Berg et al v. Murratti et al
ORDER Granting 24 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Plaintiffs Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Signed by Senior Judge Graham Mullen on 11/13/2017. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(jaw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ROBERT BERG and JILL BERG,
JAMES MURRATTI, TINA MURRATTI, )
And CHERYL GONZALEZ,
This matter is before the Court upon the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed September
18, 2017 (Doc. No. 24). The pro se Plaintiffs have filed a response in opposition. Defendants
have not filed a Reply and the time for doing so has expired. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for
On August 16, 2017, Plaintiffs Robert and Jill Berg, the parents of Haley Berg, brought
this action alleging tortious interference with parental rights, alienation of affection, intrusion
upon seclusion, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with
their daughter against Defendants James and Tina Murratti, a married couple from Pendleton,
South Carolina, and Cheryl Gonzalez, the sister of Plaintiff Jill Berg. Plaintiffs allege that the
Murrattis, along with Defendant Gonzalez, conspired to interfere with Plaintiffs' parental rights
and communication with Haley beginning in the fall of 2016, when Haley was 17 years old.
Moreover, Plaintiffs' allege that due to Haley's fragile state of mind, Defendants conspired to
conceal Haley's whereabouts from Plaintiffs, and have exerted undue influence over Haley.
Plaintiffs are residents of the State of North Carolina. Defendants James and Tina Murratti are
residents of the State of South Carolina. Defendant Cheryl Gonzalez is a resident of Lake
Worth, Florida. Defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court will first address Defendants’ challenges to subject matter and personal
jurisdiction. This is a diversity case, and Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to
allege the requisite amount in controversy of $75,000. Plaintiffs' Complaint states that they are
seeking, "among other remedies, equitable relief in the form of compensatory and punitive
damages, and Plaintiffs' claims for damages exceeds seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00),
exclusive of interests and costs, as a direct result of all Defendants' tortious actions directed
against Plaintiffs." (Compl. ¶ 9). In making a determination as to whether Plaintiffs’ Complaint
meets the $75,000 threshold in damages, “the court should look to the face of the complaint itself
to determine whether it is a legal certainty that plaintiff's claims do not reach the required
amount.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 112 (4th Cir. 1995). “Unless the claim for an
amount over the jurisdictional prerequisite is made in bad faith, or unless it is plain from the
complaint that an amount less than the jurisdictional amount is all that is at issue, the district
court has jurisdiction over the case.” Id. From the face of the Complaint, the Court cannot
determine that it is a legal certainty that Plaintiffs’ claims do not reach the jurisdictional amount.
Accordingly, the Court must deny the motion to dismiss on this basis.
The Court next turns to Defendants’ challenge to personal jurisdiction. The Defendants
have each submitted a brief affidavit claiming to have no contacts with North Carolina.
However, at this juncture the Plaintiffs need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.
See Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that where
the court rules on a 12(b)(2) motion relying on the complaint, briefs, and affidavits alone,
without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the burden is on the plaintiff to make a prima facie
showing that personal jurisdiction exists). As for the facts, “the court must construe all relevant
pleading allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assume credibility, and draw the
most favorable inferences for the existence of jurisdiction.” Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676
(4th Cir. 1989). The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is sufficient to make a prima facie
showing of specific personal jurisdiction at this stage of the litigation.
Having determined that the Court retains jurisdiction over this matter, the Court will
address the Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion. To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs must make
factual allegations which “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 545-47 (2007), Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The court must view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the plaintiff’s allegations as true. Randall v.
United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994). Moreover, the Fourth Circuit requires district
courts to construe pro se complaints liberally to ensure that valid claims do not fail for lack of
legal specificity. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). However, this liberal
construction need not extend to outright advocacy for the pro se plaintiff. Id. Like plaintiffs
who are represented by counsel, a pro se plaintiff must still “allege facts sufficient to state all the
elements of [the] claim.” Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.
2003). In light of Twombly and Bass, conclusory statements with insufficient factual allegations,
even when asserted by pro se plaintiffs, will simply not suffice.
Plaintiffs' first claim is for Tortious Interference with Parental Rights and Alienation of
Affection. Plaintiffs cite Howell v. Howell, 178 S.E. 222, 224 (N.C. 1913) as authority for their
claim, but Howell involved a custody dispute between parents. Moreover, North Carolina only
recognizes the tort of Alienation of Affection as a tort between spouses. See Jones v. Skelley, 673
S.E.2d 385, 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) ("A claim for alienation of affections is comprised of
wrongful acts which deprive a married person of the affections of his or her spouse — love,
society, companionship and comfort of the other spouse." (citation and quotation marks
omitted)). The absence of any North Carolina law recognizing these claims against non-parent
third parties is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim. See McCants v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 201
F.Supp.3d 732, 748-49 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (“[A] federal court sitting in diversity, as this Court,
cannot expand North Carolina law or policy ‘farther than any North Carolina court has been
willing to go.’” (citation omitted)).
Count Two of Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges a claim for Intrusion upon Seclusion. “The
tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion into seclusion has been recognized in North Carolina and
is defined as the intentional intrusion ‘physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns . . . [where] the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.’” Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Miller
v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)). Examples of recognized intrusions upon
seclusion include “physically invading a person's home or other private place, eavesdropping by
wiretapping or microphones, peering through windows, persistent telephoning, unauthorized
prying into a bank account, and opening personal mail of another.” Id. (quoting Hall v. Post, 355
S.E.2d 819, 823 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)). The allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint are not of the
nature of those recognized by North Carolina courts as constituting this type of tort. Again, the
Court is unwilling to expand North Carolina law. Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.
Lastly, Plaintiffs allege a claim for Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress. However, the facts in the Complaint allege intentional conduct only. See Compl. ¶ 59.
Such a claim requires “extreme and outrageous conduct.” See Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d
325, 335 (N.C. 1981). Extreme and outrageous conduct is defined as conduct that is "so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
Smith-Price v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., 595 S.E.2d 778, 782 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(citation omitted). The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations simply do not rise to the level of
extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. To the extent that Plaintiffs are attempting to assert a
claim for negligent infliction, the Court finds that they have failed to sufficiently allege “severe
emotional distress” to survive dismissal. See Pierce v. Atl. Grp., Inc., 724 S.E.2d 568, 577 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2012) (“[S]evere emotional distress” has been defined as “any emotional or mental
disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type
of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and
diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.” (quoting Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics and
Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990)).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted and
Plaintiffs’ Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Signed: November 13, 2017
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?