Streeter v. Williams

Filing 10

ORDER on initial review of Pltf's #1 Complaint: Pltf's Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Deft Williams passes initial review; Pltf's remaining claims are DISMISSED in accordance with the terms of this Order; Clerk of Court shall commence procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for Deft Williams, who is alleged to be current or former employee of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety; and the Clerk is also instructed to mail Pltf an Opt-In/Opt-Out form pursuant to Standing Order 3:19-mc-00060-FDW. Signed by Chief Judge Martin Reidinger on 2/28/2023. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.) (ejb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:23-cv-00038-MR
FAITH SHERRIE STREETER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
MARSHALL WILLIAMS,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________ )

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 1]. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2); 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2, 7].
I.

BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Faith Sherrie Streeter (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the

State of North Carolina currently incarcerated at Anson Correctional
Institution (“Anson CI”) in Polkton, North Carolina. On October 23, 2022, she
filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Marshall
Williams, identified as a Unit Manager at Anson CI, in his individual capacity
only. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff alleges as follows.
On November 8, 2022, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Defendant
Williams, along with three other officers, was escorting Plaintiff to mental

Case 3:23-cv-00038-MR Document 10 Filed 03/01/23 Page 1 of 9

health observation. Upon entering the receiving area, Plaintiff kicked a trash
can and Defendant Williams instructed staff to take Plaintiff to the ground.
Plaintiff was in full restraints, including leg shackles, at the time. Defendant
Williams shoved Plaintiff’s arms, which were restrained behind her back, up
toward her head. Defendant Marshall “kept pulling [Plaintiff’s] arms causing
[her] extreme pain.” Plaintiff was then put on her feet and instructed to enter
the cell. After Plaintiff was in the cell, Defendant Williams entered the cell
and pushed Plaintiff forcefully from behind. Plaintiff was not a threat or trying
to exit the cell. Defendant Williams then “proceeded to get into [Plaintiff’s]
face, brushing up against [her] chest and threatening [her].” [Id. at 6-7].
Defendant Williams directed staff not to give Plaintiff her dinner tray because
she was going to remain in restraints for four hours. At 8:00 p.m., when
Plaintiff’s restraints were removed, second shift staff provided her dinner.
Plaintiff did not receive a medical assessment after her restraints were
removed, but she did tell Nurse Larue that her wrists were swollen and that
she had lacerations on her ankles. Nurse Larue gave Plaintiff pain
medication but did not otherwise treat Plaintiff’s injuries. [Id. at 7]. Plaintiff
alleges that she suffered violation of her Eighth Amendment rights through
excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment. [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff also
claims “negligence for not feeding [her] or getting [her] medical attention.”
2

Case 3:23-cv-00038-MR Document 10 Filed 03/01/23 Page 2 of 9

[Id. at 8].
For injuries, Plaintiff claims she suffered extreme pain due to a preexisting shoulder injury and lacerations to her wrists and ankles. [Id. at 8].
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief only. [Id.].
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must review Plaintiff’s Complaint to determine whether it is

subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Furthermore, § 1915A requires an initial review of a “complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer
or employee of a governmental entity,” and the court must identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly
baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
3

Case 3:23-cv-00038-MR Document 10 Filed 03/01/23 Page 3 of 9

(1972).

However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III.

DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was

“deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments,” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must
satisfy both an objective component–that the harm inflicted was sufficiently
serious–and a subjective component–that the prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761
(4th Cir. 1996). In adjudicating an excessive force claim, the Court must
consider such factors as the need for the use of force, the relationship
between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury
inflicted, and, ultimately, whether the force was “applied in a good faith effort
4

Case 3:23-cv-00038-MR Document 10 Filed 03/01/23 Page 4 of 9

to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made clear that “[a]n inmate who
is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an
excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape
without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010).
Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged lack of or
inappropriate medical treatment also fall within the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state such a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a
plaintiff must show a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” of the
inmate. Id. “Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants
actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to the
detainee or that they actually knew of and ignored a detainee’s serious need
for medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th
Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
To be found liable under the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must
know of and consciously or intentionally disregard “an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994);
Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998). “[E]ven if a prison
5

Case 3:23-cv-00038-MR Document 10 Filed 03/01/23 Page 5 of 9

doctor is mistaken or negligent in his diagnosis or treatment, no constitutional
issue is raised absent evidence of abuse, intentional mistreatment, or denial
of medical attention.” Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Md. 1975),
aff’d, 535 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976).
A “serious medical need” is “one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Iko v.
Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the
prisoner's serious medical needs and the related risks but nevertheless
disregards them. DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018). The
prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true for the purposes of this initial
review and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Williams is not clearly
frivolous and survives initial review. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert
an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Williams based on deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need, however, Plaintiff has failed
6

Case 3:23-cv-00038-MR Document 10 Filed 03/01/23 Page 6 of 9

to do so. Plaintiff alleges only that she did not receive an assessment from
medical after the restraints were removed, which occurred around 8:00 p.m.
Plaintiff makes no allegation against Defendant Williams relative to the denial
of medical care nor has Plaintiff alleged the existence of a serious medical
need. This claim, therefore, will be dismissed.
Next, the body of the Complaint contains allegations against
individuals who are not named as defendants in the caption as required by
Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)
(“The title of the complaint must name all the parties”); Myles v. United
States, 416 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2005) (“to make someone a party the plaintiff
must specify him in the caption and arrange for service of process.”); Perez
v. Humphries, No. 3:18-cv-107-GCM, 2018 WL 4705560, at *1 (W.D.N.C.
Oct. 1, 2018) (“A plaintiff’s failure to name a defendant in the caption of a
Complaint renders any action against the purported defendant a legal
nullity”). The allegations directed at individuals not named as Defendants
are therefore dismissed without prejudice.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff sought to assert a state law claim for
negligence based on the denial of medical attention or the delay in her
receiving a single meal, she had failed to do so. While Defendant William’s
order not to provide Plaintiff a dinner tray because Plaintiff remained
7

Case 3:23-cv-00038-MR Document 10 Filed 03/01/23 Page 7 of 9

restrained for four hours, if true, may have been inappropriate, it does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation and the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any related state law claim. Plaintiff makes
no allegations about who was responsible for the denial of medical care and
the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such a
claim under the circumstances here in any event. The Court, therefore, will
also dismiss these claims.
IV.

CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Williams

based on the use of excessive force survives initial review.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim against Defendant Williams passes initial review.
Plaintiff’s remaining claims are DISMISSED in accordance with the terms of
this Order.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Clerk of Court shall commence
the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for
Defendant Williams, who is alleged to be current or former employee of the
North Carolina Department of Public Safety.

8

Case 3:23-cv-00038-MR Document 10 Filed 03/01/23 Page 8 of 9

The Clerk is also instructed to mail Plaintiff an Opt-In/Opt-Out form
pursuant to Standing Order 3:19-mc-00060-FDW.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: February 28, 2023

9

Case 3:23-cv-00038-MR Document 10 Filed 03/01/23 Page 9 of 9