Raynor v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc. et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 59 Motion in Limine as it pertains to the exclusion of the report of and testimony from Dr. Sara E. Boyd. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 1/31/18. (clc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. 3:17-cv-00160-FDW-DSC
E. RAY RAYNOR,
Plaintiff,
vs.
G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS (USA) INC.,
Defendant.
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ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court to memorialize the Court’s rulings on Plaintiff E. Ray
Raynor’s Motion in Limine (Doc. No. 54) as it pertains to the exclusion of the report of and
testimony from Dr. Sara E. Boyd.1 At the pre-trial hearing, the Court orally granted Plaintiff’s
motion in limine as to this matter, subject to reconsideration, and indicated that it would
memorialize its ruling on this matter in a detailed order. This order follows.
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Sara E. Boyd’s opinion fails to qualify as an expert opinion under
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and use of such an opinion is unsupported by case law.
(Doc. No. 54-1). Therefore, Plaintiff seeks the exclusion of any reference to, evidence from, or
testimony from Dr. Boyd. The Court, as stated and ordered at the pre-trial hearing, agrees.2
After review of Dr. Boyd’s report, the parties’ briefs, and the record, the Court concludes
that Dr. Boyd’s specialized knowledge will not help the trier of fact determine a fact at issue in
this case, is not based on sufficient facts or data, and is not the product of reliable principles and
Plaintiff disputes the admissibility of Dr. Boyd’s report and testimony but does not dispute her qualifications.
The Court notes that its conclusions is based on the record before the Court and the unique assessment and
circumstances of the assessment conducted by Dr. Boyd. Thus, this order in no way reflects on Dr. Boyd’s
qualifications and her expert sills as a forensic psychologist.
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methods. Fed. R. Evid. 702. Defendant, as proponent of the expert testimony, “must establish its
admissibility by a preponderance of proof.” Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199
(4th Cir. 2001). Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.
Under Rule 702, “trial judges act as gatekeepers”; trial judges must ensure that expert testimony
is both relevant and reliable. Cooper, 259 F.3d at 199 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)). In doing so, the trial court must consider whether “given the potential
persuasiveness of expert testimony, proffered evidence . . . has a greater potential to mislead than
to enlighten[.]” Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d. 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1999).
Here, Dr. Boyd, as stated in her report, completed her assessment of Plaintiff “with respect
to psychological factors potentially influencing his perception of his work performance and his
report of emotional distress” and “offer[s] [her] opinions about the symptoms and features
[Plaintiff] appears to exhibit without making any formal diagnoses.” (Doc. No. 27-2 at 2, 3).
Specifically, she concludes “Mr. Raynor’s ability to assess his work performance appeared to have
been substantially impaired by a combination of skill deficits and a narcissistic personality style
that included an inflated view of himself combined with limited insight.” (Doc. No. 27-2 at 16).
Then, she states “[t]he information I reviewed strongly indicated that to the degree Mr. Raynor
hold distorted views of his performance, achievements, and deservingness of rewards and
employment, the distortion is more likely attributable to characterological factors and the Better
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than Average Effect rather than intentional misrepresentation.” (Doc. No. 27-2 at 16). Further,
she states “it is possible that Mr. Raynor does not have the vocabulary to describe his emotions,
and/or that he has some degree of alexithymia and is consequently impaired in his ability to identify
and convey his internal emotional experience” and “it is also possible that he is not experiencing
substantial distress . . .” (Doc. No. 27-2 at 16). These statements will neither help the jury
understand the evidence nor determine a fact in issue. Dr. Boyd has not utilized her specialized
knowledge in a manner that contributes to the understanding of the jury. Dr. Boyd does not make
any diagnosis. She merely states her assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility using jargon. The
requirements of Rule 702 “prohibit[] the use of expert testimony related to matters which are
‘obviously . . . within the common knowledge of jurors.’”
United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d
437, 449 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1055 (4th
Cir.1986)). “The assessment of a witness’s credibility . . . is ‘usually within the jury’s exclusive
purview.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 815 (4th
Cir.1995)). “Thus, in the absence of unusual circumstances, Rule 702 renders inadmissible expert
testimony on issues of witness credibility.” Id. Here, there are no unusual circumstances. The
jurors, as laymen, with the opportunity to review all the evidence in this case, including seeing live
testimony from witnesses, such as Plaintiff, are in the best position to assess, weigh, and determine
the credibility of Plaintiff. Expert testimony weighing on Plaintiff’s credibility is neither helpful
nor appropriate.
Further, opinions and statements from Dr. Boyd about the “psychological factors
potentially influencing his perception of his work performance and his report of emotional
distress” do not address factual issues in this case. The third element for a prima facie case of age
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discrimination of “whether an employee met his employer's legitimate expectations at the time of
termination” turns on the “‘perception of the decision maker . . ., not the self-assessment of the
plaintiff.’” Jones v. Constellation Energy Projects & Servs. Grp., Inc., 629 F. App’x 466, 469 (4th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2000)). Therefore, Dr.
Boyd’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility as to his work performance is not a fact at issue for
this claim. The perception of Defendant’s decision maker is what is at issue.
Dr. Boyd’s evaluation of “psychological factors potentially influencing [Plaintiff’s] . . .
report of emotional distress” also does not address factual issues in this case. The Court previously
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction
of emotional distress. (Docs. No. 23, 48). Because there are no claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Doc. No. 64), any statements
or opinions from Dr. Boyd would not “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a).
Dr. Boyd’s testimony is also not based on sufficient facts or data or a reliable principal or
method. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b), (c); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
“[T]he purpose of Rule 702's
gatekeeping function is to ‘make certain that an expert . . . employs in the courtroom the same
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.’” Cooper,
259 F.3d at 203 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)). Dr. Boyd
admits that her data does not allow for an optimal assessment. Dr. Boyd relied on a videotaped
deposition of Plaintiff, telephone interviews with four employees of Defendant for a total of three
hours and five minutes, three affidavits, and other depositions and records. Dr. Boyd never met
or spoke with Plaintiff. She expressly acknowledges that “an optimal assessment would have
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included a clinical interview to gather information about his developmental history (i.e., child and
adolescence), personality testing (such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—
Second Edition), and some academic achievement testing to assess his language-related skills[.]”
(Doc. No. 27-2 at 2).
Also neither Dr. Boyd’s report nor Defendant’s brief identify Dr. Boyd’s method or puts
forth any indication that Dr. Boyd’s “method” for evaluation “(1) can be or has been tested; (2)
has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) [does not] ha[ve] a high known or potential
rate of error; and (4) is generally accepted within a relevant scientific community.” Bresler v.
Wilmington Trust Co., 855 F.3d 178, 195 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Dr. Boyd only cites
Section 9.03 of the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology, which states “[w]hen it is not
possible or feasible to examine individuals about whom they are offering an opinion, forensic
practitioners strive to make clear the impact of such limitations on the reliability and validity of
their professional products, opinions, or testimony.” (Doc. No. 27-2 at 2). A guideline is not a
principal or method of evaluation and the existence of this guideline alone is insufficient to
establish the reliability of a principal or method. Given the amount and quality of information
considered and the unexplained method applied by Dr. Boyd, Dr. Boyd’s testimony and report do
not withstand scrutiny under Rule 702 and Daubert. The Court cannot conclude from the evidence
put forth by Defendant “that the proffered testimony [and report are] properly admissible.” Pugh
v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 361 F. App’x 448, 452-53 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Therm-O-Disc., Inc., 137 F.3d 780, 784 (4th Cir. 1998)).
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THEREFORE, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as it concerns the exclusion of any reference
to, evidence from, or testimony from Dr. Boyd is GRANTED for the reasons stated in open court
at the pre-trial hearing and for the reasons memorialized herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: January 31, 2018
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