Tyler v. Anderson
Filing
209
MEMORANDUM OPINION Petitioner's Amended Motion for Relief From Judgment Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) denied. (Related Doc # 205 ). Judge David A. Katz on 8/5/13.(G,C)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
ARTHUR TYLER,
Petitioner,
vs.
CARL ANDERSON, Warden,
Respondent.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CASE NO. 1:96 CV 1881
JUDGE DAVID A. KATZ
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Petitioner Arthur Tyler’s (“Petitioner” or “Tyler”) Amended
Motion for Relief From Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). (ECF No. 205.)
Respondent Warden Carl Anderson filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the motion.
(ECF No. 206.) Petitioner replied to his memorandum. (ECF No. 208.) For the following
reasons, Petitioner’s motion is denied.
I.
Relevant Background
Tyler was twice convicted and sentenced to death for the 1983 murder of Sander
Leach, which Tyler committed while robbing Leach’s produce van.1 Tyler’s conviction
and sentence were left undisturbed by direct appeal and state post-conviction proceedings.
In 1999, Tyler sought federal habeas relief in this Court, raising sixty-four claims.
The Court denied his petition on May 20, 2002. (ECF No. 167.) Shortly after, on June 4,
2002, Tyler filed a Motion Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 59 and Stay of Execution.
(ECF No. 169.) In it, he asserts that the Court made numerous errors of law and fact, erred
1
The facts of this case are more fully set forth in State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St. 3d 24,
553 N.E.2d 576 (Ohio 1990), and this Court’s Memorandum of Opinion and
Order, dated May 20, 2002 (ECF No. 167).
in denying him discovery or an evidentiary hearing, and erred in granting a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) before he sought it. The Court denied the motion. (ECF No. 173.)
Tyler appealed that decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, asking that court to
expand the COA to include numerous additional grounds for relief. The Sixth Circuit
denied this request on December 11, 2003, and the United States Supreme Court denied
Tyler’s petition for writ of certiorari. See Tyler v. Mitchell, 416 F.3d 500, 502 (6th Cir.
2005).
Tyler then appealed the denial of his habeas petition to the Sixth Circuit, which
affirmed this Court’s ruling on July 20, 2005. Id. The Sixth Circuit denied Tyler’s request
for a rehearing and for a rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court denied Tyler’s petition
for writ of certiorari on April 17, 2006. Tyler v. Anderson, 547 U.S. 1074 (2006).
On February 21, 2008, Tyler, proceeding pro se, filed with this Court a Notice of
Intention to File Habeas Corpus Petition. (Case No. 1:08 CV 00443, ECF No. 1.) The
Court transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit on February 25, 2008, for consideration of
Tyler’s request for authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b). (ECF No. 3.) Tyler then filed a pro se motion for authorization to file a
second or successive habeas petition with a copy of his original petition. The Sixth Circuit
denied Tyler’s request on June 25, 2008. See In re Arthur Tyler, Case No. 08-3251, Doc.
00611503770.
On September 13, 2012, Tyler filed a motion with this Court requesting the
appointment of the Federal Public Defender’s Office (“FPDO”) to act as advisory counsel
for his clemency proceedings. (ECF No. 190.) The court granted the motion on September
2
14, 2012. (ECF No. 191.) On October 5, 2012, the Ohio Supreme Court set Tyler’s
execution date for May 28, 2014. (ECF No. 205-5.)
On February 28, 2013, Tyler filed a motion with this Court pursuant to Rule 60(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that this Court did not rule on one
subclaim to his twenty-fourth ground for relief, labeled “Errors In Mitigation Phase
Charges and Procedures.” (ECF No. 199.) In this subclaim, Tyler alleged that a penalty
phase jury instruction coerced the jury’s sentencing determination in violation of the Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 5; ECF No. 39, 52-53.) Tyler asserted that
this error was never raised by his habeas counsel through motion or on appeal, and was
detected only upon his new counsel’s, the FPDO, review of the record. (ECF No. 199, 56.)
Respondent countered that “the Court fully considered and rejected all of Tyler’s
alleged grounds in denying his first habeas corpus petition,” and Tyler’s motion is barred
as a second or successive petition. (ECF No. 201, 4.) Even if it were a proper 60(b)
motion, he argued, it is untimely and meritless. (Id. at 7-9.)
After obtaining permission from this Court, Tyler now has filed an Amended
Motion for Relief From Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). (ECF No. 205.)
He adds to his original motion that this Court also failed to address a subclaim of his
twenty-second ground for relief, entitled “State’s Failure to Disclose,” relating to the
State’s failure to disclose its coercion of the prosecution’s main witness. (Id. at 38-39.)
Respondent argues that the Court did, in fact, address and reject this claim. (ECF No. 206,
7-8.) He also repeats his assertion that Tyler’s motion is barred as successive and
3
untimely. (Id. at 3-5, 8-11.)
II.
Analysis
A.
Rule 60(b) and § 2244(b)
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to seek relief
from a final judgment, and request reopening of the case, under a limited set of
circumstances, including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b). Rule 60(b) applies in federal habeas corpus proceedings, however, only “to the
extent that [it is] not inconsistent with” applicable federal statutes and rules. Hab. Corp. R.
12. One possible conflict that courts have examined is whether by filing a Rule 60(b)
motion, a habeas petitioner is in fact filing a “second or successive” petition governed, and
in most cases barred from consideration, by AEPDA’s § 2244(b).
Under the gatekeeping provisions of § 2244(b), a claim presented in a “second or
successive” habeas application that was previously presented in a federal habeas petition
must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Claims that were not previously presented in a
“second or successive” petition also must be dismissed unless they rely either on a new and
retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high probability of actual
innocence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). If a filing is determined to be a “second or successive”
application, a petitioner must “move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order
authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
District courts must determine in the first instance whether a numerically second
habeas petition is “second or successive” within the meaning of § 2244(b). In re Smith,
690 F.3d 809, 809 (6th Cir. 2012). If a district court finds a petition to be “second or
4
successive,” the court should transfer it to the Sixth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631
for a determination of whether it should be authorized, rather than dismiss it outright. In re
Sims, 111 F.3d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1997). The court of appeals then may authorize the filing
of the successive application “only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie
showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” In re Bowling,
422 F.3d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 2005).
The United States Supreme Court addressed the interplay of Rule 60(b) and §
2244(b) in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005). In that case, the Court noted that
“Rule 60(b) has an unquestionably valid role to play in habeas cases.” Id. at 534. But a
“true” Rule 60(b) motion, it explained, “attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s
resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas
proceedings.” Id. at 532. Thus, Rule 60(b) motions are appropriate “when no ‘claim’ is
presented,” and “neither the motion itself nor the federal judgment from which it seeks
relief substantively addresses federal grounds for setting aside the movant’s state
conviction . . . .”2 Id. at 533.
The Court in Gonzalez provided clear instructions for lower courts on how to apply
its holding. It stated:
In most cases, determining whether a Rule 60(b) motion advances
one or more “claims” will be relatively simple. A motion that seeks to add a
new ground for relief . . . will of course qualify. A motion can also be said
to bring a “claim” if it attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a
2
The Court held that the Rule 60(b) motion at issue in Gonzalez was proper, since
it alleged that the federal courts misapplied the statute of limitations set out in §
2244(d), which was a defect in the proceeding rather than a claim. Gonzalez, 545
U.S. at 533.
5
claim on the merits, since alleging that the court erred in denying habeas
relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the
movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas
relief. This is not the case, however, when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not
the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but
some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 531-32 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis original). The Court further
explained,
The term “on the merits” has multiple usages. We refer here to a
determination that there exist or do not exist grounds entitling a petitioner to
habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) and (d). When a movant
asserts one of those grounds (or asserts that a previous ruling regarding one
of those grounds was in error) he is making a habeas corpus claim. He is
not doing so when he merely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded
a merits determination was in error–for example, a denial for such reasons
as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar.
Id. at 532 n.4 (citation omitted).
The Court in Gonzales specifically noted that a Rule 60(b) motion is in effect a
successive petition if it “seek[s] leave to present ‘newly discovered evidence’ in support of
a claim previously denied,” id. at 531 (internal citation omitted); and that “an attack based
on the movant’s own conduct, or his habeas counsel’s omissions, . . . ordinarily does not go
to the integrity of the proceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to have the merits
determined favorably.” Id. at 532 n.5 (internal citation omitted).
Here, Tyler argues that under Gonzalez, this motion should be characterized as a
Rule 60(b) motion because he is not challenging the substance of this Court’s resolution of
a claim on the merits. (ECF No. 205, 46.) Rather, the motion “challenges the procedural
ruling of the district court in dismissing the habeas petition without ever addressing a
viable, properly pled habeas claim,” which “was improper and constitutes a denial of due
6
process and a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding.” (Id. at 44, 46.)
Moreover, he asserts, neither his habeas counsel nor Respondent alerted the Court that the
claim remained pending. (Id. at 44-45.)
Tyler cites to the Tenth Circuit cases Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir.
2006), and Peach v. United States, 468 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2006), for support. (Id. at 46.)
In those cases, the Tenth Circuit held that a Rule 60(b) motion is the proper mechanism to
request relief when the district court has failed to address a habeas claim. See Spitznas,
464 F.3d at 1225 (noting that “[t]he defect lies not in the district court’s resolution of the
merits (since it never reached those merits), but in its failure to make any ruling on a claim
that was properly presented,” and citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532).
Respondent concedes that the Court “did not address” Tyler’s coercive-juryinstruction claim in its discussion of Tyler’s twenty-fourth claim. (ECF No. 206, 5.) He
counters, however, that the Court “implicitly and necessarily” considered and rejected the
claim when it stated with regard to Tyler’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel that it had reviewed the state appellate and supreme court decisions and was
“unable to find that either court used an incorrect standard of review or made rulings
contrary to or unreasonably applying settled U.S. Supreme Court law.” (Id. at 6, quoting
ECF No. 167, 89.) Respondent further claims the Court “expressly” addressed and rejected
his Brady subclaim relating to Head’s testimony. (Id. at 7-8, quoting ECF No, 167, 7577.). (Id. at 7-8.) Tyler’s motion, he argues, is therefore a successive application barred by
§ 2254(b). (Id. at 5.)
The Court finds that Tyler’s motion is indeed a true Rule 60(b) motion. Tyler
7
alleges that the Court did not directly and fully resolve two claims. Tyler thus challenges
only a procedural defect in the Court’s opinion, not the substance of the Court’s resolution
of the merits of the claims. The motion, therefore, is not subject to the jurisdictional bar of
§ 2244(b).
B.
Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(6)
Although Tyler’s motion does not constitute a second or successive habeas petition,
he still must satisfy the requirements and limitations of Rule 60(b) to prevail. Gonzales,
545 U.S. at 534-35. As a preliminary matter, a party seeking relief from judgment under
Rule 60(b) must establish that the facts of its motion are within one of the enumerated
reasons contained in the Rule. E.g., Lewis v. Alexander, 987 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1993).
Tyler bases his motion on Rule 60(b)(6), a catchall provision that provides relief for
any “other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6) motions
have no specific time limit, but must “be made within a reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(c)(1). Tyler claims his motion is timely because the mistake was not detected until new
counsel recently discovered it. (ECF No. 205, 48.) Respondent argues that because
Tyler’s motion is premised on the Court’s failure to consider two of his claims, his motion
should have been brought under Rule 60(b)(1), which allows a party to seek relief from a
final judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (ECF No. 206,
9.) And, Respondent asserts, since Tyler did not file the motion within that provision’s
one-year time limitation, it is untimely. (Id.) Tyler replies that Rule 60(b)(1) does not
apply because, first, the Court’s mistake was not one of law, and second, Respondent
“speaks generally of a ‘mistake’ by counsel,” and his habeas counsel's failure to bring the
8
unadjudicated claims to the Court's attention was not “excusable neglect.” (ECF No. 203,
4-5 (emphasis added).)
The Court agrees with Respondent that the fundamental basis of Tyler’s motion is
the Court’s failure to address two of his claims, and not his counsel’s neglect, whether
excusable or not. The question, then, is whether that omission falls under Rule 60(b)(1) or
Rule 60(b)(6). As the Supreme Court noted in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc.
Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993), “[t]hese provisions are mutually exclusive,
and thus a party who failed to take timely action due to [a reason stated in Rule 60(b)(1)]
may not seek relief more than a year after the judgment by resorting to subsection (6).” See
also Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.3d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989) (Rule
60(b)(6) is properly evoked only in “exceptional or extraordinary circumstances” not
specifically addressed by the first five numbered clauses of the rule.). Moreover, “parties
may not use a Rule 60(b) motion as a substitute for an appeal, . . . or as a technique to
avoid the consequences of decisions deliberately made yet later revealed to be unwise.” Id.
The Court disagrees with Tyler that its omission does not qualify as a “mistake”
under Rule 60(b)(1) because that ground is limited to “mistakes of law.” (ECF No. 203, 3.)
It is clear that “mistake” under Rule 60(b)(1) includes judicial error. See Barrier v. Beaver,
712 F.2d 231, 234-45 (6th Cir. 1983). Any controversy regarding what qualifies as a
judicial “mistake” under the Rule has centered not on whether non-legal court error
constitutes a “mistake,” but on whether legal error is a proper ground given the effect its
inclusion would have on Rule 59(e), the time for taking an appeal, and the finality of
9
judgments. See, e.g., Barrier, 712 F.2d at 234; Steinhoff v. Harris, 698 F.2d 270, 274-75
(6th Cir. 1983).3 In fact, numerous courts in this circuit and outside it have found that Rule
60(b)(1) “encompass[es] mistakes that constitute inadvertent judicial oversight.” Cequent
Trailer Prods., Inc. v. Intradin (Shanghai) Mach. Co., No. 1:05 CV 2566, 2007 WL
1362457, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 7, 2007) (Gwin, J.) (citing Barrier, 712 F.2d at 234-35).
These court errors are more than clerical errors (which are covered by Rule 60(a)) but do
not necessarily involve “substantive mistakes of law or fact,” including the failure to
address a claim. See, e.g., Relizon Co. and Workflow Solutions, LLC v. Seybold, No. 3:10
CV 145, 2013 WL 3396917, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 2013) (court dismissed case while
cross-claims remained pending); Stratienko v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth.,
No. 1:07 CV 258, 2009 WL 1471453, *7 (E.D. Tenn. May 27, 2009) (court failed to
address counterclaims); Howard v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 756 F. Supp. 2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (plaintiff alleged court failed to consider claim).4
This Court finds that its alleged failure to address two of Tyler’s claims is a
3
The Sixth Circuit resolved the problem in Barrier v. Beaver by “allow[ing]
reconsideration of a point of law under Rule 60(b)(1) when relief from judgment
is sought within the normal time for taking an appeal,” thereby avoiding
unnecessary appeals and facilitating the prompt correction of legal errors.
Barrier, 712 F.2d at 234-35.
4
Tyler points to the Sixth Circuit's statement that “a Rule 60(b)(1) motion is
intended to provide relief in only two situations: (1) when a party has made an
excusable mistake or an attorney has acted without authority, or (2) when the
judge has made a substantive mistake of law or fact in the final judgment or
order.” (ECF No. 203, 3, quoting United States v. Reyes, 307 F.3d 451, 455 (6th
Cir. 2002).) Aside from this general statement of law offered in dicta, however,
Tyler does not to cite any authority holding that a non-legal court error is not a
"mistake" under Rule 60(b)(1).
10
“mistake[] that constitute[s] inadvertent judicial oversight,” falling squarely within a plain
reading of Rule 60(b)(1). Indeed, this type of omission may fit best under the category of
“inadvertence.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “inadvertence” as “an accidental
oversight,” whereas it defines “mistake” as “an error, misconception, or misunderstanding;
an erroneous belief.” Black’s Law Dictionary 827, 1092 (9th ed. 2009).
Rule 60(b)(1) also applies because Tyler himself is partly to blame for the delay in
filing this motion. The Supreme Court stated in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., “To justify relief
under subsection (6), a party must show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ suggesting that the
party is faultless in the delay. . . . If a party is partly to blame for the delay, relief must be
sought within one year under subsection (1) and the party’s neglect must be excusable.”
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 393. Tyler acknowledges that he was aware that at
least one of the subclaims was not ruled upon after the decision was issued, and submits
with his motion letters he wrote to his counsel soon after the judgment was rendered
inquiring about the claim. (ECF Nos. 203, 13; 203-1.) Tyler, therefore, could have filed a
motion with the Court pro se, as he has done at least twice before in another case. (See
Case No. 1:08 CV 00443, ECF No. 1.)
Tyler’s argument that Rule 60(b)(1) does not apply here because the “neglect” of
his habeas counsel in “not act[ing] in response to or in accordance with the client’s
demand” that he address the issue with the Court was “inexcusable” is likewise unavailing.
It is true that the Court’s omission was compounded by the failure of Tyler’s habeas
counsel to alert the Court to its error, whether by including the error as a grounds of appeal
or filing a timely Rule 59(e) or 60(b) motion. But seeking to reopen a habeas case because
11
of the deficient performance of habeas counsel is not permissible in cases governed by
AEDPA. Section 2254(i) of the Act provides: “The ineffectiveness or incompetence of
counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground
for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i). The Sixth
Circuit has expressly rejected Rule 60(b) motions filed by habeas petitioners on this
ground. In Post v. Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2005), the court stated that § 2254(i)
is “clear” and “expansive in its prohibition,” and held that the provision “expressly bars
relief grounded on claims of incompetent or ineffective counsel in federal post-conviction
proceedings,” including Rule 60(b) motions premised on such claims. Id. at 423. See also
Brooks v. Bobby, 660 F.3d 959, 963 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Our court, not surprisingly, has
construed [§ 2254(i)] to mean what it says: to bar a Rule 60(b) motion based on the
ineffectiveness of habeas counsel.”).5 “Rule 60 was not intended to relieve counsel of the
consequences of decisions deliberately made, although subsequent events reveal that such
decisions were unwise.” Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Federal’s Inc. v. Edmonton Inv. Co., 555 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1977)). See also
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 396 (“clients must be held accountable for the acts and
omissions of their attorneys”). Moreover, it is possible that Tyler’s habeas counsel
carefully considered these issues and decided against raising them on appeal because the
5
Neither does the retention of new counsel justify reopening a habeas action as
Tyler suggests. Courts cannot reexamine cases they resolved long ago every time
new counsel is retained and discovers a new claim or additional grounds for
appeal. Moreover, the Court notes that Tyler’s new counsel, who identified the
Court’s errors and filed this motion on Tyler’s behalf, was appointed for the
limited purpose of advising his habeas counsel during clemency proceedings.
(See ECF Nos. 190, 191.) This motion is beyond the scope of that appointment.
12
underlying claims were not strong enough. See Hopper, 867 F.3d at 294. Indeed, counsel
did raise on appeal that the court overlooked one of his claims. See Mitchell, 416 F.3d at
504-05 (addressing and rejecting Tyler’s claim that this Court failed to address his
insufficiency-of-evidence claim).
Because the Court construes Tyler’s motion as governed by Rule 60(b)(1), relief
cannot be granted under Rule 60(b)(6), see Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 393, and
the motion is barred from review under Rule 60(b)(1)’s time limitation. A 60(b)(1) motion
must be made “not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered
or taken.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). The district court does not have the discretion to
extend Rule 60(b)’s period of limitation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (“A court must not extend
the time to act under Rule[] . . . 60(b).”); see also Smith v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
776 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (6th Cir. 1985).
Tyler had sufficient notice and many reasonable opportunities to alert the courts to
his allegedly unadjudicated claims: through a Rule 59(e) motion or a timely Rule 60(b)(1)
motion; or on appeal, through a motion for a COA. But the time for those remedies has
long since passed. The Court rendered its opinion in this case more than eleven years ago,
and Tyler’s appeals were completed more than seven years ago. Despite the equitable
underpinnings of Rule 60(b), as the Supreme Court noted in Gonzalez, the “extraordinary
circumstances” justifying the reopening of a final judgment “will rarely occur in the habeas
context.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535. See also Johnson v. Bell, 605 F.3d 333, 335-36 (6th
Cir. 2010) (observing that although Rule 60(b)(6) “confers upon the district court a broad
equitable power to ‘do justice’” in habeas actions, it “continues to have limited viability in
13
the habeas context”); Park West Galleries, Inc. v. Hochman, 692 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir.
2012) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, 487 F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2007))
(noting that relief under Rule 60(b) has always been “circumscribed by the interests in
finality and the termination of litigation”). The Supreme Court explained in another death
penalty case,
When lengthy federal proceedings have run their course and a mandate denying
relief has issued, finality acquires an added moral dimension. Only with an
assurance of real finality can the State execute its moral judgment in a case. Only
with real finality can the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral
judgment will be carried out.
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998).
III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court need not reach the issue of whether Tyler has
presented meritorious claims. Tyler has failed to demonstrate grounds for relief under Rule
60(b)(6); his Amended Motion for Relief From Judgment Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)
(ECF No. 205), therefore, is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/ David A. Katz
DAVID A. KATZ
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?