Zelaya-Sorto v. Teague et al

Filing 11

ORDER denying 10 Motion for Reconsideration re 8 Order Dismissing Case, 9 Clerk's Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 10/28/16. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.)(smj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:16-cv-00099-FDW
JULIO ZELAYA-SORTO,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
J. TEAGUE, Sgt.;
)
KENNETH D. POTEAT,
)
Assistant Unit Manager for
)
Restrictive Housing,
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the
order dismissing his pro se complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See (5:16-cv-00099,
Doc. No. 8: Order).
In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff again complains that he has not received
thermal underwear despite repeated requests and that his shelter is inadequate, and he contends
that denying him the thermals and lack of proper housing has affected his comfort and is in
violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
To establish a “prima facie case that prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment, a
plaintiff show both ‘(1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate
indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.’” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d
1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). “The Supreme Court has explained that the first showing requires the
court to determine whether the deprivation of the basic human needs was objectively ‘sufficiently
serious,’ and the second requires it to determine whether subjectively ‘the officials acted with a
1

sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). “The Constitution
‘does not mandate comfortable prisons’, but neither does it permit inhumane ones.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 U.S. 349
(1981)).
With regard to motions to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated: “A district court has the discretion to grant a
Rule 59(e) motion only in very narrow circumstances: ‘(1) to accommodate an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct
a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.’” Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Collison v. Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 34 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 1994)).
Furthermore, “Rule 59(e) motions may not be used to make arguments that could have been
made before the judgment was entered.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Indeed, the circumstances
under which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted are so limited that “[c]ommentators observe
‘because of the narrow purposes for which they are intended, Rule 59(e) motions typically are
denied.’” Woodrum v. Thomas Mem’l Hosp. Found., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 350, 351 (S.D. W. Va.
1999) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed.
1995)).
Petitioner has not shown the existence of the limited circumstances under which a Rule
59(e) motion may be granted. That is, Petitioner’s motion does not present evidence that was
unavailable when he filed his complaint nor does he present arguments tied to an intervening
change in the applicable law. Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown that a clear error of law has
been made, or that failure to grant the motion would result in a manifest injustice. See Hill, 277

2

F.3d at 708.
In sum, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is
DENIED. (Doc. No. 10).
SO ORDERED.
Signed: October 28, 2016

3