Randall v. Gaston Community Action et al

Filing 26

ORDER Granting in part and Denying in part 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; Granting 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; Granting 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The Court dismisses without prejudice the Title VII claims against Travice Conner, Joseph W. Dixon, and Carol Kilgo. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 8/13/2018. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(jaw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. 3:18-cv-00262-FDW-DSC
SHEILA RANDALL,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
GASTON
COMMUNITY
ACTION, )
JOSEPH W. DIXON, CAROL KILGO, and )
TRAVICE CONNER,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Travice Conner’s (Doc. No. 9), Joseph W. Dixon’s
(Doc. No. 10), and Carol Kilgo’s (Doc. No. 11) Motions to Dismiss. The Motions are now ripe for
review.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sheila Randall (“Plaintiff”) filed her complaint on May 17, 2018 and moved to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. Nos. 1, 2). Plaintiff asserts claims against Gaston Community
Action (“GCA”), Joseph W. Dixon, Carol Kilgo, and Travice Conner. (Doc. No. 1). The Court
granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 3), and Defendants filed answers
on July 18, 2018 (Doc. Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15). Dixon, Kilgo, and Conner (the “Individual
Defendants”) assert a counterclaim of libel per se against Plaintiff. (Doc. Nos. 12, 13, 14). The
Individual Defendants also filed their motions to dismiss on July 18, 2018. (Doc. Nos. 9, 10, 11).
Because Plaintiff appears pro se, the Court issued a Roseboro notice, informing Plaintiff of the
burden she carries in responding to the Individual Defendants’ Motions and the deadline for
responding to the Individual Defendants’ Motions. (Doc. No. 17). Plaintiff filed three documents

entitled “Motion to Proceed” on August 2, 2018. (Doc. Nos. 18, 19, 20). The Individual
Defendants filed a reply on August 9, 2018. (Doc. No. 25).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint”—“not
resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Republican Party v.
Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)). The court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true and draws all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's
favor, id. at 244 (citations omitted); Mylan Labs., 7 F.3d at 1134, but the “complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While a court accepts plausible factual
allegations in the complaint as true and considers those facts in the light most favorable to a
plaintiff in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences,
unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkt.'s Inc. v. J.D. Assoc.’s, LLP, 213 F.
3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). A court cannot “accept as true allegations that contradict matters
properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.” Venev v. Wyche, 293 F. 3d 726, 730 (4th Cir.
2002) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Dixon, Kilgo, and Conner move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claims because “[t]here is
no individual liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” (Doc. Nos. 9-1, 10-1, 11-

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1). As raised by the Individual Defendants, the Fourth Circuit in Lissau v. Southern Food Service,
Inc. held “that supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII violations.”
Abeles v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 676 F. App’x 170, 177(4th Cir. 2017) (citing Lissau v. S.
Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998)). (See Doc. Nos. 9-1, 10-1, 11-1). As explained
in Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose,
The enforcement provision of Title VII permits actions against an “employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.”
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–5(b). Title VII and the ADA define an “employer” in
pertinent part as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (West 1994); see 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12111(5)(A) (West 1995). We have expressly held that Title VII does not provide
a remedy against individual defendants who do not qualify as “employers.” See
Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180–81 (4th Cir.1998) (holding
that supervisors cannot be held liable in their individual capacity under Title VII
because they do not fit within the definition of an employer).
192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999).
Here, Plaintiff has sued the Individual Defendants in their individual capacity. The
Complaint names the Individual Defendants and does not indicate that they are sued in their official
capacity. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff’s former employer, GAC, is also already a named party. (Doc.
Nos. 1, 1-1). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting that the Individual Defendants are
employers as defined under Title VII. Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit’s precedent, Plaintiff
cannot sue the Individual Defendants as alleged.1 Therefore, the Court dismisses without prejudice
the Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants.

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed. The Motions to Proceed respond to the Individual
Defendants’ answers, counterclaims, and motions to dismiss. However, Plaintiff does not address the Fourth Circuit
precedent relied on by the Individual Defendants but merely maintains that there is individual liability under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with citation to cases irrelevant to Title VII claims. (Doc. Nos. 18 at 17, 19 at 20, 20
at 24; see also Doc. No. 25 at 2).
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Conner further argues that the Complaint “does not allege any action by Conner which was
discriminatory or actionable under law.” (Doc. No. 9-1 at 3).2 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, alleges
that on March 22, 2017, “Kilgo wrote and submitted a false report to Health & Human Services
excluding the Teacher that was directly involved and making me solely responsible for allegations.
She also submitted [a] false report for alleged use of corporal punishment against me that resulted
in my employment of 16 years being terminated.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5). Plaintiff identifies Kilgo as
“the person that initiated the false reports and statements that launched [the] investigation” on
March 13, 2017 and alleges “Mr. Dixon on April 6, 2017, knowingly went along with presenting
false allegation[s] and . . . encouraged Board members to vote to terminate me base on the false
information.”

(Doc. No. 1 at 5).

However, Plaintiff only alleges Conner, “on April 6,

2017[, ]reported the allegations and false findings to the Board of Directors for me to be
terminated[.]” (Doc. No. 1 at 5). Conner contends this allegation does not allege Conner
knowingly presented false allegations and does not allege Conner made any false report or
statement, rending the complaint insufficient to identify “any action taken by Conner for which
there is liability.” (Doc. No. 9-1 at 4). Yet, Conner does not elaborate or cite any case law for her
position.3 Local Rule 7.1(a) requires all motions to “state with particularity the grounds for the
motion and the relief or order sought.” This Court’s Initial Scheduling Order also requires “a brief

2

Kilgo and Dixon only sought dismissal of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 claims in their Motions.
(Doc. Nos. 10, 11).
3
Further, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s directive, courts hold allegations of pro se complaints “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Plaintiff,
therefore, “is entitled to liberal construction of h[er] pleadings[,]” Bala v. Virginia Dept. of Conservation and
Recreation, 532 F. App’x 332, 334 (4th Cir. 2013), and need not plead the precise legal theory applicable to her claim,
see Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (“Having informed the city of the factual basis for
their complaint, they were required to do no more to stave off threshold dismissal for want of an adequate statement
of their claim.”); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (“[Plaintiff]'s complaint is not a model of the careful
drafter's art, but under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need not pin plaintiff's claim for relief to a
precise legal theory. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires only a plausible “short
and plain” statement of the plaintiff's claim, not an exposition of his legal argument.”).

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statement of the factual and legal grounds on which the motion is based.” Conner fails to meet
these requirements. The Court therefore denies Conner’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as
to Defendant Conner without prejudice to Conner’s assertion of her defense and argument at a
later stage in the proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Joseph W. Dixon’s (Doc. No. 10) and Carol Kilgo’s
(Doc. No. 11) Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED, and Travice Conner’s (Doc. No. 9) Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court dismisses without prejudice
the Title VII claims against Travice Conner, Joseph W. Dixon, and Carol Kilgo.

Signed: August 13, 2018

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