Papenhausen v. ConocoPhillips Company et al

Filing 37

ORDER by Magistrate Judge Clare R. Hochhalter denying 15 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 17 Motion for Hearing. Status conference set for 4/5/2024 at 10:00 AM by telephone. (BG)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
David Papenhausen,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ConocoPhillips Company, and
)
Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Company )
LP, individually, and d/b/a Burlington
)
Resources Oil & Gas LP,
)
)
Defendants.
)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case No. 1:20-cv-115

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment and a request for a hearing filed by
Defendants. (Doc. Nos. 15 and 17). For the reasons that follow, the motion (Doc. No. 15) is denied
and the request for a hearing (Doc. No. 17) is deemed moot.
I.

BACKGROUND
This action arises out of an incident that occurred on March 15, 2020, at a well site owned

and operated by Defendants ConocoPhillips Company and Burlington Resources Oil & Gas
Company LP in rural Dunn County, North Dakota. (Doc. No. 1-1). Defendants had engaged MBI
Energy Services (“MBI”) to pull produced water off of the well site. (Doc. No. 1-1 at ¶8). Plaintiff
David Papenhausen (“Papenhausen”) was employed by MBI as a truck driver. (Id.).
According to Papenhausen, he was dispatch by MBI on March 15, 2020, to the well site to
load produced water. (Id.). Upon arriving at the well site, he parked his vehicle in a designated
area in front of a tank battery and stepped out. (Id.). Finding the ground icy, he started to walk
around the front of his vehicle to retrieve ice cleats that he kept in a tool bag on the passenger side.
(Id.; Doc. No. 16-1 (David Papenhausen Depo, 81:2 -83:3; 90:8-22)). As he was walking, his left
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foot and leg broke through a crust of ice and snow and he fell into a hole1 that he estimated to be
between sixteen and seventeen inches deep, injuring his knee and hip. (Doc. Nos. 1-1, 16-1 (David
Papenhausen Depo, 90:23-91:25)).
Papenhausen filed suit against Defendants in state court, seeking compensation for his
injuries under theories of negligence, respondeat superior, and premises liability. (Id.). He alleged
that the hole into which he had fallen was created by Defendants’ negligent maintenance of the well
site and was unreasonably dangerous as it was covered by ice and snow.
On June 30, 2020, Defendants filed a notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. (Doc.
No. 1). On December 17, 2021, they filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that
Papenhausen’s alleged injuries would not have occurred but for the natural accumulation of ice and
snow and, as a consequence, North Dakota’s natural accumulation rule precluded any finding of
liability against them. (Doc. No. 15).
Papenhausen responded that the natural accumulation rule did not extend to “remote areas
of property” and was otherwise inapplicable in this instance as the ice and snow concealed a
dangerous condition, i.e., the hole. (Doc. No. 20).
Noting the dearth of controlling state court precedent regarding the application of the natural
accumulation rule to remote well sites, this Court certified two questions of law to the North Dakota
Supreme Court pursuant to N.D. R. App. P. 47:
1.

Does North Dakota’s natural accumulation rule extend to an oil well site in
a rural area?

2.

If the natural accumulation rule extends to an oil well site in a rural area,

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Plaintiff uses the word “hole” when describing the void or depression that he fell into on
March 25, 2020 where as Defendants use the word “rut.” Compare Doc. Nos. 1-1 and 20 with Doc.
No. 16.
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does it still apply if it conceals a condition substantially more dangerous than
one normally associated with ice and snow?
(Doc. No. 33).
The North Dakota Supreme Court issued an opinion and Judgment on March 7, 2024, that
was transmitted and filed the same day with this Court. (Doc. Nos. 35, 36). It initially reviewed
applicable State law.
[¶ 8] Generally, “[l]andowners owe a general duty to lawful entrants to maintain
their property in a reasonably safe condition under the circumstances, considering
the likelihood of an injury to another, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden
of avoiding the risk.” Green, 2004 ND 12, ¶ 8. “If a landowner permits dangerous
conditions to exist on the premises the landowner must take reasonable measures to
prevent injury to those whose presence on the property reasonably can be foreseen.”
Fast v. State, 2004 ND 111, ¶ 8, 680 N.W.2d 265 (citing Groleau v. Bjornson Oil
Co., Inc., 2004 ND 55, ¶ 16, 676 N.W.2d 763). “The open and obvious nature of a
danger may obviate the need to warn of danger.” Wotzka v. Minndakota Ltd. P’ship,
2013 ND 99 ¶ 23, 831 N.W.2d 722 (citation omitted). “A duty to warn does not exist
when the risk is commonly known, already understood and appreciated, or obvious.”
Id. (citing 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 388 (1989)).
Under the natural accumulation rule a landowner has no duty to remove, and is not
liable for injuries caused by, natural accumulations of snow and ice, or to warn of the
dangers associated with the same. 3 Premises Liability 3d § 52:1 (2023 ed.). We
have adopted the natural accumulation rule, holding “[t]he mere fact there is snow
and ice upon a person's sidewalk, does not establish negligence by that party.”
Green v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 2004 ND 12, ¶ 8, 673 N.W.2d 257 (citing Skjervem v.
Minot State Univ., 2003 ND 52, ¶ 10, 658 N.W.2d 750); see also Clark v. Stoudt, 73
N.D. 165, 173, 12 N.W.2d 708 (1944) (explaining a rule that meets with our
approval is: "Owners and occupants of property are not liable to a pedestrian for
injuries resulting from a fall caused by slipping on snow and ice which, due to
natural weather conditions, accumulated on the sidewalk in front of the property,
notwithstanding an ordinance penalizing failure to remove such snow and ice."); but
see Strandness v. Montgomery Ward, 199 N.W.2d 690, 692 (N.D. 1972) (as an
exception to the rule, a landowner who constructs a canopy over a sidewalk upon his
property owes a duty to the public to maintain it to provide a sidewalk free from
artificial accumulations of water and ice).
The natural accumulation rule relates to the threshold question whether a duty exists.
See Gunville v. United States, 985 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1108 (D.S.D. 2013) ("The
natural accumulation rule concerns the threshold question of whether the defendant
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owes a plaintiff a legal duty to clear natural accumulations of ice and snow."). The
natural accumulation rule exists because, as a matter of law, it is not reasonable to
impose premises liability for dangers caused by natural accumulation of ice and
snow. See 62A Am. Jur. 2d Premises Liability § 625 ("To require that an owner's or
occupier's walks be always free of ice and snow would be to impose an impossible
burden in view of the climatic conditions in certain areas."). The underlying rationale
for the natural accumulation rule is reasonableness.
(Id.). It then went on to answer the first question in the affirmative, stating:
[[¶ 32] Papenhausen argues the natural accumulation rule does not extend to “remote
areas of property.” However, remote areas are precisely the locations the natural
accumulation rule protects because the reasonableness of monitoring remote areas
of property, and lack of notice resulting therefrom, demonstrates the rationale for the
rule. Where it is unreasonable for an owner or operator to continually monitor an
area, such as the remote well site in rural North Dakota, it is unreasonable to expect
the owner or operator to promptly clear any naturally accumulating snow or ice,
removing that duty and thus liability from the owner or operator.
(Id.). Finally, it answered the second question in the negative, stating:
[¶ 32] “The determination of whether a dangerous condition is open and obvious,
limiting the landowner’s duty, is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact, and
becomes a question of law only when reasonable minds could reach but one
conclusion.” Groleau, 2004 ND 55, ¶ 21. In this case, the “obvious” nature of the
concealed hole or rut and whether it was a danger the owner knew or should have
known about, are questions of fact for the trier of facts.
[¶ 32] Having considered whether a duty is created on the owner or operator of
property by snow and ice that, rather than creating an open and obvious danger of
slippery conditions, conceals a separate, otherwise open and obvious danger, and
concluding the concealment aspect of snow and ice is outside the scope of our
natural accumulation rule, we answer the federal court’s second question, “no.”
(Id.).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to

the non-moving party, indicates that no genuine issues of material fact exists and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Davison v. City of Minneapolis, 490 F.3d 648, 654
(8th Cir. 2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is not appropriate if there are factual
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disputes that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is genuine if the evidence
would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. The purpose of
summary judgment is to assess the evidence and determine if a trial is genuinely necessary.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The Court must inquire whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
the submission of the case to a jury or whether the evidence is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law. Diesel Mach., Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 832 (8th Cir.
2005). The moving party bears the responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for the motion
and identifying the portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). The non-moving
party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must set
out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). If the record taken as a whole and viewed in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no genuine issue for trial and summary judgment is appropriate. Matsushita, 475 U.S.
at 587.
III.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
After careful review of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s opinion, this Court DENIES

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 15) for the reasons articulated by the North
Dakota Supreme Court in its March 7, 2024, opinion. In so ruling, this Court concludes that, while
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the natural accumulation rule applies to remote areas of property such as Defendants’ well site, there
are material issues of fact with respect to the degree of danger posed by the snow and ice covered
hole at Defendants’ well site that must be resolved by a jury.
The Court deems Defendants’ request for a hearing (Doc. No. 17) MOOT. The Court shall
hold a status conference with the parties on April 5, 2024, at 10:00 AM by telephone to plot a course
going forward. To participate in the conference, the parties should call [phone] enter access
code 8992591.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 26th day of March, 2024.
/s/ Clare R. Hochhalter
Clare R. Hochhalter, Magistrate Judge
United States District Court

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