Adams v. Bradshaw

Filing 145

Memorandum of Opinion and Order: This matter is before the Court upon Petitioner's Motion to Appoint Advisory Counsel. (Doc. 143 ) Adams has not specified what "end stage litigation" he plans to pursue, making it impossible f or the Court to determine whether appointment of counsel for that litigation is authorized under § 3599 and Harbison v. Bell. The Court, therefore, grants Adams' motion for appointment of the Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Public Defen der's Office for the Northern District of Ohio to assist as advisory counsel for state clemency proceedings, but denies the motion without prejudice to the extent it relates to that counsel's assistance with any non-clemency proceedings. A dams may renew the motion with regard to new counsel's assistance with "other end stage litigation" when he is able to present the Court with sufficient information for it to determine whether federal funding for such representation would be appropriate. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 11/5/18. (LC,S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

STANLEY T. ADAMS,
Petitioner,

vs.
TIMOTHY SHOOP, Warden,
Respondent.

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CASE NO. 1:05 CV 1886

CHIEF JUDGE PATRICIA A.
GAUGHAN

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION &
ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon Petitioner’s Motion to Appoint Advisory
Counsel. (Doc. 143) Petitioner Stanley Adams, through counsel, has filed in this capital
habeas corpus case a motion requesting the appointment of additional counsel, the Capital
Habeas Unit of the Federal Public Defender’s Office for the Northern District of Ohio, “to
assist as advisory counsel for state clemency proceedings, and other end stage litigation as
might arise.” (Doc. 143 at 1.) Respondent Warden Timothy Shoop has responded to the
motion, agreeing that Adams is entitled to court-appointed counsel for clemency
proceedings, but opposing the appointment to the extent counsel’s duties would “include
new litigation, whether state or federal.” (Doc. 144 at 1.) For the following reasons, the
motion is granted only to the extent discussed herein.

Adams, an Ohio inmate convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death in
2001, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court in 2006. (Doc. 16.) The Court
denied Adams’ petition on April 24, 2007. (Doc. 60.) The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed that judgment on June 13, 2016, Adams v. Bradshaw, 826 F.3d 306 (6th Cir.
2016), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 17, 2017, Adams
v. Jenkins, 137 S. Ct. 814 (2017). The Ohio Supreme Court has scheduled Adams’
execution for February 16, 2022. (Doc. 143 at 1.) See also State v. Adams, 148 Ohio St.
3d 1449 (2017) (Table). Adams states that he has “exhausted his initial state and federal
legal remedies.” (Doc. 143 at 2.)
Indigent petitioners in federal capital habeas corpus cases are entitled to the
appointment of “one or more attorneys” and additional services that are “reasonably
necessary” for “adequate representation” pursuant to18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2). Subsection
(e) of § 3599 outlines the scope of that representation, stating:
[E]ach attorney so appointed shall represent the defendant throughout every
subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings, including pretrial
proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals, applications
for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, and all
available post-conviction process, together with applications for stays of
execution and other appropriate motions and procedures . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3599(e).
The Supreme Court addressed § 3599(e) in Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009),
holding that the provision “authorizes federally appointed counsel to represent their clients
in state clemency proceedings and entitles them to compensation for that representation.”
Id. at 194. Therefore, as Respondent recognizes, Adams is entitled to additional courtappointed and federally funded counsel to represent him in state clemency proceedings.
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Respondent also is correct, however, that it is not clear that Adams is entitled to
additional federally funded counsel for unspecified “other end stage litigation as might
arise,” as he requests. (Doc. 143 at 1.) In Harbison, the Court indicated that state habeas
proceedings occurring after the appointment of federal habeas counsel do not constitute
“available post-conviction process” within the meaning of § 3599(e), because “[s]tate
habeas is not a stage ‘subsequent’ to federal habeas.” Id. In fact, it explained, it is “[j]ust
the opposite: Petitioners must exhaust their claims in state court before seeking federal
habeas relief. That state postconviction litigation sometimes follows the initiation of
federal habeas because a petitioner has failed to exhaust does not change the order of
proceedings contemplated by the statute.” Id. at 189-90. The court noted, however,
Pursuant to § 3599(e)’s provision that counsel may represent her client “in
other appropriate motions and procedures,” a district court may determine
on a case-by-case basis that it is appropriate for federal counsel to exhaust a
claim in the course of her federal habeas representation. This is not the
same as classifying state habeas proceedings as “available post-conviction
process” within the meaning of the statute.
Id. at 190 n.7. The Court further stated that § 3599(a)(2) “provides for counsel only when
a state petitioner is unable to obtain adequate representation.” Id. at 189.
Applying Harbison, the Sixth Circuit has denied funding pursuant to § 3599 for
federally appointed counsel to represent a habeas petitioner in reopening state postconviction and competency-to-be-executed proceedings, because the petitioner was “not
attempting to exhaust a claim in the state courts for the purpose of later presenting it in
federal court; rather, he [was] re-opening a state judgment on state-law grounds.” Irick v.
Bell, 636 F.3d 289, 291 (6th Cir. 2011).
Adams has not specified what “end stage litigation” he plans to pursue, making it
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impossible for the Court to determine whether appointment of counsel for that litigation is
authorized under § 3599 and Harbison v. Bell. The Court, therefore, grants Adams’ motion
for appointment of the Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal Public Defender’s Office for the
Northern District of Ohio to assist as advisory counsel for state clemency proceedings, but
denies the motion without prejudice to the extent it relates to that counsel’s assistance with
any non-clemency proceedings. Adams may renew the motion with regard to new
counsel’s assistance with “other end stage litigation” when he is able to present the Court
with sufficient information for it to determine whether federal funding for such
representation would be appropriate.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Court
Chief Judge
Dated: 11/5/18

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