Jeremy Lamond Henderson Trust v. Haynes

Filing 3

ORDER dismissing without prejudice re 1 Complaint. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend his Complaint. Signed by District Judge Frank D. Whitney on 2/5/24. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(clc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:23-cv-583-FDW

JEREMY LAMOND HENDERSON TRUST,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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BRAD HAYNES,
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Defendant.
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_________________________________________ )

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se Complaint. [Doc. 1].
The Plaintiff has paid the filing fee.
I.

BACKGROUND
The pro se Plaintiff, as “Jeremy Lamond Henderson Trust ©,”purports to file this action

under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction for relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242
[Doc. 1 at 3, 6]. He names as the sole Defendant Brad Haynes of the North Carolina Division of
Motor Vehicles. [Id. at 2]. He states his claim as follows:
On August 9, 2019, MR. BRAD HAYNES of THE STATE OF NORTH
CAROLINA DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES POLICE DEPARTMENT
committed false arrest, false imprisonment, defamation of character, and
copyright/trademark infringement when he knowingly swore to a frivolous arrest
warrant pertaining to JEREMY LAMOND HENDERSON©. The frivolous arrest
warrant claims that Chief Trustee, Jeremy-Lamond:Henderson, TTEE willfully
issued false information to the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles to obtain
a North Carolina Driver’s License using 6525 Dupont Drive Apt# 1-D, Charlotte,
North Carolina, 28217 and 1040 DALE EARNHARDT BOULEVARD# 147,
KANNAPOLIS, NC 28083. He claims to have made contact with the apartment
complex to verify residency with no success. Ashford Place Apartments located at
6525 Dupont Drive, Charlotte, North Carolina 28217 is the first apartment
community that I Chief Trustee Jeremy-Lamond:Henderson, TTEE lived upon
relocating to Charlotte, North Carolina in June 2016. A warrant for arrest was
issued for JEREMY LAMOND HENDERSON© as a result of the poor

performance and malfeasance in office on behalf of Mr. BRAD HAYNES and the
North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles. I, Chief Trustee JeremyLamond:Henderson, TTEE have always ensured that the North Carolina Division
of Motor Vehicles had all of the information that was needed to contact me if
needed. They have my home and business address for JEREMY LAMOND
HENDERSON TRUST©. Unfortunately, the North Carolina Division of Motor
Vehicles made the mistake of misplacing my personal information and refuse to
take accountability for their negligence in doing so.
[Doc. 1 at 5].
The Plaintiff appears to claim that his business license for North Carolina Protective
Service was suspended as a result of the Defendant’s actions. He seeks $3,000,000.00 in lost
wages. [Id.].
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Plaintiff is not a prisoner and he has paid the full filing fee. “However, frivolous

complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the
filing fee has been paid.” Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App’x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012). This case is,
therefore, subject to frivolity review under the Court’s inherent authority. See Patrick v. Boyd, No.
7:22-CV-185-D, 2023 WL 8813590, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 27, 2023), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 7:22-CV-185-D, 2023 WL 8810763 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 20, 2023)
In its frivolity review, a court must determine whether a complaint raises an indisputably
meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or
delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the
liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to ignore a clear failure to allege
facts in his complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

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III.

DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, the Plaintiff has signed his Complaint as “Jeremy Lamond

Henderson Trust ©.” [Doc. 1 at 6]. It appears that the Plaintiff may be attempting to adopt a tactic
similar to “sovereign citizen” litigants seeking to challenge the court’s jurisdiction over them.
“[S]overeign citizens are a loosely affiliated group who believe that the state and federal
governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their
behavior.” United States v. Ulloa, 511 F. App’x. 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013). However, such
sovereign citizen claims lack merit and are frivolous. See United States v. White, 480 F. App’x
193, 195 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding “no merit in [the] claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction
over his prosecution because his ancestors had been illegally seized and brought to the United
States”); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that “[r]egardless of
an individual’s claimed status ... as a ‘sovereign citizen’ ... that person is not beyond the jurisdiction
of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily ...”); United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d
1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting defendant’s claim that he was outside the court's jurisdiction
as “completely without merit” and “patently frivolous”). To the extent that the Plaintiff attempts
to sue as a sovereign citizen, therefore, this action cannot proceed and it is dismissed without
prejudice. Even if the Plaintiff had signed the Complaint properly, it would fail initial review.
The Plaintiff purports to sue pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, which are the criminal
analogues of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1983, respectively. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 98 (1971); United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 788 n.6 (4th Cir. 1990). “Generally, a private
citizen has no authority to initiate a federal criminal prosecution … only the United States as
prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242.” Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2
(1st Cir. 1989). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to §§ 241 and 242 fail as a matter of

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law and this action cannot proceed. See Rankin v. Sykes, No. 1:18-cv-353, 2019 WL 203184, at
*3 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2019).
The Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable claim and, accordingly, the Court will
exercise its inherent authority to dismiss the Complaint without prejudice.
IV.

CONCLUSION
In sum, the Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable claim and it is dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority.
The Court will allow the Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his Complaint, if he so chooses,
to correct the deficiencies identified in this Order and to otherwise properly state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Any Amended Complaint will be subject to all timeliness and
procedural requirements and will supersede his previous filings. Piecemeal amendment will not
be allowed. Should Plaintiff fail to timely file an Amended Complaint in accordance with this
Order, this action will be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Complaint [Doc. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons
stated in this Order.
2. The Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to amend his Complaint in
accordance with the terms of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint
in accordance with this Order and within the time limit set by the Court, this action will
be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: February 5, 2024

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