Pongo et al v. Bank of America et al

Filing 99

ORDER denying 94 Motion Enforce Settlement Agreement. Signed by District Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr on 6/14/16. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(ssh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:14-cv-00020-RJC-DSC
VERONICA K. PONGO,
FRANCISCO AVOKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants.

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ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement. (Doc. No. 94).
I.

BACKGROUND
On January 17, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this Court challenging Defendants’

foreclosure of Plaintiffs’ home. (Doc. No. 1). With consent of the Court, Plaintiffs filed a First
Amended Complaint on July 11, 2014. (Doc. No. 38). Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the
First Amended Complaint on July 25, 2014. (Doc. No. 44). On September 15, 2014, the
Magistrate Judge issued a Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”), recommending that the
Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ federal claims with prejudice, decline supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims, and dismiss the First Amended Complaint without prejudice. (Doc.
No. 71). On March 31, 2015, the Court overruled Plaintiffs’ objections to the M&R, adopted the
M&R, and granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 81); and the Clerk of Court closed
the case, (Doc. No. 82).
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Fourth Circuit, and on August 24, 2015, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed this Court’s Order in all respects. (Doc. No. 90). Thereafter, it appears that the

parties participated in mediation and that they were able to reach some agreement. However, on
April 7, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, (Doc. No. 94), and
Defendants responded on April 25, 2016, (Doc. No. 95).
II.

DISCUSSION
The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue a court must address before

considering the merits of any matter. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88–
89 (1998); Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999). Where the
Court has subject-matter jurisdiction, it may hear the merits of a claim; if it lacks jurisdiction, it
has no authority to hear the case or motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “The subject-matter
jurisdiction of federal courts is limited and the federal courts may exercise only that jurisdiction
which Congress has prescribed.” Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2000). Subjectmatter jurisdiction is so limited that federal “[c]ourts have an independent obligation to determine
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). “No party can waive the defect, or consent to [subject-matter]
jurisdiction. No court can ignore the defect; rather a court, noticing the defect, must raise the
matter on its own.” Wis. Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998) (internal
citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009) (“Subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be considered when fairly in doubt.”).
Generally, district courts have “the inherent power to enforce agreements entered into in
settlement of litigation pending before them.” Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. Fairfax Cty.,
Va., 571 F.2d 1299, 1304 (4th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). However, the way in which
enforcement may be sought depends upon the circumstances of the case. The First Circuit has
explained the framework for enforcement of settlement agreements as follows:

A party to a settlement agreement may seek to enforce the agreement if another
party reneges. If, at the time of the claimed breach, the court case already has been
dismissed, the aggrieved party may bring an independent action for breach of
contract. If, however, the settlement collapses before the original suit is dismissed,
the party who seeks to keep the settlement intact may file a motion for enforcement.
Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st Cir. 1999).
This case was dismissed and closed on March 31, 2015. (Doc. Nos. 81, 82). The case is
no longer pending before the Court; therefore, the Court has been divested of its jurisdiction to
enforce the settlement agreement.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement

Agreement must be denied.
III.

CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement

Agreement, (Doc. No. 94), is DENIED.
Signed: June 14, 2016