Goulette v. Kalinski

Filing 15

ORDER denying 13 Motion to Appoint Counsel. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint survives initial review. The Clerk shall commence the procedure for waiver of service for defendants. Signed by Chief Judge Frank D. Whitney on 8/2/2018. (Pro se litigant served by US Mail.) (tmg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATESVILLE DIVISION
5:18-cv-47-FDW
ARTHUR JAY GOULETTE,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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MARTA M. KALINSKI ,
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BENJAMIN M. ANDERSON,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________)

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A. (Doc. No. 12). Also pending is Plaintiff’s Motion
to Appoint Counsel. (Doc. No. 13). On April 26, 2018, the Court entered an order waiving the
initial filing fee and directing monthly payments to be made from Plaintiff’s prison account.
(Doc. No. 9). Thus, Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
I.

BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Arthur Jay Goulette is a North Carolina prisoner incarcerated at the
Alexander Correctional Institution in Taylorsville, North Carolina. Plaintiff filed this action on
March 16, 2018, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on May
24, 2018. (Doc. No. 12). Plaintiff has named as the two Defendants Marta M. Kalinski,
identified as a doctor at Alexander at all relevant times, and Benjamin M. Anderson, identified as
the Chief Medical Officer/Assistant Superintendent of Alexander. Plaintiff purports to bring an
Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
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based on Defendants’ refusal to provide him with proper medical care related to his injured neck
and back. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and compensatory damages.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review the Complaint
to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious
[or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,
§ 1915A requires an initial review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and the
court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,
if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. In its
frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably
meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or
delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989).
III.

DISCUSSION

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged lack of or inappropriate medical
treatment fall within the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a
plaintiff must show a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” of the inmate. Id.
“Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants actually knew of and disregarded
a substantial risk of serious injury to the detainee or that they actually knew of and ignored a
detainee’s serious need for medical care.” Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76
(4th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “To establish that a health care provider’s actions constitute
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deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the treatment must be so grossly incompetent,
inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.”
Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990).
Allegations that might be sufficient to support negligence and medical malpractice claims
do not, without more, rise to the level of a cognizable § 1983 claim. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106;
Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Deliberate indifference is a very high
standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”). To be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment, a prison official must know of and consciously or intentionally disregard “an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994);
Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998). “[E]ven if a prison doctor is mistaken
or negligent in his diagnosis or treatment, no constitutional issue is raised absent evidence of
abuse, intentional mistreatment, or denial of medical attention.” Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F. Supp.
757, 762 (D. Md. 1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976). The constitutional right is to
medical care. No right exists to the type or scope of care desired by the individual prisoner. Id.
at 763. Therefore, a disagreement “between an inmate and a physician over the inmate’s proper
medical care [does] not state a § 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged.”
Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (dismissing the plaintiff’s Section 1983
claim against a defendant physician for allegedly discharging the plaintiff too early from a
medical clinic, as such claim did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference but would, “at
most, constitute a claim of medical malpractice”).
The Court finds that, assuming that Plaintiff’s allegations are true, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in his favor, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants for deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs is not clearly frivolous.
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Next, as to Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel, there is no absolute right to the
appointment of counsel in civil actions such as this one. Therefore, a plaintiff must present
“exceptional circumstances” in order to require the Court to seek the assistance of a private
attorney for a plaintiff who is unable to afford counsel. Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966
(4th Cir. 1987). In support of the motion to appoint counsel, Plaintiff states that he cannot afford
counsel; his imprisonment will greatly limit his ability to litigate the issues; the issues are
complex; he has no access to a law library and limited knowledge of the law; he suffers from a
traumatic brain injury; this case will likely involve conflicting testimony; and he has repeatedly
tried to obtain an attorney to no avail. (Doc. No. 13 at 2). Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s
contentions to the contrary, this case does not present exceptional circumstances that justify
appointment of counsel. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel is denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff has alleged a claim for deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs against Defendants sufficient to survive this Court’s initial review.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, (Doc. No. 12), survives initial review under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e).

2.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 13), is DENIED.

3.

This Court recently enacted Local Rule 4.3, which sets forth a procedure to waive
service of process for current and former employees of the North Carolina
Department of Public Safety (“NCDPS”) in actions filed by North Carolina State
prisoners. The Clerk of Court shall commence the procedure for waiver of service
as set forth in Local Rule 4.3 for Defendants, who are current or former employees
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of NCDPS.

Signed: August 2, 2018

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