Pierce El Bey v. Cooper et al
Filing
58
ORDER granting 39 Motion to Dismiss ; granting 41 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting 44 Motion to Dismiss ; granting 47 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 48 Motion to Dis miss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 49 Motion to Dismiss. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED, and in light of the fact Plaintiff had opportunity to cure any deficiencies in the Complaint here by virtue of the Fourth Circuits remand, such d ismissal is WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs requests for injunctive relief are DENIED. Defendants requests for a pre-filing injunction are DENIED. Plaintiff is again WARNED that future frivolous lawsuits will most likely result in sanctions and a pre-filing injunction from this Court.. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 8/24/17. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(clc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. 3:15-cv-00539-FDW-DSC
TORNELLO FONTAINE PIERCE EL )
BEY,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ROY COOPER, PAT MCCRORY, STATE )
OF NORTH CAROLINA, JAMES ALLEN )
JOINES, WILLIAM T. SCHATZMAN, B.J. )
BARNES, AND NANCY VAUGHAN
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court following the filing of several Motions to Dismiss by
Defendants pursuant to 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. Nos.
39, 41, 44, 47, 48,1 49). Defendants Barnes, Schatzman, and Joines also seek pre-filing injunctions
and ask this Court to impose sanctions against Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 40, 48, 50). This matter is also
before the Court on Plaintiff’s responses to those motions and his requests for injunctive relief.
(Docs. Nos. 38, 52, 55, 57). The Court issued a notice to Plaintiff, who appears pro se, pursuant
to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising him of the burden he carries in
responding to Defendants’ motions, and all motions have been fully briefed. For the reasons that
follow, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is denied, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are
granted, and Defendants’ motions for a pre-filing injunction are denied at this time.
1
The Court notes Docs. Nos. 47 and 48, filed by Defendant Schatzman, appear to be duplicative, with the exception
that Doc. No. 48 also contains a supporting memorandum attached as Doc. No. 48-1. The Court construes these
pleadings together.
1
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 1, 2016, this Court issued an order denying Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief
and granting Defendants’ previous motions to dismiss. (Doc. No. 31). Plaintiff appealed to the
Fourth Circuit, which ruled to dismiss and remand the order with instructions to allow Plaintiff to
file an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 36). Plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint (Doc.
No. 38), and Defendants submitted new Motions to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 39, 41, 44, 47, 48, 49).
The Court notes at the outset that despite an opportunity to amend his pleadings, Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint is—in large part—very similar to his Original Complaint and includes many
of the same “causes of action” and other fantastical allegations without much reference to facts to
support such claims.
II.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who appears pro se, commenced this suit against a variety of public officials.
Defendant Roy Cooper previously served as the Attorney General of North Carolina and currently
serves as the Governor of the State. Defendant Pat McCrory is the previous governor of North
Carolina. Defendant B.J. Barnes is the Sheriff of Guilford County, North Carolina. Defendant
William T. Schatzman is the Sheriff of Forsyth County. Defendant James Allen Joines is the
Mayor for the City of Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Defendant Nancy Vaughan is the Mayor
for the City of Greensboro, North Carolina.
Plaintiff filed his amended complaint in the Western District of North Carolina on
December 6, 2016. (Doc. No. 38). The Court notes at the outset that it is difficult to identify
2
specific claims and causes of action within Plaintiff’s Complaint.2 The first discernable claim
appears to be against Defendants Schatzman and Vaughan for transporting Plaintiff to a detention
center and setting bail. Id. at 5. The second claim seems to be against all Defendants, claiming
each has coerced Plaintiff into revealing his Social Security number for “capital gain for the private
corporation.” Id. Plaintiff’s next cause of action appears to be one of unlawful arrest. Plaintiff
alleges that while he was “exercising private rights of traveling,” Defendant Joines “demanded
payment of ransom” and subsequently kidnapped, harassed, caused duress, and labeled Plaintiff
as a “Sovereign Citizen.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff includes Schatzman in this claim and asserts that
Schatzman took Plaintiff’s fingerprints and pictures under duress. Id. Plaintiff then claims that
his name has been copyrighted since 2009, and, accordingly, all Defendants have infringed upon
this copyright. Id. at 14. Plaintiff claims he has not filed suit to harass Defendants, but in “good
faith, good conscience, and clean hands” to stop Defendants from harassing and slandering him.
Id. at 9.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a variety of relief for the alleged injuries.
Plaintiff asks for removal of his fingerprints and pictures from government databases. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff requests the return of his cell phone, as well as the return of an “International Driving
Permit” and “Muur’s Identification Cards.” Id. Plaintiff further requests that his criminal record
be expunged and his nursing license granted. Id. Plaintiff asks that he and his family be placed
on a State “do not detain, do not disturb” list, and that each Defendant pay the fee for filing, taxes,
2
Despite remand by the Fourth Circuit to allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint, for the most part and as explained
in more detail below, Plaintiff still fails to set forth cognizable claims. Construing the allegations in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court does its best to discern the causes of action Plaintiff seeks to allege.
3
and damages caused to himself and his automobile. Plaintiff also claims his name is trademarked
and asks that it be declared private property. Id.
All Defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Some Defendants have also asserted Plaintiff failed to follow
the pleading requirements in Rule 8(a) and filed suit in the improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) as
grounds for dismissal. This Court issued a Roseboro notice on December 29, 2016, to notify
Plaintiff of his burden to respond to Defendants’ motions.3 (Doc. No. 53).
Plaintiff filed a document titled “Response to State Agent: Attorney” (Doc. No. 52) on
December 28, 2016. Plaintiff also filed documents titled “Affidavit Respond to State AgentsAttorneys,” (Doc. No. 55) and “Respond to State Agent: Attorney” (Doc. No. 57) on January 9
and 18, 2017. As with previous filings, it is unclear to this Court as to what relief Plaintiff seeks.
At best, all pleadings appear to ask this Court to grant injunctive relief. Therefore, this Court
liberally construes these documents to be motions seeking injunctive relief.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
For a federal court to adjudicate a matter, it must first have subject matter jurisdiction.
Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 2005). A
court may have subject matter jurisdiction either under federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012),
diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012), or supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §1367
3
Roseboro requires that notice be given to pro se defendants in summary judgment motions. See Roseboro v.
Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) (requiring “that the plaintiff be advised of his right to file counteraffidavits or other responsive material and [be] altered to the fact that his failure to so respond might result in the entry
of summary judgment against him.”). However, in an abundance of caution, courts often issue Roseboro notices for
motions to dismiss, as the Court did in this case.
4
(2012). A court will have jurisdiction under federal question if a cause of action is created by
federal law. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1968). Federal question
must be clearly established in a plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,
482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987). If a court has original jurisdiction through federal question, it will also
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are part of the same case or controversy.
28 U.S.C. § 1367. A court will have diversity jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different
states where the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(h)(3).
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Evans v. B.F.
Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). In evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1), courts apply the standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment, under which the
nonmoving party must set forth specific facts beyond the pleadings to show that a genuine issue
of material facts exists. Richmond, Fredricksburg, & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.3d
765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). The moving party prevails on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “if the
material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter
of law.” Id. at 768.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows defendants to move for
dismissal when a plaintiff has not stated a claim that is recognized by law. In order to survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
Plaintiff’s “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
5
(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In order to be plausible, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter “that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable.” Id. Rule 8(a) requires that a plaintiff’s complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). While a high level of factual detail is not required, a complaint needs more
than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, a complaint must be
“clear enough to enable the Defendant to know how to defend himself.” North Carolina v.
McGuirt, 114 Fed. App’x. 55, 558 (4th Cir. 2004).
Although pleadings from pro se litigants are entitled to some leniency, they are still bound
to follow the rules of procedure. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e
have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as
to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”). While a pro se complaint must be
construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the liberal construction
requirement will not permit a district court to recognize a clear failure to allege facts in the
complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
IV.
ANALYSIS
The Court first turns to Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, which Plaintiff carries the burden in responding. Plaintiff’s pleadings appear to assert,
to some extent, this Court has no jurisdiction:
[A]s each Defendant has clearly shown that they are Article I court and entities
created by congress and that no remedy or relief could be attained in these
6
administrative courts whereas each Defendant lacks subject matter and personal
jurisdiction as i tornello am not resident of State of North Carolina nor Citizen or
corporation of . . . .
(Doc. No. 38, p. 7). In response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiff’s pleadings continue
to invoke “equity” jurisdiction without reference to any supporting allegations or applicable law.
(See Doc. No. 52; see also Doc. No. 38 (referencing throughout the Amended Complaint “equity
jurisprudence” as a basis for his claims instead of any actual law, state or federal)). Even the
Amended Complaint’s mere reference to “causes of action” over which this Court might have
federal question jurisdiction are wholly unsupported by fact, making the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction problematic for Plaintiff here.
Aside from Plaintiff failing to establish how this Court has subject matter jurisdiction, the
Court turns to the motions to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Despite this Court’s previous ruling and admonishment to Plaintiff, his Amended
Complaint continues to contain rambling assertions, unsupported by allegations of fact, and as a
whole falls short of meeting its burden of pleading under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides a basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff’s failure to substantiate his claims with any concrete facts makes it challenging
for the Court and Defendants to understand Plaintiff’s reasons for bringing suit. His references
throughout the Amended Complaint to the Constitution, various provisions of the United States
Code, case citations to inapplicable case law, and other “maxims” are unavailing in establishing a
basis for Defendants to know how to defend against the purported causes of action. See North
Carolina v. McGuirt, 114 F. App'x 555, 558 (4th Cir. 2004) (“When determining whether a district
court abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to comply with Rule 8(a), courts have looked
7
to various factors, including . . . whether the complaint was clear enough to enable the defendant
to know how to defend himself.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, dismissal for failure to comply
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is appropriate.
Nevertheless, this Court examines Plaintiff’s apparent claims individually under 12(b)(6).
At best, this Court construes Plaintiff’s amended complaint as an attempt to assert the following
claims, generally categorized by this Court as: 1) social security fraud; 2) unlawful imprisonment,
including unlawful detention, unlawful arrest, and kidnapping; and 3) copyright and trademark
infringement. Plaintiff also appears to be clarifying his attempt to assert a purported defamation
claim in his Response to the Motions to Dismiss. For the following reasons, all of Plaintiff’s claims
are dismissed.
A.
Plaintiff’s Social Security Fraud Claim
Plaintiff alleges Defendants coerced him into giving them his social security number “for
capital gain for the private corporation without informing beneficiary reason why.” (Doc. No. 38).
First, it is unclear as to the basis in law related to Plaintiff’s allegation here. 4 Plaintiff claims each
Defendant used “commercial paper(s)” and “ex post facto law” to obtain his Social Security
number, yet offers no actual allegation indicating that anyone unlawfully compelled him to reveal
his this information. Id. at 13.
Plaintiff cites to a North Carolina statute prohibiting any
government agency from denying individuals any rights because of their refusal to disclose their
social security number, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-64.50(a), yet nowhere in his Amended Complaint
does Plaintiff describe a situation where he was denied rights for failing to disclose this
While Plaintiff does not reference applicable federal law, based on this Court’s research and broad reading of the
contents of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the social security fraud claim could be liberally construed as an assertion
of a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(A).
4
8
information. Plaintiff cites no applicable federal law. He does not appear to be seeking a remedy
of any kind. As noted in Iqbal, complaints that are “naked assertion[s] devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement’” are subject to 12(b)(6) dismissal. 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff provides no facts to
substantiate
this
claim,
therefore
it
is
not
plausible
and
dismissed
under
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) with prejudice.
B.
Plaintiff’s Unlawful Detention Claim
Plaintiff also appears to make a claim of unlawful detention, and he generally references
claims for “kidnap[ping],” apparently based on being stopped by law enforcement while
“exercising private rights of traveling . . . .”5 (Doc. No. 38, p. 6). Defendants move to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Mere conclusory
statements that lack sufficient factual basis will not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. The only context Plaintiff provides for the unlawful detention claim is that he was
“kidnap [sic] for eleven (11) hours and harassed, caused duress, stressed” by Defendants Joines
and Schatzman. (Doc. No. 38). Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Joines “demanded payment
of ransom.” Id. Plaintiff fails to include any dates, times, or descriptions of the circumstances that
would allow this Court to make any reasonable inferences towards Defendants’ liability. See
Iqbal, 56 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff cites to no cognizable set of facts articulated in the Complaint to
support the claims. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful detention is not plausible and is
dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) with prejudice.
C.
Plaintiff’s Copyright and Trademark Infringement Claim
5
While Plaintiff does not expressly assert federal law in his Amended Complaint, his unlawful arrest claim could be
liberally construed as an assertion of a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
9
Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of copyright and trademark infringement
under Rule 12(b)(6).6 Plaintiff claims that his name, “Tornello Fontaine, Pierce el Bey,” is
trademarked and copyrighted. (Doc. No. 38). Plaintiff alleges each Defendant, on unspecified
occasions, infringed upon this copyright and/or trademark by using his name without his consent.
Id. at 13. Plaintiff claims this copyright has been in place since 2009. Id. at 14.
Plaintiff
additionally alleges that (unspecified) Defendants have “committed identity theft, stolen
birthrights, and trade/copyrights.” Id. at 13. Despite these accusations, Plaintiff has not plausibly
established for this Court that he has a basis to obtain relief for copyright or trademark
infringement. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Copyrights serve to protect “original works of
authorship” created by “tangible medium[s] of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
Assuming that it would be possible to copyright and/or trademark Plaintiff’s name,
Plaintiff offers no evidence of any official government record to demonstrate that his name was
registered as a copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 408. Plaintiff also fails to offer evidence that his name
was subject to trademark protection under 15 U.S.C. § 1051 or N.C. Gen. Stat. §80-3. In the
absence of any supporting allegation, documentation, or basis in law, this Court finds it is not
plausible that Plaintiff has an actionable copyright or trademark. Plaintiff’s claim for copyright
and trademark violations are therefore dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
D.
Plaintiff’s other “claims”
To the extent Plaintiff purports to assert causes of action for “trespass,” “deprive of private
rights thru use of force, harassment, duress and threat to contract;” “intentional infliction of
emotional distress and hardship by interfering with private rights; or “taken private property for
6
Trademark and copyright infringement claims arise under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 and are therefore subject to federal
jurisdiction.
10
public gain without compensation;” (Doc. No. 38, pp. 13-14), the Court hereby summarily
dismisses those claims, as well, for failure to comply with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Plaintiff provides no recitation of any allegations related to these claims, and his
use of legal terminology, without more, is insufficient to comply with pleading standards under
applicable law.
E.
Plaintiff’s Responses to the Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiff filed three documents in response to the Motions to Dismiss his Amended
Complaint. (Doc. No. 52, 55, 57). In all documents, Plaintiff makes additional accusations against
Defendants. He discounts the pre-filing injunction against him in the Middle District, Doc. 40 at
2, Noble v. City of Greensboro, No 1:10CV572 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 20, 2012), and alleges the United
States District Judge in that matter is liable for slander, copyright infringement, and lacks
jurisdiction over him. (Doc. No. 52, 55). Plaintiff additionally accuses each Defendant’s attorney
of professional misconduct and requests sanctions. (Doc. No. 57). Plaintiff fails to support these
allegations with any facts. Plaintiff accuses Defendants Barnes and Vaughan of “spreading
propaganda of hate” and of “denying rights/private rights” and of “disobeying an Executive order.”
(Doc. No. 52, 55). Plaintiff cites no evidence to substantiate these claims, and it is unclear whether
this Court has jurisdiction over these claims, even if they were plausible. Fraud, libel, and slander
are actions that arise under state law, and Plaintiff has not shown how any law, federal or state,
applies to these claims.
To the extent that this Court has jurisdiction over the matter and the subsequent allegations
contained in Plaintiff’s responsive pleadings, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
Once again, Plaintiff provides only “‘[n]aked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
11
enhancement,’” which are subject to 12(b)(6) dismissal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff
provides no facts on which to base his claims; therefore they are not plausible and are dismissed
with prejudice.
F.
Plaintiff’s Motions for Injunctive Relief
To grant a preliminary injunction, a court must find that, among other factors, a plaintiff’s
case is “likely to succeed on the merits.” League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769
F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014). Permanent injunctive relief is appropriate when a Plaintiff
demonstrates that (1) it has suffered irreparable injury; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3)
the balance of hardship favors an equitable remedy; and (4) the issuance of an injunction is in the
public’s interest. Id. To grant a permanent injunction, a plaintiff must prove that he has suffered
an irreparable injury (among other factors). eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391
(2006). Plaintiff cannot demonstrate satisfaction of any of the above requirements due to failure
to provide any substantive facts or relevant law, and his motions for injunctive relief are hereby
denied.
G.
Defendant’s Request for a Pre-filing Injunction
As noted in this Court’s previous order, Plaintiff is currently subject to a pre-filing
injunction in the Middle District of North Carolina for a history of filing frivolous lawsuits. Noble,
No 1:10CV572 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 20, 2012). In fact, Plaintiff has filed at least six lawsuits in federal
court by the same or slightly different names in recent years. Defendants Barnes, Schatzman, and
Joines ask this Court to impose a pre-filing injunction on Plaintiff here in this district. (Doc. No.
40, 48, 50).
12
While the use of a pre-filing injunction against a pro se plaintiff should be approached with
caution, Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004), litigants do not
have an absolute and unconditional right of access to federal courts in order to prosecute frivolous,
successive, abusive, or vexatious legal actions. Hutton v. U.S. Dep’t of Vet. Affairs, 2017 WL
2060006, *4; See In Re Vincent, 105 F.3d 943, 945 (4th Cir. 2004). The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a), allows a federal court to limit access to the courts for vexatious and repetitive litigants.
Cromer, 390 F.3d at 817. A judge should not limit a litigant’s access to courts absent exigent
circumstances, such as “abuse of the judicial process by filing meritless and repetitive actions.”
Id. at 817-818.
When determining whether a pre-filing injunction is necessary, courts must weigh: (1) the
party’s history of litigation, in particular whether he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative
lawsuits; (2) whether a party had good faith basis for pursuing the litigation or simply intended to
harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the party’s filings
and (4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions. Id.
This Court is aware of this Plaintiff’s history of filing frivolous lawsuits. In the original
order to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, this Court noted Plaintiff’s claims were “utterly frivolous”
and filed “with the intent to harass Defendants.” (Doc. No. 31). This Court provided Plaintiff
with a final warning against future frivolous filings in this district, and informed Plaintiff that
future filings would likely result in sanctions and a pre-filing injunction. Id. In this case, however,
Plaintiff did not file a new complaint; he amended his first one, with the permission of the Fourth
Circuit. Because Plaintiff did not file a new complaint, this Court denies Defendants’ request at
this time for a pre-filing injunction. This Court reiterates to Plaintiff that this is a FINAL
13
WARNING that future frivolous filings in this district will most likely result in sanctions and
a pre-filing injunction limiting his access to the courts.
V.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. Nos. 39, 41,
44, 47, 48, and 49) are GRANTED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim as stated above. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED, and in light of the fact Plaintiff
had opportunity to cure any deficiencies in the Complaint here by virtue of the Fourth Circuit’s
remand, such dismissal is WITH PREJUDICE. See McGuirt, 114 F. App'x at 559 (4th Cir. 2004)
(“Aggravating factors may, however, present sufficient weight in favor of that sanction and bring
it within the appropriate discretion of the district court. One such aggravating factor, for instance,
is whether the plaintiff has persisted in failing to comply with Rule 8(a).” (citations omitted)).
Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief are DENIED. Defendants’ requests for a pre-filing
injunction are DENIED. Plaintiff is again WARNED that future frivolous lawsuits will most likely
result in sanctions and a pre-filing injunction from this Court.
The Clerk is respectfully directed to CLOSE THIS CASE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: August 24, 2017
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