a
security interest in a piece of real property (the land in dispute) located at 2635 Gaston Day
School Road, Gastonia, North Carolina 28056. Subsequently, Residential Funding Corporation
became the investor of the loan and SunTrust Mortgage remained the servicer of the loan. (Doc.
No. 1, p. 14; Doc. No. 23, p. 2). On December 21, 2009, a foreclosure on Plaintiff’s property
commenced. (Doc. No. 1, p. 4; Doc. No. 23, p. 2). On January 20, 2010, the Assistant Clerk of
Superior Court of Gaston County entered an Order allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16. (Doc. No. 1, p. 6; Doc. No. 23, p. 2). On May 4, 2010,
Plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy; however, Plaintiff contends this was voluntarily
dismissed shortly thereafter. (Doc. No. 1, p. 6; Doc. No. 23, p. 2). The substitute trustee then
moved the state court to reactivate the foreclosure. (Doc. No. 1, p. 6; Doc. No. 23, p. 2).
On October 27, 2010, the trustee held the foreclosure sale and sold the property to the
highest bidder. (Doc. No. 1, p. 7; Doc. No. 23, p. 3). On November 15, 2011, Plaintiff filed the
current action seeking damages related to the foreclosure, a recession of the new trustee’s deed,
and an order setting aside the clerk’s order allowing the foreclosure sale. (Doc. No. 1, p. 7; Doc.
No 23, p. 3).
II. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal where the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the lawsuit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1), the Court may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting a
defendant’s motion to one for summary judgment. Id.; Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.
Co. v. U.S., 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). Ultimately, the burden of proof is on Plaintiff to
demonstrate that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute. Adams v. Bain, 697
F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982).
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata (or “claim preclusion”) precludes a party from
bringing a claim that has already been “litigated to a final judgment by that party . . . and
precludes the assertion by such parties of any legal theory, cause of action, or defense which
could have been asserted in that action.” Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556
F.3d 177, 210 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). “To
establish a res judicata defense, a party must establish: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a
prior suit, (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and later suit, and (3) an
identity of parties . . . in the two suits.” Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.l (4th Cir. 2000).
III. Analysis
Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim
for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Defendant’s reasoning is centered on the Supreme
Court cases that make up the Rooker/Feldman doctrine. Both Rooker and Feldman, while
decided several years apart, center on the idea that a Plaintiff who is dissatisfied with a state
court judgment may not appeal the exact claims to a federal district court.
Rooker states, “where constitutional questions actually arose in a cause in which a state
court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, that court’s decision, whether right
or wrong, is conclusive, unless and until reversed or modified by a timely and appropriate
appellate proceeding.” Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414 (1923).
Feldman cites Rooker and has a similar factual situation to the case at hand. In Feldman,
plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought permission to sit for the District of Columbia bar examination
and brought an action challenging the validity of the rule which prevented them from doing so.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The court determined it
did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and could not rule in Feldman’s case.
They stated, “[District courts] do not have jurisdiction . . . over challenges to state court
decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege
that state court’s action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may be held only in
[the United States Supreme Court].” Id. at 486; see also id. at 483 (“lower federal courts
possessed no power whatsoever to sit in direct review of state court decisions.”); Leonard v.
Suthard, 927 F.2d 168, 169-170 (4th Cir. 1991) (“We hold that, under the Feldman doctrine, the
state court’s decision may not be reviewed by the district court, and thus, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal.”); see also, Czura v. Supreme Court of South Carolina, 813 F.2d 644 (4th Cir.
1987).
While the Rooker/Feldman doctrine does not deprive federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction over claims similar to those brought in state court, Kimble v. Greenpoint Mortg.,
128 Fed. Appx. 984, 985 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he doctrine does not deprive a federal district court
of subject matter jurisdiction over a suit involving issues similar to those raised in pending state
court litigation.”), the court does not retain jurisdiction over identical claims. Here, Plaintiff
raises the same claims that have been properly adjudicated in state court.
Even if Rooker/Feldman did not apply, the doctrine of res judicata is applicable in North
Carolina and would bar the Plaintiff’s claims in this court. In re Atkinson-Clark Canal Co., 67
S.E.2d 276 (1951) (noting that res judicata does apply to state clerk’s orders that are not
“excepted to and reversed or modified on appeals, as allowed by the statute”).
However, Plaintiff is not left without a remedy. Plaintiff may, of course, appeal her
claims to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. This Court simply does not have jurisdiction
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Rooker and Feldman.
IV. Conclusion
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is GRANTED. Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: February 23, 2012
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