Ballard v. Hatley et al

Filing 13

ORDER that the Clerk of Court shall commence the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Rule 4.3 for Defendants, who are current or former employees of NCDPS. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 8/2/18. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(clc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:17-cv-393-FDW
ROBERT BALLARD,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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FNU HATLEY, et al.,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A, (Doc. No. 12). On August 2, 2017, the Court
entered an order waiving the initial filing fee and directing monthly payments to be made from
Plaintiff’s prison account. (Doc. No. 8). Thus, Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
I.

BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Robert Ballard is a North Carolina prisoner incarcerated at Central Prison
in Raleigh, North Carolina. Plaintiff filed this action on July 7, 2017, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Pursuant to an order from the Court, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 2,
2018, naming the following persons as Defendants: (1) Mr. Herring, Superintendent, Lanesboro
Correctional; (2) J. Bennett, Assistant Superintendent, Lanesboro Correctional; (3) Mr.
Thompson, Nurse Supervisor, Lanesboro Correctional; (4) Mr. Rogers, Assistant Superintendent,
Lanesboro Correctional; (5) Mr. D. Hatley, Unit Manager, Lanesboro Correctional; (6) Capt.
Aaron, Captain, Lanesboro Correctional; (7) Sergeant Simmons, Sergeant, Lanesboro
Correctional; (8) Nurse Parks, Nurse, Lanesboro Correctional; and (9) First Shift Nurses,
Lanesboro Correctional. Plaintiff alleges that, while he was incarcerated at Lanesboro,
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Defendants violated his constitutional rights by deliberately ignoring his serious medical needs
and by subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that he is confined to a wheelchair and needs to be in a
handicap cell. He alleges that he was housed in Red Unit, segregation, until he was sent to an
outside hospital for chest pains, and then returned to Lanesboro. He alleges that he was
transferred to Lanesboro in May 2017. Plaintiff alleges that he should never have been
transferred to Lanesboro because it is not a medical hospital. Plaintiff alleges that, for numerous
days, he was denied the use of a shower, hot water, and lights in his cell; that various Defendants
denied him needed medications; he was denied clean clothing and underwear, pants, shirts, and
bedding for nine days; he was chained (by Defendants Aaron, Simmons, and three other officers)
with a waist chain and handcuffs (black box); and his leg was cut in response to him knocking on
his cell door to receive medical assistance when having chest pains, and he was forced to use the
bathroom on the floor. Plaintiff alleges that he wrote a letter to Defendant Rogers, Assistant
Superintendent, about not receiving a shower or clean clothes, and Defendant Rogers told
Plaintiff he could receive a shower and clean clothes, but it did not happen.
Plaintiff filed grievances with Defendant Herring, Superintendent of Lanesboro, about his
medications not being given to him. He also alleges that Defendant Thompson changed
Plaintiff’s activity level from A-3 to A-1, which is the wrong level for Plaintiff because he
suffers from numerous health issues. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Hatley has denied
Plaintiff a handicap cell while at Lanesboro. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that “each and every
named Defendant has personal knowledge and involvement in the above actions, decisions.”
(Doc. No. 12 at 7). For relief, Plaintiff states that he seeks injunctive relief and compensatory
and punitive damages. (Id. at 8).
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint
to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious
[or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,
§ 1915A requires an initial review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and the
court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,
if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. In its
frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably
meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or
delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989).
III.

DISCUSSION

To state a claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based
on an alleged lack of or inappropriate medical treatment, a plaintiff must show a “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs” of the inmate. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976). “Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants actually knew of and
disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to the detainee or that they actually knew of and
ignored a detainee’s serious need for medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567,
575-76 (4th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “To establish that a health care provider’s actions
constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the treatment must be so grossly
incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to
fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Allegations that might be sufficient to support negligence and medical malpractice claims
do not, without more, rise to the level of a cognizable Section 1983 claim for a federal
constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir.
1999) (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not
meet it.”). To be found liable for a constitutional violation, a prison official must know of and
consciously or intentionally disregard “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998).
“[E]ven if a prison doctor is mistaken or negligent in his diagnosis or treatment, no constitutional
issue is raised absent evidence of abuse, intentional mistreatment, or denial of medical attention.”
Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Md. 1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976).
The constitutional right is to medical care. No right exists to the type or scope of care desired by
the individual prisoner. Id. at 763. Therefore, a disagreement “between an inmate and a
physician over the inmate’s proper medical care [does] not state a § 1983 claim unless
exceptional circumstances are alleged.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985)
(dismissing the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against a defendant physician for allegedly discharging
the plaintiff too early from a medical clinic, as such claim did not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference but would, “at most, constitute a claim of medical malpractice”).
As to Plaintiff’s claim alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the Eighth
Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane
conditions of confinement. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). “Prison
conditions may be harsh and uncomfortable without violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.” Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997).
Rather, extreme deprivations are required, and “only those deprivations denying the minimal
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civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth
Amendment violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (internal quotation omitted)). The plaintiff must allege facts sufficient
to support a claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious
harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). A plaintiff must also generally allege “a
serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.”
Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993).
The Court finds that, assuming that Plaintiff’s allegations are true, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in his favor, Plaintiff’s claims are not clearly frivolous. Thus, this action
survives initial screening. As to the Defendants named only as “First Shift Nurses,” however,
the Court notes that these Defendants cannot be personally served unless and until Plaintiff
identifies each of their names.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s claims survive initial review.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1.

This action survives initial review.

2.

This Court recently enacted Local Rule 4.3, which sets forth a procedure to waive
service of process for current and former employees of the North Carolina
Department of Public Safety (“NCDPS”) in actions filed by North Carolina State
prisoners. The Clerk of Court shall commence the procedure for waiver of service
as set forth in Local Rule 4.3 for Defendants, who are current or former employees
of NCDPS.

1.

Signed: August 2, 2018

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