Stafford v. Murray et al

Filing 8

ORDER ordering that plf's complaint survives initial review as to plf's excessive force claim against dfts Quigley, Copeland, and Murray. The Court will grant plf 20 days in which to submit a statement to the Court addressing whether he filed any grievances specifically addressing the deliberate indifference claim he purports to raise in this action. Plf shall address why his deliberate indifference claim should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administ rative remedies. The Court will wait until receiving plf's response to this Order before ordering service on any of the named dfts in this action. Plf's Motion to Appoint Counsel is denied. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 5/7/2015. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(cbb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:14-cv-186-FDW
DAMON DEMOND STAFFORD,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
FNU MURRAY, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Doc. No. 1). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Also pending
before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, (Doc. No. 4). On December 10, 2014,
the Court entered an order waiving the initial filing fee and directing monthly payments to be
made from Plaintiff’s prison account. (Doc. No. 5). Thus, Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis.
I.

BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Damon Stafford, a North Carolina prisoner currently incarcerated at
Scotland Correctional Institution, filed this action on November 17, 2014, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right not to be subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution based on alleged
excessive force and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs while Plaintiff was
incarcerated at Alexander Correctional Institution (“Alexander”). In his Complaint, Plaintiff
names as Defendants (1) FNU Murray, identified as a segregation sergeant at Alexander; (2)
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FNU Copeland, identified as a segregation correctional officer at Alexander; (3) FNU Quigley,
identified as a transportation correctional officer at Alexander; (4) FNU Honeycutt, identified as
a captain at Alexander; and (5) David Guinn, identified as a nurse practitioner at Alexander.
The following allegations by Plaintiff are taken as true for the purpose of this initial
review:
On 7-30-2014, around 1410, Plaintiff was found unresponsive on the floor
of cell SC-3, by a c/o making their routine rounds through the segregation wing.
A code blue distress announcement went out over the institution, to alert all
available staff, medical, and custody to respond immediately. Plaintiff had been 7
days without eating in protest against his placement on administrative segregation
pending a[n] investigation. After having vital signs checked by nurse practitioner
Guinn, Plaintiff was given glucose tablets to raise his sugar level. Then a lengthy
discussion ensued between Mr. Guinn and Captain Honeycutt. Afterward
plaintiff was told by Mr. Guinn that he would be sent to the outside hospital by
ambulance to receive I.V.s for severe dehydration and a[n] elevated blood
pressure reading. Video footage was recorded of this from the time officials
entered cell SC-3 until they exited with the fully restrained plaintiff in a
wheelchair.
Plaintiff was pushed from segregation to main medical, to transition to
ambulance, by c/o Copeland with Sgt. Murray walking along side of the
wheelchair. Copeland and Murray discussed their frustration with all the extra
work they were having to do with the numerous prisoners who were on hunger
strikes at the time, on the way to main medical. Murray told Copeland of his
desire to start forcing feeding tubes down prisoner’s throat, saying, “I bet that’ll
slow this shit down.” Copeland laughed and said, “That’s what’s about to happen
to this one” and stated he had witnessed a prisoner pull one of the feeding tubes
out of his throat. Transportation c/o Quigley, who would be one of the two
officers escorting plaintiff to the hospital, was waiting in main medical of
Alexander, to change all the restraints from segregation to transportation’s before
the ambulance arrived.
After switching handcuffs, shackles and the waist chain on Plaintiff,
Quigley told plaintiff to turn his hands one over the other so the black box could
be secured over the handcuffs and attached to the waistchain. Plaintiff told
Quigley that wasn’t policy and the black box could be placed over the handcuffs
the normal way because he had just went out to the hospital that way on 7-26-14.
At that time Murray stated, “Fuck this shit, twist his wrists” and grabbed
plaintiff’s left wrist as Quigley tossed the black box onto a nearby stretcher and
grabbed his right wrist. Copeland, who was standing behind the wheelchair in
which plaintiff sat in proceeded to choke plaintiff by grabbing him around the
right side of the neck and applying pressure. Then Murray ordered, “Flip the
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chair” and Copeland complied.
When fully restrained plaintiff hit floor [sic] Quigley dove on top of him
with Murray following with his forearm driving into plaintiff’s forehead which
busted on impact with the floor. Murray further instructed Copeland to “spray his
ass” while him and Quigley continued to roughly twist plaintiff’s wrists, for no
other reason than to hurt plaintiff, neither had the black box at this time.
Copeland sprayed a few bursts of OC pepper spray directly into plaintiff’s
face, once he stopped spraying, a moment later plaintiff felt something hard
smash into the back of his head, behind the right ear. It’s plaintiff’s belief that
Copeland struck him with the bottom of the spray canister. As other staff
members arrived on the scene Murray shouted to them, “Go get the big can. We
need the big can!”, meaning the more concentrated canister of spray. At that time
plaintiff cried out, “Okay please!” to stop them from hurting him any more.
Quigley got off of plaintiff, retrieved the black box off the stretcher, and clamped
them down over plaintiff’s handcuffed wrists.
Capt. Honeycutt arrived as plaintiff was being lifted off the floor, and
asked his subordinates if plaintiff had been in restraints at the time force was
used. Upon hearing that plaintiff had been, Capt. Honeycutt stated, “Everyone
here who was involved, go make a statement and make it good.” Quigley told the
captain that he was assigned as one of the officers who would be transporting
plaintiff to the hospital and Honeycutt replied, “not any more.” That’s when
E.M.S. personnel arrived in main medical, and Mr. Guinn conversed with them
briefly, before conferring with Capt. Honeycutt for a minute. After the two of
them conversed for a short time, Mr. Guinn told the E.M.S. workers that plaintiff
wouldn’t be going to the hospital now. A Sgt. Walker took a couple of pictures of
plaintiff’s busted and bleeding forehead. After the photos were taken, Capt.
Honeycutt ordered two staff members to wheel plaintiff back to segregation
without being reexamined for the condition Mr. Guinn had just deemed serious
enough to be sent to the hospital for, nor was plaintiff examined for the injuries he
got during the excessive force. Later after being decontaminated back in C-block
wing of the segregation unit as plaintiff laid in bed a male nurse (unknown)
stopped by cell SC-3 with 3 packs of ointment for plaintiff’s forehead and advised
plaintiff to fill out sick calls about any other problems.
Plaintiff suffered a busted forehead, numerous cuts and scarring around
his wrists, throat problems that makes him have bouts that almost chokes him on a
thick greenish colored phlegm, that has also been spotted with blood, and makes
him cough continuously until these fits subsided. A constant intense ringing in
the right ear. Since this incident plaintiff has submitted numerous sick calls that
the nurses has referred me to see Mr. Guinn about, and I’ve only been able to get
him to address the problem with the ringing of the ear. On 9-23-14, plaintiff was
examined by Mr. Guinn about the ringing in his right ear. Mr. Guinn did nothing
claiming nothing was wrong, although plaintiff clearly explained the symptoms of
his ear problems. Then on 10-30-14, after being referred again to see Mr. Guinn,
which the ringing had intensified to a worse condition, Mr. Guinn prescribed a 3month prescription of Loratadine 10 milligram tablets for the problem. Plaintiff is
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still trying to be seen about his throat issues as of 11-4-14, although he has
referred by the sick call nurses to see Mr. Guinn, he has refused to see plaintiff
about his throat.
(Doc. No. 1 at 3-7). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 5).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint
to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious
[or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,
under § 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and dismiss the complaint,
or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an
indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such
as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989).
Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to
ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable
under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III.

DISCUSSION

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim,
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an inmate must satisfy both an objective component–that the harm inflicted was sufficiently
serious–and a subjective component–that the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). In adjudicating an
excessive force claim, the Court must consider such factors as the need for the use of force, the
relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury inflicted,
and, ultimately, whether the force was “applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Albers, 475
U.S. at 320-21. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently reiterated that “[a]n inmate who is
gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely
because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S.Ct.
1175, 1178-79 (2010). In Wilkins v. Gaddy, the Supreme Court observed:
This is not to say that the “absence of serious injury” is irrelevant to the Eighth
Amendment inquiry. “[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor
that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought
necessary’ in a particular situation.” The extent of injury may also provide some
indication of the amount of force applied. As we stated in Hudson, not “every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” “The
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily
excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force,
provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.” An inmate who complains of a “push or shove” that causes no
discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.
Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that
ultimately counts.
Id. at 1178-79 (citations omitted).
In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment “imposes
duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison
officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and
must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” 511 U.S. 825, 832
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(1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1992)). This is a low standard, as the
Supreme Court emphasized that “[p]rison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh.” Id. at
833 (internal quotations omitted). To sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show
(1) that the deprivation was objectively sufficiently serious—that is, the deprivation must be a
“denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and (2) that the defendant was
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s health or safety. Id. at 834 (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, “[d]eliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants actually knew of and
disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to the detainee or that they actually knew of and
ignored a detainee’s serious need for medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567,
575-76 (4th Cir. 2001).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Quigley,
Copeland, and Murray based on alleged excessive force survives initial review in that it is not
clearly frivolous. The Court notes, however, that it does not appear that Plaintiff has exhausted
his administrative remedies with regard to his claims of deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs as to the remaining Defendants. Plaintiff’s grievance, dated August 4, 2014, does
not discuss alleged refusal to provide needed medical care by prison officials. See (Doc. No. 11). Rather, it describes the alleged incident of excessive force by Defendants Quigley, Copeland,
and Murray. Moreover, prison officials’ response to the grievance at Step Two noted the
following in response to Plaintiff’s grievance: “A code blue was called due to you being found
unresponsive in your cell. At that time, you were assessed by medical and made the
determination to send you to Main Medical for a closer observation. While in main medical, you
refused staff orders. Therefore, force was used to gain compliance and disciplinary action was
taken, which you were found guilty of. Due to force being used an investigation is being
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completed at this time.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 4). At Step Three, a grievance examiner denied
Plaintiff’s appeal, stating that Plaintiff alleged in his grievance that “he was treated unfair and
pepper-sprayed by staff when he was being placed in full restraints.” (Id. at 5). The grievance
examiner stated that there was no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim. The Court will grant
Plaintiff 20 days in which to submit a statement to the Court addressing whether he filed any
grievances specifically addressing the deliberate indifference claim he purports to raise in this
action. Specially, Plaintiff shall address why his deliberate indifference claim should not be
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Finally, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel. In support of the
motion, Plaintiff asserts that imprisonment will greatly limit his ability to litigate, he has limited
knowledge of the law and no access to a law library, and that the issues are complex. There is no
absolute right to the appointment of counsel in civil actions such as this one. Therefore, a
plaintiff must present “exceptional circumstances” in order to require the Court to seek the
assistance of a private attorney for a plaintiff who is unable to afford counsel. Miller v.
Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966 (4th Cir. 1987). Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s contentions to the
contrary, Plaintiff has not shown exceptional circumstances justifying appointment of counsel at
this time. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel will be denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Complaint survives initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915A as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendants Quigley, Copeland, and
Murray. The Court will grant Plaintiff 20 days in which to submit a statement to the Court in
accordance with this Order.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
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1. Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. No. 1), survives initial review as to Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim against Defendants. Quigley, Copeland, and Murray. The Court will
grant Plaintiff 20 days in which to submit a statement to the Court addressing whether
he filed any grievances specifically addressing the deliberate indifference claim he
purports to raise in this action. Specially, Plaintiff shall address why his deliberate
indifference claim should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
2.

The Court will wait until receiving Plaintiff’s response to this Order before ordering
service on any of the named Defendants in this action.

3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, (Doc. No. 4), is DENIED.

Signed: May 7, 2015

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