Steele v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER that, pursuant to the power of this Court to enter judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED, and the case is hereby REMANDED for further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion. Signed by Chief Judge Martin Reidinger on 3/25/2024. (ejb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL CASE NO. 3:23-cv-00301-MR
BARBARA STEELE,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
)
SECURITY,
)
)
Defendant.
)
_______________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s appeal of the
Commissioner’s decision denying her benefits. The parties have fully briefed
the issues. [Docs. 8, 9].
I.

BACKGROUND
On June 11, 2020, the Plaintiff, Barbara Steele (“Plaintiff”), filed an

application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social
Security Act (the “Act”), alleging an onset date of November 19, 2019.
[Transcript (“T.”) at 18]. The Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied on January
20, 2021, and upon reconsideration on July 14, 2021. [Id.]. Upon the
Plaintiff’s request, a telephone hearing was held on July 21, 2022, before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). [Id.]. On October 4, 2022, the ALJ issued
a written decision denying the Plaintiff benefits, finding that the Plaintiff was

not disabled within the meaning of the Act since the alleged onset date of
November 19, 2019. [T. at 29-30]. The Appeals Council denied the Plaintiff’s
request for review, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of
the Commissioner.

[T. at 1].

The Plaintiff has exhausted all available

administrative remedies, and this case is now ripe for review pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner is limited to

(1) whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision,
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); and (2) whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Hays v. Sullivan, 907
F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).

“When examining [a Social Security

Administration] disability determination, a reviewing court is required to
uphold the determination when an ALJ has applied correct legal standards
and the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Bird
v. Comm’r, 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “It consists of more than a mere scintilla

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of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667
F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the Court should] not undertake
to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute
[its] judgment for that of the ALJ.”

Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653 (internal

quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Rather, “[w]here conflicting

evidence allows reasonable minds to differ,” the Court defers to the ALJ’s
decision. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To enable judicial review
for substantial evidence, “[t]he record should include a discussion of which
evidence the ALJ found credible and why, and specific application of the
pertinent legal requirements to the record evidence.” Radford v. Colvin, 734
F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2013). It is the duty of the ALJ to “build an accurate
and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Monroe v. Colvin,
826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

“Without this

explanation, the reviewing court cannot properly evaluate whether the ALJ
applied the correct legal standard or whether substantial evidence supports
his decisions, and the only recourse is to remand the matter for additional
investigation and explanations.” Mills v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-cv-25-MR, 2017
WL 957542, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2017) (Reidinger, J.) (citing Radford,
734 F.3d at 295).

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III.

THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
A “disability” entitling a claimant to benefits under the Social Security

Act, as relevant here, is “[the] inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Administration Regulations
set out a detailed five-step process for reviewing applications for disability.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th
Cir. 2015). “If an applicant’s claim fails at any step of the process, the ALJ
need not advance to the subsequent steps.” Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200,
1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The burden is on the claimant to
make the requisite showing at the first four steps. Id.
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity.

If so, the claimant’s application is denied

regardless of the medical condition, age, education, or work experience of
the claimant. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920). If not, the case progresses to
step two, where the claimant must show a severe impairment. If the claimant
does not show any physical or mental deficiencies, or a combination thereof,

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which significantly limit the claimant’s ability to perform work activities, then
no severe impairment is established, and the claimant is not disabled. Id.
At step three, the ALJ must determine whether one or more of the
claimant’s impairments meets or equals one of the listed impairments
(“Listings”) found at 20 C.F.R. 404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P. If so, the
claimant is automatically deemed disabled regardless of age, education or
work experience. Id. If not, before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). The RFC is an
administrative assessment of “the most” a claimant can still do on a “regular
and continuing basis” notwithstanding the claimant’s medically determinable
impairments and the extent to which those impairments affect the claimant’s
ability to perform work-related functions. Social Security Ruling 96-8p; 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c); 404.943(c); 416.945.
At step four, the claimant must show that his or her limitations prevent
the claimant from performing his or her past work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920; Mascio, 780 F.3d at 634. If the claimant can still perform his or her
past work, then the claimant is not disabled.

Id.

Otherwise, the case

progresses to the fifth step where the burden shifts to the Commissioner. At
step five, the Commissioner must establish that, given the claimant’s age,
education, work experience, and RFC, the claimant can perform alternative

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work which exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. Id.; Hines
v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 567 (4th Cir. 2006). “The Commissioner typically
offers this evidence through the testimony of a vocational expert responding
to a hypothetical that incorporates the claimant’s limitations.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920; Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635.

If the Commissioner

succeeds in shouldering his burden at step five, the claimant is not disabled
and the application for benefits must be denied. Id. Otherwise, the claimant
is entitled to benefits.
IV.

THE ALJ’S DECISION
At step one, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date, November 19, 2019.
[T. at 21]. At step two, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff has the severe
impairments of rheumatoid arthritis and obesity. [Id.]. At step three, the ALJ
determined that the Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the Listings. [Id.]. The ALJ then
determined that the Plaintiff, notwithstanding her impairments, has the RFC:
“[T]o perform the full range of medium work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(c).” [Id. at 22].
At step four, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff was able to perform past
relevant work “as a housekeeping cleaner (DOT 323.687-014, SVP 2,

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unskilled, light), a hand packager (DOT 920.587-018, SVP 2, unskilled,
medium), and an inserting machine operator (DOT 208.685-018, SVP 2,
unskilled, light)” and that this work “does not require the performance of
work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional
capacity.” [Id. at 27-28]. Additionally, based upon the testimony of the VE,
the ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff is capable of performing jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy, including garment sorter,
inspector/hand packager, and marker.

[Id. at 29].

The ALJ therefore

concluded that the Plaintiff was not “disabled” as defined by the Social
Security Act from November 29, 2019, the alleged onset date, through
October 4, 2022, the date of the decision. [Id. at 29-30].
V.

DISCUSSION1
The Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “did not properly evaluate the

evidence or form a clear and logical bridge from the evidence to her
conclusions,” and therefore, substantial evidence does not support her RFC
assessment. [Doc. 8 at 6-7].
Social Security Ruling 96-8p explains how adjudicators should assess
a claimant’s RFC, instructing that the “assessment must first identify the

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Rather than set forth the relevant facts in a separate section, the Court has incorporated
the relevant facts into its legal analysis.
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individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her workrelated abilities on a function-by-function basis, including the functions” listed
in the regulations.2 SSR 96-8p; see also Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636 (finding
that remand may be appropriate where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant’s
capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the
record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ’s analysis frustrate
meaningful review) (citation omitted).
In formulating the RFC, an ALJ is required to “consider limitations and
restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are
not ‘severe.’” SSR 96-8p. More specifically, Rule 96-8p provides:
The RFC assessment must include a narrative
discussion describing how the evidence supports
each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g.,
laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g.,
daily activities, observations). In assessing RFC, the
adjudicator must discuss the individual’s ability to
perform sustained work activities in an ordinary work
setting on a regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8
hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work
schedule), and describe the maximum amount of
each work-related activity the individual can perform
based on the evidence available in the case record.
The functions listed in the regulations include the claimant's (1) physical abilities, “such
as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or other physical functions
(including manipulative or postural functions, such as reaching, handling, stooping or
crouching);” (2) mental abilities, “such as limitations in understanding, remembering, and
carrying out instructions, and in responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and
work pressures in a work setting;” and (3) other work-related abilities affected by
“impairment(s) of vision, hearing or other senses, and impairment(s) which impose
environmental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945.
2

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[Id.].
Here, the ALJ’s decision never explains how she accounted for any of
the Plaintiff’s symptoms in formulating her RFC. Indeed, after concluding
that the Plaintiff’s rheumatoid arthritis was severe at step two, the ALJ
discounted the opinions of both the Plaintiff’s treating physicians and did not
explain how the remaining evidence supports the ALJ’s proscribed RFC.
[See T. at 23-27]. As noted above, the Social Security Administration’s own
regulations require an ALJ to consider every impairment asserted by a
claimant, even those that an ALJ concludes are non-severe, in formulating
an RFC. See SSR 96-8p. As there is no indication in the ALJ’s decision that
she took the Plaintiff’s rheumatoid arthritis into account in formulating the
Plaintiff’s RFC, this Court cannot conclude that the ALJ built the necessary
“accurate and logical bridge” between the evidence that the Plaintiff
presented about her impairments and the RFC. Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189.
Furthermore, the ALJ’s discussion of the Plaintiff’s RFC cuts off abruptly midsentence,3 further indicating that additional explanation is warranted. [T. at
27].

The last paragraph of the RFC discussion simply reads: “Based on the foregoing, the
undersigned finds the claimant has the above residual functional capacity assessment,
which is supported by[.]” [T. at 27].
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Other significant gaps in reasoning are found throughout the ALJ’s
opinion. In determining the Plaintiff’s impairments at step two, the ALJ also
entirely fails to discuss the Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairments. [T. at 2122]. In discussing the Plaintiff’s symptoms in her justification of the RFC, for
example, the ALJ merely recites and summarily concludes that “[t]he
claimant’s weight and its impact on the claimant’s ability to ambulate has
been considered,” but does not explain how the Plaintiff’s obesity was
considered in developing the RFC. [T. at 25]. The ALJ also only finds the
medical opinions of the State agency medical consultants persuasive but
notes that their opinions are consistent with the record that “[the Plaintiff’s]
symptoms [are] attributed to other causes than her arthritis.” [T. at 27]. The
ALJ fails to explain, however, how these symptoms, regardless of their
cause, are accounted for in the RFC.
“Without this explanation, the reviewing court cannot properly evaluate
whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard or whether substantial
evidence supports [her] decisions, and the only recourse is to remand the
matter for additional investigation and explanations.”
957542, at *4 (citation omitted).

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Mills, 2017 WL

VI.

CONCLUSION
Because this Courts lacks an adequate record of the basis for the ALJ's

decision, it cannot conduct a meaningful review of that ruling. See Radford,
734 F.3d at 295. On remand, the ALJ should conduct a proper function-byfunction analysis of the Plaintiff’s exertional and non-exertional limitations,
narratively discussing all the relevant evidence, and specifically explaining
how she reconciled that evidence to her conclusions. In light of this decision,
the Plaintiff’s other assignments of error need not be addressed at this time
but may be addressed on remand.

ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that, pursuant to the power of this
Court to enter judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the decision of
the Commissioner is REVERSED, and the case is hereby REMANDED for
further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: March 25, 2024

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