Stafford v. Murray et al

Filing 57

ORDER granting dft Lane Huneycutt's 43 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting dft David Guinn's 35 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Dcmt. Nos. 35 and 43 are granted to the extent that plf's deliberate indifference claim against these dfts is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust, and dfts Guinn and Huneycutt are hereby dismissed from this action. Furthermore, to the extent that plf seeks injunctive and/or declaratory relief in this action, those claims are moot. Order dismissing as moot 50 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 11/2/2015. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(cbb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:14-cv-186-FDW
DAMON DEMOND STAFFORD,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
FNU MURRAY, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)

ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant David Guinn’s Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, (Doc. No. 35); Defendant Lane Huneycutt’s Motion for
Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust, (Doc. No. 43); Defendant Lane Huneycutt’s Motion
for Protective Order, (Doc. No. 50); and Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Respond,
(Doc. No. 51).
I.

BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Damon Demond Stafford, a North Carolina prisoner currently
incarcerated at Scotland Correctional Institution, filed this action on November 17, 2014,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right not to be
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
based on alleged excessive force and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs while
Plaintiff was incarcerated at Alexander Correctional Institution (“Alexander”). In his Complaint,
Plaintiff named as Defendants (1) FNU Murray, identified as a segregation sergeant at
Alexander; (2) FNU Copeland, identified as a segregation correctional officer at Alexander; (3)
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FNU Quigley, identified as a transportation correctional officer at Alexander; (4) FNU
Huneycutt, identified as a captain at Alexander; and (5) David Guinn, identified as a nurse
practitioner at Alexander. Plaintiff purports to bring a claim of excessive force against
Defendants Murray, Copeland, and Quigley, based on an incident allegedly occurring on July 30,
2014, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Alexander Correctional Institution, and he brings a
claim of deliberate indifference against Defendants Huneycutt and Guinn based on alleged
failure to ensure that proper medical treatment was provided to Plaintiff after the alleged
excessive force incident.
On December 15, 2014, Plaintiff signed and submitted a “Verified Statement” addressing
his exhaustion of administrative remedies, indicating that Plaintiff had exhausted his
administrative remedies, and Plaintiff referred the Court to certain grievance forms attached to
his Complaint. (Doc. No. 6). On May 7, 2015, the Court conducted a frivolity review, finding
that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Quigley, Copeland, and Murray
based on alleged excessive force survived initial review in that it was not clearly frivolous.
(Doc. No. 8). The Court noted, however, that it did “not appear that Plaintiff has exhausted his
administrative remedies with regard to his claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs” against Defendants Guinn and Huneycutt. (Id. at 6). The Court granted Plaintiff twenty
days to “submit a statement to the Court addressing whether he filed any grievances specifically
addressing the deliberate indifference claim he purports to raise in this action.” (Id. at 7).
On May 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file amended complaint along with
a proposed amended complaint. (Doc. Nos. 9; 9-1). In his motion for leave to file an amended
complaint, Plaintiff stated that “he has obtained the final responses to the final 2 grievances filed

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in connection, they were submitted before the filing of suit and needs to be added to the record.”
(Doc. No. 9 at 1). Plaintiff’s attachments show that on October 13, 2014, Plaintiff submitted
Unit Grievance No. 4870-S-14-321, which was directed to his deliberate indifference claim. The
prison’s Step Two Response to that grievance was dated December 4, 2014. Plaintiff appealed
the Step Two Response. (Doc. No. 9-3 at 2). Plaintiff’s appeal was denied at Step Three by the
Inmate Grievance Resolution Board on December 31, 2014.1 (Doc. No. 9-4 at 2).
On June 1, 2015, the Court entered an Order noting that the Step Two and Step Three
responses submitted by Plaintiff “show that Plaintiff did not grieve his deliberate indifference
claim through all steps of the grievance process before filing this lawsuit on November 17,
2014.” (Doc. No. 11 at 3). That is, Plaintiff’s own filings showed conclusively that Plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claim was not exhausted until December 2014, despite that Plaintiff filed
this action in November 2014. The Court concluded that it appeared that “Plaintiff did not
exhaust his administrative remedies as to his deliberate indifference claim before filing this
lawsuit,” but the Court decided not to “dismiss the deliberate indifference claim for failure to
exhaust at this time.” (Id. at 4). Rather, the Court noted that it would allow Defendants Guinn

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Plaintiff also attached to his Amended Complaint two documents relating to a rejected
grievance, Grievance No. 4870-S-15-063, in which Plaintiff complained about prison officials’
failure to provide him with proper medical treatment after the alleged excessive force incident.
(Doc. No. 9-5). Grievance No. 4870-S-15-063 was originally received at Alexander on October
20, 2014, seven days after Plaintiff submitted Grievance No. 4870-S-14-321, and before
Grievance No. 4870-S-14-321 completed step two review. Id. Grievance No. 4870-S-15-063
was returned to Plaintiff on October 23, 2014, with the instruction that it “can only be accepted
when your current grievance completes step two.” (Doc. No. 9-5 at 2-3). See NCDPS ARP §
.0304(b) (an inmate may not submit a new grievance before a pending grievance has completed
step two review). Grievance No. 4870-S-14-321 completed step two review on November 25,
2014. (Doc. No. 9-3 at 2). Plaintiff resubmitted Grievance No. 4870-S-15-063 on February 17,
2015, and it was rejected because it was submitted 90 days after the alleged incident giving rise
to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim.
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and Huneycutt to “raise exhaustion as an affirmative defense in their response to Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint.” (Id.).
Defendant Guinn filed the pending motion to dismiss on August 24, 2015. Defendant
Guinn moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against him on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies relating to Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need against Defendant Guinn before bringing this action; (2)
Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need against Defendant Guinn; (3) Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief is moot; (4) the
allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint do not support an award of punitive
damages; and (5) Defendant Guinn is entitled to qualified immunity. On September 21, 2015,
Defendant Huneycutt filed his own summary judgment motion, in which he incorporates the
arguments made in Defendant Guinn’s motion to dismiss. Defendant Huneycutt also contends in
his summary judgment motion that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the deliberate indifference claim as
to Huneycutt before filing this action.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that a prisoner exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA
provides, in pertinent part: “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id.
In Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life. The Court ruled that “exhaustion in

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cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory.” Id. at 524 (citation omitted). The Porter Court
stressed that under the PLRA, exhaustion must take place before the commencement of the civil
action in order to further the efficient administration of justice. Id.
In Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006), the Supreme Court held that the PLRA
exhaustion requirement requires “proper” exhaustion: “Administrative law . . . requir[es] proper
exhaustion of administrative remedies, which ‘means using all steps that the agency holds out,
and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).’” Id. at 90 (quoting
Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199
(2007), the Supreme Court stated: “There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the
PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Id. at 211 (citing Porter, 534
U.S. at 524). “Consequently, a prisoner does not comply with the mandatory requirements of 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a) by exhausting his remedies during the course of litigation; exhaustion must
occur before the filing of the lawsuit, or the case must be dismissed.” Woodward v. Daughtery,
845 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684 (W.D.N.C. 2012)). See Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th
Cir. 2008) (The PLRA requires that “prisoners . . . exhaust such administrative remedies as are
available prior to filing suit in federal court.”) (internal quotations omitted); Cannon v.
Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that a prisoner may not file a lawsuit
before exhausting his administrative remedies, even if he exhausts those remedies while
litigating is pending); Green v. Rubenstein, 644 F. Supp. 2d 723, 743 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (“The
plain language of the [PLRA] makes exhaustion a precondition to filing an action in federal
Court . . . . The prisoner, therefore, may not exhaust administrative remedies during the
pendency of the federal suit.”) (quoting Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999)).

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III.

DISCUSSION

In North Carolina, state prisoners must complete a three-step administrative remedy
procedure in order to exhaust their administrative remedies. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 148-118.1
to 148-118.9 (Article 11A: Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure). As noted above, by
Plaintiff’s own statements and attachments, he did not proceed through all three steps of the
grievance process as to his deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Guinn and
Huneycutt before filing this action. See (Doc. Nos. 9; 9-2; 9-3; 9-4; 10). Furthermore, in
support of the motion to dismiss, Defendant Guinn has attached an affidavit submitted by North
Carolina Inmate Grievance Resolution Board Executive Director Finesse Couch, in which Couch
sets forth the grievances submitted by Plaintiff between July 30, 2014, and November 15, 2014.
Couch’s affidavit confirms that Plaintiff did not exhaust his deliberate indifference claim before
filing this action. See (Doc. No. 37-1: Couch Aff.). Plaintiff exhausted his administrative
remedies as to this claim only after filing this action. As the Court noted, supra, however, it is
well established that a prisoner may not exhaust his administrative remedies during the pendency
of a § 1983 action. Ha v. Smith, No. 5:10-CT-3070-FL, 2011 WL 2173630, at *2 (E.D.N.C.
June 2, 2011) (dismissing § 1983 action for failure to exhaust where the prisoner plaintiff
completed step three of the administrative remedies process after he filed his complaint); Harris
v. Midford, No. 1:10-cv-263, 2011 WL 1601446, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2011) (dismissing a
§ 1983 action where the prisoner plaintiff conceded in a verified statement that he did not
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing his claim); see also Cannon, 418 F.3d at 719
(noting that the “exhaustion requirement is designed to alert prison officials to perceived
problems and to enable them to take corrective action without first incurring the hassle and

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expense of litigation. . . . Permitting a prisoner to sue first and then ask the prison to address
issues that are now the subject of pending litigation defeats the purpose of the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement.”).
In response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss the deliberate indifference claim based on
failure to exhaust, Plaintiff now contends, for the first time, that he submitted a grievance as to
the deliberate indifference claim on July 31, 2014, but that the grievance was never processed or
returned to him. (Doc. No. 54 at 1). Plaintiff claims that the grievance “gave a detailed report of
all that transpired on 7-30-14 from the code blue to Defendants Huneycutt and Guinn sending me
back to my cell without any medical attention at all.” (Id.). About three days later, Plaintiff
submitted Grievance No. 4870-S-14-247, which detailed the alleged excessive force incident.
Plaintiff attaches multiple exhibits in which he complains to prison administrators about the
length of time grievance 4870-S-14-247 was pending. However, Plaintiff provides no
evidentiary support for this new claim that he filed a previous grievance outlining all of the
deliberate indifference claims that grievance 4870-S-14-247 fails to contain. Plaintiff has only
now, for the first time, raised the issue of this disappearing grievance. Plaintiff cannot provide
conflicting statements in order to survive a summary judgment motion, nor can he rely on an
incredible conjecture that is contradicted by his own record of failing to ever mention a
grievance that was filed before grievance 4870-S-14-247, in which he detailed the excessive
force incident. Additionally, Plaintiff’s own failure to follow the rules of the grievance process
cannot serve as the basis for the argument that the administrative remedy process was somehow
“unavailable” to him.
In sum, for the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s deliberate

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indifference claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Finally, the
Court also finds that, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive and/or declaratory relief in this
action, those claims are moot because he has been transferred away from Alexander Correctional
Institution where the alleged excessive force and deliberate indifference occurred. 2 See Taylor v.
Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1048 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986).
IV.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim is dismissed without prejudice for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies as to this claim before filing this action. Thus, Defendants
Guinn and Huneycutt are dismissed from this action. Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff
seeks injunctive and/or declaratory relief in this action, those claims are moot.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
(1) Defendant David Guinn’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, (Doc. No.
35), and Defendant Lane Huneycutt’s Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to
Exhaust, (Doc. No. 43), are GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference claim against these Defendants is dismissed without prejudice for failure
to exhaust, and Defendants Guinn and Huneycutt are hereby dismissed from this
action. Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive and/or declaratory
relief in this action, those claims are moot.
(2) Defendant Huneycutt’s Motion for Protective Order, (Doc. No. 50), is DISMISSED
as moot.

2

The Court will reserve judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff properly pled a claim for
punitive damages as to the remaining Defendants.
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(3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Respond, (Doc. No. 51), is GRANTED
nunc pro tunc.
Signed: November 2, 2015

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