United States of America v. Walker

Filing 24

DEFAULT JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff against Judson E Walker. Signed by District Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr on 9/8/2017. (eef)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:15-cv-00594-RJC-DSC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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JUDSON E. WALKER,
)
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Defendant.
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________________________________________ )

ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment,
(Doc. No. 19), and Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Default Judgment, (Doc. No. 21).
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed its Complaint on December 7, 2015, (Doc. No. 1), and Defendant was served

in person on February 19, 2016, (Doc. Nos. 3, 4). Defendant failed to file an Answer; therefore,
on July 13, 2016, the Court directed Plaintiff to file a Motion for Entry of Default. (Doc. No. 7).
Without offering any explanation as to his dilatory conduct, Defendant filed his Answer the next
day on July 14, 2016. (Doc. No. 8). Thereafter, in order to comply with the Court’s Order, Plaintiff
filed its Motion for Entry of Default on July 27, 2016. (Doc. No. 11). That motion was denied as
the Court granted Defendant latitude and accepted his untimely filed answer. (Doc. No. 13).
Nevertheless, after Defendant requested, received, and failed to comply with an extension of time
to hold an initial attorneys’ conference and file a certification thereof, (Doc. Nos. 14, 15), Plaintiff
again filed a Motion for Entry of Default and the Clerk entered default on October 18, 2016, (Doc.
Nos. 16, 18). After the Clerk’s entry of default, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment and

Amended Motion for Default Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 19 and 21). Defendant has not responded to
either, nor has he moved to set aside default.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
The entry of default judgment is governed by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure which provides in relevant part that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a).
Upon the entry of default, the defaulted party is deemed to have admitted all well-pleaded
allegations of fact contained in the complaint. Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778,
780 (4th Cir. 2001); Weft, Inc. v. GC Inv. Assocs., 630 F. Supp. 1138, 1141 (E.D.N.C. 1986)
(citations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation - other than one relating to the
amount of damages - is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not
denied.”). Nonetheless, the defendant is not deemed to have admitted conclusions of law and the
entry of “default is not treated as an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the
plaintiff’s right to recover.” Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780 (citations omitted); see also E.E.O.C. v. Carter
Behavior Health Servs., Inc., No. 4:09-cv-122-F, 2011 WL 5325485, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 7,
2011). Rather, in determining whether to enter judgment on the default, the court must determine
whether the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint support the relief sought. See Ryan, 253
F.3d at 780 (citing Weft, 630 F. Supp. at 1141); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pernites, 200 F. App’x 257,
258 (4th Cir. 2006) (a ““defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit
conclusions of law”“) (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200,
1206 (5th Cir. 1975)); Arista Records, LLC v. Gaines, 635 F. Supp. 2d 414, 416 (E.D.N.C. 2009);
10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688 (3d ed. Supp. 2010)

(“[L]iability is not deemed established simply because of the default . . . and the court, in its
discretion, may require some proof of the facts that must be established in order to determine
liability.”).
To that end, the Fourth Circuit has “repeatedly expressed a strong preference that, as a
general matter, defaults be avoided and that claims and defenses be disposed of on their merits.”
Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Univ., Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted). Nonetheless, default judgment “may be appropriate when the adversary process has been
halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” SEC v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421
(D. Md. 2005).
If the court finds that liability is established, it must then determine damages. Carter
Behavior Health, 2011 WL 5325485, at *4 (citing Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780-81; Gaines, 635 F. Supp.
2d at 416-17). The court must make an independent determination regarding damages, and cannot
accept as true factual allegations of damages. Id. (citing Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 422).
While the court may conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine damages, it is not required to do
so, but may rely instead on affidavits or documentary evidence in the record to determine the
appropriate sum. See EEOC v. CDG Mgmt., LLC, No. RDB-08-2562, 2010 WL 4904440, at *2
(D. Md. Nov. 24, 2010) (citations omitted); EEOC v. North Am. Land Corp., No. 1:08-cv-501,
2010 WL 2723727, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Jul. 8, 2010).
III.

DISCUSSION
Defendant has been almost entirely unresponsive throughout this litigation, with his only

filings being two motions for extensions and a short Answer to the Complaint wherein he by and
large denied the substantive allegations in the Complaint. (Doc. Nos. 5, 8, 14). Indeed, the Court
has not heard from Defendant in almost a year and Defendant has not cooperated with Plaintiff to

move the case forward. See (Doc. No. 16). Defendant has failed to defend himself in this lawsuit.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 55. Accordingly, default was appropriately entered, and the Court will proceed
with the Motion for Default Judgment. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant owes a student-loan debt
of $25,857.17 plus 4.375% interest, totaling $36.097.57 as of October 8, 2015. (Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶
5, 9 at ¶ 5). Despite Defendant’s denial of these allegations, Plaintiff submits a Certificate of
Indebtedness and Defendant’s Federal Direct Consolidation Loan Application and Promissory
Note demonstrating the debt Defendant owes. (Doc. No. 1-1). These well-pleaded allegations in
the Complaint and Plaintiff’s Declaration for Entry of Default and Default Judgment support
findings that Defendant owes a debt to the U.S. government and owes it in the amount represented
in the Complaint. In conjunction with Defendant’s failure to defend himself, default judgment is
warranted as ordered below.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the claims asserted in the Complaint, (Doc. No. 1), the Plaintiffs’ Motions

for Default Judgment, (Doc. Nos. 19, 21), and the associated memoranda, (Doc. Nos. 19-1, 21-1),
the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Motion should be, and hereby is, GRANTED.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Default Judgment, (Doc. No. 21), is GRANTED;
2. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff against Defendant in the amount of
$36,097.57 plus 4.375% interest from October 9, 2015 until the date of this Order;
3. Plaintiff shall be entitled to post-judgment interest at the statutory rate until the
judgment is fully paid, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961;
4. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment, (Doc. No. 19), is DISMISSED as moot;
and

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
Signed: September 8, 2017