Triplettt v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety
Filing
95
ORDER denying 75 Motion for Additional Relief and denying as moot 91 Motion to Strike. Signed by Senior Judge Graham Mullen on 9/5/2018. (nvc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:15CV75
AMBER A. TRIPLETT,
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)
Plaintiff,
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)
vs.
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)
NORTH CAROLINA
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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
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SAFETY,
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)
Defendant.
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______________________________)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the Plaintiff’s Motion for Additional Relief. A jury trial
in this case was held by the Honorable Richard Voorhees in May of 2017, at which the jury
found for the Plaintiff on her hostile work environment claim only and awarded her $10,000.
Plaintiff thereafter sought attorneys’ fees and costs and, in addition, filed the present Motion for
Additional Relief. Judge Voorhees entered an Order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’
Fees and Costs with modification, but did not address Plaintiff’s Motion for Additional Relief.
This matter was subsequently transferred to the undersigned upon the retirement of Judge
Voorhees. The Court entered an Order directing the parties to secure a transcript of the trial and
thereafter submit amended briefs that contain citations to the trial transcript in support of their
arguments and allegations. The parties have now complied with the Court’s Order and this
Motion is finally ripe for disposition.
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I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is former employee of Defendant. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleged
that she was employed by Defendant at its Alexander Correctional Institute in June 2007 as a
Correctional Health Assistant and her job duties consisted of assisting with the healthcare of the
inmates at the facility. (Compl. ¶ 6). She was assigned to the Segregation Unit where she
assisted the healthcare providers with the daily medical care of the inmates in the unit. Id. at ¶
10. She alleges that while working in the Segregation Unit she was subjected to continuous
sexually harassing incidents by the inmates which she reported to management but that
management failed to address her complaints. Id. at ¶¶ 11-19. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of
her hostile work environment she suffered medical problems, and took medical leave from
March 16, 2016 to April 6, 2016. At trial, Plaintiff testified that she had not regularly worked in
the Segregation Unit since 2014, and had only been assigned to work there once since that time.
(Tr. p. 372).
Plaintiff resigned from her job on April 15, 2016 after her return from medical leave. She
claims that upon her return she was asked to fill in for an absent co-worker in the Segregation
Unit. However, after she refused, her supervisor acquiesced and allowed her to work in the
Chronic Unit instead, where she had described the inmates as respectful. (Tr. pp. 373, 773).
Despite the fact that she was not forced to work in the Segregation Unit, Plaintiff submitted her
resignation, effective April 15, 2016. Her resignation letter stated:
I'm resigning effective 4/15/16 from Alexander Correctional Institution due to
repeated retaliatory incidents from staff creating a hostile work environment and
undue stress, preventing me from performing all said work duties. I have tried to
get resolution from the administration, medical staff to no avail. Therefore, it
is regretfully necessary to resign my position as a CHA II to protect my health and
well- being.
(Def. Ex. 3) (emphasis added).
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Plaintiff alleged in her Second Amended Complaint and throughout the trial that she was
forced to resign because she was being subjected to retaliation. (Tr. p. 266). At trial, she testified
extensively that she felt that her fellow employees were retaliating against her by requesting
medical records clearing her to return to work following her medical leave. She refused to
submit the required return-to-work documents as requested by Defendant. (Tr. p. 372).
After her resignation Plaintiff diligently sought other employment. (Tr. pp. 268-70). She
eventually secured a job with Caldwell Memorial Hospital, earning a higher salary and
comparable benefits. (Tr. pp. 269; 278-79; 385). Plaintiff resigned this position after she was
moved from day shift to night shift. (Tr. pp. 278-79; 385). Plaintiff then obtained a second job
but also resigned that position because as she asserted at trial she “had to go to court dates for my
unemployment, and my mediation, and my attorney appointments” (Tr. p. 271).
Plaintiff sued for hostile work environment based on sex and retaliation. At trial, the jury
ultimately rejected Plaintiff’s retaliation claim but awarded her a “$10,000 Limit” for her hostile
work environment claim. Plaintiff now seeks front pay and back pay as a prevailing Plaintiff
under Title VII.
II.
DISCUSSION
The Court has a statutory duty to determine awards of equitable relief in Title VII claims. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1) (“If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in ...
an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may ... order ...
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate.”). The trial court has “wide discretion to award equitable relief.”
Peyton v. DiMario, 287 F.3d 1121, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d
1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). The court should “fashion this relief so as to provide a victim of
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employment discrimination the most complete make-whole relief possible.” Id. However, the
equitable relief of back pay is not an automatic remedy for successful Title VII plaintiffs. See
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
The problem with Plaintiff’s position is that in her Second Amended Complaint and
throughout trial, Plaintiff argued that she was forced to resign because she was being subjected to
retaliation. (Tr. p. 266). The jury unequivocally rejected Plaintiff’s contention that she was
subjected to unlawful retaliation. The evidence at trial revealed that Plaintiff was no longer
regularly assigned to the Segregation Unit where the alleged sexual harassment took place and in
fact had not been assigned there for over two years. (Tr. p. 372). When she refused to fill in for a
co-worker in the Segregation Unit, her supervisor did not force her to work in that Unit. (Tr. p.
373).
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and the evidence introduced at trial all support the
fact that Plaintiff resigned her employment due to what she alleged was retaliation. The back pay
for which Plaintiff argues she is entitled directly flows from her decision to resign which was
directly tied to Plaintiff’s unsuccessful retaliation claim. Plaintiff did not argue, much less prove
at trial, that her resignation was a result of the hostile work environment that she alleges she
endured while working in segregation. The jury rejected Plaintiff’s assertions that she was
subjected to retaliation and as a direct result of that retaliation she was forced to resign. Although
Plaintiff prevailed on her hostile work environment claim, the argument she presented at trial and
in her pleadings linked her resignation, and thus entitlement to back pay, to her retaliation claim.
Awarding Plaintiff back pay under these circumstances would not further the purposes of Title
VII.
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In the alternative, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to mitigate any damages as required
by the Fourth Circuit. See Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 651 (4th
Cir. 2002). In the context of this case, where Plaintiff was removed from the environment that
she deemed hostile and had been for over two years, Plaintiff’s resignation constitutes a failure to
mitigate. Moreover, the duty of a Title VII plaintiff to mitigate damages includes the obligation
to accept a “job substantially equivalent to one he was denied.” Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458
U.S. 219, 232 (1982). Such a duty of necessity also includes the obligation to make reasonable
and good faith efforts to maintain that job once accepted. While Plaintiff did obtain a
substantially equivalent job, she voluntarily resigned from that job for personal reasons. (Tr. pp.
278-79; 385). Plaintiff obtained a second job and also resigned that position. (Tr. pp. 271).
The considerable authority among the decisions of reviewing courts supports the longstanding principle that a plaintiff who voluntarily quits comparable, interim employment fails to
exercise reasonable diligence in the mitigation of damages. See DiSalvo v. The Chamber of
Commerce of Greater Kansas City, 568 F.2d 593, 597-598 (8th Cir. 1978). In this case, Plaintiff
voluntarily quit suitable and comparable employment twice for personal reasons. Back pay is
foreclosed when an employee’s resignation from suitable employment is motivated by personal
reasons unrelated to the job or as a matter of personal convenience. See Reiner v. Family Ford,
Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (M.D. FL. 2001) (court held that plaintiff’s inability to retain
subsequent employment due to child care issues did not excuse her duty to mitigate).
Accordingly, she has freely chosen to incur a loss of earnings, thereby failing to use reasonable
diligence in the mitigation of damages. Furthermore, it was unreasonable for Plaintiff to
voluntarily quit her jobs without having secured replacement employment. Plaintiff unreasonably
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failed to maintain her employment and thus failed to mitigate her damages. Accordingly, in its
discretion, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for back pay.
For the same reasons the Court has denied back pay, the Court likewise denies Plaintiff’s
request for front pay.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Additional Relief is hereby
DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Defendant’s Motion to Strike is hereby DENIED AS MOOT.
Signed: September 5, 2018
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