Dekattu v. Burnette et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM ORDER DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE as to the Bivens claims against all Defendants in their official capacity as well as the claims based on First Amendment retaliation and the Eighth Amendment, and DISMISSED WITHOUT PR EJUDICE as to the Bivens claims against all Defendants in their individual capacity. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dekattu's 14 "Request Urging the Courts to Remove Personal Address from Order 4 Filed July 5, 2022" is construed as a motion to redact and is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall redact Dekattus personal address from the courts July 5, 2022 order. Signed by District Judge Thomas D. Schroeder on 11/18/2022. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(thh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
NGOMANI DEKATTU,
Plaintiff,
v.
RODERICK BURNETTE, JENNIFFE
INMAN, SHERAIN TEEL, and JENNY
LEISER,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

3:22-CV-00265

MEMORANDUM ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.1
At the time of the filing of this action, pro se Plaintiff
Ngomani Dekattu was a pretrial detainee at the Mecklenburg County
Jail,

where

he

had

been awaiting

a

final

supervised

release

revocation hearing in his criminal case, Case Number 3:22-cr00073-TDS-DCK-1.2

His amended complaint (Doc. 9) seeks relief

pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed’l Bureau
Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina, designated on September 19, 2022, by the Chief Judge of
the Fourth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(b). (Doc. 15.)
1

Dekattu’s criminal case, 3:22-cr-00073-TDS-DCK-1, was opened on March
16, 2022, when jurisdiction over Dekattu’s supervised release was
transferred from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York to this court. (Doc. 1 in case no. 3:22-cr-00073TDS-DCK-1.)
Dekattu was appointed counsel, and a United States
Magistrate Judge entered an Order of Detention on April 14, 2022. (Doc.
8 in case no. 3:22-cr-00073-TDS-DCK-1.) The criminal case was originally
assigned to the Honorable Frank D. Whitney but was reassigned to the
undersigned by designation on September 19, 2022. (Doc. 30 in case no.
3:22-cr-00073-TDS-DCK-1.) After a hearing, Dekattu’s supervised release
was revoked on November 3, 2022. (Doc. 35 in case no. 3:22-cr-00073TDS-DCK-1.)
Dekattu was sentenced to time-served and continued on
supervision for two years. (Id.)
2

of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), asserting that the Defendants,
three federal probation officers and a probation lab supervisor,
violated

his

federal

civil

rights

by

falsifying

supervision

violations against him. The amended complaint is before this court
for preliminary review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A.

For the reasons set forth below, the amended complaint

will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Also pending before the court is a “Request Urging
the Courts to Remove Personal Address from Order Filed July 5,
2022” (Doc. 14), that is construed as a motion to redact.

This

motion will be granted.
I.

BACKGROUND
Dekattu filed this action on June 13, 2022.

(Doc. 1.)

The

court struck the complaint because it appeared to have been signed,
at least in part, by a non-lawyer.3

(Doc. 4).

Dekattu was granted

30 days to amend his complaint but was admonished that “to the
extent that [he] is seeking to challenge his probation or is
seeking the immediate release from custody, he must do so, if at
all, in a separate civil action” seeking federal habeas corpus
relief.

(Id. at 4).

At that time, this case was assigned to the Honorable Martin Reidinger,
Chief United States District Judge.
3

2

Soon thereafter, Dekattu filed the present amended complaint4
pursuant to Bivens, naming the following as Defendants in their
individual

and

official

capacities:

Rodrick

Burnette,

a

U.S.

probation officer; Jenniffe Inman and Sherain Teel, United States
supervisory probation officers; and Jenny Leiser, a United States
probation office lab supervisor. (Doc. 9 at 2-3).

Dekattu alleges

that his “Federal Constitutional Rights and Human Rights was [sic]
violated 1, 4, 5, 8 Amendment, and Corporate Punishment was used”
against him (id. at 15), all of which has caused him to “suffer
mental

stress

employment.”

and

distress,

(Id. at 15-16.)

personal

injury,

and

los[s]

of

Specifically, Dekattu claims that

the Defendants falsified allegations that he violated the terms of
his supervised release.5

(Id. 17-18.)

As a remedy, he seeks

The amended complaint consists of two non-identical complaint forms
(Doc. 9 at 1-16) and an unverified “Affidavit of Truth and Complaint for
Violation of Civil Rights” (id. at 17-18).
4

At the November 3, 2022 supervised release revocation hearing, Dekattu
was sentenced to time-served based on his admission at the hearing to
using marijuana on November 23, 2021, and December 29, 2021, during his
supervision, which dates were set out in violation number 1 of the
petition for revocation, and his request for a time-served sentence.
(See Doc. 33 at 1 (Notice of Proposed Resolution) (noting that the
Government and Dekattu recommend a sentence of time-served based on
Dekattu’s admitted marijuana use referenced in violation 1 and the
Government’s agreement not to proceed on the remaining alleged
violations) and Doc. 35 (judgment), both in case number 3:22-cr-0007373-TDS-DCK-1.)
5

In the amended complaint filed in the instant case, Dekattu claims that
the Defendants fabricated false supervised release violation reports
against him on various dates from January 2022 to April 2022. (See Doc.
9 at 5.) These allegedly fabricated supervised release violations –
which the Government agreed not to proceed on as part of Dekattu’s agreed

3

damages,

his

supervision.6
II.

immediate

release,

and

the

termination

of

his

(Id. at 5.)

ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

Dekattu is “a prisoner seek[ing] redress from a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” within the
meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), obligating
this court to review his amended complaint.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).7

upon recommended sentence of time-served - did not form the basis of
Dekattu’s revocation.
Accordingly, as to his claim for damages, a
judgment in Dekattu’s favor would not necessarily imply the invalidity
of the revocation of his supervised release under Heck v. Humphrey. 512
U.S. 477 (1994). See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751-52 (2004)
(per curiam) (if a “prisoner's challenge threatens no consequence for
his conviction or the duration of his sentence,” “[t]here is no need to
preserve the habeas exhaustion rule and no impediment under Heck”)
(cleaned up).
Because Dekattu is no longer a pre-trial detainee and was given a
custodial sentence of time-served, (Case No. 3:22-cr-00073-TDS-DCK-1,
Doc. 35), his request for “immediate release” is now moot. Furthermore,
to the extent that he seeks to have his current term of supervised
release “extinguished,” he must seek relief pursuant to his direct appeal
and, thereafter, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, rather than through a Bivens action.
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, (1973); Heck, 512 U.S. at 481
(“Presier . . . held that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a
state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement
and seeks immediate or speedier release”); Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d
1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 1995) (in § 2255 case, applying Preiser to dismiss
civil rights claims for injunctive relief under Bivens as means to
overturn conviction).
6

The PLRA defines a “prisoner as “any person incarcerated or detained
in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or
adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and
conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary
program.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c).
Although Dekattu is no longer
incarcerated, because he was a pretrial detainee at the time he filed
the amended complaint in July 2022, his pleading is reviewed under the
PLRA. See Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e
7

4

The court must screen his prisoner complaint and in forma pauperis
filing and “shall,” at any time, sua sponte dismiss any claims
that (i) are frivolous or malicious, (ii) fail to state a claim
for relief, or (iii) are against a defendant who is immune.

See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Michau v. Charleston Cnty.,
S.C., 434 F.3d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 2006).
The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007), governs dismissals for failure to
state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013).

See

Thus, to

survive an initial review under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A), a
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Courts

liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases
and hold them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.
The

liberal

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

construction

requirement,

however,

does

not

permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts

hold that only individuals who, at the time they seek to file their civil
actions, are detained as a result of being accused of, convicted of, or
sentenced for criminal offenses are ‘prisoners’ within the definition
of . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”) Even if it were not, because he is seeking
to proceed in forma pauperis, his pleading is also subject to review
under § 1915(e)(2).

5

in the complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under
federal law.

See Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5

(4th Cir. 2008); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. Of
Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that after
Iqbal and Twombly, a “pro se complainant must plead factual matter
that permits the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B.

Bivens Claims

Here, Dekattu styles his claims under Bivens.

In Bivens, the

Supreme Court “recognized for the first time an implied private
action

for

damages

against

federal

officers

violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.”
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001).

alleged

to

have

Corr. Serv. Corp. v.

In that case and two subsequent

cases, the Supreme Court allowed individuals alleging certain
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment violations to proceed under
this implied cause of action.

See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97

(finding remedy for Fourth Amendment violation related to use of
unreasonable force during warrantless search and seizure); Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) (same for violation of
equal protection component of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause);
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–19 (1980) (same for violation of
Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
“In the years since those cases were decided, however, the
Supreme Court’s approach to implied damage remedies has changed
6

dramatically to the point that ‘expanding the Bivens remedy is now
a disfavored judicial activity.’”

Annappareddy v. Pascale, 996

F.3d 120, 133 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.
Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017)).

“To inform a court’s analysis of a

proposed Bivens claim,” the Supreme Court has “framed the inquiry
as proceeding in two steps.”
1803 (2022).
presents

‘a

Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793,

First, a court should consider “whether the case
new

Bivens

context’

—

i.e.,

is

it

meaningfully

different from the three cases in which the Court has implied a
damages action.”

Id. (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859-1860).

Second, if the claim does arise in a new context, “a Bivens remedy
is unavailable if there are ‘special factors’ indicating that the
Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to
‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to
proceed.’”

Id. (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858).

Last term in Egbert, the Supreme Court emphasized that this
two-step inquiry boils down to “a single question: whether there
is any rational reason (even one) to think that Congress is better
suited to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages
action to proceed’”; if so, Bivens does not afford relief.
Ct. at 1803 (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858).

142 S.

Bivens is thus

unavailable where “Congress has provided alternative remedies for
aggrieved parties in [the plaintiff's] position.”

Id. at 1806.

The nature of an alternative remedy, moreover, is of no moment
7

because “[s]o long as Congress or the Executive has created a
remedial process that it finds sufficient to secure an adequate
level

of

deterrence,

the

courts

cannot

calibration by superimposing a Bivens remedy.”

second-guess

that

Id. at 1807.

It is a fundamental proposition that a Bivens action may not
be brought against a federal employee in his or her official
capacity.

Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Bivens

action does not lie against . . . officials in their official
capacity”); Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir.
1996) (“Any remedy under Bivens is against

federal officials

individually, not the federal government”); Kim v. United States,
632 F.3d 713, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“It is well established that
Bivens remedies do not exist against officials sued in their
official capacities.”)

Therefore, before proceeding further, the

court is constrained to conclude that each of Dekattu’s claims
asserted against the Defendants in their official capacity is not
cognizable and will therefore be dismissed with prejudice.
the

claims

made

against

the

Defendants

in

their

As to

individual

capacity, for the reasons below, Dekattu’s amended complaint fails
to state a claim at this stage.
1.

Supervisory Liability Claims

In the amended complaint, Dekattu names four defendants, each
of whom he purports to sue in both their official and individual
capacity: Rodrick Burnette, a U.S. probation officer; Jenniffe
8

Inman

and

Sherain

Teel,

United

States

supervisory

probation

officers; and Jenny Leiser, a United States probation office lab
supervisor.

(Doc. 9 at 2-3, 17-18.)

Even liberally construed,

however, the complaint’s allegations make it apparent that each of
Dekattu’s allegations is made against Burnette – not the other
named Defendants.

Nowhere in either the complaint or in the

accompanying “Affidavit of Truth” does Dekattu allege personal
involvement or even awareness by Inman, Teel, or Leiser.
Doc. 9 at 17-18.)
supervisory

(See

To the extent that Dekattu is seeking to impose

liability

necessarily fails.

on

these

three

Defendants,

that

claim

In the Fourth Circuit, there is no supervisory

liability under Bivens absent a showing “that the supervisor had
actual or constructive knowledge that her subordinate was engaged
in

conduct

that

posed

a

pervasive

and

unreasonable

risk

of

constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff” and that the
supervisor's response showed “deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of the alleged offensive practices,” causing the
plaintiff's injury.

Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th

Cir. 2014); see also Baker v. United States, 645 F. App'x 266, 269
(4th Cir. 2016).
Here, the

amended complaint

is completely devoid of any

allegation to plausibly establish that the supervisory defendants
had constructive knowledge that Burnette was engaged in conduct
that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional
9

injury to Dekattu.

See Jones v. Alvarez, No. 1:19CV930, 2021 WL

796509, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2021).

Accordingly, the claims

against Defendants Inman, Teel, and Leiser will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In the affidavit accompanying the amended complaint, Dekattu
also makes allegations against the U.S. Probation Office itself.
(See Doc. 9 at 18.)

Any such claim is not cognizable, as it is

well-established that a plaintiff cannot bring a
against a federal agency.

Bivens suit

See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-

86 (1994); Humphrey v. U.S. Prob. Dep't, 221 F.3d 1334 (6th Cir.
2000); Fuller-Avent v. U.S. Prob. Office, 226 F. App’x 1, 4 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
2.

Claims Against Burnette
a.

First Amendment Claim

The remaining claim is against Burnette. Dekattu first claims
that Burnette violated his First Amendment rights.
14, 15).

(Doc. 9 at 4,

Read generously, Dekattu’s complaint ostensibly raises

a First Amendment retaliation claim.

In various places in the

affidavit accompanying his complaint, Dekattu claims that Burnette
intimidated, threated, and harassed him.

(Doc. 9 at 17 -18.)

He

also asserts that Burnette created “false” supervised release
violation reports against him and then “deprived” him of the
ability to “file a formal complaint . . . prior to [the] Supervised
Release Violation Report.”

(Id.)
10

His claim fails for two reasons.

First, nowhere does Dekattu

allege that he was engaged in protected speech, nor does he claim
that certain adverse actions were taken against him because of
that speech.

See Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990)

(conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of
material fact, are not sufficient to state a claim).

Although pro

se litigants are entitled to a significant degree of latitude when
it comes to pleadings, the liberal construction requirement “does
not mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.”

See Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d

605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020).

Second, and dispositive, is the fact

that the Supreme Court has held that “there is no Bivens action
for First Amendment retaliation.”

Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1807;

Earle v. Shreves, 990 F.3d 774, 781 (4th Cir. 2021) (pre-Egbert
case

declining

to

extend

Bivens

to

include

First

Amendment

retaliation claims); see also Reichel v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658,
663 n.4 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has “never held that
Bivens extends to First Amendment claims”).
Accordingly,

Dekattu’s

First

Amendment

claim

will

be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
b.
Dekattu
Amendment

also

rights,

Eighth Amendment Claim
claims

that

apparently

Burnette
by

11

violated

subjecting

him

his
to

Eighth

corporal

punishment.

(Doc. 9 at 15).8

Preliminarily, the court notes that

a federal pretrial detainee’s right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment.

See Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388
(4th Cir. 2001).

This is because “the State does not acquire the

power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until
after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance
with due process of law.”
n. 40 (1977).

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671

This distinction can matter, moreover, because the

“language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature of the claims
often differs. And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike
convicted

prisoners)

cannot

be

‘maliciously and sadistically.’”

punished

at

all,

much

less

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576

U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
671 n. 40 (1977)).

For this reason, Dekattu’s Bivens claim under

the Eighth Amendment fails.
Here, however, even if analyzed under the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, Dekattu’s claim fails to satisfy the most basic
pleading requirements.

Aside from one vague reference to being

In the affidavit accompanying the amended complaint, Dekattu claims
that “corporate punishment was used against me.” (Doc. 9 at 15.) The
court assumes Dekattu meant “corporal punishment,” which is ordinarily
considered “physical punishment . . . that is inflicted on the body.”
Punishment, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
8

12

“violated”

by

Defendants

ostensibly refers

to a

on “or
violation

about

April

7, 2022” (which

of his supervised release),

Dekattu sets forth no specific instance of “corporal punishment,”
much less any specific allegations plausibly alleging that the
“force” used against him “was objectively unreasonable” in light
of “the legitimate interests that stem from the government's need
to manage the facility in which the individual is detained.”
Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396–97 (cleaned up).
In short, Dekattu’s Eighth Amendment claim – which the court
construes as resting on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
- “is exactly the kind of ‘naked assertion’ that is insufficient
to state a claim.”

Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 776 F.3d 214,

221 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Accordingly,

this claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.9

Even had Dekattu alleged more facts, it is unclear – and perhaps
doubtful – whether Bivens would provide a cause of action under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Although the Supreme Court authorized a
Bivens action under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause in Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), this does not mean that all Fifth Amendment
claims have a Bivens remedy. See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1863 (rejecting
Bivens remedy for prisoner abuse claim based on Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 420 (1988) (denying
a Bivens action under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause for
wrongful denial of Social Security disability benefits); Cantu v. Moody,
933 F.3d 414, 422 (5th Cir. 2019) (“No one thinks Davis — which permitted
a congressional employee to sue for unlawful termination in violation
of the Due Process Clause — means the entirety of the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause is fair game in a Bivens action.”)
9

13

c.

Fourth and Fifth Amendment Claims

The remaining claims against Burnette, liberally construed,
can be boiled down to two basic theories of liability.

The first

theory is that Burnette violated the Fourth Amendment, ostensibly
under

Franks v. Delaware,

438

U.S. 154

(1978), by knowingly

submitting false information – primarily the results of certain
drug tests showing that Dekattu had used marijuana in violation of
the

terms

Dekattu’s

of

his

supervision

–

supervised release.

to

secure

(Doc.

9

the

at

17

revocation

of

(claiming that

Burnette “has falsified the Toxicology Report . . . and Abbott
Drug Test Report”).)
the Fifth

The second theory is that Burnette violated

Amendment's Due Process Clause by fabricating that

evidence to obtain the revocation of Dekattu’s supervised release.
(Id.

at

17-18

(claiming

that

Burnette

“has

created

a

supervised release violation report against plaintiff”).)

false
See

Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 354 (4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing
a “due process right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of
the fabrication of evidence by a government officer acting in an
investigating capacity”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Dekattu,

however,

has

alleged

no

facts

-

beyond

his

subjective, unsupported belief – making plausible the claim that
Burnette

falsified

revocation.

evidence

to

secure

the

supervised

This failure is fatal to his claims.
14

release

The allegations

do not specify how Burnette falsified evidence against Dekattu.
Nor do they refer to any underlying facts to support the purported
constitutional violations.

Instead, Dekattu’s Fourth and Fifth

Amendment claims amount to “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation[s]” that are not pled with enough specificity
to plausibly state a claim.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Oakley v.

Dyer, No. 2:21-CV-169-Z-BQ, 2022 WL 10676593, at *6 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 12, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:21-CV169-Z-BQ, 2022 WL 10656143 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2022) (allegation
that defendant falsified drug test results failed to state a claim
because the plaintiff “set forth no facts — beyond his subjective,
unsupported belief — demonstrating [that the defendant] falsified
his drug test results”); Teixeira v. Hanneman, No. 17-CV-6673-PSG
(KS), 2018 WL 6164309, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018) (“Plaintiffs'
conclusory

allegation

that

[the

defendants]

engaged

in

a

conspiracy with the employees of the drug testin g facilities to
falsify evidence, without a single supporting fact, is not enough
to state a claim”).
Consequently, Dekattu’s claims based on the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
C.

Motion to Redact

In initiating this case, though Dekattu was detained at the
Mecklenburg County jail, he included his Charlotte home address in
15

the complaint and four summonses.

(Doc. 1 at 1; Doc. 1-1).

the

struck

court

ordered

the

complaint

on

July

5,

When

2022,

it

instructed the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of the order to
Dekattu at both his home address and the Mecklenburg County jail.
(Doc. 4 at 5).

Dekattu now moves the court to redact his home

address from the court’s July 5, 2022 order because it is available
publicly and “can potentially cause an [sic] safety issue” for
Dekattu and his family.
A

(Doc. 14 at 1).

court's power over

its

records

is constrained

by

two

separate legal principles: the public's presumptive common-law
right of access to judicial records, Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, (1978), and the First Amendment's grant
of access to judicial records, Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607, 1982)).

“The common-

law presumptive right of access extends to all judicial documents
and records, and the presumption can be rebutted only by showing
that

‘countervailing

interests in access.’”

interests

heavily

outweigh

the

public

Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.2d 249, 265-

66 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)).

Accordingly, the “redaction

of a judicial opinion is appropriate only when redactions are
necessary
interests.”

and

justified

to

protect

a

party's

legitimate

Lipocine Inc. v. Clarus Therapeutics, Inc., No. CV
16

19-622 (WCB), 2020 WL 4569473, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 7, 2020); see
also Doe v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 49, 52 (D.D.C.
2008) (“[A] district court may deny access to judicial records
only if, after considering the relevant facts and circumstances of
the particular case, and after weighing the interests advanced by
the parties in light of the public interest and the duty of the
courts,

it

concludes

that

justice

so

requires.”)

(internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, Dekattu requests the redaction of his home address in
the interest of his family’s safety.
and

circumstances,

the

court

Considering all the facts

discerns

no

public

interest

in

Dekattu’s personal address, which is immaterial to the merits of
this action.

Redacting his address from the court’s July 5, 2022

order would not affect the public’s interest in this matter in any
meaningful way, while Dekattu has a legitimate and “strong privacy
interest in [his] home address[].”

Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-

CIO, Loc. 1923 v. U.S., Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 712 F.2d
931, 932 (4th Cir. 1983).

Accordingly, Dekattu’s motion to redact

his home address is granted and

the Clerk of Court

will

be

instructed to redact Dekattu’s home address from the July 5, 2022
order (Doc. 4).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, therefore,

17

IT IS ORDERED that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as
to the Bivens claims against all Defendants in their official
capacity as well as the claims based on First Amendment retaliation
and the Eighth Amendment, and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to
the Bivens claims against all Defendants in their individual
capacity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dekattu’s “Request Urging the
Courts to Remove Personal Address from Order Filed July 5, 2022”
(Doc. 14) is construed as a motion to redact and is GRANTED.

The

Clerk of Court shall redact Dekattu’s personal addres s from the
court’s July 5, 2022 order (Doc. 4).

/s/
Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
November 18, 2022

18