Carawan v. Mitchell et al,
Filing
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ORDER directing Clerk to mail summons forms to Plaintiff. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 2/28/17. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(clc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:16-cv-577-FDW
WILLIAM CARAWAN, JR.,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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FNU MITCHELL, et al.,
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Defendants.
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__________________________________________)
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. No.
1). On September 14, 2016, this Court entered an order granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis
status and waiving the initial filing fee. (Doc. No. 8).
I.
BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff William Carawan, Jr., is a North Carolina prisoner incarcerated at Tabor
Correctional Institution in Tabor City, North Carolina. Plaintiff filed this action on July 26,
2016, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as Defendants (1) FNU Mitchell, identified as the
Superintendent at Lanesboro Correctional Institution; and (2) FNU Bird, identified as the
Chaplain at Lanesboro. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff alleges the following in the Complaint:
On February 28, 2015, Plaintiff asserted his right to practice zakat (charity) in
accordance with Islam but was forced by policy to withhold that charity even
though it is an Islamic pillar. Other camps use the zakat fund through the canteen
but Mr. Mitchell and Chaplain Bird both refuse to provide means for the zakat
fund in order for Muslims to practice charity which policy otherwise forbids w/o
the fund, which creates the least restrictive means for us to practice charity. This
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.
(Id. at 2-3). As relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. (Id. at 7).
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Plaintiff specifically seeks an order from the Court instructing Lanesboro officials to “initiate the
zakat fund and keep it running as long as it is active.” (Id.).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint
to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious
[or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In its
frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably
meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or
delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). A pro se complaint
must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal
construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in
his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that, by refusing to institute a zakat fund at Lanesboro, Defendants
violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion (Islam), and his
rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.1 Beginning with plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, RLUIPA provides, in part:
“No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing
in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
Plaintiff also purports to bring a separate “due process” claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to exercise his religion arises through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court therefore analyzes this claim as
part and parcel of his First Amendment claim.
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unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “RLUIPA thus
protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are
therefore dependent on the government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their
religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). Under RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears
the initial burden of showing that the challenged policy substantially burdens his exercise of his
religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). The statute
defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246,
251 (4th Cir. 2009). A “‘substantial burden’ is one that puts substantial pressure on an adherent
to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, [] or one that forces a person to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting governmental benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion on the other hand.” Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d
174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (quotations, citation, and alterations omitted).
Once the inmate makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the government to
prove that “the burden in question is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest.” Ozmint, 578 F.3d at 250. “‘RLUIPA adopts a . . . strict scrutiny’
standard.” Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting and citing Lovelace, 472
F.3d at 198 n.8). Under RLUIPA, the court must give “due deference to the experience and
expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to
maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited
resources.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723 (quotation omitted). “However, ‘a court should not rubber
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stamp or mechanically accept the judgments of prison administrators.’ . . . Rather, due deference
will be afforded to those explanations that sufficiently ‘take[] into account any institutional need
to maintain good order, security, and discipline.’” Couch, 679 F.3d at 201 (quoting Lovelace,
472 F.3d at 190).
As for Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). To
state a free exercise claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to
show that he held a sincere religious belief, and that the official action or regulation substantially
burdened his exercise of that belief. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). A prison
policy that substantially burdens an inmate’s ability to practice his religion withstands a First
Amendment challenge when it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
89 (1987)). In deciding whether a defendant’s actions can be sustained as reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests, the court must consider the following four factors: (1) whether
there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate penological
interest; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right in question that remain
open to prisoners; (3) the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have
on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether ready
alternatives exist which accommodate the right and satisfy the penological interest. See Turner,
482 U.S. at 89-90. Claims brought under the First Amendment are subject to a less demanding
standard of proof than claims brought under RLUIPA, with RLUIPA claims requiring “strict
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scrutiny instead of reasonableness.” See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 199 n.8.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are not clearly frivolous and therefore survive
initial review. To the extent, however, that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, that claim is moot
because Plaintiff has been transferred away from Lanesboro.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims survive initial
screening by the Court in that they are not clearly frivolous.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.
Plaintiff’s action survives initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
2.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Clerk is directed to mail summons
forms to Plaintiff for Plaintiff to fill out and return for service of process on
Defendants. Once the Court receives the summons forms, the Clerk shall then
direct the U.S. Marshal to effectuate service on Defendants.
The Clerk is
respectfully instructed to note on the docket when the forms have been mailed to
Plaintiff.
Signed: February 28, 2017
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