Pearson v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Schools

Filing 5

ORDER for clerk to issue summons. Signed by Chief Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr on 8/21/2012. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(blf)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:12-cv-334-RJC
SHARON PEARSON,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CHARLOTTE MECKLENBURG SCHOOLS, )
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Defendant.
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ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e). Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint, (Doc. No. 1), on May 29, 2012.
Pro se Plaintiff Sharon Pearson filed this lawsuit on a form used by the Court for actions
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff does not cite to any federal constitutional
provisions or other federal statutes in her Complaint but does refer to the Americans with
Disabilities Act in her Charge of Discrimination before the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). (Doc. No. 4 at 5). Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against
when Defendant Charlotte Mecklenburg Schools failed to hire her based on the fact that she
suffers from sickle cell disease and based on her gender. Plaintiff’s allegations, therefore, appear
to be in the nature of an employment discrimination action brought pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42
U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) et seq.; and/or N.C. GEN . STAT . § 95-28.1 (prohibiting discrimination
against any person possessing the Sickle Cell or Hemoglobin C trait).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint
to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious
[or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In its
frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably
meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or
delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). In assessing whether
Plaintiff’s claim fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court uses the same
standard for a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). De’Lonta v. Angelone,
330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003).
In its review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the court should accept as true all well-pleaded
allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan
Labs, Inc. v. Matakari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be
supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at
563. A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will survive if it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
In an attachment to the Complaint, Plaintiff states that she is “seeking redress for
harassment, discrimination and denial of employment including the providing of negative
evaluations once information of the disability [sickle cell disease] was made known.” (Doc. No.
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1-1 at 1). “In order to state a claim for relief, Plaintiff[’s] complaint need not make out a prima
facie case of employment discrimination. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508
(2002). Rather, it must allege facts sufficient to nudge [her] claims across the line from merely
conceivable to plausible . . .” Bannister v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., No. 4:11-cv-94, 2012
489239, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 14, 2012) (Boyle, J.). In Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court held
that the McDonnell Douglas framework is merely an evidentiary standard by which a plaintiff’s
claims are often judged upon summary judgment and that a plaintiff’s statement of claim is
sufficient if it passes Rule 8(a)’s requirements. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513.
Plaintiff’s claim passes this threshold. Plaintiff explains that she was employed with the
Charlotte Mecklenburg Schools before she was notified that her school would be closing. (Id.).
She attempted to apply for jobs within the system. (Id.). Plaintiff states that once Defendant
found out about her sickle cell disease Defendant denied her promotions and other internal
employment opportunities, including transfers. (Id.). Plaintiff ultimately found herself without a
job at CMS. (Id.). Plaintiff states that, as relief, she is seeking back pay from 2009 up to 2012.
(Id. at 3). Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficiently raises a claim of disability discrimination for
purposes of initial review.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.

the Clerk shall issue a summons for service upon the defendant in accordance
with Plaintiff’s proposed summons, (Doc. No. 1-6); and

2.

the United States Marshal shall serve Defendant.

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Signed: August 21, 2012

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