Brown v. Solomon et al
Filing
47
ORDER granting in part and denying in part Defendants' 38 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 12/18/2018. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(nvc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:15-cv-66-FDW
MARSHALL LEE BROWN, JR.,
)
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Plaintiff,
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)
vs.
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GEORGE T. SOLOMON, et al.,
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Defendants.
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__________________________________________)
ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
(Doc. No. 38), Plaintiff’s Response, (Doc. No. 42), and Defendants’ Reply (Doc. No. 45).
I.
BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff, a North Carolina prisoner incarcerated at the Alexander Correctional
Institution, filed this action on April 29, 2015, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”). He named as Defendants: (1)
North Carolina Department of Public Safety (“NCDPS”) Director George T. Solomon; (2) NCDPS
Chaplaincy Services Director Betty Brown; (3) NCDPS Chaplaincy Services Director Swindell
Edwards; (4) Alexander C.I. Chaplain Daniel Redding; and (5) Alexander C.I. Superintendent
Susan White. (Doc. No. 1). The Complaint passed initial review, (Doc. No. 7), Defendants were
served, (Doc. Nos. 21-24), and Defendants filed an Answer, (Doc. No. 29). The Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 38), is now pending before the Court.
(1)
Complaint (Doc. No. 1)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are violating the Constitution and the RLUIPA by
1
incorrectly categorizing Jehovah’s Witness as a Christian-Protestant denomination or sect and by
failing to provide separate group worship services for Jehovah’s Witness adherents at Alexander
C.I.
Plaintiff alleges that group worship service is part of the Jehovah Witness belief and
practice. (Doc. No. 1 at 15). Alexander C.I. provided Jehovah’s Witness inmates with a separate
faith worship services until mid-2014. This included classes once a week on Sundays in the chapel
library, a special annual celebration of Christ’s death on April 14, 2014, and a religious faith
worship service and lecture on April 26, 2014. After permitting Jehovah’s Witnesses to worship
for years at Alexander C.I., Defendant Redding arbitrarily and indefinitely suspended the
Jehovah’s Witness worship services. (Doc. No. 1 at 15). On June 30, 2014, a request was made to
Redding to reinstate the weekly services but he refused, stating that the NDCPS Religious
Resource Guide and Practices Manual (“Manual”) categorizes Jehovah’s Witnesses as ChristianProtestants who do not have to be granted a separate time, meeting place, or specific services.
(Doc. No. 1 at 16-17).
Plaintiff claims that the Manual incorrectly categorizes Jehovah’s Witnesses as ChristianProtestant sect. The three recognized categories of Christians in the Manual – Catholics,
Protestants, and Eastern Orthodox – share the three common beliefs of God as revealed in Jesus
Christ, the Holy Spirit as the third person of the trinity, and salvation through Christ. Jehovah’s
Witnesses do not believe in the holy trinity doctrine so they should be recognized as a distinct
Christian organization with non-traditional beliefs and practices. Jehovah’s Witnesses follow the
biblical commands that they all speak in agreement, have no division, meet together, and annually
celebrate Christ’s death. (Doc. No. 1 at 19). The Manual itself recognizes that it is not exhaustive
and needs to be reviewed and updated at regular intervals, and that relevant materials from
2
knowledgeable religious authorities should be added to make it more accurate and useable.
Defendant Redding’s prior provision of separate religious worship services shows that he
is conscious that a doctrinal disparity exists between Jehovah’s Witnesses and other Christian
denominations. (Doc. No. 1 at 18). Redding refused to reinstate Jehovah’s Witness services even
though he was in the best position to do so, which shows his intent to discriminate.
On February 23, 2015, an informal letter, DC-572 form, and extensive factual information
were sent to Defendant White requesting that she contact the Jehovah’s Witness governing body,
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society. White did not respond but forwarded the materials to
Defendant Redding who, in turn, forwarded them to Defendant Brown. Plaintiff does not know
whether it was within White’s power to take further action or investigate the matter. (Doc. No. 1
at 21).
On March 23, 2015, a memorandum from Defendant Edwards to Brown stated that the
DC-572 form is not to be used for existing religious faith groups. Further, “Jehovah’s Witnesses
is considered as a Christian-Protestant in the Manual, therefore there is to be no separate services
or meeting time just for them, they are being accommodated according to NCDPS policy.” (Doc.
No. 1 at 20).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Brown and Edwards were in a position to recognize the
Manual’s policy error and its unconstitutional consequences yet they chose to allow discriminatory
religious suppression to continue. (Doc. No. 1 at 21). He claims that Defendant Solomon
supervises all the named Defendants, which “should keep him aware of the possible legal or
Constitutional matters, as well as the Grievance Commission/Resolution Board; and the examiners
they appoint.” (Doc. No. 1 at 22).
Plaintiff seeks to have the Manual amended to recognize Jehovah’s Witnesses as a distinct
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Christian organization with non-traditional beliefs and practices, reinstatement of distinct religious
worship services once a week, payment of the cost of filing the complaint by Defendants Edwards
and Brown as nominal damages due to the emotional and religious stress their actions have caused,
and other relief that the Court deems just.
(2)
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 38)
Defendants argue that they have not violated the Constitution or RLUIPA because they
have not imposed a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religious exercise and that Plaintiff cannot
recover monetary damages from Defendants in their official or individual capacities pursuant to
sovereign and qualified immunity.
As to a substantial burden, Defendants argue that NCDPS policies and procedures
regarding religious services were not promulgated with any intent to discriminate against Plaintiff
or the Jehovah’s Witness denomination. Alexander C.I. does not have the time or space to offer a
service for every Protestant denomination. Plaintiff has a right to associate with other members of
the Jehovah’s Witness faith, except restrictions that exist due to his status as an inmate, and he is
provided ample opportunity to express his religious beliefs. Interfaith services provide Plaintiff
with a reasonable opportunity to exercise his beliefs; there is no requirement that various religious
groups be treated identically. Plaintiff’s assertion that Jehovah’s Witness adherents were provided
separate faith services including classes once a week until mid-2014 is incorrect. There is no
evidence that Alexander C.I.’s current lack of a separate worship service for the Jehovah’s
Witnesses places a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religious rights. Requiring a separate service
for a single person would be a tremendous burden on Alexander C.I. While Jehovah’s Witnesses
do not believe in the holy trinity doctrine in the same manner as some Christian denominations or
sects, Jehovah’s Witness is a Christian organization with nontraditional beliefs and practices.
4
Other Christian groups with nontraditional beliefs and practices are not provided weekly services
due to limited time and space. Plaintiff failed to identify how this policy caused him to modify his
behavior or violate his beliefs. Prison policy does not pressure the adherent to violate his or her
religious beliefs or abandon a precept of the religion and is not a substantial burden. There is
insufficient evidence for a jury to find that the lack of a separate weekly Jehovah’s Witness service
would interfere with Plaintiff’s religious rights.
Plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages from Defendants in their official capacities due
to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity from any
claims for monetary damages in their individual capacities. No officer o or administrative
personnel would believe that providing non-denominational Christian services that allow all
denominations and sects of Christian faith to worship corporately at Alexander due in part to limits
of space and time in the facility would violate Plaintiff’s free exercise of his religion. Further,
RLUIPA only authorizes injunctive relief against a state official. Moreover, Plaintiff has not
demonstrated any compensable damages for the alleged violation of his First Amendment rights
aside from emotional distress or mental anguish; it is not reasonably quantifiable. Moreover,
Plaintiff has not demonstrated any physical injury pursuant to § 1997e.
(3)
Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. No. 42)
Plaintiff asserts that, when he asked Defendant Redding’s permission to continue religious
group worship services once a week, Redding said that the Manual includes Jehovah’s Witnesses
as a Protestant denomination. Plaintiff informed Redding that Jehovah’s Witnesses “denounce all
of Christendom as False Religion” and do not adhere to Christianity’s trinity doctrine. (Doc. No.
42 at 3). Redding responded that, until the Religious Policy is changed there will be no group
worship services for Jehovah’s Witnesses and they are encouraged to attend the Protestant services
5
on Sundays. Plaintiff sought recourse through the Administrative Remedy Procedure and
Defendant Redding’s statements were confirmed.
Defendant Brown alleges to have communicated with a number of religious theologians
and alleges that the Manual includes a brief description of different beliefs. However, “Defendant
Brown’s admissions of investigating the Jehovah’s Witnesses based on predominantly
contemporary authorities and the admission that this contributed in writing the Policies considering
similarities … and hope the difference lead to ultimately teaching similar ideas….” (Doc. No. 42
at 4). Rather than consulting predominantly contemporary authorities, Defendants should have
consulted Watchtower Bible. Information from Watchtower and Plaintiff’s personal knowledge
create a genuine dispute of material fact. NCDPS policy falsely describes the Jehovah’s Witness
religion and constitutes discrimination and a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religion.
Summary judgment should be denied because Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ affidavits
contradict each other with regards to Jehovah’s Witnesses being a protestant religion.
(4)
Defendants’ Reply (Doc. No. 45)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that they violated his right to exercise his
religious beliefs. Alexander C.I.’s Christian worship services follow the same basic format that
includes prayer, singing, and a message. There is only one chapel at Alexander C.I. that is used for
Christian services as well as for the other faith groups. Alexander C.I. does not have the time or
space to offer a service for every Christian denomination. Jehovah’s Witness is a Christian
organization with nontraditional beliefs and practices. Each individual prison does not have the
time or space to offer a service for every protestant denomination or sect.
NCDPS Religious Services provides that at least six offenders must regularly attend
services to hold a religious corporate service. Plaintiff has not alleged or forecast that there are the
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required number of inmates that have expressed an interest or made a request to attend a separate
Jehovah’s Witness service at Alexander C.I.
With regards to qualified immunity, it is not unreasonable for prisons to limit the number
of separate group services due to space and time limitations and has granted prison officials
qualified immunity on similar claims. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Defendants took actions
out of ill will or animus directed at him. They were only following NCDPS practices and
procedures and neutrally and reasonably applied those policies.
(5)
Evidence1
(A)
Plaintiff’s Affidavit (Doc. No. 42 at 10)
Plaintiff states that Jehovah’s Witnesses do not believe in the same god as Protestants or
Christians, and do not believe in the trinity doctrine. Jehovah’s Witness religious stance is that
they do not mix with any religion “considering Christendom to be Babylon the Great, Protestant,
Catholic and all religion; except Jehovah’s Witnesses Watchtower Bible and Tract Society.” (Doc.
No. 42 at 11). Jehovah’s Witnesses believe their religion is the only true religion on earth and that
taking part in any other religious belief is apostasy and subjects them to disfellowship.
(B)
Defendant Daniel Redding Jr.’s Affidavit (Doc. No. 40-1)
Defendant Redding has been the Clinical Chaplain at NCDPS since 2004. His duties
include ensuring that religious rights and practices of approximately 1,252 inmates are respected.
NCDPS provides written guidance to administrators, chaplains, and other staff concerning
religious practices and paraphernalia. The NCDPS Manual includes a list of faith practices
officially recognized by NCDPS. It includes a brief description of the basic beliefs, authorized
practices, worship procedures, and authorized religious items associated with each faith group.
1
This section is not exhaustive.
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Jehovah’ Witness is included as a denomination or sect of the Christian faith.
The Manual provides that Sunday is generally observed as the day of worship, study, prayer
and fellowship. Denominational services are not offered. Jehovah’s Witness adherents are
encouraged to attend Christian Worship.
NCDPS policies and procedures related to religious services were not promulgated with
any intent to discriminate against Plaintiff or the Jehovah Witness denomination.
An average of 2,000 offenders attend service each month at Alexander C.I. It is Redding’s
role to create and maintain a monthly religious services calendar that establishes a schedule for
opportunities for inmates to participate in corporate worship there. Alexander has a full list of
services offered with very little space for new services. The Christian Worship schedule has a wide
representation of protestant denominations with an attempt to minister to the wide range of officer
spiritual needs. Alexander’s Christian worship services follow the same basic format that includes
prayer, singing, and a message. There is only one chapel at Alexander and it is used for Christian
services as well as other faith groups. Alexander does not offer a separate weekly worship service
for Jehovah Witness adherents “because the Manual includes Jehovah’s Witness as a Protestant
denomination [and] Alexander does not have the time nor space to offer service for every
Protestant denomination.” (Doc. No. 40-1 at 4).
Plaintiff alleges that, up until mid-2014, Jehovah’s Witness inmates were provided separate
faith services that included classes once a week on Sundays in the Chapel library, a special annual
celebration of Christ’s death on 14 April 2014 and a religious faith worship service and lecture on
6 April 2014, however, Reddings records do not show that Alexander offered Jehovah’s Witness
adherents a regular meeting time or service during 2014. Redding keeps personal calendars and
records all religious service attendance on the calendars for each service. The calendars for 2014
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do not indicate that Alexander had separate weekly Jehovah Witness services in 2014. The April
2014 calendar shows a remembrance of the Lord’s Supper for Jehovah Witness on Monday, April
14, 2014, that was allowed because Mr. Fittipaldi2 asked if he could meet with the inmates during
the Easter season. Redding’s records do not show that there was any service on April 6, 2014, or
a meeting on Sunday April 24, 2014. However, Plaintiff receives a Pastoral visit from a Jehovah’s
Witness visitor once a month.
Redding “ha[s] made every reasonable effort to accommodate Plaintiff’s requests related
to the practice of his faith in compliance with NCDPS’s Religious Practices Resource Guide and
Reference Manual.” (Doc. No. 40-1 at 5). He denies that he violated any rights secured to Plaintiff
under the laws of the State of North Carolina or the U.S. Constitution.
(C)
OPUS (Doc. No. 40-1 at 7)
Plaintiff’s OPUS printout indicates that Plaintiff was transferred from Tabor C.I. to
Alexander on March 9, 2011, and remains at Alexander C.I.
(D)
NCDPS Religious Practices Reference Manual (Doc. No. 40-1)
The NCDPS Manual describes Christianity’s Basic Beliefs as follows:
Christianity is made up of many denominations who view the Bible as the
divinely inspired word of God and the guide for belief and practice. Christianity
can be divided into three major groups: 1) Protestant, 2) Catholic & 3) Eastern
Orthodox. Religious concepts and practices within Protestantism vary greatly from
denomination to denomination. However, there are a group of beliefs and practices
that are common to all Christian denominations: God as revealed in Jesus Christ;
the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Holy Trinity; Salvation through Christ.
(See Appendix for other denominations and Sects.).
(Doc. No. 40-1 at 10) (emphasis added).
The Manual addresses Authorized Practices and it recognizes with regards to Holy Days
2
Louis Fittipaldi is a Jehovah’s Witness volunteer minister. Plaintiff appears to allege that Mr. Fittipaldi was
permitted to conduct alternate services for Jehovah Witnesses during 2014. See (Doc. No. 1 at 15-16).
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that “Sunday is generally observed as the day of worship, study, prayer, and fellowship.
Denominational Services are not offered.” (Doc. No. 40-1 at 10).
The Manual includes Jehovah’s Witness as a Protestant denomination or sect. (Doc. No.
40-1 at 15). It states that “[i]nmates within these groups are encouraged to attend Christian
Worship.” (Id.).
(E)
NCDPS Policy & Procedures (Doc. No. 40-1 at 17)
NCDPS Policy & Procedures states with regards to Authorized Religious Practices, that
“[r]egular population offenders are allowed to attend any corporate worship service held at the
facility.” (Doc. No. 40-1 at 21) (Section .0106 (b)). Further, “[a]ny offender may privately pray,
meditate, and study scriptures or religious literature in his or her cell, so long as the offender does
not interfere with other offender(s), the offender’s assigned program or work assignments, security
or operational management.” (Id.) (Section 0106(e)). With regards to Religious Corporate
Services, “[i]f a facility chaplain or community volunteer is not available for a specific minority
faith group and at least six (6) offenders regularly attend services then an offender faith helper may
be considered to assist with facilitation of a religious service or program. The faith group must be
listed in the Religious Practices Manual.” (Doc. No. 40-1 at 22) (Section .0107(b)).
(F)
Defendant Swindell Edwards’ Deposition (Doc. No. 40-2)
Defendant Edwards has been NCDPS’s Regional Chaplain for nine years. The theological
similarities that place Jehovah Witness within the context of Christiandom are:
1. They both believe in God.
2. They both believe in Jesus Christ.
3. They both believe that all will die and meet in the Judgment.
4. They both believe in the Holy Spirit.
5. They both believe that Jesus came from Heaven and when He died He returned
to Heaven.
6. They both believe that Jesus gave His life as a ransom and sacrifice and it was
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through His death and His resurrection that made it possible for those who
exercise their faith in Him to gain eternal or everlasting life.
7. They both believe in the resurrection of Jesus Christ and the kingdom of God.
(Doc. No. 40-2 at 2).
Defendant Edwards made every reasonable effort to accommodate Plaintiff’s request
related to his faith in compliance with NCDPS’s Manual. He denies that in performing his duties,
he violated any rights secured to Plaintiff under the laws of the State of North Carolina or the U.S.
Constitution.
(G)
Defendant Betty Brown’s Deposition (Doc. No. 40-3)
Defendant Brown has been the NCDPS Director of Chaplaincy Services since 2003. Her
duties and responsibilities include formulating and providing professional supervision of
chaplaincy services. She provides guidance and assistance for the religious activities to all the
facilities within North Carolina prisons.
The NCDPS Manual includes Jehovah’s Witness as a denomination or sect of the Christian
faith. While not all religions are the same they attempt to answer similar questions about how to
live life, communicate with the divine or sacred, and behave in harmony with nature and others.
Religions offer similar principles and tools for living. The Manual correctly categorizes Jehovah’s
Witness as a Christian-Protestant sect. It is a “restorationist, chiliastic Christian Protestant
religion,” and considers the Bible to be the ultimate authority for their teachings and practices.
(Doc. No. 40-3 at 3). Protestant Christians believe the Bible to be the ultimate authority of their
teachings and practices, but the interpretation of this statement varies between sects and
denominations.
Pastor Charles Taze Russell was an American Christian restorationist minister and founder
of the Bible Student movement (later named Jehovah’s Witnesses) from his experiences as a
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member of Christian Protestant churches (Presbyterianism and Congregationalism). (Doc. No. 403 at 3). The entire Protestant canon of scripture is considered the inspired, correct word of God.
Jehovah’s Witnesses accept the Bible as scientifically and historically accurate and
reliable, and interpret much of it literally, while also accepting it is abundant in symbolism. The
Jehovah’s Witnesses produced an edition of the Bible, the New World Translation of the Holy
Scriptures, though the identity of the translators has remained anonymous. Jehovah’s Witnesses
claim to use the Bible as the basis for all their beliefs, although studies of the religion show that
the traditional teachings of Russell, as well as the pronouncements of the Governing Body, through
Watch Tower publications, carry at least as much weight as the Bible, if not more. The leadership
of Jehovah’s Witnesses claims to be the single visible channel of Jehovah and asserts that the Bible
cannot be understood without its assistance. (Doc. No. 40-3 at 3-4).
Defendant Brown admits that “Plaintiff is correct to state that the Jehovah’s Witnesses do
not believe in the holy trinity doctrine, in the same manner as some Christian denominations or
sects.” (Doc. No. 40-3 at 4). However:
The Jehovah’s Witnesses is a Christian organization with nontraditional
beliefs and practices. Each individual prison facility such as Alexander does not
have the time nor space to offer a service for every Protestant denomination or sect.
There are other Christian groups that have nontraditional beliefs and practices, such
as snake handling and partaking of the blood of Christ that due to this limitation of
time and space are provided weekly services through each facilit[y’s] nondenominational Christian service.
(Doc. No. 40-3 at 4).
Defendant Brown made every reasonable effort to accommodate Plaintiff’s requests related
to the practice of his faith in compliance with NCDPS’s Religious Practices Resource Guide and
Reference Manual. She denies that in performing her duties she violated any rights secured to
Plaintiff under the laws of the State of North Carolina or the U.S. Constitution.
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II.
(1)
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fec. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.
The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its
motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
(internal citations omitted).
Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving
party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3.
The nonmoving party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings
to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. The nonmoving party must present sufficient
evidence from which “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; accord Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 818
(4th Cir. 1995).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence and any
inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255. “‘Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586
13
(2009) (quoting Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
(2)
First Amendment
The First Amendment of the Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const.
Amend I. The First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). For government conduct to survive scrutiny under
the Establishment Clause, “(1) it must have a secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect
must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.” Buxton v. Kurtinitis, 862 F.3d 423, 432 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)); see also Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir.
2003). To state a free exercise claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to show that he held a sincere religious belief, and that the official action or regulation
substantially burdened his exercise of that belief. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
A prison policy that substantially burdens an inmate’s ability to practice his religion withstands a
First Amendment challenge when it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987)). In deciding whether a defendant’s actions can be sustained as reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests, the court must consider the following four factors: (1) whether
there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate penological interest;
(2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right in question that remain open to
prisoners; (3) the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have on guards
and other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether ready alternatives
exist which accommodate the right and satisfy the penological interest. See Turner, 482 U.S. at
14
89-90. Claims brought under the First Amendment are subject to a less demanding standard of
proof than claims brought under RLUIPA, with RLUIPA claims requiring “strict scrutiny instead
of reasonableness.” See Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 199 n.8 (4th Cir. 2006).
(3)
RLUIPA
RLUIPA provides, in part that no government shall impose a “substantial burden” on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden on that person “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc1(a). “RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their
religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission and accommodation
for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). A plaintiff bears
the initial burden of showing that the challenged policy substantially burdens his exercise of his
religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). The statute
defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central
to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 251
(4th Cir. 2009). A “‘substantial burden’ is one that puts substantial pressure on an adherent to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, [] or one that forces a person to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting governmental benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion on the other hand.” Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187
(quotations, citation, and alterations omitted).
Once the inmate makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the government to prove
that “the burden in question is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental
15
interest.” Ozmint, 578 F.3d at 250. “‘RLUIPA adopts a . . . strict scrutiny’ standard.” Couch v.
Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 198 n.8). Under RLUIPA,
the court must give “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators
in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and
discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723
(quotation omitted). “However, ‘a court should not rubber stamp or mechanically accept the
judgments of prison administrators.’ . . . Rather, due deference will be afforded to those
explanations that sufficiently ‘take[] into account any institutional need to maintain good order,
security, and discipline.’” Couch, 679 F.3d at 201 (quoting Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 190).
(4)
Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits directly against a state or its agencies, unless the state
has waived its immunity or Congress has exercised its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to override that immunity. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66
(1989). Congress has not imposed § 1983 liability upon states, and the state of North Carolina has
done nothing to waive its immunity. Bright v. McClure, 865 F.2d 623, 626 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing
McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1328 (4th Cir. 1987)).
“In an official capacity action, the plaintiff seeks damages not from the individual officer,
but from the entity for which the officer is an agent.” Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652,
657 (6th Cir.1993). “[A]n official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as
a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Therefore, a lawsuit
against an officer in his official capacity is, in substance, a claim against the governmental entity
and should be subject to the same analysis. See Almone v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 106
(2d Cir. 2007); see Hutto v. S.C. Retirement Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 549 (4th Cir. 2014) (State officials
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sued in their official capacities for retrospective money damages have the same sovereign
immunity accorded to the State).
(5)
Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). Qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of
whether the government official’s error is “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based
on mixed questions of law and fact.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978), for the proposition that
qualified immunity covers “mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one
of law”). The existence of qualified immunity “generally turns on the ‘objective reasonableness’
of the actions” without regard to the knowledge or subjective intent of the particular official. Am.
Civil Libs. Union of Md., Inc. v. Wicomico County, Md., 999 F.2d 780, 784 (4th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 641 (1987)) (internal citations omitted).
Where the defendant’s entitled to immunity turns on a factual dispute, that dispute is resolved by
a jury at trial. Id. (citing Turner v. Dammon, 848 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1988), overruled on other
grounds, Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995)).
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court mandated a two-step sequence
for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims by determining whether: (1) the
17
facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the
right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct. While the
sequence of the steps set forth in Saucier is “often appropriate,” it is not mandatory. Pearson, 555
U.S. at 236. Judges are permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances
in the particular case at hand. Id.
To overcome the qualified immunity defense at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff
must have shown facts that make out a violation of a constitutional right, and the right at issue
must have been “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Thompson
v. Commonweath of Va., 878 F.3d 89, 97 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). The
analysis takes place against the backdrop of two dueling interests: “the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555
U.S. at 231.
In determining whether a right is clearly established, the court must define “the right
allegedly violated … at its appropriate level of specificity.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615
(1999). This does not mean that “the exact conduct at issue [must] have been held unlawful for the
law governing an officer’s actions to be clearly established.” Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 362
(4th Cir. 2001). Rather, the court’s analysis must take into consideration “not only already
specifically adjudicated rights, but those manifestly included within more general applications of
the core constitutional principle invoked.” Id. at 362-63 (internal quotation omitted). The right at
issue is “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes if:
[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
18
understand that what he is doing violates that right. That is not to say that an official
action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has
previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (citation omitted).
To determine if the right in question was clearly established, the court first looks to cases
from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, or the highest court of the state in which the action
arose. Owens ex rel. Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d 267, 279 (4th Cir. 2004). In the absence of “directly
on-point binding authority,” courts may also consider whether “the right was clearly established
based on general constitutional principles or a consensus of persuasive authority.” Booker v. South
Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 543 (4th Cir. 2017); Owens, 372 F.3d at 279 (“the absence
of controlling authority holding identical conduct unlawful does not guarantee qualified
immunity.”). Ordinarily, the unlawfulness of government conduct must be apparent in light of preexisting law. White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548, 442 (2017). However, a “general constitutional rule
… may apply with obvious clarity ... even though the very action in question has not previously
been held unlawful. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (citing United States v. Lanier, 520
U.S. 259, 271 (1997)). Therefore, “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates
established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Id. at 741.
III.
(1)
DISCUSSION
First Amendment & RLUIPA
The First Amendment and RLUIPA both require as a first step that a plaintiff show that his
right to freely exercise his religion has been substantially burdened. The next step under RLUIPA
is the least restrictive means analysis, whereas the First Amendment only requires a reasonableness
test.
19
Plaintiff alleges that his Jehovah Witness religion is not a Christian sect or denomination
because it rejects the holy trinity doctrine, and that Jehovah’s Witness requires group worship
services as part of its beliefs and practices. He claims that NCDPS has erroneously classified
Jehovah’s Witness as a Christian faith and that Defendants’ refusal to provide separate worship
services for Jehovah’s Witnesses substantially burdens the practice of his religion. The availability
of a general Christian faith group service does not satisfy the Jehovah’s Witness group service
requirement because the holy trinity is considered by Jehovah’s Witnesses as apostasy and would
subject Plaintiff to disfellowship. Plaintiff alleges that NCDPS’s classification of Jehovah’s
Witness as a Christian denomination or sect has caused him to choose between attending a group
worship service that violates his religion’s tenets or abandoning his religion’s group services
requirement altogether.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s religious exercise is not being substantially burdened and
that the failure to provide separate group worship services is reasonable. Defendants admit that
Jehovah’s Witnesses do not accept the holy trinity doctrine, (Doc. No. 42 at 4), and that the NCDPS
Manual describes Christianity’s Basic Beliefs as including “the Holy Spirit as the third person of
the Holy Trinity…,” (Doc. No. 40-1 at 10). Defendants do not contest Plaintiff’s assertion that
Jehovah’s Witness requires faith group worship service, or a Jehovah’s Witness participation in a
religion that is not approved by Jehovah’s Witness leadership could result in his disfellowship.
Defendants nevertheless contend that Jehovah’s Witness is correctly classified as a Christian sect
and, as such, they are not required to provide separate group worship and that the availability of
general Christian group worship is adequate. Defendants note that Plaintiff may practice his
religion by associating with other Jehovah’s Witness adherents in the general population,
corresponding with those of similar belief, and receiving a Pastoral visit once per month.
20
Defendants argue that there is only one Chapel at Alexander C.I. that is used for all faith groups’
services, that Alexander C.I. does not have the time or space to offer a service for every Protestant
denomination, and that requiring a separate service for a single person would be a tremendous
burden on Alexander C.I.
Construing the Complaint in Plaintiff’s favor, he has adequately alleged that his religious
practice has been substantially burdened by Defendants’ policies and actions. See, e.g., Wilcox v.
Brown, 877 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2017) (allegation that plaintiff was being deprived of group worship
that is a required component of his observation of the sabbath was sufficient to show a substantial
burden). Plaintiff has demonstrated that genuine disputes of material fact exist, i.e., whether
NCDPS has properly classified Jehovah’s Witness as a Christian denomination or sect, and
whether Defendants are obligated to provide separate Jehovah’s Witness group worship services.
Defendants have failed to carry their burden on summary judgment to show that no substantial
burden occurred and that their actions satisfy RLUIPA’s least restrictive means or the First
Amendment’s reasonableness standards. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff’s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims will therefore be denied.
(2)
Sovereign Immunity
Defendants argue that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff from recovering monetary
damages from Defendants in their official capacities. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for
monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities are essentially claims against the
State of North Carolina and are thus barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff does not appear to
contest the immunity issue.
The Court agrees with Defendants that the damages claims against them in their official
capacities are barred by sovereign immunity. See generally Will, 491 U.S. at 66; see, e.g.,
21
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293 (2011) (“We conclude that the States, in accepting federal
funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages
under RLUIPA because no statute expressly and unequivocally includes such a waiver.”);
Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 189 n.2 (4th Cir. 2009) (“RLUIPA does not authorize claims
for official or individual capacity damages….”). Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment will be granted on Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against them in their official
capacities.
(3)
Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s First
Amendment individual capacity claims for damages.3 Defendants argue that they were following
NCDPS policies and procedures, they neutrally and rationally in carried out those policies and
procedures, and that their individual conduct was objectively reasonable in light of constitutional
requirements. They argue that Plaintiff has failed to overcome Defendants’ showing that their
actions were reasonable under the circumstances and that no officer or administrative personnel
would believe that providing nondenominational Christian services that allow all denominations
and sects of the Christian faith to worship corporately at Alexander C.I. due, in part, to limits of
space and time in the facility would violate Plaintiff’s right to freely exercise his religion.
The Court is unable to determine at this time whether a constitutional violation occurred.
See Section (1), supra. The Court is also unable to determine if Defendants violated a clearly
established right. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that prison
regulations are permitted to impinge on an inmate’s constitutional rights if the regulation is
“RLUIPA does not authorize claims for official or individual capacity damages….” Rendelman, 569 F.3d
at 189 n.2.
3
22
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. However, a factual dispute exists with
regards to whether Jehovah’s Witness should be categorized as a separate non-Christian faith. See
Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 359 (4th Cir. 1995) (unlike the determination of whether a right
is clearly established, which is a question of law, the determination of what an officer did may
require the resolution of dispute factual allegations by the trier of fact; “If a plaintiff has alleged a
clearly established right, summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is improper as long
as there remains any material factual dispute regarding the actual conduct of the defendants.”);
ACLU of Md., Inc. v. Wicomico County, Md., 999 F.2d 780, 784 (4th Cir. 1993) (where “the
defendant’s entitlement to immunity turns on a factual dispute, that dispute is resolved by the jury
at trial.”). The record is simply too uncertain to determine whether qualified immunity should
apply at this point in the proceedings. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will
be denied on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims for damages against Defendants in their
individual capacities.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on
Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities, and on Plaintiff’s
RLUIPA claims for damages against Defendants in their individual capacities. Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied in all other respects.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 38) is GRANTED as to
Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities and as to
23
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their individual capacities for damages under
RLUIPA. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgement is DENIED in all other
respects.
Signed: December 18, 2018
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