McGinnis v. Allstate Insurance Company et al

Filing 22

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion to Dismiss and Defendants AI, ACCCC, and ISAOA/AIIMA are terminated from this action. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 2/4/2015. (eef)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. 3:14-cv-00581-FDW-DCK
LAQUITA NICHOLE MCGINNIS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ALLSTATE INSURANCE,
)
ISAOA/AIIMA, ALLSTATE INSURANCE )
COMPANY, and ALLSTATE
)
CUSTOMER CONTACT CENTER)
CHARLOTTE,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). (Doc.
No. 10). Defendants also move to terminate Defendants AI, ACCCC, and ISAOA/AIIMA from
this action. The parties have fully briefed the motion, and these matters are now ripe for
disposition. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
On October 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action alleging an employment discrimination
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964. While Plaintiff initially filed her claim pro se,
she has since retained counsel to represent her in this matter.1 (Doc. No. 16).

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The Court notes that Plaintiff was proceeding pro se at the time Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss.
Therefore, the Court issued a Roseboro notice and granted Plaintiff additional time to respond to Defendants’
Motion. (Doc. No. 13). Plaintiff then retained counsel and timely filed its response.

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This action is based on Plaintiff’s former employment with Defendant Allstate Insurance
Company (“Allstate”). (Doc. No. 1, p. 5).

According to the Complaint, and assuming the

allegations to be truthful, Plaintiff began working for Allstate in April 2005, and it appears that
Plaintiff continued this work until October 2010, at which time she was hospitalized and
“diagnosed with mineral deficiencies causing syncopy episodes of altered mental status.” Id.
Plaintiff claims that she was repeatedly “refused protection of FMLA protected time and
penalized for protected time.” Id. She further claims that “[u]pon requesting leave of absence,
Allstate den[ied] leave of absence or delay[ed] leave of absence.” Id. At some point in 2010,
Plaintiff was granted leave of absence and remained on leave until December 2012. Id. During
this period of leave, Allstate’s representatives periodically inquired about Plaintiff’s status and
intent to return to work, and Plaintiff maintained correspondence with Allstate. Id. Then, on or
about December 24, 2012, an Allstate representative requested Plaintiff’s return to work. Id.
Thereafter, Plaintiff contends that Allstate’s representatives “repeatedly denied the acceptance of
[her] doctor’s orders regarding the conditions under which [she] should return to work” and
eventually forced her doctor to write an order for Plaintiff to return to work. Id. Plaintiff was to
return to work, with accommodations, on or about February 5, 2013. Id. However, it appears
that before she returned to work, Allstate terminated her employment based on its allegations
that Plaintiff had wrongfully written an insurance policy during her employment prior to taking
her medical leave of absence. Id.
After her termination, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) and received a right to sue letter on July 15, 2014. (Doc. No. 1, pp. 3,
8). Thereafter, on October 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed the present action. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff
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appears to contest her culpability for writing the alleged wrongful insurance policy by claiming
that she wrote the policy at a time when she was “under a medical condition which may have
altered [her] abilities to execute the policy effectively.” Id. She also contends that Allstate acted
with malice in terminating her employment. Id.
On December 10, 2014, Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
FRCP 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 10). Defendants also moved to terminate Defendants AI, ACCCC,
and ISAOA/AIIMA from the action. Id.
DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will survive if it contains

enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id.

(citing

Twombly at 556).
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step process for determining whether a
complaint meets this plausibility standard. First, the court identifies allegations that, because
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (allegation that government officials adopted
challenged policy “because of” its adverse effects on protected group was conclusory and not
assumed to be true). Although the pleading requirements stated in “Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules
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of Civil Procedure] mark[ ] a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era … it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed
with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79.
Second, to the extent there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume
their truth and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at
679. “Determining whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for
relief ‘will … be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.’” Id. “Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief,’” and therefore it should be dismissed. Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In other words, if after taking the complaint’s well-pleaded
factual allegations as true, a lawful alternative explanation appears a “more likely” cause of the
complained of behavior, the claim for relief is not plausible. Id.
II.

Analysis
a. Defendants’ Motion
ISAOA/AIIMA

to

Terminate

Defendants

AI,

ACCCC,

and

Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants AI, ACCCC, and
ISAOA/AIIMA, claiming that these parties “are not legal entities capable of suing or being sued.
(Doc. No. 10, p.1). Plaintiff does not contest dismissal of these defendants. (Doc. No. 20, p.3).
An entity that does not exist cannot be sued. Accordingly, the Court dismisses all claims in this
matter brought against Defendants AI, ACCCC, and ISAOA/AIIMA.
b. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Sole Claim for Unlawful
Termination in Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
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Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s sole claim for unlawful termination in violation of the
ADA should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support this
claim. (Doc. No. 10, p.1). Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not properly
alleged: (1) a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended (the
“ADAAA”); (2) that she was qualified for the position in question at the time of her discharge;
and (3) that she has a record of impairment or was regarded by Defendant as having one. (Doc.
No. 11, pp. 6-13).
Upon review by the Court, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED without prejudice. Defendants are free to raise the issues set forth
in this Motion again at summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss AI, ACCCC, and
ISAOA/AIIMA from this action is GRANTED. Accordingly, Defendants AI, ACCCC, and
ISAOA/AIIMA are terminated from this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: February 4, 2015

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