Sayman et al v. Lehman Brothers FSB et al
Filing
48
ORDER. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 2/25/2015. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(eef)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. 3:14-cv-00426-FDW-DSC
ROBERT W. SAYMAN
MARY B. SAYMAN
Plaintiffs,
v.
ASHLEY RICHEY
ANDREW J. PETERSON
GODDARD & PETERSON, PLLC
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC
Defendants.
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ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8) and
Motion for Pre-filing Injunction (Doc. No. 20-1). Defendant, through counsel, seeks a pre-filing
injunction to prohibit Plaintiffs from filing any further pleadings in the current case. Regarding
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 8), in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d
309 (4th Cir. 1975), the Court advised Plaintiffs, who are proceeding pro se, of the heavy burden
that they carry in responding to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
Having reviewed and consider the written arguments, administrative record, and applicable
authority, for the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, Plaintiff’s
Pro Se Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety, and Defendant’s Motion for Pre-filing Injunction
is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On August 4, 2014, Plaintiffs Robert and Mary Sayman filed a pro se complaint against
Defendants Ashley Richey, Andrews Peterson, Goddard & Peterson, and Nationstar Mortgage
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(“Nationstar”). (Doc. No. 1). This complaint is the second action filed by Plaintiffs in this Court
against Nationstar arising out of a 2007 real estate transaction. The Court dismissed the first action
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (3:13-cv-288, Doc. No. 41), and the
Fourth Circuit dismissed on appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Sayman v. Lehman Bros., 14-1575,
2015 WL 105598 (4th Cir. 2015).
At the 2007 real estate closing, Plaintiffs executed Promissory Notes and Deeds of Trust.
(Doc. No. 1). In the first action, Plaintiffs accused Defendants of improperly “monetizing” those
documents. (3:13-cv-288, Doc. No. 34). In the present action, Plaintiffs allege:
The present quasi-judicial hearing as being exercised itself is against North
Carolina Rules and Federal Rules of Evidence §§901, 902, 1002, 1003 and§803.6
[sic] and the North Carolina and the Federal Uniform Commercial Code Title §25
N.C.G.S. §§25-3-101 to 25-3-605 and §25-9-203 is unconstitutional for it uses
copies of Promissory and Deed of Trust Notes unverified and inadmissible
accounting figures without the production of supporting accounting ledgers and
defective affidavits with [sic] violated both State and Federal Law §803.6 and
56(e).
(Doc. No. 1, p. 10, ¶ 19). Plaintiffs also appear to allege violations under the Federal Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), North Carolina General Statues, the Uniform Commercial
Code, and the North Carolina Commerical Code. However, it is unclear from the complaint how
or why Plaintiffs contend any of these laws were violated. It is also unclear what actually
transpired during this real estate transaction. Plaintiffs allege:
On or about July 18, 2007 [sic] Plaintiffs unwittingly executed a Deed of Trust and
Promissory Note; the exact terms of which, and, the extent to which it adversely
affected Plaintiffs [sic] rights, without recourse, were purposely left unknown. . . .
Plaintiff had no knowledge whatsoever as to particular cognovits terms contained
within the Deed of Trust, which, Plaintiff learned much later, contained, inter alia,
a small and somewhat hidden and/or disguised provision, known as a Power of Sale
Clause that, [sic] Plaintiff now finds defendant wanton to, individually and
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severally invoke, in order to literally confiscate Plaintiff’s property without due
process.
(Doc. No. 1, p. 8, ¶ 11-12). Further, after interests in the Notes were transferred several
times, Defendant Nationstar now claims to be owner of Plaintiffs’ Promissory Notes and Deeds of
Trust. (Doc. No. 1). Defendants have not produced the original promissory notes and deeds of
trust, but have provided Plaintiffs copies of these documents. Id.
Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin Defendants from selling, converting, or dispossessing them
of the real estate property named in the aforementioned note. Id. Plaintiffs include Defendants
Goddard & Peterson, PLLC (“Goddard”), Richey, and Peterson in this action by alleging:
Defendants [Goddard] and Peterson acting under the respondeat superior
relationship with Defendant [Nationstar] has [sic] failed to investigate whether
[Nationstar] is in legal possession of the promissory and mortgage note(s) and has
the right to enforce the notes(s) in a foreclosure action and has violated Title 15
U.S.C. §2692e(2)(a) . . . and Article 3 as codified in Title 25 N.C.G.S. §§13-3101
to 13-4605 and N.C.G.S. 25-9-302.
Defendant [Nationstar, Goddard], Richey and Peterson has [sic] intentionally
violated the supreme law of the land . . . by filing a foreclosure complaint on May28,
2014 [sic] without proving the existence of any original note(s) in direct
contradiction to a ruling of Chief Justice John Marshal in Sheehy v. Mandeville, 11
U.S. 208, 218 (1812). . . .
(Doc. No. 1, p.12, ¶ 22-23). Finally, Plaintiffs allege that this case involves civil rights
issues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and violations of the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution because Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their
right to own property and their access to courts. (Doc. No. 1).
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Defendant Nationstar moves to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 8(a)(2) for
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failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the
sufficiency of the complaint, and a complaint which does not state a “short and plain statement of
the claim” is not sufficient under this standard. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943,
952 (4th Cir. 1992).
Under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8, a party seeking relief must set forth a “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Further, the
allegations contained within the pleading must be “simple, concise, and direct.” Id. at 8(d)(2).
While the court must treat the facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,
the court does not need to accept as true “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkts. v. J.D. Assoc., 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). A pleading
must contain enough information to give a defendant and the court “fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges violations under the FDCPA, North Carolina General
Statutes, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the North Carolina Commercial Code arising out of
the transfer of the mortgage documents from one mortgage lender to another. To state a claim
under the FDCPA, Plaintiffs must show: (1) they have been the object of collection activity arising
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from consumer debt, (2) Defendant is a debtor collector, and (3) Defendants engaged in an act or
omission prohibited by the FDCPA. Boosahda v. Providence Dane, 462 Fed.Appx. 331, 333 n. 3
(4th Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs’ complaint does not contain a factual basis satisfying any of these three
prongs.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are trying to foreclose illegally because they have not
produced the original note in the foreclosure hearing. However, “arguing that a defendant has ‘not
proven that it is the holder of the note because it failed to produce the original note’ is
‘unavailing.’” Mullis v. First Charter Bank, et. al., No. 5:12-cv-90, 2-13 WL 3899888, *15
(W.D.N.C. 2013) (quoting Dobson v. Substitute Trustee Servs., Inc., 711 S.E.2d 728, 730 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2011)). Therefore, this allegation, without more, does not state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege general violations of North Carolina General Statutes, the Uniform
Commercial Code, the North Carolina Commercial Code, the Federal Rules of Evidence, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. However, Plaintiffs do
not specify how their allegations provide for affirmative relief under any of the code sections cited,
nor do they allege a cognizant violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the U.S. Constitution. The
cited sections to the codes include general rules regarding the negotiability of an instrument, but
Plaintiffs do not allege specific violations, nor do they provide a factual basis to support their
allegations. 1 The complaint does not allege any specific violations of the Constitution, instead
only mentioning several times that certain behavior is “unconstitutional” without explaining why.
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The portions of the codes cited by Plaintiffs include: N.C.G.S. §§ 25-3-101 through 25-3-605, § 25-9-203, §
9203(b)(1)-(3)(i), § 45-21-16; Fed. R. Ev. §§ 803, 901, 902, 1002-03; UCC § 25, 3-203, 3-308; and 15 U.S.C. §§ 807
and 1692.
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Plaintiffs failed to plead any claim with the requisite specificity and/or factual basis.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and is
dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Similarly, the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint do not comply with the standard set out
in Rule 8. Plaintiffs’ complaint is confusing, and the allegations are disguised amongst generalized
grievances against the financial services industry.
Further, the conclusory and confusing
allegations are provided without a logical sequence of events, making the complaint even more
difficult to parse through. The complaint alone is thirty-seven pages long, and as discussed above,
does not contain a single claim upon which relief can be granted. The thrust of Plaintiffs’ argument
appears to center on the fact that Defendants did not produce an original copy of the signed
promissory note at a foreclosure hearing. Collateral to this argument are allusions to a deprivation
of Plaintiffs’ right to due process, a claim that the deeds of trust between parties was an
unconscionable contract of adhesion, and a general argument against North Carolina’s power of
sale statutes as unconstitutional. However, these “arguments” are jumbled among other disjointed
thoughts, none of which are supported by the alleged facts. The complaint is too garbled to give
Defendants fair notice of the allegations against them, and it is too long and confusing to satisfy
the “short and plain” requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Even giving the Plaintiffs the benefit
of the doubt, this complaint is frivolous.
Since Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to set out a short and plain statement of the claim, it is not
sufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Therefore, Defendant Nationstar’s Motion to Dismiss is granted
under both Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8 and 12(b)(6).
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THIS COURT’S SUA SPONTE REVIEW OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
In reviewing the complaint pursuant to Nationstar’s motion, the Court also considers the
sufficiency of the pleading against the remaining Defendants. A plaintiff’s complaint is subject to
review pursuant to the inherent authority of the district court and may be dismissed as frivolous
when appropriate. Penland Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Select Fin. Servs., Inc., 2008 WL 5279638, *2
(D.S.C. 2008); see also Mallard v. U.S.D.C. for So. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307 (1989). The
Fourth Circuit, along with other courts, have recognized a district court’s authority to dismiss a
complaint as frivolous on the grounds that a frivolous complaint cannot confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the court. See Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 817 n.5 (4th Cir. 2004);
Ricketts v. Midwest Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181-83 (7th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745
F.2d 1221, 1227 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984). The authority for this position derives from a long line of
Supreme Court cases holding that “[a] patently insubstantial complaint may be dismissed . . . for
want of federal subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n.6 (1989); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 53637 (1974) (holding the same and citing a long line of cases); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83
(1946).
A district court may dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on its own
motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Furthermore, “aside from the interests of the individual
parties in a lawsuit, a district court has an important interest in keeping its docket from becoming
clogged with dormant cases . . . .” Eriline Co., S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2006).
Here, only Nationstar filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint, so the effect of
granting that motion only removes Nationstar from the proceedings. However, as explained above,
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Plaintiffs’ complaint itself does not meet the standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or Rule 8 because
it is frivolous. Among the lists of state and federal codes that Defendants were alleged to have
violated, Plaintiffs alleged various accusations against financial services industry as a whole: “One
thing is very clear that Title 45-21-16 is unconstitutional or the attorneys are involved in corruption
at the highest levels of judiciary. . . .” (Doc. No. 1, p. 19). The conclusory allegations are presented
in such a jumbled manner that it becomes impossible to create a logical sequence of events. For
example, it is unclear from the complaint what role all the Defendants play or what actually
transpired during this matter. Plaintiffs allege that “Defendant [Nationstar] are [sic] the masters
and under the Doctrine of Respondent [sic] Superior, apparent authority, maintenance and
champerty are the party guiding, controlling in a direct supervisory management roll [sic] and are
controlling of the actions of defendant [Nationstar], Peterson and Richey. . . .” (Doc. No. 1, p. 13).
Plaintiffs further allege:
Defendant Nationstar . . . now claims that they are the owners or creditor and
servicing agent of the unproduced Sayman Promissory and Deed of Trust Notes.
Defendant Nationstar has not produced their contractual agreement including and
not limited to the valid “Chain of Title” or the original promissory and deed of trust
to prove their claim as creditor having maintained full servicing rights. [Nationstar]
is operating through a respondeat authority, champertous, apparent authoritative
and maintenance relationship with [Goddard]. . . .
Id. at p. 2. While it appears that some transfer was made, there is no explanation
surrounding the circumstances of this 2007 real estate matter. Due to the conclusory, lengthy, and
confusing nature of Plaintiffs’ complaint, it is frivolous. As the Fourth Circuit held in Dixon v.
Coburg Dairy, a frivolous complaint does not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the court.
369 F.3d at 817. Furthermore, this Court has an interest in keeping its docket clear of dormant
cases, especially cases such as this that are frivolous and unfounded.
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Plaintiffs’ complaint is frivolous and thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, this
Court sua sponte grants a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PRE-FILING INJUNCTION
Defendant Nationstar has moved for a pre-filing injunction because “Plaintiffs [sic]
repeated, factually and procedurally improper filings have and continue to cause Defendant
Nationstar expensive, unnecessary expense and cost.” (Doc. 21 p. 1). The All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a), allows a federal court to limit access to the courts for vexatious and repetitive
litigants. Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004). “There are no
exceptions for pro se litigants.” Armstrong v. Koury Corp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 616, 620 (M.D.N.C.
1998) (quoting Mallon v. Padova, 806 F.Supp. 1189 (E.D.Pa. 1992)). However, the use of a prefiling injunction against a pro se plaintiff should be approached with caution and should be used
as the exception to the rule of free access to the courts. Cromer, 390 F.3d at 817 (citing Pavilonis
v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1980)).
In determining whether a prefilling injunction is substantively warranted, a court
must weigh all the relevant circumstances, including (1) the party’s history of
litigation, in particular whether he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative
lawsuits; (2) whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or
simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the courts and other
parties resulting from the party’s filings; and (4) the adequacy of alternative
sanctions.
Cromer,390 F.3d at 817-18.
Additionally, the “district court must afford the litigant notice and an opportunity to be
heard.” Larrimore v. Williamson, 288 Fed. App’x. 62, 63 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (quoting
Cromer, 390 F.3d at 819). The Fourth Circuit has deemed notice sufficient where a litigant was
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given “proper notice of the magistrate’s recommendations and ample opportunity to register his
objections” before the injunction was adopted. Joyner v. Riley, No. 88-6698, 1988 WL 131841,
at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 1988) (unpublished).
“The court is given substantial discretion to craft appropriate sanctions, and an injunction
from filing any further actions is an appropriate sanction to curb groundless, repetitive, and
frivolous suits: ‘A court faced with a litigant engaged in a pattern of frivolous litigation has the
authority to implement a remedy that may include restrictions on that litigant’s access to the
court.’” Armstrong v. Koury Corp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 616, 620 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (quoting Lysiak v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 816 F.2d 311, 313 (7th Cir. 1987)). The Court must narrowly
tailor the injunction to fit the circumstances at issue. Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818.
A. Party’s history of litigation, in particular whether they have filed vexatious,
harassing, or duplicative lawsuits.
Plaintiffs have a history of filing lawsuits in this Court. In 1998, Plaintiffs, through
counsel, filed claims against Secura Investments Incorporated claiming assault, libel, and slander.
The case was settled through mediation and was dismissed by the court. (Sayman v. Secured
Investments Incorporated, 3:98-cv-00046 (W.D.N.C. 1998) (Doc. 11)).
In 2012, Robert Sayman, a Plaintiff in this case, filed suit against Teague, Rotenstreich,
Stanaland, Fox & Holt, PLLC and multiple employees of Teague, Rotenstreich, Stanaland, Fox &
Holt, including Steven B. Fox, Steven G. Teague, Michael D. Holt, Jeremy K. Kosin, Lyna K.
Broom, Robert K. Franklin, Kara C. Vey, Camilla F. DeBoard, Terrence B. Stanaland, John Doe,
and Jane Doe. Mr. Sayman claimed that the defendants, on behalf of and under the direct
supervision of Wells Fargo Bank, violated the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, by engaging in “abusive,
deceptive, deceitful and unfair debt collection practices in an attempt to injure, abuse, deceive, and
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to collect on an unverifiable, unliquidfied [sic] and disputed debt § 1692a(5).” (Sayman v. Teague,
Rotenstreich, Stanaland, Fox & Holt, 3:12-cv-00787 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (Doc. 1 pp. 2-3)). The
defendants filed answers to the complaint alleging that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
the plaintiff had failed to obtain effective service of process over the defendants, and the plaintiff
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. All parties stipulated that all the claims
against the defendants be dismissed with prejudice. (Sayman v. Teague, Rotenstreich, Stanaland,
Fox & Holt, 3:12-cv-00787 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (Doc. 12)).
On May 10, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Lehman Brothers (“Lehman”),
Volkswagen Bank USA (“Volkswagen”), and Nationstar asserting various claims in connection
with financing obtained by Plaintiffs. (Sayman v. Lehman Brother, 3:13-cv-00288 (W.D.N.C.
2013)). Nationstar filed a motion to dismiss the claims. Id. On December 4, 2013, the Magistrate
Judge recommended dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim and by Order dated
March 4, 2014, the Court adopted the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and dismissed the
complaint. (Sayman v. Lehman Brother, 3:13-cv-00288 (W.D.N.C. 2013) (Doc. 41)). Plaintiffs
appealed the judgment to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Sayman v. Lehman Brother, case
3:13-cv-00288 (W.D.N.C. 2013) (Doc. No. 43)). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
the claim for lack of jurisdiction. Sayman v. Lehman Bros., 14-1575, 2015 WL 105598 (4th Cir.
2015).
On August 4, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Nationstar. (Doc. No. 20-1,
p. 2). In response, Nationstar answered and moved to dismiss. Id. As explained above, Nationstar
has prevailed on its arguments to dismiss. To date, Plaintiffs have filed several frivolous
documents in this case including a “Settlement Agreement and Release,” (Doc. No. 15), and a
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“Motion to Strike Nationstar’s Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. No. 16). Plaintiffs alleged in their
Motion to Strike that Nationstar’s Motion to Dismiss was clearly improper because Nationstar
filed an answer. (Doc. 20-1, p. 2).
B. Whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or
simply intended to harass.
Plaintiffs claim that they have a good faith basis for pursuing the current litigation because
“[t]he Plaintiffs’ first Complaint was erroneously dismissed by this Court, and is on appeal, and
Plaintiffs have made credible and meritorious arguments that this Court erroneously concluded
that the statute of limitations had run on their claim.” (Doc. 24, p. 3). The Fourth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of that action, and Plaintiffs cannot now seek to re-litigate those claims. The past
two cases filed by Plaintiffs have been dismissed. In the present case, the Court is dismissing the
claim as to all Defendants for being a frivolous action. It appears that the very nature of the claims
filed by Plaintiffs is intended to harass the Defendants and has resulted in Defendants having to
litigate against frivolous claims.
C. The extent of the burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the
party’s filings.
In the Motion for Pre-filing Injunction, Nationstar claims that they have faced “the great
burden of having to weed through and decipher the various filings by Plaintiffs in order that it may
properly respond.” (Doc. 20-1, p. 4). Nationstar specifically points to having to respond to an
eighty-six paragraph complaint, responding to a “Settlement Agreement” filing that Nationstar
never agreed to, and responding to an improper Motion to Strike. (Doc. 20-1, pp. 4-5). Nationstar
has now had to spend time and money litigating another matter before the Court that is being
dismissed as frivolous.
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Plaintiff’s duplicative filings and repeated motions place a substantial burden on the
Court’s limited judicial resources and on Defendants who must respond. Moreover, many of
Plaintiff’s motions are not cognizable. Plaintiff’s docket entries are unmistakably void of any
rational legal argument. Plaintiff’s filings are “tiresome” and “wasteful of the Court’s time” and
“wasteful of the Defendants’ resources.” Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s
motions lack good faith and are a burden on judicial and Defendants’ resources.
D. The adequacy of alternative sanctions.
Nationstar seeks to prohibit Plaintiffs from the “continued, frivolous filings.” (Doc. 20-1,
p. 5). The Court has the right to sanction Plaintiffs as long as it is narrowly tailored to fit the
circumstances at issue. The Court could find the adequate remedy to be: banning Plaintiffs from
filing any further pleadings in this case, barring Plaintiffs from filing any subsequent case against
Nationstar in this Court based upon the real estate transaction at issue herein without prior
permission from the Court, and requiring Plaintiffs to seek the Court’s permission before filing
any subsequent case. These sanctions would be narrowly tailored not to cut off Plaintiffs from the
Court but to curb further groundless, repetitive, and frivolous suits.
E. Adequate notice of a pre-filing injunction.
Defendant’s motion for a pre-filing injunction and Plaintiffs’ subsequent response maybe
minimally sufficient to alleviate the Court’s due process concerns over issuing a pre-filing
injunction against a pro se litigant. Out of an abundance of caution and because there is no specific
reference to a pre-filing injunction in the Court’s previous warnings to Plaintiffs, the Court declines
to impose a pre-filing injunction at this time notwithstanding the Court’s analysis above that such
a sanction might be warranted. Such leniency will not be extended in future filings.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, this case is dismissed because it has no arguable basis in law or fact and, indeed,
is frivolous. Plaintiff’s latest Complaint is nothing more than Plaintiff’s attempt to relitigate claims
already adjudicated on the merits by the Court. Plaintiff’s repetitive, vexatious, and duplicative
filings have demonstrated a lack of respect for the judicial process and caused all participants to
expend considerable resources. The Court will not entertain frivolous filings. By declining to
enjoin Plaintiffs today, the Court in no way condones the pro se litigants’ conduct in these matters.
Therefore, based upon aforementioned considerations the Court expressly warns Plaintiffs that
any future filings of frivolous documents in this Court against any of the named Defendants
in this case, or any frivolous action in a subsequent case will result in Rule 11 sanctions and/or
the issuing of a pre-filing injunction order. Such sanctions or injunction could issue sua
sponte, that is, without motion from Defendants.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8) is
GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ Pro Se Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED. Defendant’s Motion for
Pre-filing Injunction (Doc. No. 20-1) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs are CAUTIONED that further filing of
frivolous documents in this Court against any of the named Defendants in this case, or any
frivolous action in a subsequent case will result in Rule 11 sanctions (for ex. a monetary fine)
and the issuing of a pre-filing injunction order. Such sanctions or injunction could issue sua
sponte, that is, without motion from Defendants.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court is instructed to file a copy of
this Order in any case in which Plaintiff Robert Sayman appears, including, but not limited to,
3:12-cv-00787, 3:13-cv-00288, and 3:14-cv-00426.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: February 25, 2015
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