Eskridge v. Hickory Springs Manufacturing Company et al

Filing 26

ORDER that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims as to individual Defendants Catherine Fish, Jason Boring and Nero Monero be granted. Signed by District Judge Richard Voorhees on 4/8/14. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(smj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CASE NO.: 5:11-cv-176
ALTON ESKRIDGE,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
HICKORY SPRINGS MANUFACTURING,
)
CATHERINE FISH, JASON BORING, and
)
NERO MONERO,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_________________________________________ )

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on its own motion for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
I.

BACKGROUND

On January 11, 2012, Defendants Hickory Springs Manufacturing, Catherine Fish
(“Fish”), Jason Boring (“Boring”), and Nero Monero (“Monero”) filed a Motion to Dismiss
based on Plaintiff’s alleged failure to file the instant action within 90-days of his receipt of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) Dismissal and Notice of Rights. (Doc.
13 at 1.) Alternatively, Defendants argued all of Plaintiff’s claims against the individual
defendants should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”) do not convey liability on individual defendants and because Plaintiff failed to name
any of the individual Defendants as Respondents to his EEOC charge. (Doc. 13 at 1.)
This Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in a Memorandum and Order filed on
May 5, 2012. (Doc. 19.) The basis for the Court’s Order of dismissal was Plaintiff’s failure to

comply with the 90-day window for filing. The Court’s Order did not address the subject-matter
jurisdiction argument.
On September 28, 2012, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded this Court’s dismissal
in an unpublished opinion. Eskridge v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 477 F. App'x 139, 140 (4th
Cir. 2012).
II.

DISCUSSION

“Without jurisdiction [a federal court] cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is
that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) (citing Ex parte McCardle, 7
Wall. 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868)).
Here, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction as to Boring, Fish, and Monero because
Plaintiff’s claims are based on Title VII and the ADEA. These acts of Congress do not provide
liability as to individuals defendants. Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir.
1998) (The Fourth Circuit holding that, just as the ADEA did not convey individual liability, nor
did Title VII, “the closest statutory kin” to the ADEA.)) As such, subject-matter jurisdiction
under Title VII or the ADEA does not exist as to Plaintiff’s claims against the individual
Defendants.

III.

CONCLUSION

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims as to individual Defendants CATHERINE FISH, JASON BORING, and NERO
MONERO be GRANTED.

Signed: April 8, 2014