Triplettt v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety

Filing 81

ORDER granting with modification Plaintiff's 73 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by District Judge Richard Voorhees on 8/31/2017. (nvc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
CASE NO. 5:15-CV-00075-RLV-DCK
AMBER A. TRIPLETT,
Plaintiff,
v.
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on Plaintiff Amber A. Triplett’s Motion for
Attorney Fees and Costs (Doc. 73). The parties have filed their respective briefs (Docs. 74, 76,
79) and this matter is ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED WITH MODIFICATION.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff raised claims for sexual harassment/hostile work environment and for retaliation,

both under Title VII. Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff was represented by Geraldine Sumter of
Ferguson, Chambers & Sumter, P.A. in Charlotte, North Carolina. After a six-day trial, a jury
returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on her sexual harassment/hostile work environment claim
and awarding her $10,000.00 in compensatory damages. (Doc. 71). The jury, however, found that
Plaintiff did not prove the elements of her retaliation claim. Id. Plaintiff filed the pending posttrial motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). (Doc. 73). In her
motion, Plaintiff seeks (1) $130,972.50 in attorney fees based on 241.20 hours of attorney work at
$400.00 an hour and 255.5 hours of legal assistant, law intern, and paralegal work at $135.00 an
1

hour;1 (2) $3,913.66 in litigation costs; and (3) $1,107.40 in costs incurred by Plaintiff related to
her appearance at depositions and at trial and related to her meetings with Sumter in Charlotte.
(Doc. 74). Defendant raises a slew of objections to Plaintiff’s requested attorney fees and costs:
(1) Plaintiff is only entitled to recover 50% of the requested fee where she did not prevail on her
retaliation claim; (2) the proposed hourly rates for Sumter and for Sumter’s legal assistants,
paralegals, and law intern are unreasonable; (3) the time entries in support of the motion use block
billing, contain entries for background research, contain entries for travel time, contain entries for
clerical tasks, and contain entries for excessive amounts of time; (4) the law intern’s time is not
recoverable to the extent that his work did not meaningfully contribute to the jury verdict; (5)
Plaintiff’s request for $1,610.47 in copying costs is unreasonable; (6) Plaintiff’s request for
$1,781.26 in hotel costs is unreasonable; and (7) no authority supports compensating Plaintiff for
the expenses she incurred related to the litigation. (Doc. 76). In total, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff is entitled to a base award of attorney fees and costs of $39,667.50, which Defendant
further argues should be reduced by the aforementioned 50% down to a total award of $19,833.75.
Id. at 24.
II.

ANALYSIS
It is within the discretion of a court to award a prevailing party in a Title VII action her

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The burden is on a party requesting
fees and costs to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the fees and costs requested
are reasonable. EEOC v. Nutri/System, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 568, 572 (E.D. Va. 1988) (citing Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 (4th Cir. 1987));

Plaintiff’s Motion requests $132.332.50 in fees but Plaintiff has since acknowledged that 3.4 hours of attorney time
for preparing a response to a motion to dismiss was incorrectly included in her motion for fees and costs and has
withdrawn her request for compensation for the 3.4 hours. (Doc. 79 at 4).
1

2

see also Bland v. Fairfax Cty., 2011 WL 5330782, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2011). “In calculating
an award of attorney’s fees, a court must first determine a lodestar figure by multiplying the
number of reasonable hours expended times a reasonable rate.” Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs.,
LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009). In performing this reasonableness assessment, a district
court should look to the twelve factors:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the
attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee
for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the
time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in
controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of
the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which
the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between
attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases.
Id. at 243-44 (quoting Barber v. Kimbrell’s Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978) (adopting
twelve factors from Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)) (factors
typically referred to as the “Johnson factors”). “After determining the lodestar figure, the court
should subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones” and must
then “award[] some percentage of the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success
enjoyed by the plaintiff.” Id. at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, . . . a plaintiff’s
complaint ‘cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims’ if the claims ‘involve a common core
of facts or are based on related legal theories.’” Marsal v. E. Carolina Univ., 2012 WL 3283435,
at *6 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 2012) (brackets omitted) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).
A.

Reasonable Hourly Fees

A Plaintiff must “furnish specific support for the hourly rate[s] [she] proposes.”
Nutri/System, 685 F. Supp. at 573. A court must consider the “prevailing market rates in the
relevant community” when determining what a reasonable hourly fee is in a given case. Rum

3

Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). “The relevant market for determining the prevailing rate is ordinarily
the community in which the court where the action is prosecuted sits,” however, “[i]n
circumstances where it is reasonable to retain attorneys from other communities . . . the rates in
those communities may also be considered.” Id. “Typically, a reasonable hourly rate is established
by affidavits from lawyers with first-hand knowledge of the prevailing community rate in
comparable cases for counsel with similar qualifications.” Nutri/System, 685. F. Supp. at 573.
Finally, in determining the reasonable hourly rate in a given case, a court may look toward the
Johnson factors, specifically factors three, five, nine, and twelve. See Alexander S., 929 F. Supp.
at 936-38 (considering Johnson factors three, four five, eight, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve when
determining reasonable hourly rate).
i.

Sumter’s Hourly Rate

Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $400.00 for Sumter’s reasonable time in this matter. In
support of this requested hourly rate, Sumter proffers affidavits from three local attorneys familiar
with Sumter’s work and with hourly rates for legal work in the field of employment law. (Doc.
74 at 28-35). Of the three attorneys, one attests that “$400.00 an hour, is well within what is
normal for the market for someone with [Sumter’s] knowledge, expertise, and experience” while
two attest that the market rate in Charlotte for employment law work by an attorney with Sumter’s
experience ranges from $375.00 to $800.00 per hour.2 Id. at 30, 32, 34. Plaintiff also offers an
affidavit from Sumter, in which Sumter attests that her “hourly rate is $400 per hour” and that she
charges that rate for “non-litigation employment matters.” Id. at 17. This Court finds that these

2

Although Plaintiff filed this case in the Statesville Division, the Court finds that Plaintiff acted reasonably by hiring
counsel based in Charlotte.

4

affidavits, coupled with this Court’s knowledge of local hourly rates, establish that a fee of $400.00
per hour for Sumter’s time is reasonable.3
ii.

Legal Assistant and Paralegal Hourly Rate

Plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $135.00 for legal assistant and paralegal time. Plaintiff
relies on the same three attorney affidavits in support of the proposition that the requested $135.00
per hour is consistent with market rates in Charlotte, as well as Sumter’s affidavit that her firm
typically charges $135.00 per hour for paralegal work. Id. at 18, 30, 32, 34. Defendant objects to
the $135.00 an hour rate, citing Dyer and arguing that the $135.00 rate far exceeds the hourly rate
seasoned court law clerks receive. (Doc. 76 at 9). Based on this Court’s experience, a rate of
$135.00 per hour is consistent with the market rate in Charlotte. Furthermore, this Court declines
to adopt the reasoning advanced in Dyer. First, while it is true that the charged hourly rate well
exceeds the hourly rate of court law clerks, the hourly rate law clerks receive does not capture the
prestige and post-law clerk employment benefits that motivate individuals to serve as a law clerk
to a federal judge. Second, while paralegals do not have the same legal education as law clerks,
they often have considerable experience with discreet issues in the discovery process as well as
with drafting and filing routine motions such that paralegals are often more prepared to handle
certain issues. As a result, paralegals, if assigned appropriate tasks, may considerably reduce total
legal fees even when their time is billed at a rate of $135.00 an hour.

Defendant’s reliance on Dyer v. City of Gastonia, 2016 WL 4443190 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2016) for the proposition
that a rate of $295.00 is reasonable is not well taken. Notably, the attorney in Dyer only requested $295.00 per hour
such that there is no telling whether the Court in Dyer would have found a higher hourly rate reasonable. See Dyer,
2016 WL 4443190, at *2. Dyer is also distinguishable as it is not apparent that counsel in Dyer was employed by a
firm with the same stature and reputation as Sumter’s firm. Separately, Defendant’s argument that Sumter did not
specify her hourly rate for litigation of employment law cases is also not well taken as the majority of Plaintiff litigation
in employment law is done on contingency or yields fees through statutory fee-shifting schemes.
3

5

iii.

Legal Intern/Law Student Hourly Rate

Plaintiff also seeks an hourly rate of $135.00 for work performed by legal intern/law
student Spencer Woodstock. To support this hourly rate, Plaintiff relies on the same evidence that
she cites for the hourly rate for paralegals and legal assistants. (Doc. 74 at 18, 30, 32, 34).
Defendant argues that a rate of $75.00 is more appropriate. (Doc. 76). Here, this Court concurs
with Defendant with respect to the request rate being unreasonable and will lower the rate to the
level requested by Defendant. Notably, law interns neither have the full training of law graduate
nor the experience of a paralegal. Furthermore, it is not apparent that a firm faces the same
financial outlay and overhead burden relative to the employment of law student interns such that
billing at the same hourly rate as paralegals and legal assistants would provide Plaintiff, and in
turn the recovering lawyer and law firm, a windfall. Cf. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 (noting that
properly calculated attorney fees should be “adequate to attract competent counsel, but . . . do not
produce windfalls to attorneys”).
B.

Reasonable Hours Expended

A court should not automatically accept the hours requested by counsel as reasonable and,
instead, must review each hour entry for reasonableness, excluding those “hours which it finds
‘excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary.’” Alexander S. by & through Bowers v. Boyd,
929 F. Supp. 925, 928 (D.S.C. 1995) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. In considering whether
a given requested hour entry is reasonable, a court may consider the first two Johnson factors—
the time and labor expended and the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised. Id. at 939.
“[H]ours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary
pursuant to statutory authority.” Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

6

“Proper documentation is the key to ascertaining the number of hours reasonably spent on
legal tasks. Fee claimants must submit documentation that reflects reliable contemporaneous
recordation of time spent on legal tasks that are described with reasonable particularity.”
Nutri/System, Inc., 685 F. Supp. at 573. “The information supplied must be sufficient to permit
the trial judge to ‘weigh the hours claimed against his own knowledge, experience, and expertise
of the time required to complete similar activities.’” Id. (quoting Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717). Only
properly documented hours will permit a district court to accurately exclude “‘hours that were not
reasonably expended.’”

Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).

Finally, “[i]nadequate

documentation is a basis for reducing or denying a fee award.” Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at
433).
i.

Sumter’s Hours

Attorney Sumter alleges that she performed 241.2 hours of work on this matter during her
over three years of representing Plaintiff. Defendant objects to thirty of Sumter’s time entries and
seek to reduce Sumter’s hour total by 122.8 hours to a total of 118.4 hours. (See Doc. 76 at 1821). In so objecting, Defendant argues that (1) many of Sumter’s entries are “vague,” (2) Sumter
engaged in “block billing,” (3) some of Sumter’s entries are unrelated to the result or relate to the
unsuccessful retaliation claim, (4) some of Sumter’s entries are excessive, and (5) Sumter’s hour
log includes entries for noncompensable time for background research, travel, and clerical tasks.
See id. In reply, Plaintiff admits that some of Sumter’s entries constitute “block billing” and
suggests that the proper remedy is to reduce Sumter’s hours by ten percent. (Doc. 79 at 4-5).
Plaintiff, however, challenges the remainder of Defendant’s arguments. Id. at 5-10. Before
considering each of Defendant’s thirty objections, the Court will provide a general analysis on
Defendant’s block billing, unrelated to result/related to unsuccessful retaliation claim, and

7

noncompensable time arguments, which Defendant advances across several of its specific
objections.
a.

Block Billing

The practice of “block billing” involves listing multiple tasks within a single time entry.
This practice is problematic because it does not provide the district court with a clear sense of how
many hours were performed on a particular task because multiple tasks are lopped into a single
block of hours. In lopping multiple tasks into a single time entry, counsel’s time records frustrate
a court’s attempt to review whether an attorney’s hours on a given task were reasonable versus
excessive. Courts faced with block billing entries typically, as Plaintiff suggests, reduce, by a
given percentage, the total time requested or reduce the individual time entries infected by block
billing. See Denton v. PennyMac Loan Servs., LLC, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2017 WL 2113138, at
*14-15 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2017) (noting that “[t]he traditional remedy for block billing is to
reduced the fee by a fixed percentage reduction” and reducing total hours by 10%); Lusk v. Virginia
Panel Corp., 96 F. Supp. 3d 573, 583 (W.D. Va. 2015) (reducing overall fee by 5% for block
billing); McAfee v. Boczar, 2012 WL 6623038, at *2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 19, 2012) (reducing block
billing entry by 10%), aff’d 738 F.3d 81, 90-91 (4th Cir. 2013); Wolfe v. Green, 2010 WL 3809857,
at *8 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 24, 2010) (collecting cases applying 10% or 15% reduction for block
billing and opting to apply 10% reduction for block billing where hours did not appear facially
unreasonable).
Here, this Court concludes that a reduction of 10% is appropriate for those entries that
include block billing in a manner that frustrates reasonableness review. Although a greater
reduction might otherwise have been warranted, as argued by Plaintiff, Sumter’s request for
attorney fees does not include any entries for several key and time consuming entries such as

8

preparing Plaintiff’s trial brief and proposed jury instructions.

(See Doc. 74 at 23-24).

Furthermore, the block billing in this case, for the most part, does not significantly hinder the
Court’s ability to assess the reasonableness of Sumter’s listed hours because the grouped tasks are
typically related to a single topic or issue and are the type of tasks that an attorney might perform
during a single sitting. Finally, the overall hours expended do not appear facially unreasonable.
Accordingly, absent a contrary reason appearing relative to a specific entry, this Court will reduce
time entries infected by block billing by 10%.
b.

Entries Unrelated to Result or Related to Retaliation Claim

As previously noted, the process for excluding hours related to unsuccessful claims is twofold. First, a Court must exclude those hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to the
successful claim. Robinson, 560 F.3d at 243-44; Marsal, 2012 WL 3283435, at *6. Then a court
considers the plaintiff’s success on all related claims and reduces the overall fee depending on the
degree of success. Robinson, 560 F.3d at 243-44; Marsahl, 2012 WL 3283435, at *6. Here,
Plaintiff raised two claims, one for sexual harassment/hostile work environment and one for
retaliation. As noted numerous times by this Court during motions practice, Plaintiff’s two claims
revolved around the same set of facts, allegations, and evidence, and the time period encompassing
the retaliation claim fell entirely within the larger time period encompassing the sexual
harassment/hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s two claims were related and
any reduction to the lodestar based on time spent by counsel on the retaliation claim should be
addressed as part of the assessment of Plaintiff’s success in the litigation after determining the
reasonable number of hours spent rather than as part of the initial determination of which requested
hours are reasonable.

9

c.

Background Research, Travel Time, Clerical Tasks

As to background research, “‘time spent maintaining competency to practice law is part of
the cost of doing business’ and is not compensable.” Certain v. Potter, 330 F. Supp. 2d 576, 582
(M.D.N.C. 2004) (quoting Castle v. Bentsen, 872 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (D.D.C. 1995)). “However,
there is no per se rule that research time is never compensable” and “counsel are not forbidden
from receiving fees for background research if the research is (1) relevant and (2) reasonable in
terms of time for the scope and complexity of the litigation.” Id. at 583 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, “where the movant has satisfied the Court that experienced, skilled counsel
have conducted relevant legal research in good faith, the number of allowable hours in the lodestar
computation will not be reduced absent a showing of specific grounds.” Id. (quoting Wileman v.
Frank, 780 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Md. 1991)). The complexity of the issues involved in a given case
will impact the compensability for background research. Sugarman v. Village of Chester, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 304, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
While this Court will address each of Defendant’s objections based on background research
individually, the Court notes that this case involved a complicated theory of liability based on the
conduct of third-party inmates housed in a segregation unit of a close custody facility and on
Defendant’s failure to take prompt remedial action in response to the inmates’ actions.
Furthermore, the Court asked for supplemental briefing on several discreet issues during the course
of motion practice in this case. Accordingly, some degree of background research in excess of
what might be expected in a typical Title VII case was required and compensation for such is
reasonable.
As to travel time, “[w]hen a lawyer travels for one client [s]he incurs an opportunity cost
that is equal to the fee [s]he would have charged that or another client if [s]he had not been

10

traveling.” Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 194 (7th Cir. 1984). “Travel is often a necessary
incident of litigation, and an attorney’s travel time may be reimbursed in a fee award. Hutchinson
ex rel. Julien v. Patrick, 636 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2011). So long as the travel underlying the
requested compensation was necessary, “to award nothing for travel time . . . would be
unreasonable.” Henry, 738 F.2d at 194. To this end, in some circuits, there exists a presumption
“that a reasonable attorney’s fee includes reasonable travel time billed at the same hourly rate as
the lawyer’s normal working time.” Id., see also Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 532
(6th Cir. 1994) (noting that “time spent traveling[] is fully compensable”); but see Hutchinson,
636 F.3d at 15 (suggesting that travel time should be compensated at a reduced rate). Furthermore,
the issue of the rate at which travel time should be compensated is an issue that a district court has
discretion over given its “greater familiarity with local practice.” Perotti v. Seiter, 935 F.2d 761,
764 (6th Cir. 1991). Here this Court concludes that Sumter is entitled to recover for her reasonable
travel time and that her reasonable travel time should be compensated at her normal, reasonable
hourly rate. In support of this conclusion, this Court notes that counsel appointed to represent
indigent clients in this district receive compensation for travel time at their normal hourly rate.
As to billing for clerical tasks, clerical tasks include filing documents, preparing and
serving summons, and filing and organizing client papers. Neil v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 495 F.
App’x 845, 847 (9th Cir. 2012) (collecting published cases). A district court does not abuse its
discretion by determining that requested hours are excessive where they include numerous requests
for clerical tasks. Doe v. Kidd, 656 F. App’x 643, 656 (4th Cir. 2016). Many clerical tasks should
be subsumed in a law firm’s overhead, rather than billed even at a firm’s rate for paralegal work,
because the most basic of clerical tasks—filing, transcription, and document organization—are
part of the cost of doing business. See Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009).

11

Where a court is faced with a request for attorney fees that includes clerical tasks, it is appropriate
for the Court to compensate the attorney at a lower rate. Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S.
274, 288 n.10 (1989) (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717); but see Baker v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 815 F.
Supp. 2d 102, 109 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that purely clerical tasks are not reimbursable but that
“certain de minimis clerical tasks may be reimbursable if they cannot be separated from legal
activities”). Here, this Court will keep the limitations on clerical tasks in mind when reviewing
each objection based on the clerical nature of the task and either disallow compensation or limit
compensation to a rate of $50.00 per hour.
d.

Defendant’s Specific Objections to Sumter’s Hours

First, Defendant objects to Sumter’s request for 0.3 hours for her time during the initial
attorney’s conference (IAC) on the grounds that the entry is vague and unrelated to the result.
(Doc. 76 at 18). Pursuant to Local Rule 16.1, counsel for both parties were required to conduct an
IAC and formulate a proposed discovery plan. The record shows that counsel for both parties did
so and that Sumter filed the certification of the IAC. (Doc. 9). Accordingly, Sumter’s time for the
IAC is essential to the litigation and is reasonable and Defendant’s objection to this entry is entirely
baseless.
Third,4 Defendant objects to Sumter’s request for 4.0 hours for her time responding to
Defendant’s motion to compel discovery on the grounds that the request includes block billing and
is excessive. (Doc. 76 at 19). Defendant proposes reducing this entry to 1.0 hours. Id. In reply,
Plaintiff argues that the “discovery responses included an 18 page document which addressed in
more specificity the categorization of over 600 pages of documents.” (Doc. 79 at 7).5 It is true

Defendant’s second objection dealt with the time entry regarding the response to a motion to dismiss, which Plaintiff
conceeds was listed in error.
5
Plaintiff’s Reply incorrectly identifies the date of the entry at issue as June 29, 2016, whereas the correct date is
June 19, 2016. (Compare Doc. 74 at 21, with Doc. 79 at 7).
4

12

that a one-page, six-sentence response that recites events relative to the discovery process and does
not cite any case law would not entail 4.00 hours of attorney time. (See Doc. 12). However,
drafting an eighteen page response could easily take 4.0 hours of attorney. Accordingly, while
this entry suffers from some degree of block billing, the entry is not unreasonable and will only be
reduced by the 10% figure previously identified for the purpose of addressing block billing.
Therefore, the entry is reduced from 4.0 hours to 3.6 hours.
Fourth, Defendant objects to Sumter’s request for 0.3 hours to receive and review a letter
form the EEOC and to draft a letter to Plaintiff on the grounds that this entry constitutes block
billing and is related to the unsuccessful retaliation claim. (Doc. 76 at 19). To the extent this entry
might be viewed as block billing, the combination of tasks does not inhibit this Court’s
reasonableness assessment given the relatively short amount of time Sumter spent on the two tasks.
Furthermore, as previously discussed, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, although unsuccessful, was
related to her successful sexual harassment/hostile work environment claim such that any
reduction for time spent on the retaliation claim will be taken at the end as a percentage of the total
reasonable hours. Accordingly, Defendant’s fourth objection is overruled.
Fifth, Defendant objects to Sumter’s request for 0.8 hours for “review file, telephone to
opposing counsel, email to attorney, research retaliation issue” on the grounds that the entry
constitutes block billing, includes noncompensable background research, and is related to the
unsuccessful retaliation claim.

(Doc. 76 at 19).

Although addressing other objections by

Defendant based on noncompensable background research, Plaintiff’s reply does not address this
objection. (See Doc. 79 at 5-6). This Court concludes that the block billing inhibits meaningful
review of the reasonableness of this entry. Furthermore, without any response from Plaintiff, it is
difficult for this Court to determine if the research at issue was background research or research

13

essential to a specific issue in this matter. At best, the Court can surmise that given the early stage
of the matter at the time of this entry, it is likely that the research was more of the background
nature. In any event, Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing that compensation for the
research is reasonable. Therefore, the Court will reduce the entry from 0.8 hours to 0.3 hours to
account for the block billing and to research time.
Sixth, Defendant objects to Sumter’s request for 6.0 hours for deposition preparation on
the ground that the entry is excessive where the deposition only lasted for 3.5 hours. (Doc. 76 at
19). Defendant urges this Court to reduce the entry to 3.0 hours. Id. While Sumter’s time
considerably exceeded the actual time of the deposition, this is hardly surprising as Sumter needed
to prepare her client for a far wider array of questions than those necessarily asked. Furthermore,
given the high volume of documents in this case—namely the incident reports completed by
Plaintiff and some of her fellow prison nurses—a deposition preparation time of 6.0 hours is
reasonable. Therefore, Defendant’s sixth objection is overruled.
Seventh, Defendant objects to Sumter’s request for 12.0 hours for traveling to and
appearing at Plaintiff’s first deposition on the grounds that the time requested is excessive where
the deposition only lasted 3.5 hours and that travel time is not compensable. (Doc. 76 at 19).
Defendant urges this Court to reduce the entry to 5.0 hours. Id. Plaintiff argues that travel time is
compensable and that some of the time listed included conferring with Plaintiff outside the
deposition time. (Doc. 79 at 9). As previously noted, this Court will permit compensation for
travel time at Sumter’s normal reasonable hourly rate. That said, even accounting for Sumter’s
travel, the entry is unreasonable. Notably, the deposition occurred in Raleigh, North Carolina, (see
Doc. 74 at 36), which is approximately 2.5 hours from Charlotte. Accounting for travel time both

14

ways, time conferring with Plaintiff, and the 3.5 hour deposition time, this Court finds that only
10 hours of time for the deposition is reasonable and reduces the entry accordingly.
Eighth, Defendant objects to Sumter’s entry for 0.5 hours for filing final protective order
on the ground that the task of filing an order is clerical. (Doc. 76). Plaintiff’s Reply does not
contain a specific defense of this time entry. (See Doc. 79). In accordance with the aforementioned
discussion of compensation for clerical tasks, the Court will sustain Defendant’s objection to this
entry and disallow compensation on the entry because the entry, as listed, is for work that is purely
clerical in nature.
Ninth, Defendant objects to Sumter’s entry for 2.3 hours for researching continuing
violation and timeliness issue on the ground that this is background research. (Doc. 76 at 19).
This research occurred in response to Defendant’s summary judgment argument that Plaintiff’s
claims were timebarred and the research was essential to Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. (See Doc. 18). Accordingly, the research was not general
background research meant to maintain only a general competency of law. 6

Therefore,

Defendant’s objection is overruled.
Tenth, Defendant objects to Sumter’s entry for 3.4 hours for drafting and editing draft of
brief and researching remedial action on the grounds that the entry contains block billing and is
for noncompensable background research. (Doc. 76 at 19). Like with the preceding objection, the
research was in direct response to arguments advanced in Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and declines to categorize it as noncompensable background research. That said, the
entry does contain block billing. In accord with this Court’s early discussion of block billing, the
Court will reduce the entry by 10%, from 3.4 hours to 3.06 hours.

6

This Court further notes that 2.3 hours of research time is reasonable, especially in light of the incomplete statement
of the law regarding the timeliness of retaliation claims in Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

15

Eleventh, Defendant objects to Sumter’s entry for 0.6 hours for mediation preparation, case
review for jury verdicts on the grounds that the entry contains block billing and that the entry
involves noncompensable background research. (Doc. 76 at 19). Plaintiff argues that the research
was necessary to “inform a Plaintiff of the range of possibilities of recovery, as well as the chances
of recovery.” (Doc. 79 at 6). This entry constitutes noncompensable background research as the
likely results of a jury trial constitutes information that should be well known to a skilled and
seasoned attorney such as Sumter and is, otherwise, part of maintaining a general competency of
the law in a particular field of practice. Accordingly, Defendant’s objection is sustained and
compensation for this entry is disallowed.
Twelfth, Defendant objects to Sumter’s entry for 6.0 hours for drafting and editing brief
and reviewing laches issue on the ground that the entry includes block billing and no laches issues
was involved in the brief at issue. (Doc. 76 at 19-20). Plaintiff’s Reply does not contain a specific
response to Defendant’s objection. (See Doc. 79). As to the laches issue, this Court had already
rejected Defendant’s laches defense at the time of the brief at issue in this entry and the brief
relative to this entry does not include any information relevant to the laches issue. (See Doc. 30).
Nonetheless, the Court declines to strike Plaintiff’s entry of hours in its entirety as this is Sumter’s
only entry for the eleven-page brief at issue. (See Doc. 74 at 21). Instead, this Court views the
inclusion of the laches issue as a problematic example of block billing and imprecise record
keeping. Because the use of block billing in this entry more significantly impairs this Court’s
ability to evaluate the entry for reasonableness than the average entry that contains block billing,
the Court reduces the entry by 30% and finds that a total attorney time of 4.2 hours is reasonable
given the quality, complexity, and length of the brief in question.

16

Thirteenth, Defendant objects to Sumter’s entry for 0.7 hours for mediation preparation,
jury verdict research on the grounds that then entry contains block billing and involves
noncompensable background research. For the reasons stated in sustaining Defendant’s eleventh
objection, this Court also sustains Defendant’s thirteenth objection and determines that the 0.7
hours are noncompensable background research.
Fourteenth, Defendant objects to Sumter’s entry for 5.3 hours for preparing for and
appearing at mediation on the grounds that the entry includes block billing and is excessive given
that mediation lasted 2.7 hours.7 (Doc. 76 at 20). Defendant urges this Court to reduce this entry
to 2.7 hours. Id. In reply, Plaintiff contends that compensation beyond the exact duration of
mediation is warranted as Sumter needed to prepare for mediation and to confer with Plaintiff
before and after mediation. (Doc. 79 at 8). This Court agrees with Plaintiff, in part. Obviously
some degree of preparation and consultation was required but the Court finds 2.6 hours of
preparation and consultation to be excessive. Instead, an hour of preparation and consultation is
at the outer limits of reasonableness where Plaintiff fails to specify the nature of preparation and
consultation underlying this entry. Accordingly, this entry is reduced from 5.3 hours to 3.7 hours.8
Defendant’s fifteenth through twenty-first objections involve Sumter’s entries for a total
of 52.6 hours for pre-trial preparation, research, travelling to Statesville for trial, and conferring
with Plaintiff. (Doc. 76 at 20). Defendant argues that the entries for “trial preparation” are vague,
that travel time is not compensable, that any research was noncompensable background research,
and that several of the entries involve block billing. Id. Defendant urges this Court to reduce these

7

Defendant describes mediation as featuring Plaintiff requesting $300,000.00 in damages, Defendant countering at
$1,500.00, Plaintiff rejecting Defendant’s offer, and mediation terminating. (Doc. 76 at 1). This Court is rather
flummoxed as to how those limited events, assuming mediation was limited to the events described by Defendant,
lasted for 2.7 hours.
8
This Court declines to further reduce this entry for block billing as the two tasks are highly related and the imprecision
of the entry is already reflected in this Court’s reduction of the entry.

17

entries to a total of 6.0 hours. Id. Defendant’s contention that only six hours of pre-trial
preparation is reasonable and should be compensable is easily rejected where the trial spanned six
days, featured numerous witnesses, and where Plaintiff supported her case with a plethora of
documents. Furthermore, this Court rejects the notion that entries such as “trial preparation” are
unduly vague as this Court has little trouble discerning the nature of Sumter’s work during those
hours. On the matter of travel, this Court has already concluded that travel is compensable. This
Court further rejects Defendant’s argument that pre-trial research is noncomepnsable where
research is a natural part of responding to motions in limine, preparing proposed jury instructions,
and preparing trial briefs—all items not specifically documented in Sumter’s time entries. Finally,
however, this Court does sustain Defendant’s objection as to four of these entries that contain
block billing and will reduce those four entries by the aforementioned 10%. As a result of this
10% reduction, Sumter’s proposed 52.6 hours are reduced to 47.34 hours.
Defendant’s twenty-second. Twenty-third, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-eighth
objections involve Sumter’s entries for 77.7 hours during the days of trial. (Doc. 76 at 20-21). As
Plaintiff argues, it is not unusual for a trial attorney to work 12+ hour days during trial. This is
particularly true in this situation where Sumter’s pre-trial preparation was well below that which
the Court would have found reasonable. Accordingly, these objections of Defendant are overruled.
Defendant’s twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh objections involve Sumter’s entries for 12.0
hours of time for trial preparation on a weekend during the course of trial. (Doc. 76 at 21).
Defendant argues that the entries are vague, contain block billing, and are for noncompensable
travel time. Contrary to Defendant’s contention, the entries do not contain block billing; but,
instead, specify what type of trial preparation Sumter performed during those time blocks.

18

Furthermore, this Court has already concluded above that Sumter’s travel time is compensable at
her normal, reasonable hourly rate. Accordingly, Defendant’s objections are overruled.
Defendant’s twenty-ninth objection is to Sumter’s entry for 3.0 hours for drafting and
editing declarations for attorney fees and reviewing time entries on the ground that the entry
contain block billing. As the entry does contain block billing, this Court will reduce the entry by
the aforementioned 10%, resulting in a reduction from 3.0 hours to 2.7 hours.
Defendant’s thirtieth objection is to Sumter’s entry for 6.0 hours for reviewing and drafting
motion for front and back pay, researching and finalizing declarations, talking with an attorney
who provided an affidavit, and drafting and editing fee petition on the ground that the entry
contains block billing and noncompensable research. This Court agrees with Defendant in part.
The entry does contain block billing and will be subject to the aforementioned 10% reduction.
However, the citations to law in the briefs on attorney fees and on forward and back pay are
relevant to the issues at hand and does not merely represent research for maintaining only a general
competency of law. Accordingly, this Court will only reduce the entry by 10% from 6.0 hours to
5.4 hours.
In sum, this Court reduces Sumter’s requested hours by 14.6 hours, finding 226.6 hours to
be reasonable. At the approved rate of $400.00 an hour, Sumter reasonable fees come to
$90,640.00.
ii.

Paralegal Julia C. Hare’s Hours

Plaintiff requests 17.3 hours for work performed by paralegal Julia C. Hare. (Doc. 74 at
27). Defendant raises nine objections to Hare’s time entries. (Doc. 76 at 16-17). Keeping in mind
the earlier discussion regarding block billing, clerical work, and background research, this Court
will address each objection in turn.

19

First, Defendant objects to Hare’s entry for 5.0 hours for reviewing file, researching the
Defendants, preparing the complaint, and filing the complaint and summons. Id. at 16. Defendants
argue that this entry contains block billing and includes clerical tasks. Id. To the extent that the
entry includes time for filing the complaint and summons, the entry does include a purely clerical
task. Furthermore, because of the use of block billing, the Court is unable to determine what
percentage of the entry is attributable to the filing of the complaint and summons. Accordingly,
rather than reduce the entry by 10% for block billing, the entry will be reduced by 20% to account
for both the block billing and the noncompensable purely clerical work within the entry.
Therefore, the time entry is reduced from 5.0 hours to 4.0 hours.
Second, Defendant objects to Hare’s entry for 0.5 hours to update file and to prepare
pleadings file and pleadings index. Id. Defendant argues that the entry includes block billing and
time spent on clerical tasks. This Court agrees with Defendant that the entirety of the entry is
purely clerical in nature. Accordingly, the Court finds that compensation for this entry is not
reasonable.
Third, Defendant objects to Hare’s entry for 0.3 hours for writing a letter to Plaintiff,
arguing that the entry is clerical in nature. Id. This Court finds no support in the law for the
proposition that communications with a client constitute clerical work. Accordingly, Defendant’s
third objection is overruled.
Defendant’s fourth, fifth, and sixth objections involve Hare’s entries for a total of 3.0 hours
for researching service of process, contacting an agency that performs service processing,
conferring with Sumter, preparing the summons, and preparing the service of process documents.
Id. Defendant argues that the entries employ block billing, include time spent on clerical tasks,
and include time for noncompensable background research. Performing research on how to

20

effectuate service of process is part of maintaining a general competency of law as the
requirements for service of process are generally uniform and unchanging. Accordingly, where
Plaintiff does not provide any details regarding the nature of Hare’s research during the time
requested in this entry, Plaintiff has not sustained her burden of demonstrating that the time entries,
as listed, are reasonable and compensable. Furthermore, the use of block billing in these entries
considerably impairs this Court’s ability to determine what percentage of the time spent during
these entry was on research rather than on compensable tasks. In total, however, the Court
concludes that 1.0 hours for the compensable tasks related to service of process is reasonable.
Defendant’s seventh, eighth, and ninth objections involve Hare’s entries for a total of 6.0
hours to review EEOC file and client materials, and work on Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 disclosures. Id. at
17. Defendant argues that the three entries include block billing, are excessive, and include time
for clerical tasks. The Court agrees with Defendant to the extent that the entries do include block
billing. The Court, however, rejects Defendant’s contention that reviewing an EEOC file,
reviewing materials provided by a client, or preparing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 disclosures constitute
clerical tasks. Furthermore, where the remaining entries in the time log submitted by Plaintiff only
include 0.8 hours for work on the Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 disclosures, this Court concludes that the 6.0
hours objected to by Defendant are not excessive. Accordingly, the three time entries totaling 6.0
hours will be reduced by only 10% for the use of block billing.
In sum, the Court reduces Hare’s entries by 4.1 hours, from 17.3 hours to 13.2 hours. At
the previously approved rate of $135.00 an hour, Hare’s reasonable and compensable entries total
$1,782.00.

21

iii.

Paralegal Vicky M. Reddy’s Hours

Plaintiff requests 18.5 hours for work performed by paralegal Vicky M. Reddy. (Doc. 74
at 27). Defendant raises six objections to Reddy’s time entries. (Doc. 76 at 17-18). Keeping in
mind the earlier discussion regarding block billing and clerical work, this Court will address each
objection in turn.
First, Defendant objects to Reddy’s entry for 4.0 hours to transcribe a tape recoding of
Plaintiff’s responses to Defendant’s interrogatories, copy, redact, and scan documents, and bates
stamp documents. Id. at 17. Defendant argues that this entry involves clerical tasks. Id. The
Court agrees with Defendant that the entry is entirely clerical in nature and does not entail the
skills that justify a rate of $135.00 per hour for paralegal work. That said, the tasks performed by
Reddy are necessary to the representation of a client. Accordingly, the Court will reduce Reddy’s
hourly rate to $50.00 per hour for this entry and allow compensation in the amount of $200.00.
Second, Defendant objects to Reddy’s entry for 2.0 hours for drafting and editing
discovery. Id. Defendant argues that this entry involves clerical tasks. Id. The drafting and
editing of discovery requests and answers, however, is far from a clerical task and is a task
appropriate delegated to a paralegal. Accordingly, this Court overrules Defendant’s objection.
Third, Defendant objects to Reddy’s entry for 2.0 hours for drafting a letter to opposing
counsel and for editing supplemental responses to interrogatories and requests for discovery. Id.
at 18. Defendant argues that the entries include block billing and time spent on clerical tasks.
Again, this Court agrees with Defendant in part. While the entries do include block billing, neither
drafting a letter to opposing counsel nor editing interrogatory and discovery responses constitute
clerical tasks. Therefore, this Court will reduce this time entry by only 10%, from 2.0 hours to 1.8
hours.

22

Fourth, Defendant objects to Reddy’s entry for 4.5 hours for preparing an outline of
Plaintiff’s medical records. Id. Defendant argues that 4.5 hours is excessive given that the medical
records were only 60 pages. Id. This Court rejects Defendant’s argument. Although not
voluminous is size, medical records are not easily digestible to lawyers and, as pointed out by
Plaintiff, research to fully understand the meaning of the records is necessary. This is particularly
true here where the medical records involved notes on Plaintiff’s mental condition and provided
much of the basis for Plaintiff’s argument for compensatory damages. Accordingly, this Court
finds that 4.5 hours of paralegal time to review and summarize Plaintiff’s medical records is
reasonable.
Defendant’s fifth and sixth objections are to Reddy’s entries for a total of 6.0 hours to
prepare two copies of exhibit notebooks and to prepare other documents for trial. Id. Defendant
argues that these entries involve purely clerical tasks. Id. This Court agrees with Defendant, as
no particular legal or paralegal training is necessary to assemble trial notebooks and arrange trial
documents in a logical order. Furthermore, given that the trial exhibits fit into a single notebook,
this Court finds 6.0 hours of time to prepare copies of the exhibits excessive. Accordingly, while
this Court will permit compensation at the reduced rate of $50.00 per hour for clerical tasks, this
Court finds that only 3.0 hours of time for this task is reasonable. Therefore, compensation for
this entry is limited to $150.00.
In sum, Reddy’s hours compensable at the reasonable paralegal rate of $135.00 per hour
are reduced by 10.2 hours from 18.5 hours to 8.3 hours. Accordingly, Reddy’s compensable
paralegal work totals $1,120.50. Additionally, Reddy’s compensable clerical work amounts to 7.0
hours at the rate of $50.00 per hour for a total of $350.00.

23

iv.

Legal Assistant Hours

Plaintiff requests 50.8 hours for work performed by legal assistants. (Doc. 74 at 27).
Defendant raises eight objections to time entries for the legal assistants. (Doc. 76 at 11-12).
Keeping in mind the earlier discussion regarding block billing and clerical work, this Court will
address each objection in turn.
Defendant’s first and second objections involve time entries totaling 2.5 hours for
preparing pre-trial disclosures, preparing issues for trial, and preparing letters to opposing counsel.
Id. at 11. Defendant argues that the entries include block billing and time spent on clerical tasks.
Id. This Court agrees that the entries include block billing but rejects Defendant’s argument that
the entries include time spent on clerical tasks. Preparing disclosures and materials submitted to
opposing counsel are tasks that are part of litigation and are not purely clerical in nature.
Accordingly, this Court will reduce the entry by only 10%, from 2.5 hours down to 2.25 hours.
Defendant’s third objection is to an entry for 1.0 hours for letters to Plaintiff and to Assa
Bell. Id. Defendant argues that this entry includes block billing and time spent on clerical tasks.
Id. Plaintiff does not provide any specific response to Defendant’s objection. (See Doc. 79). In
failing to respond to Defendant’s objection, Plaintiff leaves this Court without any information
regarding who Assa Bell is or regarding the nature of the letters.

Accordingly, while

communications with a client are compensable, this Court lacks the necessary information to judge
the reasonableness of the entry as a whole and will sustain Defendant’s objection.
Defendant’s remaining five objections are to entries totaling 46.3 hours for preparing trial
exhibits.9 (Doc. 76 at 11) Defendant argues that the entries are excessive and that they involve

9

One of the five entries to which Defendant objects includes time for the preparation of supplemental discovery
responses and a letter to opposing counsel. (See Doc. 76 at 11). Because the use of block billing prevents this Court
from meaningfully separating time for those activities from time spent in that entry on the preparation of trial exhibits

24

time spent on clerical tasks. Id. This Court agrees on both accounts. First, while Plaintiff’s
exhibits were numerous and included a plethora of prison incident reports, the exhibits were not
so extensive as to justify 46.3 hours of time, a total that amounts to roughly an hour per exhibit.
Instead, having reviewed the trial exhibit notebook provided by Plaintiff, this Court concludes that
20 hours to prepare the trial notebooks is on the outer limits of reasonableness. Furthermore,
preparing trial exhibits and trial notebooks, while essential to trying a case, is a clerical task that
does not require any specific legal or paralegal training. Therefore, to the extent that this Court
permits recovery for 20 hours of time, it does so at the reduced rate of $50.00 per hour for clerical
work.
In sum, the legal assistant hours compensable at the reasonable rate of $135.00 per hour
are reduced from the requested amount of 50.80 hours to 3.25 hours, for a total of $438.75.
Additionally, this Court finds that $1,000.00 is reasonable for the clerical work performed by the
legal assistants.
v.

Law Clerk/Student Intern Spencer Woodstock’s Hours

Plaintiff requests 168.9 hours for work performed by law clerk Spencer Woodstock, a
second-year law student interning at Sumter’s firm. (Doc. 74 at 27). Defendant raises twenty-four
objections to Woodstock’s time entries. (Doc. 76 at 12-14). Keeping in mind the earlier discussion
regarding block billing, clerical work, and background research, this Court will address each
objection in block based on the nature of Defendant’s objections.
Included in Woodstock’s hours are 29.2 hours dedicated solely to researching. Defendant
argues that this research permitted Woodstock to get up to speed on precedents governing
employment law and that compensation is not due for this background research. (Doc. 76 at 14-

and because the tasks are not clearly connected or related, this Court will treat the entry as an entry for preparing
documents for trial.

25

15). Plaintiff merely responds that Woodstock provided “assistance in researching and drafting
various documents that were filed with the Court.” (Doc. 79 at 10). Plaintiff, however, provides
no specifics regarding what research Woodstock performed and whether a law clerk or paralegal
familiar with employment law would have needed to perform the research or could have completed
the research tasks in less time. (See Doc. 79). Accordingly, it is impossible for this Court to
determine whether the research time listed, or a percentage thereof, is reasonable and this Court
concludes that Plaintiff has not sustained her burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of these
29.2 hours of time.
Also included in Woodstock’s hours are 38.6 hours for a combination of researching,
writing briefs, and editing briefs. Defendant argues that these entries include block billing and
time spent on noncompensable background research.

(Doc. 76 at 12-14).

This Court’s

aforementioned conclusion regarding Woodstock’s time spent researching carries through, in part,
to these entries. However, to the extent that Woodstock drafted several briefs that were ultimately
submitted to this Court, some of Woodstock’s research time was necessary. Because of the block
billing and the lack of specificity in Woodstock’s time entries and in Plaintiff’s Reply, it is
challenging for the Court to determine the specific number of reasonable hours. Nonetheless,
based on this Court’s review of the briefs Woodstock worked on and on other time entries in the
billing log relative to those briefs, this Court concludes that a total of 25.0 hours for these entries
is reasonable.10
Next, Woodstock’s entries include 12.2 hours for reviewing the case file and reviewing
briefs submitted by Defendant. Defendant argues the time relative to these entries was unnecessary
and did not contribute to the jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff. (Doc. 76 at 12-13). As Woodstock

10

In reaching this conclusion, this Court accounts for the use of block billing in these entries and does not further
reduce the hours by 10%.

26

drafted briefs ultimately submitted to this Court, it follows that he needed to review the case file
and review the briefs of Defendant to which Plaintiff was responding. Accordingly, this Court
overrules Defendant’s objections to these entries.
Finally, Woodstock’s entries include 43.5 hours for attending the trial and traveling to the
trial. Defendant argues that Woodstock’s presence at the trial did not contribute to the result in a
meaningful way. Here, this Court agrees with Defendant. While it was certain beneficial to
Woodstock’s educational pursuits to attend the trial, based on this Court’s observations of
Woodstock during the trial, it is not apparent that his presence significantly aided Sumter’s
litigation efforts. While court was in session, Woodstock primarily took on the role of an attentive
observer and did not frequently consult with Sumter or Plaintiff. Accordingly, it is not apparent
to this Court that Woodstock’s presence in the courtroom sufficiently aided Plaintiff’s cause so as
to render compensation for his time at trial reasonable.
In sum, this Court reduces Woodstock’s time entries by 86.3 hours, from 168.9 hours to
82.6 hours. At the aforementioned approved rate of $75.00 per hour for Woodstock’s time, the
reasonable fee for Woodstock’s time amounts to $6,195.00.
C.

Application of Johnson Factors and Calculation of Final Reasonable Fee

Combining the figures from the above analysis results in a total base reasonable attorney
fee of $101,526.25. This Court, however, finds two additional Johnson factors relevant to its final
determination of a reasonable attorney fee.
i.

The Amount in Controversy and Result Obtained

Plaintiff did not obtain full success in this matter. First, Plaintiff did not prevail on her
retaliation claim and a percentage reduction to account for Plaintiff’s lack of success on the
retaliation claim is appropriate. In determining the proper percentage reduction, the Court

27

acknowledges that (1) the retaliation claim was premised on the same facts and evidence as the
sexual harassment/hostile work environment claim and (2) the retaliation claim was a secondary
claim that was not fully pled until shortly before trial. These two considerations might suggest
that a reduction of only 10% would sufficiently account for Plaintiff’s lack of success on the related
retaliation claim. However, because the retaliation claim was not initially properly pled, a full
round of briefs in this case centered entirely on the ultimately unsuccessful retaliation claim. Thus,
although only 10% of trial may have been devoted specifically to the retaliation claim, a much
larger percentage of pre-trial litigation, and in turn pre-trial attorney hours, centered on the
retaliation claim. Accordingly, this Court concludes that a 25% reduction to the overall fee for
Plaintiff’s lack of success on the retaliation claim is appropriate.
Second, the jury award on Plaintiff’s sexual harassment/hostile work environment claim,
while far more than nominal, can not be viewed as entirely successful given some of Plaintiff’s
allegations in support of compensatory damages, including Plaintiff’s arguments regarding her
medical evidence. Although the Court acknowledges that cases of this nature are often as much
about a given plaintiff obtaining a favorable judgment against an offending defendant as they are
about the specific damages award, an additional reduction of 10% based on the relatively low jury
award is appropriate. Therefore, a 35% reduction based on the results Plaintiff obtained at trial is
warranted.
ii.

The Undesirability of the Case within the Legal Community

Although the average Title VII cases is not inherently undesirable, the specific facts
underlying this case do present an element of undesirability that warrant a modest upward
adjustment. Notably, this litigation was centered on the conduct of segregation inmates in a close
custody facility and success in the litigation required Plaintiff to demonstrate that the conduct of

28

the inmates could be imputed on the prison officials and Defendant. It is fair to say that a
considerable majority of attorneys, even in the employment law field, would have declined a case
of this nature because of the challenges it presented. To that point, it is also likely that Plaintiff’s
counsel’s expectation of success at the outset of this litigation may not have been very high; yet,
Plaintiff’s counsel committed herself to this case at every step of the matter and ardently
represented Plaintiff through to trial. Accordingly, based on the undesirability of this specific case,
an upward adjustment of 5% is appropriate.
iii.

Final Reasonableness Assessment

Accounting for the 35% reduction and the 5% upward adjustment, this Court will reduce
the base reasonable fee of $101,526.25 by 30%. Accordingly, this Court concludes that a total
attorney fee of $71,068.38 is reasonable.
D.

Attorney-Related Litigation Costs

Plaintiff seeks $3,913.66 in attorney-related litigation costs, including charges for
photcopying, mileage, postage, meals, hotels, and trial supplies. (Doc. 74 at 26). Defendant
objects to Plaintiff’s request for costs related to (1) photcopying, specifically an April 30, 2017
entry for $1,481.40; and (2) hotels during trial. (Doc. 76 at 23-24). In reply to Defendant’s
argument regarding the photocopying, Plaintiff indicates that the photocopying was necessary and
that counsel was required to copy “various pleadings.” (Doc. 79 at 12). Plaintiff, however, neither
provides an estimate regarding the number of pages copied nor specifies the rate per page normally
charged by the representing firm. See id. There is no disputing that costs related to copying are
compensable where the copying is necessary to litigation and the costs are reasonable. See Cherry
v. Champion Int’l Corp., 186 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Certain, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 591
(“Reasonable litigation expenses include such expenses as ‘secretarial costs, copying, telephone

29

costs and necessary travel.’” (quoting Trimper v. City of Norfolk, Va., 58 F.3d 68, 75 (4th Cir.
1995)). However, “[t]he burden is on the party seeking recovery of photocopying costs to
demonstrate the reasons for each copying charge” and courts have declined to award compensation
for copying charges where a party fails to provide a proper and discernable explanation for the
copying charges. Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., 272 F.R.D. 436, 444 (E.D. Va. 2011) (citing Ford
v. Zalco Realty, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 558, 563 (E.D. Va. 2010)). Here, Plaintiff’s explanation for
the significant photocopying costs is vague and does little to allow this Court to review the
requested costs attributed to photocopying.

Because some photocopying was undoubtedly

required, this Court will reduced Plaintiff’s April 30, 2017 photocopying costs to a total of $160,
which equates to more than $0.05 cents per page for four trial binders based on the number of
pages identified in Plaintiff’s trial exhibit list. (See Doc. 62).
As for hotel costs, Plaintiff claims seven nights of lodging for Sumter and six nights of
lodging for Woodstock. Based on a total request of $1,781.26 for hotels, Plaintiff’s hotel fees
equate to a cost of $137.02 per night. This amount is consistent with the typical rates for lodging
of modest quality in the Statesville area and only slightly above the government rate available to
court employees during trial. Furthermore, the Court finds the number of nights of lodging for
Sumter reasonable. Although the trial spanned six days, the jury did not return its verdict until
around 6:00pm on final day, after the deadline for cancelling reservations. Furthermore, where
the jury deliberated at length and initially indicated that they were deadlocked, it was reasonable
for Sumter to expect that deliberations might continue an extra day. Finally, to the extent that
traffic between Charlotte and Statesville is unpredictable because of an ongoing construction
project covering 20 miles of the interstate between the two cities, it was reasonable for Sumter to

30

travel to Statesville on the day before trial proceedings, and such is the practice of court staff.
Accordingly, $959.14 in hotel costs for Sumter are reasonable and compensable.
On the other hand, based on this Court’s earlier conclusion regarding Woodstock’s
attendance at trial, this Court finds that compensation for Woodstock’s lodging would be
unreasonable. Therefore, this Court reduces Plaintiff’s requested costs for hotel lodging by
$822.12.

Combing this reduction with the previously disallowed costs for photocopying,

Plaintiff’s reasonable and substantiated attorney-related litigation costs total $1,770.14.
E.

Plaintiff’s Own Costs Related to Litigation

Plaintiff seeks to recover costs associated with her travel to meet with counsel, her travel
to depositions and trial, and her meal expenses during trial. (See Doc. 74 at 36-37). Defendant
objects to Plaintiff’s request, arguing that no legal authority supports compensation for Plaintiff’s
personal costs. (Doc. 76 at 24). This Court concludes that Plaintiff has not supported her request
for personal costs with adequate citation to legal authority permitting recovery for said costs.
Notably, the only case Plaintiff cites in favor of her position is Xiao-Yue Gu v. Hughes Stx Corp.,
127 F. Supp. 2d 751, 770 (D. Md. 2001). (See Doc. 79 at 12-13). Xiao-Yue Gue, however, is
easily distinguishable from the present situation as the defendant in that case did not contest the
plaintiff’s recovery of personal costs. See Xiao-Yue Gu, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 770. Accordingly,
Xiao-Yue Gue did not reach the issue of whether recovery for personal costs is available.
III.

DECRETAL
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT:
(1)

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (Doc. 73) is GRANTED WITH

MODIFICATION;

31

(2)

Plaintiff’s reasonable, substantiated, and compensable attorney fees total

$71,068.38; and
(3)

Plaintiff’s reasonable, substantiated, and compensable costs total $1,770.14.

Signed: August 31, 2017

32