Boyd v. USA

Filing 14

ORDER denying 12 Pro Se MOTION for Reconsideration re 7 Order on Motion to Vacate/Set Aside/Correct Sentence (2255). Signed by District Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr on 8/20/2018. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(eef)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:17-cv-673-RJC
(3:15-cr-298-RJC-DSC-1)
QUINBY BOYD,

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
vs.
)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
)
Respondent.
)
__________________________________________)

ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration re
Order on Motion to Vacate/Set Aside/Correct Sentence. (Doc. No. 12).
I.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted in this Court, pursuant to a written guilty plea, of conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and with possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. Petitioner did not appeal. On November 20, 2017, Petitioner filed
the underlying motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On
March 27, 2018, this Court denied and dismissed Petitioner’s motion to vacate. (Doc. No. 7).
On April 17, 2018, Petitioner filed the pending Motion for Reconsideration, which this Court
construes as a motion to alter or amend, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Doc. No. 12).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

With regard to motions to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated:
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A district court has the discretion to grant a Rule 59(e) motion only in very
narrow circumstances: “(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling
law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear
error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.”
Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Collison v. Int’l Chem. Workers
Union, 34 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, “Rule 59(e) motions may not be used to
make arguments that could have been made before the judgment was entered.” Id. Indeed, the
circumstances under which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted are so limited that
“[c]ommentators observe ‘because of the narrow purposes for which they are intended, Rule
59(e) motions typically are denied.’” Woodrum v. Thomas Mem’l Hosp. Found., Inc., 186
F.R.D. 350, 351 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary
Kay Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)).
III.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner has not shown the existence of the limited circumstances under which a Rule 59(e)
motion may be granted. That is, Petitioner’s motion does not present evidence that was
unavailable when he filed his motion to vacate, nor does his motion stem from an intervening
change in the applicable law. Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown that a clear error of law has
been made, or that failure to grant the motion would result in manifest injustice to him. See Hill,
277 F.3d at 708. Rather, in his motion Petitioner merely reasserts or extrapolates from some of
the allegations made in the original motion to vacate. For instance, Petitioner complains in the
motion for reconsideration that there was a discrepancy between the Criminal Complaint and the
Factual Basis as to the grounds for the Government to find probable cause to search Petitioner’s
vehicle, which led to the discovery of methamphetamine in the vehicle. Petitioner contends that
counsel was, therefore, ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress. As the Court noted in
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its Order, however, because Petitioner pled guilty he waived the right to challenge all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceeds before the guilty plea. The Court noted, in any event, on
the merits, the Government showed that probable cause existed to conduct the search of the
vehicle.
Next, Petitioner takes issue, apparently for the first time, with alleged defects in the
indictment, such as the fact that the indictment did not identify any of Petitioner’s alleged
conspirators, nor did it state the exact amount of methamphetamine attributable to Petitioner.
Petitioner also contends that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated under Alleyne v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013), because a jury did not make a determination regarding the
amount of drugs attributable to Petitioner. Petitioner’s arguments are all without merit because,
as noted, by pleading guilty, Petitioner waived the right to challenge any non-jurisdictional
defects in the proceedings before the plea. Furthermore, Petitioner agreed, in the plea agreement,
that he was responsible for at least 200 grams of methamphetamine. In any event, Alleyne is not
applicable to Petitioner. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in Harris v.
United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), and held that any fact that increases the statutory mandatory
minimum is an element of the offense and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. Alleyne, however, has not been made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. In any event, the determination regarding
the amount of drugs attributable to Petitioner did not increase Petitioner’s statutory mandatory
minimum; rather, it increased Petitioner’s advisory guidelines range.
Finally, Petitioner also contends in the motion for reconsideration that probable cause did not
exist for the search warrant issued at his residence where certain firearms were found. See
Search Warrant, United States v. 9115 Post Canyon Lane, 3:15MJ358 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2015,
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Doc. Nos. 1-2). As the Court has already noted, Plaintiff waived the right to challenge all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings before the entry of his plea and, in any event, probable
cause did exist for the search warrant issued at Petitioner’s residence.
In sum, the Court will deny Petitioner’s motion.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will deny Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
(1) Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, (Doc. No. 12), is DENIED.
(2) The Court finds that the Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a
constitutional right. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003) (in order to satisfy § 2253(c), a “petitioner
must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of
the constitutional claims debatable or wrong”) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484-85 (2000). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate both that this Court’s
dispositive procedural rulings are debatable, and that his Motion to Vacate states a
debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484-85 (2000). As a result, the Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the
United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Signed: August 20, 2018

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