Norman v. Hooks

Filing 3

ORDER DISMISSING CASE as untimely. Court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 11/17/2017. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(chh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:17-cv-00496-FDW
LESTER SAUNDERS NORMAN, JR.,

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Petitioner,
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vs.
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ERIK A. HOOKS,
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Respondent.
)
__________________________________________)

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Petitioner Lester Saunders
Norman, Jr.’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1).
I.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina who, on November 19, 2012, pled
guilty in Gaston County Superior Court to two counts of second degree murder, three counts of
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, felonious eluding arrest with a motor
vehicle causing death, reckless driving, resisting a public officer, and various other traffic
offenses. See State's Resp. to Pet. for Writ of Cert. ¶ 1, State v. Norman, No. P17-475, 2017 WL
3208392 (N.C. Ct. App. filed July 25, 2017). The convictions were consolidated into three
judgments, and Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of: (1) a minimum 258,
maximum 322 months, (2) a minimum 40, maximum 62 months, and (3) 30 days. See id.
Judgments were entered on December 4, 2012. (J., § 2254 Pet. 58, Doc. No. 1.)
Petitioner does not state whether he filed a direct appeal (§ 2254 Pet. 2), but state court
filings indicate that he did not, see State's Resp. to Cert. Pet. ¶¶ 1-3, Norman, 2017 WL 3208392.
On September 19, 2016, he filed a motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) in the Gaston County
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Superior Court, which was denied on October 4, 2016. See id. at ¶ 2. Thereafter, Petitioner filed
a petition for writ of certiorari on July 10, 2017, seeking review in the North Carolina Court of
Appeals of the denial of his MAR; the certiorari petition was denied on July 26, 2017. (Order
Den. Cert. Pet., § 2254 Pet. 15.)
Petitioner filed the instant § 2254 Petition in this Court on August 15, 2017, see Houston
v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 267 (1988). (§ 2254 Pet. 14.) He raises the following grounds for relief:
1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel rendered his guilty plea involuntary, unknowing, and
unintelligent; 2) the state prosecutor and trial counsel failed to provide Petitioner the entire
discovery file, rendering him unable to make an intelligent, informed decision about the state’s
plea offer; 3) judgment was entered in violation of the Double Jeopardy clause; 4) the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct; 5) the plea offer included a charge for which there was no true bill of
indictment; and 6) false statements were used against Petitioner at sentencing. (§ 2254 Pet. 5-8.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court is guided by Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts, which directs district courts to dismiss habeas petitions when it plainly
appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.
Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254. In conducting its review under Rule 4, the court “has the
power to raise affirmative defenses sua sponte,” including a statute of limitations defense under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 2002). The court may dismiss
a petition as untimely under Rule 4, however, only if it is clear that the petition is untimely, and
the petitioner had notice of the statute of limitations and addressed the issue. Id. at 706–707.
III.

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 imposes a statute of
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limitations for § 2254 petitions by a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The petition must be filed within one year of “the date on which the
judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review.”1 § 2244(d)(1)(A). The limitations period is tolled during the pendency of
a properly filed state post-conviction action. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Petitioner’s judgments were entered on December 4, 2012, when he was sentenced. To
the extent he retained the right to a direct appeal subsequent to his guilty plea, Petitioner had 14
days to file a notice of appeal in the North Carolina Court of Appeals. See N.C. R. App. P.
4(a)(2). Because he did not file a direct appeal, Petitioner’s judgments became final on or about
December 18, 2012, when the time for seeking direct review expired. See § 2244(d)(1)(A).
The statute of limitations then ran for 365 days until it fully expired on or about
December 18, 2013, more than three years before Petitioner filed the instant habeas Petition.
None of Petitioner’s filings in the state courts after that date served to resurrect or restart the
federal statute of limitations. See Minter v. Beck, 230 F.3d 663, 665–66 (4th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing that state applications for collateral review cannot revive an already expired federal
limitations period). Consequently, the petition is time-barred under § 2244(d)(1)(A) unless
Petitioner can demonstrate that equitable tolling should apply.
Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is available only when the petitioner
demonstrates “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,

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There are three alternate start dates for the statute of limitations. See § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). However, the facts
alleged in the instant Petition do not support a finding that any of those apply.

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649 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Fourth Circuit precedent, equitable tolling
is appropriate in those “rare instances where—due to circumstances external to the party's own
conduct—it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross
injustice would result.” Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting
Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In explaining why his habeas Petition was filed more than a year after his judgments
became final, Petitioner asserts that he was never notified of the federal statute of limitations but
was told only that his direct appeal rights would be limited. (§ 2254 Pet. ¶ 18.) He also explains
that he only recently learned he could seek post-conviction relief in the state courts by way of a
motion for appropriate relief and that since then he has been diligently pursuing his legal rights.
(§ 2254 Pet. ¶ 18.)
“[E]ven in the case of an unrepresented prisoner,” however, “ignorance of the law is not a
basis for equitable tolling.” United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing
Cross-Bey v. Gammon, 322 F.3d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[E]ven in the case of an
unrepresented prisoner alleging a lack of legal knowledge or legal resources, equitable tolling
has not been warranted.”); United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A]
petitioner's own ignorance or mistake does not warrant equitable tolling . . . .”); Delaney v.
Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting the argument that a pro se prisoner's
ignorance of the law warranted equitable tolling); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th
Cir. 2000) (same)). Petitioner’s ignorance about his right to seek post-conviction review is
“neither extraordinary nor a circumstance external to his control.” See Sosa 364 F.3d at 512.
The fact that Petitioner has limited access to legal resources in prison (§ 2254 Pet. ¶ 18) also is
not “extraordinary.” Accordingly, he is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of
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limitations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The habeas Petition is untimely under § 2244(d)(1)(A), and equitable tolling is not
warranted. Consequently, the § 2255 habeas Petition shall be dismissed.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED as untimely;
2. Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court declines
to issue a certificate of appealability as Petitioner has not made a substantial showing
of a denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003) (in order to satisfy § 2253(c), a petitioner must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 474, 484
(2000) (holding that when relief is denied on procedural grounds, a petitioner must
establish both that the correctness of the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable,
and that the petition states a debatably valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right).

Signed: November 17,

2017

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