Carawan v. Mitchell et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 5 Motion to have summons served on Defendants by USMS. Plaintiff shall fill out and return summons to Clerk for issuance and service by USMS. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 12/20/16. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(clc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:16-cv-563-FDW
WILLIAM CARAWAN, JR.,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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FNU MITCHELL, et al.,
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Defendants.
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__________________________________________)
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. No.
1). Also pending is Plaintiff’s “Motion to Have Civil Summons Served on Defendants by US
Marshal Services or by Other Legal Means.” (Doc. No. 5). On August 18, 2016, this Court
entered an order granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status and waiving the initial filing fee.
(Doc. No. 6).
I.
BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff William Carawan, Jr., is a North Carolina prisoner incarcerated at Tabor
Correctional Institution in Tabor City, North Carolina. Plaintiff filed this action on July 21,
2016, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as Defendants (1) FNU Mitchell, identified as the
Superintendent at Lanesboro Correctional Institution; (2) FNU Hammond, identified as the
Programs Supervisor at Lanesboro; (3) FNU Bennett, identified as a Programmer at Lanesboro;
(4) FNU Mullis, identified as a Lieutenant at Lanesboro; (5) FNU Jarman, identified as a teacher
at Lanesboro and South Piedmont College; (6) FNU Mullis, identified as a Captain at Lanesboro;
and (7) FNU Tillman, identified as a Correctional Officer at Lanesboro. (Doc. No. 1). In the
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, while incarcerated at Lanesboro, he was forced to choose
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between attending class to earn gain-time credits and attending worship services to practice his
religion, Islam. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges the following:
Plaintiff was forced to choose between getting infractions for not going to school,
even though staff could allow the plaintiff to attend the class immediately after
service or going to his religious services. Plaintiff had a right to both the gained
time earned for going to school and for the practice of Islam, yet staff threatened
plaintiff with an infraction if he missed 6 one half day periods. Services for
Muslims is 1 hour, from roughly 1:15 pm to 2:15 pm, leaving 2 hours of school,
which Mr. Jarmon the teacher wouldn’t allow. I was also not allowed to pray
while seated at my desk even though it caused no distraction of any sort. Mr.
Mitchell, Mrs. Hammond, Mrs. Bennett, Lt. Mullis, Cpt. Mullis, Mr. Jarman, and
the school officer c/o Tillman all acted on such practices and policies giving
Plaintiff an ultimatum: religious practice or school, and threatened to write
plaintiff up for absences forced by staff as plaintiff could’ve easily went back to
class utilizing the hour or so left. This act occurred between January 6, 2015, and
mid-February 2015 and is still being practiced toward all student inmates who
practice their religion to this date.
(Id. at 2, 4-5). Plaintiff alleges that, in forcing Plaintiff to choose between taking classes and
practicing his religion, Defendants violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of his
religion, and his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.1 As relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief, as well as compensatory damages. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff specifically seeks an order from the
Court instructing Lanesboro officials to “stop forcing students to miss school time or services
and for students of the Islamic faith to be able to pray as it is a pillar of Islam recognized in
policy.” (Id.).
Plaintiff also purports to bring a Fourteenth Amendment “due process” claim, alleging that he
“was not allowed to attend one service nor was I allowed to pray and these decisions made did
not involve due process at all.” (Doc. No. 1 at 7). Because Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to
exercise his religion arises through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court therefore analyzes this claim as part and parcel of his First Amendment claim.
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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint
to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious
[or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In its
frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably
meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or
delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). A pro se complaint
must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal
construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in
his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III.
DISCUSSION
As noted, Plaintiff alleges claims pursuant to both RLUIPA and the First Amendment.
Beginning with plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, RLUIPA provides, in part: “No government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “RLUIPA thus protects
institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore
dependent on the government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.”
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). Under RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of showing that the challenged policy substantially burdens his exercise of his religion.
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See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). The statute defines
“religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 251
(4th Cir. 2009). A “‘substantial burden’ is one that puts substantial pressure on an adherent to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, [] or one that forces a person to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting governmental benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion on the other hand.” Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d
174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (quotations, citation, and alterations omitted).
Once the inmate makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the government to
prove that “the burden in question is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest.” Ozmint, 578 F.3d at 250. “‘RLUIPA adopts a . . . strict scrutiny’
standard.” Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting and citing Lovelace, 472
F.3d at 198 n.8). Under RLUIPA, the court must give “due deference to the experience and
expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to
maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited
resources.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723 (quotation omitted). “However, ‘a court should not rubber
stamp or mechanically accept the judgments of prison administrators.’ . . . Rather, due deference
will be afforded to those explanations that sufficiently ‘take[] into account any institutional need
to maintain good order, security, and discipline.’” Couch, 679 F.3d at 201 (quoting Lovelace,
472 F.3d at 190).
As for Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment to the states
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through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). To
state a free exercise claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to
show that he held a sincere religious belief, and that the official action or regulation substantially
burdened his exercise of that belief. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). A prison
policy that substantially burdens an inmate’s ability to practice his religion withstands a First
Amendment challenge when it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89 (1987)). In deciding whether a defendant’s actions can be sustained as reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests, the court must consider the following four factors: (1) whether
there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate penological
interest; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right in question that remain
open to prisoners; (3) the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have
on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether ready
alternatives exist which accommodate the right and satisfy the penological interest. See Turner,
482 U.S. at 89-90. Claims brought under the First Amendment are subject to a less demanding
standard of proof than claims brought under RLUIPA, with RLUIPA claims requiring “strict
scrutiny instead of reasonableness.” See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 199 n.8.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are not clearly frivolous and therefore survive
initial review. To the extent, however, that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, that claim is moot
because Plaintiff has been transferred away from Lanesboro.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims survive initial
screening by the Court in that they are not clearly frivolous.
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.
Plaintiff’s action survives initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
2.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Clerk is directed to mail summons
forms to Plaintiff for Plaintiff to fill out and return for service of process on
Defendants. Once the Court receives the summons forms, the Clerk shall then
direct the U.S. Marshal to effectuate service on Defendants.
The Clerk is
respectfully instructed to note on the docket when the forms have been mailed to
Plaintiff.
3.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Have Civil Summons Served on Defendants by US Marshal
Services or by Other Legal Means, (Doc. No. 5), is GRANTED.
Signed: December 20, 2016
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