Scheeler v. Peterson

Filing 17

ORDER by Magistrate Judge Charles S. Miller, Jr. granting 7 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. (BG) (Main Document 17 replaced on 3/26/2014 to correct case number. Regenerated NEF. Distributed.) (rh).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION

Daniel P. Scheeler, personally and on
behalf of the Estate of Margaret Pedro,

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)
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION
Plaintiffs,
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TO DISMISS
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vs.
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Case No. 1:13-cv-00074
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Charles J. Peterson and Mackoff Kellogg )
Law Firm,
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Defendants.
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_______________________________________________________________________________
Before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 7). For the reasons set forth
below, the motion will be granted.1
I.

BACKGROUND
This action was commenced by plaintiff Daniel Scheeler filing a pro se complaint against

defendants Charles Peterson and the Mackoff Kellogg Law Firm, of which Peterson is a member.
The complaint itself is sparse and somewhat disjointed in terms of the relevant facts. What follows
is what the court is able to glean from the complaint and a number of attachments.
Scheeler, a resident of Phoenix, Arizona, is one of five natural children of Margaret Pedro,
now deceased. The subject of this action is a prior probate proceeding in state district court, i.e.,
Estate of Margaret Pedro, Case No. 45-99-P-00024, Southwest Judicial District, Stark County, North
Dakota. In that proceeding, there was a dispute over the interpretation of Margaret Pedro’s will.
Scheeler was represented by an attorney from South Dakota and Scheeler’s brother, who was the

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The parties have consented to disposition of this case by a magistrate judge. (Doc. Nos. 5 & 11).

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personal representative of Margaret Pedro’s estate, and Denan Pedro were represented by defendant
Peterson and law firm. On July 25, 2012, the state district court entered judgment resolving what
it determined to be an ambiguity in the will in favor of Denan Pedro and against Scheeler by
concluding that the intent of the will was that Denan Pedro would inherit the entire estate if she
survived Margaret Pedro, which she apparently did.
In this action, Scheeler alleges that Peterson provided untrue facts in the state probate
proceeding that caused the state district court to rule against him. The relief that Scheeler seeks is
that this court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) “[p]rovide the Plaintiff/Petitioner Daniel Scheeler
relief from the Judgment for the defendants, on the grounds of fraud by defendants Mackoff Kellogg
Law Firm, Represented by attorney Charles Peterson, in the presentation of his Brief dated June 13,
2012.”
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (1) for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II.

DISCUSSION
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . .” The complaint in this case contains no such statement;
hence, it is subject to dismissal for this reason alone. Further, it apparent from the complaint and
Peterson’s response to the motion to dismiss that giving leave to amend prior to dismissing the
action would be futile because defendants’ arguments for why subject matter jurisdiction is lacking
are well-taken.
First, as defendants correctly point out, the court lacks jurisdiction to grant Scheeler the relief
he requests (even if there nominally was a basis for diversity jurisdiction) because of the “probate

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exception” to federal court jurisdiction. E.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 307-312 (2006);
Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946) (“It is true that a federal court has no jurisdiction to
probate a will or administer an estate . . . .”). This is because, whatever might be the outer
boundaries of the probate exception, it is clear that Scheeler’s request for relief here (which is to
grant relief from a state court judgment adjudicating the meaning of a will in a state probate
proceeding) lies at the core of the exception that federal court lacks jurisdiction to probate a will or
an estate. See id.
Second, the court also lacks jurisdiction for another very fundamental reason as noted by
defendants, which is the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “This is the doctrine that prevents a losing state
court party from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state court judgment
in federal court, based upon District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103
S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68
L.Ed. 362 (1923).” Dittmer Properties, L.P. v. F.D.I.C., 708 F.3d 1011, 1018 n.6 (8th Cir. 2013).
In other words, if Scheeler was disappointed with the judgment of the state district court, his sole
recourse was an appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court.
III.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, defendants motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

(Doc. No. 7) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 26th day of March, 2014.
/s/ Charles S. Miller, Jr.
Charles S. Miller, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge

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