Reed v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 25

ORDER by Magistrate Judge Clare R. Hochhalter granting in part and denying in part 19 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. (GW)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA
Barbara Jean Reed,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING
COMMISSIONER’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND
REMANDING DECISION
Case No.: 1:22-cv-00099

The Plaintiff, Barbara Jean Reed (“Reed” or “claimant”), seeks judicial review of the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her Title II Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Title XVI Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). This court reviews the Commissioner’s final
decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Before the court are competing motions for summary
judgment filed by Reed and the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). (Doc. Nos.
19, 21).
I.

BACKGROUND
Reed filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security

Income on May 15, 2019, alleging a disability onset date of March 15, 2019, due to carpal tunnel
in both hands, astigmatism, arthritis in thumb and fingers, depression, anxiety, weak ankles,
arthritis in knees, problems with elbow, shoulder problems, scoliosis from neck to tailbone,
headaches, misaligned hips, back problems, and acid reflux. (Doc. No. 15-6 at 2-3, 17-18). Reed’s
date last insured was December 31, 2024. (Doc. No. 15-2 at 15). On December 2, 2019, Reed’s
applications were denied upon initial review, and again upon reconsideration on March 20, 2020.
(Doc. No. 15-6 at 34-35). On May 19, 2020, Reed requested a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Doc. No. 15-7 at 51-52). A hearing was held on January 21, 2021, with ALJ

Hallie Larsen presiding. (Doc. No. 15-2 at 36). Reed was represented by attorneys Bradford Myler
and Brenda Benson, with attorney Benson representing Reed at the hearing. (Doc. No. 15-2 at 36;
Doc. No. 15-7 at 55-58; Doc. No. 15-8 at 37-40). Vocational expert (“VE”) David Perry also
appeared. (Id.). On March 17, 2021, ALJ Larsen issued a decision finding Reed not disabled. (Doc.
No. 15-2 at 25-26).
On March 23, 2021, Reed submitted a request for review to the Appeals Council. (Doc.
No. 15-9 at 10-12). On April 11, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Reed’s request for review,
rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. No. 15-2 at 2-8). On
June 15, 2022, Reed filed a Complaint in this court seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision.
(Doc. No. 6).
At the time of Reed’s alleged onset date, she was 49 years of age. (Doc. No. 20 at 3). At
the time of the hearing, Reed was 51 years of age. (Doc. No. 15-2 at 40). Reed has a high school
education and has past relevant work as a forklift operator, stamping press operator, salvage
laborer, and hand packager. (Id. at 24, 40).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months….” 12 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant’s impairments must be of “such severity that
[s]he is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which [s]he

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lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for [her], or whether [s]he would be hired if [s]he
applied for work.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In determining whether an individual has a disability under the Social Security Act, the
Commissioner follows a five-step sequential process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a).
The five steps include (1) a consideration of the claimant’s work activity and whether the claimant
is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment meeting the duration requirement; (3) whether the
claimant’s impairment meets or is equal to an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1; (4) a consideration of claimant’s residual functional capacity and whether the claimant
can return to their past relevant work; and (5) an assessment of claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience to determine whether claimant can perform other
work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v).
Upon reviewing the record, the court may affirm, modify, or review the Commissioner’s
decision, with or without remanding the case for hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To affirm, the court
must find substantial evidence appearing in the record as a whole supports the Commissioner’s
decision. Id.; see also Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir. 1989); Emerson v. Kijakazi,
No. 1:18-CR-146, 2022 WL 17403569, at *6 (D.N.D. Dec. 2, 2022). “Substantial evidence is less
than a preponderance of the evidence and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would
find adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Igo v. Colvin, 839 F.3d 724, 728 (8th
Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). “If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.” Dols v. Saul, 931 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir.
2019) (quoting Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005)); see Igo, 839 F.3d at 728.

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The court must consider evidence which supports the Commissioner’s decision, as well as
that which detracts from it. Charette v. Saul, No. 3:18-CV-254, 2019 WL 7605835, at *2 (D.N.D.
Nov. 22, 2019); see Dols v. Saul, 931 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 2019). The court will not disturb the
ALJ’s decision unless it lies outside the available “zone of choice.” Nicola v. Astrue, 480 F.3d 885,
886 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 2006)). An ALJ’s
decision is not outside the “zone of choice” simply because the court may have reached a different
conclusion if it were the initial factfinder. Id.
III.

DISCUSSION
The ALJ applied the five-step evaluation to determine whether Reed was disabled. First,

the ALJ found Reed had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 15, 2019, the
alleged onset date. (Doc. No. 15-2 at 15). Second, the ALJ determined Reed had the following
severe impairments: osteoarthritis of the right knee, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,
herniation in the cervical spine, depression, de Quervain tenosynovitis status post right sided
release, and right compartment finger release. (Id.). Third, the ALJ concluded Reed had no
impairments or combination thereof meeting or medically equal to the severity of one of the
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 16). Fourth, the ALJ found
Reed had the residual functional capacity to perform less than the full range of light work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and § 416.967(b). (Id. at 18). Specifically, the ALJ noted:
She is able to lift and/or carry up to ten pounds frequently and twenty pounds
occasionally. The claimant can sit up to eight hours in an eight-hour day with
normal breaks and can stand and/or walk about six hours in an eight-hour day with
normal breaks. She can frequently, but not constantly, handle and finger bilaterally.
The claimant should never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She can only
occasionally climb stairs or ramps, balance as defined in the Selected
Characteristics of Occupations, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. The claimant can
tolerate only occasional exposure to work around hazards such as dangerous
moving machinery and unprotected heights. She is able to understand, remember
and carry out short, simple instructions. The claimant is able to interact
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appropriately with coworkers and the general public on an occasional basis. She is
able to maintain attention and concentration for routine work for two hour
segments. The claimant is able to respond appropriately to work pressures in a usual
work setting and is able to respond appropriately to changes in a routine work
setting.
(Id.). The ALJ also determined Reed was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Id. at 24).
Fifth, the ALJ considered Reed’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), and found jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy Reed could
perform. (Id.).
Reed now asserts “[t]he ALJ’s RFC determination is unsupported by substantial evidence
and is the product of legal error because she failed to properly evaluate the opinion evidence of
Jolynn Azure, M.D., according to the prevailing law and regulations.” (Doc. No. 20 at 14).
A. Opinion Evidence of Jolynn Azure, M.D.
Reed argues the RFC finding is legal error as the ALJ failed to evaluate the opinion of
Jolynn Azure, M.D. (“Dr. Azure”) according to prevailing law and regulations. (Doc. No. 20 at
14). Reed specifically asserts the ALJ did not conduct a supportability and consistency analysis as
required by regulations. (Id. at 16).
For claims filed after March 27, 2017, an ALJ cannot “defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), including those from [the claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), §
416.920c(a). Rather the following factors need be considered when evaluating medical opinions
and prior administrative evidence: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship to claimant;
(4) specialization; and (5) other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), § 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).
Supportability and consistency are the two most important factors and must be explained. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(b)(2), § 416.920c(b)(2). Under supportability “[t]he more relevant the objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or
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her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical
opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1), §
416.920c(c)(1). Under consistency “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence form other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2), § 416.920c(c)(2).
As to Dr. Azure’s opinion, the ALJ wrote:
The opinions of one of her treating physicians, Jolynn Azure, M.D., are not
persuasive (Exhibit 17F, 19F). She had opined that the claimant could only sit for
two hours and stand and/or walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday, yet the
claimant had only demonstrated some limited range of motion in her lumbar spine
and back, with only minimal degenerative changes noted in the lumbar spine
(Exhibit 17F). Dr. Azure had opined that the claimant could lift at a medium
exertional level, but could only handle or finger for 25% of an eight-hour workday
and reach for fifty-percent of a workday. However, while the claimant had reported
pain in her hands and eventually had surgery on the right hand and finger, she
displayed no problems with the left hand. Dr. Azure’s exertional limits and
manipulative restrictions are internally inconsistent. She had opined that the
claimant would miss more than four days a month due to her impairments, yet
treatment records do not reflect that she sought treatment for her pain complaints
or even received medications which would correspond with that type of pain
significance and frequency. Dr. Azure had also noted that the claimant had chronic
anxiety and depression, but she noted only mild limitations, if any, in the claimant’s
ability to perform a variety of mental activities (Exhibit 19F). While she noted that
the claimant’s depression and anxiety required medications, the claimant has
basically been without medications for her mental health throughout the period in
question.
(Doc. No. 15-2 at 23). Reed argues the ALJ failed to properly address consistency and
supportability. First Reed argues the ALJ cited minimal reasoning for finding Dr. Azure’s opinion
unpersuasive, without explaining how the opinion is supported or unsupported by Dr. Azure’s own
notes. (Doc. No. 20 at 16). Second, Reed contends the ALJ failed to discuss how evidence in the
record is inconsistent with that of Dr. Azure. (Id. at 19).

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The court does not find the ALJ failed to properly address supportability. Supportability
considers the relationship between the medical opinion and the evidence from the medical source.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1), § 416.920c(c)(1). Here, the ALJ’s decision noted, “Dr. Azure had
also noted that the claimant had chronic anxiety and depression, but she noted only mild
limitations, if any, in the claimant’s ability to perform a variety of mental activities (Exhibit 19F).”
The ALJ cites to the mental capacity assessment completed by Dr. Azure which shows Dr. Azure
noted Reed had diagnoses of chronic anxiety and depression but marked at most, mild limitations.
(See Doc. No. 15-22 at 61-63). Based on these records, the ALJ sufficiently addresses
supportability.
The ALJ failed to comply with regulations when evaluating the consistency factor. For
example, the ALJ noted that “[Dr. Azure] has opined that the claimant would miss more than four
days a month due to her impairments, yet treatment records do not reflect that she sought treatment
for her pain complaints or even received medications which would correspond with that type of
pain significance and frequency.” (Doc. No. 15-2 at 23) (emphasis added). The ALJ did not cite
specific records which were inconsistent with Dr. Azure’s opinion, rather only mentioned a vague
reference to “treatment records.” See Hirner v. Saul, No. 2:21-CV-38 SRW, 2022 WL 3153720, at
*7 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 8, 2022) (finding the ALJ did not comply with regulations when evaluating the
consistency factor as “[t]he ALJ did not cite specific records that are inconsistent with the [medical
provider’s] opinion or specify how, or which, other evidence contradicts his opinion.”). The court
also cannot determine whether “treatment records” reference care provided by other providers or
that of Dr. Azure. “[W]hile an ALJ’s explanation need not be exhaustive, boilerplate, or ‘blanket
statement[s]’ will not do.” Hirner, 2022 WL 3153720, at *7 (quoting Lucas v. Saul, 960 F.3d 1066,
1069 (8th Cir. 2020).

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Several courts have found the regulation requiring explanation of supportability and
consistency cannot be satisfied because the court may review the entirely of the ALJ’s decision
and create a post-hoc rationale for the ALJ. Loren F. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-2862 (NEB/ECW),
2023 WL 8456174, at *11 (D. Minn. Nov. 13, 2023); see also Bonnet v. Kijakazi, 859 F. App’x 19,
20 (8th Cir. 2021). Furthermore, “the failure to address or adequately explain either the
supportability or consistency factors (or both) when evaluating the persuasiveness of a medical
opinion warrants remand.” Violet G. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-2105 (TNL), 2023 WL 2696594, at *6
(D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2023) (collecting cases). As the ALJ failed to properly address the issue of
consistency, this matter shall be remanded.
Reed also argues the ALJ mischaracterized evidence. Notably, Reed contends the ALJ
mischaracterized evidence pertaining to Reed’s lumbar spine and regarding Reed’s treatment and
receipt of medications for pain complaints.
Reed asserts the ALJ’s failure to discuss cervical objective evidence supporting Dr. Azure’s
opinion “mischaracterizes the record and illuminates the ALJ’s error in cherry-picking the record.”
(Doc. No. 20 at 18). She alleges the ALJ’s rejection of a supportive opinion leads the court to
believe the record contains only “minimal” degenerative findings, although the record contains
evidence supporting sitting, standing, and walking limitations as contained in Dr. Azure’s opinion.
She also contends the ALJ mischaracterized the record by stating treatment records do not reflect
she sought treatment or received medications for her pain complaints. (Id. at 20). In turn, Reed
points to treatment records showing she took medications such as Hydrocodone and received right
sacroiliac joint injections.
While Reed contends the ALJ improperly analyzed objective evidence pertaining to her
lumbar spine, cervical spine, and osteoarthritis, the court is disinclined to agree. An examination

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conducted on Reed showed levoscoliosis of the lumbar spine, multilevel degenerative disc disease
of the lumbar spine most pronounced at the L1-L2 and L2-L3, hypertrophic facet degenerative
joint disease throughout the lumbar spine with minimal right neural exit narrowing at L1-L2 and
L2-L3. (Doc. No. 16-5 at 6). Further examination of Reed’s cervical spine showed multilevel
degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, most pronounced in the C4 and C5. The C4 and C5
showed spinal canal stenosis with right side disk protrusion, and significant neural exit narrowing
on the right at the level of C4-C5 and C5-C6. (Doc. No. 16-16 at 8).
Though Reed argues the ALJ mischaracterized the evidence in rejecting Dr. Azure’s
opinion through the assertion Reed only had minimal degenerative changes noted in the lumbar
spine and omitted analysis on Reed’s cervical objective evidence supportive of Dr. Azure’s
opinion, the ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence submitted. Black v. Apfel, 143
F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998); see Miller v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 611, 613 (8th Cir. 1993). “An ALJ’s
failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that such evidence was not considered.” Black,
143 F.3d at 386; see Montgomery v. Chater, 69 F.3d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1995).
Moreover, elsewhere in the ALJ’s decision there is substantial discussion of Reed’s
limitations. Notably, the ALJ opined,
As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects
of her symptoms, they are inconsistent because they are not corroborated with
findings on examination. Though the claimant has had imaging which revealed
degenerative changes in the mid and lower cervical spine as well as the lumbar
spine, her examinations have remained fairly normal, with only some limited range
of motion in the cervical and lumbar spine at times (Exhibits 3F, pg. 4, 87, 116; 5F,
pg. 16; 15F, pg. 16-17; 21F, pg. 12, 21; 25F, pg. 48; 26F). Prior to the alleged onset
date, an MRI of her lumbar spine from August of 2016 revealed moderate disc
degeneration at the L2-3 level but no significant spinal canal narrowing or
significant foraminal narrowing (Exhibit 5F, pg. 16). It also showed mild
degenerative changes elsewhere without no significant spinal canal narrowing or
foraminal narrowing. An MRI of her cervical spine from July of 2019, showed
levoscoliosis and multilevel degenerative changes including severe right neural
foraminal stenosis at the C4-5 level and moderate to severe right neural foraminal
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stenosis at the C5-6 level and moderate right-sided spinal canal stenosis at the C45 and mild right-sided spinal canal stenosis at C5-6 (Exhibit 5F, pg. 15; 18F). An
x-ray of her right knee showed only mild medial femoral-tibial joint space
narrowing in July of 2019 (Exhibit 13F, pg. 10). She demonstrated some edema and
tenderness in her knee, but generally maintained nearly normal range of motion
(Exhibits 2F, pg. 1-2, 8-9; 8F, pg. 3; 10F, pg. 61; 13F, pg. 3, 15). Though she had
demonstrated some reduced range of motion at various times (Exhibit 15F, pg. 42).
In 2020, the claimant’s gait was noted to be without unsteadiness or difficulty
(Exhibit 21F, pg. 12, 18, 24, 35). In October of 2020, she was also noted to have
full five out of five strength in her upper and lower extremities (Exhibit 21F, pg.
35).
(Doc. No. 15-2 at 20).
Given the ALJ’s discussion of Reed’s cervical spine, lumbar spine, and levoscoliosis, the
court is not convinced the ALJ was incorrect in its determination. The medical records show some
reduced range of motion (Doc. No. 15-23 at 13; 23). However, the evidence also notes that upon
physical examination of Reed in October of 2020, she had normal range of motion in the thoracic
area, and stable lumbar spine with normal range of motion. (Doc. No. 16-23 at 6). Physical therapy
notes are also indicative of a level of limited motion; however, it also provides Reed was
“significantly guarded” during her assessment, noting “[Reed] self limited with range of motion
assessment due to comfort and guarding.” (Doc. No. 16-25 at 5). Accordingly, the court is not
inclined to disturb the ALJ’s decision as it pertains to Reed’s spinal issues. A court will only disturb
an ALJ’s decision when it is outside the “available zone of choice.” Ross v. O’Malley, 92 F.4th
775, 778 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing Kraus v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 2021)). A decision is
not outside the zone of choice because the court may have reached a different conclusion if acting
as the initial factfinder. Id. “If the record supports two inconsistent conclusions, this court must
affirm the Commissioner’s choice among those two conclusions.” Ross, 92 F.4th at 778 (quoting
Bagwell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 916 F.3d 1117, 1119 (8th Cir. 2019)).
Furthermore, Reed asserts the ALJ mischaracterized the record in rejecting Dr. Azure’s
opinion that Reed would miss more than four days a month due to her impairments by opining
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“treatment records do not reflect [Reed] sought treatment for her pain complaints or even received
medications which would correspond with that type of pain significance and frequency.” (Doc.
No. 15-2 at 23). Reed points to her receipt of injections and use of Hydrocodone to refute the ALJ’s
findings.
Here, while Reed argues in part that the record reflects that she took Hydrocodone, the
medical records only show a fleeting reference to any Hydrocodone usage. Reed was prescribed
Norco in October of 2019, following a knee arthroscopy. (Doc. No. 15-22 at 32-33, 36, 38).
Psychologist Michael Brady, Ph.D., briefly mentions Reed’s use of Hydrocodone approximately
one month after Reed’s knee arthroscopy procedure (Doc. No. 15-20 at 34), and Podiatrist Aaron
Albers, DPM (“Dr. Albers”), noted Reed’s statement that “the only thing that has really been
helping with the discomfort is what Dr. Williams our hand surgeon has had her own [sic]. She said
that does alleviate her pain. When looking it up, it is hydrocodone.” (Doc. No. 16-3 at 3). While
the medical records show Reed used Hydrocodone, she fails to note that this was prescribed after
a medical procedure performed by Daniel Williams, MD (“Dr. Williams”) (Doc. No. 16-4 at 3),
and there is no indication of Hydrocodone on Reed’s medication list as a prescribed medication
for daily use. (Doc. No. 16-3 at 5-6; Doc. No. 16-15 at 5). Moreover, while Reed is correct that
she previously received injections, Reed also repeatedly refused injections asserting that her
previous attempts for other problems were unsuccessful, often pushing for surgical solutions. (Doc.
No. 15-21 at 40; Doc. No. 16-17 at 3; Doc. No. 16-27 at 6).
The medical records also provide Reed did not comply with physical therapy or in adhering
to her medications as required. Notably, medical records reflect that “[Reed] says that she is not
taking the medications on her medication list as prescribed.” (Doc. No. 16-31 at 3). Physical
therapy records also note “[Reed] has had multiple episodes of physical therapy with no

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improvement stating that her last therapy was out-of-state in roughly October of last year and at
that point she was not performing any home exercises only having modalities.” (Doc. No. 16-25
at 4). She was also “noted to have low motivation to participate in therapy and significantly
guarded with all movements today.” (Id. at 5). On an October 5, 2020, visit, records reflect Reed
was partially compliant with her home program. (Id. at 6). On an October 14, 2020, visit, Reed
was noted to be non-compliant with her home program, with the record reflecting that “[Reed]
does not follow therapist advice with bladder retraining, void times, urge suppression techniques,
or home program and states ‘same’ with all symptoms compared to initial evaluation.” (Doc. No.
16-27 at 3). It is also noted that while Reed reported frustration for attending therapy for her low
back “four times” with no resolution of symptoms, “[s]he was overly non-compliant with
education and home program for pelvic floor and overall has made no objective gains in therapy
at this time.” (Id.).
The ALJ appropriately analyzed Reed’s pain treatment within the decision. The ALJ noted
that while Reed received treatment for pain complaints, she was able to work with the impairments
leading up to the alleged onset date. (Doc. No. 15-2 at 20). The ALJ also opined Reed used only
non-steroidal anti-inflammatories and ice at the time of her right knee injury and underwent
physical therapy. (Id.). Reed was also prescribed Gabapentin, but relied on Ibuprofen, and in 2019
was prescribed Cymbalta for pain. (Id.). The ALJ described Reed’s limited range of motion in the
cervical and lumbar spine at fall 2019 therapy sessions, but her knee had range of motion within
normal limits at the time. (Id.). Reed also demonstrated moderate to severe back tenderness, and
an October 2019 diagnostic arthroscopy revealed a partial ACL tear. (Id.). In 2020, Reed was
prescribed Baclofen, Flexeril, and Diclofenac. (Id.). An EMG revealed Reed had chronic C5

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radiculopathy. (Id. at 21). However, when offered a nerve block at the C4-5 level, Reed declined,
but began therapy for her back in late 2020 and started Meloxicam. (Id.).
While Reed argues the ALJ mischaracterized evidence, the ALJ found sufficient evidence
existed in the record to support the finding that Dr. Azure’s exertional limits and manipulative
restrictions were internally inconsistent as well as her opinion that Reed would miss more than
four days a month due to her impairments. The ALJ did not say Reed received no treatment or
medications for her pain complaints, rather the treatment and medications did not meet the type of
pain significance and frequency to warrant missing more than four days a month due to her
impairments. (See Doc. No. 15-2 at 23). Although Reed may disagree with how the ALJ weighed
the evidence, this court will not reweigh that evidence. See Schmitt v. Kijakazi, 27 F.4th 1353, 1361
(8th Cir. 2022) (citing Johnson v. Colvin, 788 F.3d 870, 872 (8th Cir. 2015)). The ALJ’s findings
were within the “available zone of choice” and supported by substantial evidence. See Ross v.
O’Malley, 92 F.4th 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 936 (8th
Cir. 2006)).
Reed also asserts “[t]he ALJ does not provide any indication what type of medication or
treatment would correspond to Plaintiff’s pain or what the ALJ required to show that Plaintiff
would have the frequency opined.” (Doc. No. 20 at 20) (emphasis in original). The ALJ is not
required to advise on what medications or treatments Reed should partake in for her pain or at
what frequency. This is a matter left for Reed’s medical providers. An ALJ may not substitute their
opinion for those of a medical provider. Ness v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 432, 435 (8th Cir. 1990); see
also Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 946-47 (8th Cir. 2009) (determining an ALJ may not “play
doctor”); Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996) (“ALJs must not succumb to the
temptation to play doctor and make their own independent findings.”). Accordingly, the court is

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not inclined to remand the ALJ’s decision based on Reed’s argument the ALJ mischaracterized the
evidence. The record reflects substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the ALJ’s
decision.
The court shall not consider Reed’s remaining arguments. On remand, the ALJ shall
consider the consistency factor as it pertains to Dr. Azure. The court also cautions the ALJ to ensure
the remaining providers have adequate analyses in compliance with regulations.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the court concludes the ALJ’s decision was not supported

by substantial evidence on the record. Accordingly, Reed’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.
No. 19) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, the Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 21) is DENIED, and the matter is REMANDED for further
consideration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 26th day of November, 2024.
/s/ Clare R. Hochhalter
Clare R. Hochhalter, Magistrate Judge
United States District Court

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