Cromartie v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety of Prisions et al

Filing 55

ORDER denying 41 Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party not wishing to participate in a Judicial Settlement Conference shall file written objections so informing the Court within 14 days of this Order. Signed by Chief Judge Martin Reidinger on 1/16/2023. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.) (hms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 3:20-cv-00432-MR

CHRISTOPHER D. CROMARTIE, JR., )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT
)
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_______________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Adam Hardin’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 41].
I.

BACKGROUND
The incarcerated Plaintiff Christopher D. Cromartie, Jr. (“Cromartie” or

“the Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 addressing incidents that allegedly occurred at the Scotland and
Alexander Correctional Institutions.1 The Amended Complaint [Doc. 12: Am.
Compl.] passed initial review against Defendant Hardin, a correctional
sergeant, for Eighth Amendment violations, and the Court exercised

1

The Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Pender Correctional Institution.

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supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s negligence claim against him.
[Doc. 17: Order on Initial Review].

The Plaintiff seeks compensatory,

punitive, and nominal damages; fees and costs; and a letter of apology.
[Doc. 12: Am. Compl. at 18].
Defendant Hardin filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment.
[Doc. 41].

Thereafter, the Court entered an Order in accordance with

Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the
requirements for filing a response to the summary judgment motion and of
the manner in which evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 44:
Roseboro Order]. The Plaintiff filed a notarized Response [Doc. 50: MSJ
Response] and supporting documents,2 and the Defendant filed a Notice of
Intent Not to File a Reply [Doc. 53: Notice]. Having been fully briefed, this
matter is ripe for disposition.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

2

The voluminous supporting materials include transcripts from proceedings before the
North Carolina Industrial Commission (NCIC) and medical records. [See Doc. 51:
Response Exhibits].
2
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for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under
governing law. Id.
The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(internal citations omitted).
Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not
rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party
must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to
“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the
nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
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248. To that end, only evidence admissible at trial may be considered by the
Court on summary judgment. Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 F.
App’x 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the
evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a
‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127
S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). As the Supreme Court has emphasized,
“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under
Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than simply
show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts …. Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)
(footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-28, 106 S. Ct.
2505 (1986). When opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version
of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
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III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties’ forecasts of evidence show the following, which is

undisputed except as otherwise noted.
The Plaintiff’s leg was injured at another institution. [Doc. 50: MSJ
Response at 2]. When he was transferred to Alexander CI in December
2017, he had a Medical Duty Status granting him an elevator pass and the
following restrictions: standing limit 15 minutes per setting; walking limited to
100 yards per setting; sitting limit 1 hour per setting; and no climbing. [Doc.
50: MSJ Response at 3; Doc. 51: Response Ex. at 89 (Medical Duty Status)].
At all relevant times, Sergeant Hardin worked the overnight shift from 5:45
p.m. to 6:00 a.m., during which there is no scheduled meal. [Doc. 42-1:
Hardin Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6]. However, the Plaintiff would encounter Sergeant
Hardin during breakfast when Hardin worked overtime.

[Doc. 50: MSJ

Response at 3].
The location for service of breakfast was more than 100 yards, and two
or three flights of stairs, from the Plaintiff’s housing unit. [Doc. 50: MSJ
Response at 3; Doc. 51: Response Ex at 50, 71, 80 (NCIC transcript)]. The
Plaintiff told Sergeant Hardin about his medical restrictions several times,
showed him his medical pass, and asked to use the elevator or to have

5
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courtesy meals brought to him at the housing unit.3 [Doc. 50: MSJ Response
at 3-5; Doc. 51: Response Ex at 23, 69, 71; Doc. 1: Compl.4 at 21].
Nevertheless, the Defendant forced the Plaintiff to walk up and down stairs
and walk a long distance to breakfast, despite having been informed of the
Plaintiff’s medical restrictions.5

[Doc. 51: Response Ex at 65; Doc. 1:

Notarized Compl. at 19, 21]. This caused the Plaintiff’s leg injury to worsen,
and resulted in an intravenous abscess that required an emergency surgical
procedure and hospitalization. [Doc. 50 at 3-4; Doc. 51: MSJ Ex at 19, 6567; Doc. 1: Verified Compl. at 21].
IV.

DISCUSSION
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual

punishments,” U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must
satisfy both an objective component—that the harm inflicted was sufficiently
serious—and subjective component—that the prison official acted with a

3

Defendant Hardin does not remember having any conversation with the Plaintiff related
to his medical restrictions. [Doc. 42-1: Hardin Decl. at ¶ 10].
4

The Complaint was sworn before a notary. [See Doc. 1: Compl. at 25].

5

Defendant Hardin denies that he has ever forced any offender to engage in an activity
that was counter to the offender’s confirmed medical restrictions. [Doc. 42-1: Hardin Decl.
at ¶ 9].
6
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sufficiently culpable state of mind. ). Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761
(4th Cir. 1996).
Here, the Plaintiff has presented a forecast of evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Hardin knowingly refused to
honor Plaintiff’s medical restrictions, which caused his injury to worsen and
resulted in a venous abscess. The Defendant’s arguments that Defendant
Hardin could not have violated the Plaintiff’s rights because he worked
nights, and that the claim of causation is speculative, are rejected. [See Doc.
42: MSJ Memo.]. The Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence demonstrates the
existence of genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Defendant
Hardin violated the Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights on the occasions
when he worked overtime, and whether the Defendant’s actions caused the
Plaintiff’s leg injury to worsen. Accordingly the Court cannot conclude, on
the record presently before it, that the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims.6 The forecast of
evidence also reveals the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact on
the questions of whether the Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive

6

Because genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding whether Defendant violated
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the Court further concludes that the Defendant is not
entitled to qualified immunity at this time. See E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172,
178 (4th Cir. 2018); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1992).
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damages, and whether the Defendant was negligent under North Carolina
law. Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is denied.
The Court intends to refer this case to a United States Magistrate
Judge for the purpose of conducting a Judicial Settlement Conference. Any
party not wishing to participate in a Judicial Settlement Conference shall file
written objections within fourteen (14) days of this Order.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 41] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party not wishing to participate in
a Judicial Settlement Conference shall file written objections so informing the
Court within fourteen (14) days of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: January 16, 2023

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