Lawrence v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America et al

Filing 14

ORDER Granting 8 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. Signed by Senior Judge Graham Mullen on 8/31/2018. (jaw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:18CV259
SEAN LAWRENCE,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
Vs.
)
)
TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY
)
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA; TIAA-CREF
)
INDIVIDUAL & INSTITUTIONAL SERVICES, )
LLC,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)

ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Plaintiff has filed a response in
opposition, and the Defendants have filed a Reply. This matter is therefore ripe for disposition.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an African-American, was employed by Defendant Teachers Insurance and
Annuity Association of America (“TIAA”). He was terminated in August of 2017 after TIAA
discovered that he had sent personal packages using TIAA’s corporate CampusShip account.
(Compl. ¶¶ 12-24). Although he admits the misconduct, he alleges that he “is aware of white
employees of TIAA who had used the TIAA UPS CampusShip account for personal packages,
and who were not disciplined or terminated as a result.” (Id. at ¶ 28). He does not name these
employees. Plaintiff filed this Complaint asserting claims for unlawful race discrimination
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (“Title VII”) and 42
U.S.C. § 1981.
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DISCUSSION
In response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff has now voluntarily withdrawn his Title VII
claim, as it was clear that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Left remaining is
Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim for disparate treatment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
As the Supreme Court has explained, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). To state a plausible claim of discrimination and
withstand dismissal, a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment discrimination must adequately
allege his comparators. “[O]nce a plaintiff bases her allegations entirely upon a comparison to
an employee from a non-protected class, she must demonstrate that the comparator was
‘similarly situated’ in all relevant respects.” Sillah v. Burwell, 244 F. Supp. 3d 499, 512 (D. Md.
2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing Section 1981 claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6)). “Such a showing would include evidence that the employees ‘dealt with the same
supervisor, [were] subject to the same standards and ... engaged in the same conduct without
such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the
employer's treatment of them for it.’” Haywood v. Locke, 387 Fed. App'x 355, 359 (4th Cir.
2010) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.1992)).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations point out the substantial differentiating circumstances that
distinguish TIAA’s treatment of him vis-à-vis his alleged comparators: TIAA did not know who
the unnamed white employees were, and Plaintiff refused to tell them. Plaintiff alleges in his
Complaint:
Mr. Lawrence stated that he was aware of other employees who also used TIAA’s
UPS CampusShip account for personal packages. He declined to identify these
other employees, because he did not want to get his co-workers in trouble.

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(Compl. ¶ 23). These allegations admit not only that Plaintiff did not provide names to TIAA in
order to enable TIAA to investigate, but that he believed TIAA did not know who those
unnamed white employees were—otherwise he would not have been concerned about getting
them “in trouble.”
An employer must have knowledge of the relevant circumstances in order to be expected
to mete out similar discipline. As this Court has explained, “unless the plaintiff can prove the
decisionmaker ‘knew of the [comparators' misconduct] the events cannot be considered in
determining whether [plaintiff and his comparators] are similarly situated.’” Perry v. Mail
Contractors of Am., Inc., 3:12CV405, 2013 WL 6119226, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2013)
(quoting Duggan v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hospitals, 663 F.Supp.2d 456, 463 (D.S.C.
2009)), aff'd, 589 Fed. Appx. 617 (4th Cir. 2014). When a complaint admits misconduct by the
plaintiff and alleges facts indicating the employer was unaware of comparable misconduct by the
supposed comparators, the complaint does not state a claim of disparate treatment. See Curry v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 3:08CV609, 2010 WL 431692, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 4, 2010)
(dismissing disparate treatment claim and observing that “[b]y Plaintiff's own admission, she
violated clear and unambiguous company policy . . . . Common sense dictates that in light of this
fact, the Court can draw no more than the ‘mere possibility’ of discrimination from the other
facts alleged”).
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to establish a plausible basis for concluding his termination
was the result of unlawful discrimination. Accordingly,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is hereby
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

Signed: August 31, 2018

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