Ladda, Jr. v. Colvin
Filing
15
ORDER denying Plaintiff's 11 Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Defendant's 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. The decision of the Commissioner is Affirmed. Signed by District Judge Richard Voorhees on 1/31/2017. (nvc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CASE NO. 3:15-CV-00257-RLV
LEON L. LADDA, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSINER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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ORDER
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on cross-motions for summary judgment.
(Docs. 11, 13). For the reasons that follow, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
11) is DENIED, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13) is GRANTED, and
the decision of the Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.
I.
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
On December 19, 2011, Plaintiff Leon L. Ladda, Jr., protectively filed applications for
disability insurance benefits and for supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act, alleging an inability to work due to a disabling condition commencing on
November 9, 2011.
(Tr. 19).
The Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or
“Defendant”) initially denied Plaintiff’s application on February 2, 2012 and, upon
reconsideration, again denied the application on May 28, 2012. On June 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed
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a written request for a hearing. (Tr. 136-38). Plaintiff’s request was granted and a hearing was
held before Administrative Law Judge Wendell M. Sims (“ALJ Sims”).
At Step One, ALJ Sims found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 21). At Step Two, ALJ Sims found that the injuries
Plaintiff sustained in a vehicular accident resulted in a severe medically determinable
impairment(s) consisting of osteoarthritis, neuropathy, and chronic pain. Id. At Step Three, ALJ
Sims concluded that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, or a combination thereof, met the Listings.
(Tr. 21-22). ALJ Sims then assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, first making findings
about Plaintiff’s credibility, injuries, and limitations and then applying those findings to determine
that Plaintiff could “perform tasks at the light exertional level,” with a restriction for only
occasional climbing and balancing. (Tr. 22-27). Based on this determination, ALJ Sims, at Step
Four, concluded that Plaintiff was unable to return to his past relevant work as a baker. (Tr. 27).
However, at Step Five, ALJ Sims decided, with the assistance of a vocational expert, that Plaintiff
was not disabled because there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy
that Plaintiff could perform, including an unskilled housekeeper, a cafeteria attendant, and a mail
clerk. (Tr. 28).
Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review ALJ Sims’s adverse decision. (Tr. 9;
272-73). Specifically, Plaintiff contended that ALJ Sims improperly discredited his testimony
based on his failure to seek physical therapy treatment and that ALJ Sims incorrectly weighed the
evidence regarding his pain and the impact of that pain on his ability to work. (Tr. 272-73). The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. 1-3). Plaintiff timely filed this action
seeking judicial review of the denial of benefits.
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II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), § 1383(c)(3) (2006), limits this Court's
review of a final decision of the Commissioner to: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner's decision; and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.
1990). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion; [i]t consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may
be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.1996)
(quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir.1966)) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “In reviewing for substantial evidence, [a court] do[es] not undertake to reweigh
conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the
[Commissioner].” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d
at 589)).
B.
Analysis
In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff contends that ALJ Sims (1) did not perform
a complete function-by-function analysis before determining Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity, and (2) did not provide legally sufficient reasons in support of his adverse credibility
determination. (Doc. 12 at 5-15). Because an ALJ must consider a claimant’s testimony before
determining the claimant’s residual functional capacity see Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 639
(4th Cir. 2015), the Court will consider Plaintiff’s challenge to ALJ Sims’s credibility
determination before Plaintiff’s challenge to ALJ Sims’s residual functional capacity assessment.
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i.
Credibility Determination
The law provides a two-part test for evaluating the probative weight to be assigned to a
claimant's statements about symptoms and pain. Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. First, there must be “the
existence of a medical impairment(s) which results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities and which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged.” Id. at 594 (quotation marks, citations, and emphasis omitted). If the ALJ
determines that such an impairment exists, the second part of the test then requires the ALJ to
consider all available evidence, including the claimant's statements about limitations and about
pain, in order to determine whether the person is disabled.
Id. at 595-96; 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4).
While an ALJ must consider a claimant's statements during the second part of the analysis,
he need not credit them to the extent they conflict with the objective medical evidence of record.
Craig, 76 F.3d at 596. Relevant evidence for this inquiry includes the claimant's “medical history,
medical signs, and laboratory findings,” id. at 595, as well as various regulatory factors,1 Social
Security Regulation (“SSR”) 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *3.2 Although the ALJ must consider
each of the relevant factors, “[t]he regulations do not mandate that the ALJ discuss all these factors
in a decision.” Allmon v. Colvin, 2016 WL 6651326, at *2 n.4 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 10, 2016).
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The regulatory factors are: (i) the claimant's daily activities; (ii) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of
the claimant's pain or other symptoms; (iii) precipitating and aggravating factors; (iv) the type, dosage, effectiveness,
and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; (v) treatment,
other than medication, the claimant receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (vi) any measures
the claimant uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (vii) other factors concerning the claimant's
functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3).
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Subsequent to Plaintiff filing his complaint and his motion for summary judgment, the Social Security Administration
superseded SSR 96-7p with SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016). Social Security Ruling 16-3p eliminates
the use of the term “‘credibility’ from . . . sub-regulatory policy” and “clarify[ies] that subjective symptom evaluation
is not an examination of an individual’s character.” Id. at *1. Because SSR 96-7p was in effect at the time of ALJ
Sims’s decision, this Court will review the decision under SSR 96-7p. See Keefer v. Colvin, 2016 WL 5539516, at
*11 n.5 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2016).
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An ALJ's credibility determination is generally entitled to great deference. Shively v.
Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989-90 (4th Cir. 1984). This is because a reviewing court does not, and
cannot, make credibility assessments. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. However, when considering
whether the ALJ properly analyzed a claimant’s credibility, the district court must determine if the
reasons the ALJ provided for discrediting the claimant’s testimony explain the extent to which the
ALJ credited and discredited the claimant’s testimony—i.e., which of the allegations and
statements testified to by the claimant the ALJ credited and discredited. See Mascio v. Colvin, 780
F.3d 632, 639-40 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 188-90 (4th Cir. 2016).
Put another way, the ALJ’s discussion of the claimant’s credibility in light of the other evidence
in the record must establish an “‘accurate and logical bridge’” to the ALJ’s decision to credit or
discredit the relevant aspects of the claimant’s testimony. See Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189 (quoting
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000)).
At his hearing, Plaintiff testified that he experiences pain and tingling in his right hand, left
hip, and back. (Tr. 22, Tr. 39). As a result of this alleged pain, Plaintiff testified that he could
only walk for ten to fifteen minutes without the assistance of a walker and that he uses a cane or a
crutch for walks up to ten or fifteen minutes and when traversing stairs. (Tr. 22-23, 40-42). As
for lifting objects, Plaintiff stated that one of his hands was fine and could lift up to forty pounds
but that the other hand could only lift five pounds. (Tr. 22, 42, 44). Plaintiff further testified that
his left knee often gave out if he stood on it too long and that pain in his hip and back prevented
him from tying his shoes and that he needed help to get in and out of the bathtub. (Tr. 22, 42).
Finally, when questioned by ALJ Sims about whether his doctor’s advised him to ambulate without
the assistance of a cane, Plaintiff offered conflicting testimony. (See Tr. 47-48). Initially Plaintiff
denied receiving such advice, then he said he was told once to walk without a cane, and then he
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redenied receiving that advice and stated, “[t]hey didn’t tell me [to walk independently not using
a cane], not as I remember. They didn’t tell me that.” Id.
After summarizing the aforementioned testimony (Tr. 22-23), ALJ Sims commenced his
credibility analysis by stating:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
credible for the reasons explained in this decision.
(Tr. 23). ALJ Sims then provided a detailed summary of Plaintiff’s medical records. (Tr. 23-25).
Specific to Plaintiff’s back, hip, and knee injuries, ALJ Sims’s review of Plaintiff’s medical
records show that, in January 2012, the surgical wound to his left knee was “well healed” and that
his left femur “alignment was grossly stable” and that the “remaining bony structures were intact.”
(Tr. 23-24). In March 2012, Plaintiff presented with some soft tissue swelling in his left knee
with a range of motion of 0-45 degrees of flexion, and no swelling in the lower portion of his left
leg. (Tr. 24). At that time, Plaintiff’s imaging showed “good clinical alignment” and healing in
both the hip and the femur. Id. Imaging in June 2012 showed further healing of the left femur,
leading Plaintiff’s doctor to conclude that Plaintiff should walk without the assistance of a crutch.
(Tr. 25). By September 2012, Plaintiff’s range of motion in his left hip matched his range of
motion in his right hip and he had regained full range of motion in his right knee and 0-110 degree
range of motion in his left knee, improved from 0-45 degree range of motion in January and March
2012. Id. Plaintiff had also regained 5/5 strength in his hip flexors and extensors and his straight
leg test was negative for back pain. Id. A second of Plaintiff’s doctors advised Plaintiff to walk
without the use of an assistive device such as a cane and to do more aggressive physical therapy
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at home. Id. Plaintiff was also advised to switch off of narcotic pain medication, in favor of a
non-steroidal anti-inflammatory. Id.
Based on his review of the medical records, ALJ Sims stated three interim conclusions: (1)
the objective medical findings were not consistent with Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and
limitations, (2) Plaintiff’s condition was improving, and (3) Plaintiff’s pain was “adequately
managed with medications.” (Tr. 23-26). ALJ Sims then briefly discussed Plaintiff’s daily
activities, concluding that his reported activities of attending church, brushing his hair, shaving,
feeding himself, doing household chores, and driving shows that Plaintiff’s condition improved
and that he is able to “preform[] substantial gainful work activity” and “a higher level of
functioning than alleged.” (Tr. 26, 27). ALJ Sims then stated his ultimate credibility conclusion
that the claimant’s allegations of physical limitations to his ability to walk more than ten or fifteen
minutes and to lift ten pounds were incredible and overstated Plaintiff’s actual limitations. Id.
Central to Plaintiff’s claim for benefits and his challenge to ALJ Sims’s credibility
determination was Plaintiff’s testimony about pain in and functionality of his lower extremities.
Viewing ALJ Sims’s decision on the whole, it is readily apparent that ALJ Sims relied on
Plaintiff’s medical records to discredit Plaintiff’s allegations of limited mobility in his lower
extremities, including his need to use a cane when walking. Furthermore, the medical evidence
cited by ALJ Sims constitutes substantial evidence in support of his conclusion as it demonstrates
that Plaintiff’s condition improved significantly from January 2012 to September 2012 and that
multiple doctors concluded that Plaintiff was capable of, and needed to, walk without the
assistance of a cane, walker, or crutch.3 The recommended switch in medication also provides
Notably, in challenging ALJ Sims’s credibility determination, Plaintiff does not contend that ALJ Sims erred in
discussing Plaintiff’s medical records. Further, the medical records cited by ALJ Sims also contradict Plaintiff’s
testimony that doctors did not instruct him to ambulate without the assistance of a cane, walker, or crutch.
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substantial evidence for ALJ Sims’s conclusion that plaintiff’s condition improved and that
Plaintiff’s pain was “adequately managed.” Plaintiff, however, raises several specific issues with
ALJ Sims’s credibility determination, which the Court will discuss in turn.
First, Plaintiff contends that the language ALJ Sims employed at the start of his credibility
analysis constitutes boilerplate language that does not provide any indication of why ALJ Sims
found Plaintiff not entirely credible or which parts of Plaintiff’s testimony ALJ Sims credited and
discredited. (Doc. 12 at 9-10). Although the block-quoted language above is boilerplate language
that does not provide a sufficient explanation of ALJ Sims’s adverse credibility determination, the
language merely summarized ALJ Sims’s analysis that followed. Thus, read in context, the
boilerplate language Plaintiff takes issue with presents no basis for remand and merely prepares a
reader of ALJ Sims’s decision for the conclusion within ALJ Sims’s credibility determination.4
Second, Plaintiff criticizes ALJ Sims for relying on statements in Plaintiff’s medical
records stating that Plaintiff was “doing well.” Id. at 11-13; (see e.g. Tr. 23, 24, 25). Plaintiff
argues that descriptive phrases of this nature are of little value in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility
because they are expressions of Plaintiff’s state relative to his poor condition following his
vehicular accident and surgery. (Doc. 12 at 11-13). Absent proper context, a doctor’s use of a
descriptive phrase like “doing well” is ambiguous and provides an insufficient basis to discredit a
claimant’s testimony at the second part of the credibility analysis. Kellough v. Heckler, 785 F.2d
1147, 1153-54 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Beck v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4455861 (D.N.H. Sept. 23, 2011)
(collecting cases concluding that words and phrases like “doing well” and “stable” are not
indicative of the claimant’s actual state absent consideration of the context the words are used in,
To the extent ALJ Sims credited some of Plaintiff’s statements and allegations, ALJ Sims’s decision to limit Plaintiff
to light work, rather than medium work as found by the medical consultants, makes it implicitly apparent which of
Plaintiff’s allegations ALJ Sims partially credited—i.e., primarily that Plaintiff could not lift fifty pounds occasionally
or twenty-five pounds frequently.
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specifically the claimant’s medical history and prior condition). Here, however, ALJ Sims’s
detailed discussion of Plaintiff’s medical records over the course of several months, including an
overview of Plaintiff’s bone structure, strength, healing around the incision sites, range of motion,
and nerve function, provide sufficient context for ALJ Sims’s reliance on notations by Plaintiff’s
doctors that Plaintiff was “doing well.” (See Tr. 23-25).
Third, Plaintiff attacks ALJ Sims’s reliance on Plaintiff’s daily activities when reaching
the credibility determination, arguing that Plaintiff’s ability to brush his hair, shave, feed himself,
attend church, grocery shop, iron, and drive do not demonstrate that he is capable of working eight
hours a day five days a week. (Doc. 12 at 13-14). Had ALJ Sims relied exclusively, or even
heavily, on these daily activities to conclude that Plaintiff was not credible and could perform light
work, the Court would agree, in part, with Plaintiff’s assignment of error.5 In actuality, ALJ Sims
only relied on Plaintiff’s daily activities as some evidence, primarily in conjunction with Plaintiff’s
medical records, that Plaintiff’s condition was improving. (See Tr. 26). Accordingly, ALJ Sims’s
limited reliance on Plaintiff’s daily activities does not constitute error.
Even, however, if ALJ Sims’s opinion could be read as relying on Plaintiff’s daily activities
as direct and independent evidence that contradicts Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and pain, any
error would be harmless in light of the other reasons ALJ Sims provided for discounting Plaintiff’s
alleged pain and functional limitations. Although an ALJ may err in assessing one aspect of the
record relative to the claimant’s credibility, the error is harmless “so long as there remains
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusions on credibility and the error does not negate
the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate credibility conclusion.” Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin,
While Plaintiff’s ability to brush his hair, shave, feed himself, iron, and drive do not provide much evidence of his
ability to work or stand, these daily activities are relevant to Plaintiff’s ability to use his hand and to the progress and
prognosis of his wrist injury.
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533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Here, ALJ
Sims’s thorough discussion of Plaintiff’s medical records renders any error in assessing Plaintiff’s
daily activities harmless.
Fourth, and finally, Plaintiff argues that ALJ Sims erred in judging Plaintiff’s credibility
where ALJ Sims mistakenly concluded that Plaintiff did not attend physical therapy. (Doc. 12 at
14-15). In actuality, ALJ Sims concluded that Plaintiff “routinely denied treatment or modalities
that could have potentially helped [Plaintiff] with his pain problems.” (Tr. 26). In support of this
conclusion, ALJ Sims noted Plaintiff’s failure to pursue physical therapy as recommended by
Plaintiff’s doctors. Id. Although the record, as Plaintiff points out, shows that Plaintiff attended
four sessions of physical therapy in 2011, it also strongly suggests that Plaintiff discontinued
physical therapy in 2012 and that Plaintiff did not follow doctors’ instructions regarding activities
outside of physical therapy that could improve his mobility and prognosis, including the repeated
instructions to place more weight on his left leg and not to use an assistive device when walking.6
(See Tr. 404). ALJ Sims also supported his conclusion that Plaintiff failed to follow medical advice
through citation to Plaintiff’s refusal to have sutures removed and the repeated suggestions of
doctors that Plaintiff needed to be more aggressive with his range of motion exercises. (Tr. 24,
26). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports ALJ Sims’s conclusion and ALJ Sims was entitled
to draw from this conclusion that Plaintiff’s allegations of limitations and pain were not credible.
See Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 36 (4th Cir. 1992) (Plaintiff’s failure to fill prescriptions,
attend prescribed physical therapy, and undergo treatment for condition permitted inference that
Plaintiff was not credible as to severity of and limitations caused by condition).
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Although Plaintiff identifies one medical note suggesting that Plaintiff attended four physical therapy sessions in
2011, he does not cite anything in the record suggesting that he attended any physical therapy sessions in 2012 or
otherwise did any range of motion or strength exercises on his own.
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ii.
Residual Functional Capacity
Before determining at Step Four whether a claimant can perform his past relevant work,
the ALJ must conduct a residual functional capacity assessment. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635.
Residual functional capacity is defined as “‘an administrative assessment of the extent to which
an individual’s medically determinable impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such as
pain, may cause physical or mental limitations or restrictions that may affect his or her capacity to
do work-related physical and mental activities.’” Id. at 639 (quoting SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg.
34,474, 34,475 (July 2, 1996)) (emphasis omitted). In assessing a claimant’s residual functional
capacity, the ALJ “‘must first identify the individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and
assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis, including the functions’
listed in the regulations.” Id. at 636 (quoting SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,475 (July 2, 1996)).
Furthermore, an ALJ’s “residual functional capacity ‘assessment must include a narrative
discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts
(e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).’” Id.
(quoting SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,478).
First, Plaintiff contends that ALJ Sims failed to consider Plaintiff’s use of a cane in the
residual functional capacity assessment and that this error resulted in ALJ Sims not including a
restriction on ambulation and the need for a walking assistive device when posing the hypothetical
to the vocational expert. (Doc. 12 at 6-7). In light of the prior discussion regarding the medical
records and ALJ Sims’s determination that Plaintiff’s allegation that he needed a cane was not
credible, ALJ Sims did not need to account for the use of a walking assistive device in the residual
functional capacity assessment. See Kearse v. Massanari, 73 F. App’x 601, 604 (4th Cir. 2003)
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(ALJ does not err by not including limitation in hypothetical to vocational expert limitation that
ALJ discredited through reliance on substantial evidence).
Second, Plaintiff contends that ALJ Sims failed to include a restriction accounting for
Plaintiff’s reduced grip strength in his right hand. (Doc. 12 at 7). In support of this argument,
Plaintiff cites a single “patient visit form” that notes reduced grip strength on a physical exam.
(See Tr. 628). None of the other three patient visit forms from Plaintiff’s prior and subsequent
visits include a notation of reduced grip strength. (See Tr. 627, 629-30). Plaintiff also fails to
point to any evidence in the rest of the medical record that suggests Plaintiff suffered from reduced
grip strength. Furthermore, the lone notation cited by Plaintiff does not specify to what degree
Plaintiff’s grip strength was reduced on the day of the visit. (Tr. 628). Accordingly, where the
only evidence Plaintiff cites for his contention that he suffered from reduced grip strength is a
single, unelaborate notation on a patient visit form, it is not apparent that ALJ Sims needed to
include a discussion of Plaintiff’s grip strength in the residual functional capacity assessment.
Third, Plaintiff argues that ALJ Sims did not properly analyze Plaintiff’s ability to walk,
stand, sit, crouch, kneel, or crawl. ALJ Sims’s discussion of Plaintiff’s medical records specific
to the strength, range of motion, bone structure, and healing of Plaintiff’s left leg directly related
to ALJ Sims’s conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s ability to walk, stand, and sit. As for Plaintiff’s
ability to crouch, kneel, or crawl, the medical consultants concluded that Plaintiff did not suffer
from any limitation as to those motions. (Tr. 81, 92). Nothing in Plaintiff’s hearing testimony
directly contradicts the findings of the medical consultants as to crouching, kneeling, or crawling
and Plaintiff’s brief before this Court does not identify any evidence in the record that suggests a
limitation regarding his ability to crouch, kneel, or crawl. Accordingly, ALJ Sims did not commit
reversible error by not discussing these motions as part of the residual functional capacity
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assessment. See Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636 (rejecting per se rule requiring remand in instances where
“ALJ does not discuss functions that are ‘irrelevant or uncontested’” (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue,
729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013))).
Fourth, and finally, Plaintiff argues that ALJ Sims failed to consider his functional
limitations within the context of his ability to perform the functions over the course of a full work
day. (Doc. 12 at 8-9). The Commissioner argues that ALJ Sims did discuss Plaintiff’s capacity to
perform functions over the course of a full work day and that even if he did not directly discuss
the Plaintiff’s functional capacity within the context of a full work day, remand would be futile
because no evidence in the record contradicts a finding that Plaintiff can perform the relevant
functions over the course of a full work day. (Doc. 14 at 9-10). ALJ Sims’s direct discussion of
Plaintiff’s functional capacity over the course of a full work day is scant. (See Tr. 22-27).
Nonetheless, the Court concludes that remand is not necessary to address any deficiency in ALJ
Sims’s decision.
“‘[R]emand may be appropriate where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant’s capacity to
perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other
inadequacies in the ALJ’s analysis frustrate meaningful review.’” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637
(emphasis added) (quoting Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177). Here, although an explicit statement about
Plaintiff’s ability to function over the course of a full work day would have simplified the judicial
review process, the Court’s ability to meaningfully review ALJ Sims’s decision is not frustrated.
Plaintiff’s brief to this Court cites no evidence for the proposition that Plaintiff could not walk, sit,
or stand for the requisite period of time associated with light work and the only conflicting
evidence identified in ALJ Sims’s decision is Plaintiff’s own testimony. Accordingly, where ALJ
Sims relied on substantial evidence to discredit Plaintiff’s testimony, no dispute in the evidence
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remained as to Plaintiff’s ability to perform the requisite functions over the course of a full work
day and this Court is fully able to review the reasoning supporting ALJ Sims’s decision.
III.
DECRETAL
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT:
(1)
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 11) is DENIED;
(2)
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13) is GRANTED; and
(3)
The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
Signed: January 31, 2017
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